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Abstract 
 
While relatively neglected in the historiography, the 4
th Earl of Minto, who achieved the 
distinction of serving consecutively as Governor-General of Canada and Viceroy of India 
from 1898-1910, is more truly representative of the methods Britain adopted to govern its 
Empire than his more illustrious contemporaries. He was one of the many aristocrats who, 
while increasingly marginalised in other aspects of British political life, were believed to 
possess important qualities that made them ideally suited to the highest levels of imperial 
service. As part of the governing elite, Britain’s aristocrats shared many of the assumptions 
held by politicians, civil servants and military officers, about imperial governance. Vague 
notions circulated about Britain’s duty to civilize its possessions, but most policy-makers 
eschewed  ‘ideological’  visions  in  favour  of  a  more  pragmatic  approach  based  on 
recognition that protecting the empire from both internal and external threats was vital to 
maintaining Britain’s leading position amongst its rival Great Powers. The pragmatism of 
its  governors  provided  an  element  of  continuity  in  the  diverse  territories  of  Britain’s 
empire. 
 
 
This thesis examines the role of Lord Minto in the formation of defence and foreign policy 
to illustrate the centrality of the pragmatic approach to British imperialism. He held his 
posts at a time of transition for the Empire. Ideas about the duties of imperial governors 
were changing, as power shifted either to local governments in the self-governing colonies 
or back to the metropole from the periphery. Yet as Britain faced an increasing range of 
challenges, governors remained able to influence many of the decisions made in response. 
Like most governors Minto worked under a series of constraints. He was forced to repair 
the  damage  caused  by  his  predecessors  and  contain  the  unrealistic  aspirations  of  his 
superiors, although, a soldier himself, he found his military colleagues a valuable source of 
support  throughout  his  career.  In  Canada  Minto  worked  hard  to  ensure  that  Laurier’s 
government accepted its imperial responsibilities, most notably during the South African 
war, but also that his British superiors understood Canadian attitudes towards the Empire 
and rapprochement with America. As Viceroy, Minto’s priority remained protecting the 
security of the Raj, particularly the strategically vital North West Frontier, often against the 
insistence of a Liberal government focused on economic retrenchment. That he was able to 
achieve these aims and restore stability to previously troubled territories is a tribute to the 
effectiveness of pragmatism. 
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1. Introduction 
The Ideas of Empire: Britain and ‘Pragmatic Imperialism’ 
 
 
Lord  Minto’s  career  as  Governor  General  of  Canada  and  Viceroy  of  India  provides  a 
useful illustration of the methods that dominated Britain’s approach towards governing its 
Empire, the arguments about which made by Judd and Brown are echoed by many other 
historians: 
 
 
Above  all,  and  despite  many  failings  and  occasional  brutalities,  the  British 
steered clear of high-minded theory and tended to approach the enormous test of 
imperial rule with a relatively humane pragmatism.
1 
 
British imperialism was a pragmatic exercise, the response to current pressures, 
threats and opportunities.
2 
 
 
Discussion  or  analysis  of  the  foundations  of  British  imperial  rule  was  rare  and  few 
attempts were made to define its principles or shape it to fit a central paradigm.
3 Contrary 
to some modern beliefs, British expansion was never driven by a desire to assert racial 
superiority,  and  such  ideology  was  conspicuous  by  its  absence.
4 Instead,  to  ease  the 
pressures of governing an enormous heterogeneous Empire, British imperialism was based 
on a flexible pragmatism. Policies evolved from the reaction to events and adaptation to 
local circumstances, as the lessons of attempting to mould these to suit British desires were 
swiftly learned from mistakes, such as had occurred in India in 1857. 
 
 
British imperialism was instead based on a set of shared ‘unspoken assumptions’ that were 
so obvious to all those who shared in the process of policy-making they seldom had to be 
evinced. The similar backgrounds of the ‘ruling elite,’ where politicians, officials, imperial 
administrators and generals often came from aristocratic families, created a common ethos 
about the nature of British interests and the methods to be adopted in defending them. 
Robinson  and  Gallagher  described  this  phenomenon  as  the  ‘official  mind,’  which 
successfully  insulated  itself  from  the  pressures  of  those,  either  missionaries  or 
                                                 
1 D. Judd, ‘The Impact of Imperialism’ BBC History 9 (1) (2008), p. 25. 
2 J.M. Brown, Modern India: The Origins of a Modern Democracy (OUP, Oxford, 1994), pp.100ff. 
3 Brown, Modern India, pp. 100ff; R. Johnson, British Imperialism (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2003), 
p. 11. 
4 A. Webster, The Debate on the Rise of the British Empire (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 
2006), p. 131.   8 
businessmen, who wished to dictate imperial policy to serve their own selfish interests. 
The  theory  has  been  subjected  to  frequent  criticism  from  those  like  Darwin  who 
challenged  the  existence  of  a  unified  ‘official  mind’  dictating  decision-making,  and 
claimed that as British policy was subject to a wide range of external pressures it lacked 
coherence and consistency. Others have supported this view by arguing that each of the 
large number of departments involved in imperial governance had its own views about the 
priorities of British policy which made it difficult for any one to impose its opinions, while 
Cain and Hopkins, and their followers, have claimed that the interaction between policy-
makers and the representatives of high finance, provided the latter with an influential voice 
in decisions.
 5   
 
 
Yet aspects of Robinson and Gallagher’s arguments have endured and continue to provoke 
vigorous debate. Britain’s ruling elite believed that its traditional sense of duty extended to 
the Empire, and that as representatives of a superior race and the leading great power, they 
were  responsible  for  spreading  their  own  version  of  civilisation  around  their  imperial 
territories and ruling ‘lesser races’ in a benevolent fashion that would encourage local 
development. An important priority for imperial administrators was to provide good and 
efficient  government  that  maintained  law  and  order  while  also  promoting  economic 
prosperity.
6 Enthusiasts for empire were regarded with some distaste by the aristocratic 
elite, who felt such people were often representatives of a vulgar middle class, while the 
plans they promoted invariably threatened to upset the equilibrium of imperial rule, as 
Salisbury felt about Milner, Chamberlain and Curzon.  
 
 
Central to the ‘official mind’ argument, and an idea strongly supported by historians like 
Hyam,
7 was  that  strategic  considerations  predominated  in  the  formulation  of  British 
                                                 
5 R. Robinson & J. Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism (Macmillan, 
London, 1981) passim, but especially pp. 19-26; P. Cain & A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation 
and Expansion, 1688-1914 (Longman, London, 1993); R. Hyam, ‘The Primacy of Geo-Politics: The 
Dynamics of British Imperial Policy, 1763-1963’ JICH 27 (1999),  pp. 27-52, & ‘The Colonial Office Mind, 
1900-1914’ JICH 8 (1979), pp. 30-55; Johnson, British Imperialism, pp. 39ff; P. Kennedy, The Realities 
Behind Diplomacy (Fontana, London, 1981), pp. 50, 63ff; J. Darwin, ‘Imperialism and the Victorians: The 
Dynamics of Territorial Expansion’ EHR 112 (1997), pp. 614-642; T.G. Otte, ‘The Foreign Office and 
Defence of Empire, 1856-1914’ & G. Peden, ‘The Treasury and Defence of Empire’ in G. Kennedy, Imperial 
Defence: The Old World Order 1856-1956 (Routledge, London, 2008), pp. 9-29 & 71-90; Z Steiner, The 
Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (CUP, Cambridge, 1969); Webster, Rise of the British 
Empire, passim. 
6 P. Burroughs, ‘Imperial Institutions and the Government of Empire’ in A Porter (ed.) The Oxford History of 
the British Empire Vol. III The 19
th Century (OUP, Oxford, 1999), pp. 170ff. 
7 Hyam, ‘Primacy of Geo-politics.’   9 
imperial policy, an idea that provided a connecting link between the different approaches 
adopted for governing the different parts of the empire. Although ‘imperial defence’ was a 
fluid concept,
8 both officials and the public were aware that the Empire was the primary 
source  of  Britain’s  strength,  and  therefore  it  was  necessary  to  defend  it  at  all  costs. 
Imperial  concerns  exercised  a  dominating  influence  over  British  foreign  policy,  the 
overriding  aim  of  which,  especially  under  the  tutelage  of  foreign  secretaries  like 
Lansdowne whose imperial experiences gave them a greater understanding of the strategic 
issues  involved,  became  safeguarding  imperial  interests  to  reduce  the  burden  of 
commitments that had to be actively defended. Securing existing interests, notably India 
and  its  lines  of  communication,  compelled  British  expansion  into  Africa  and  the 
subsequent  occupation  of  strategically  important  territories,  such  as  Egypt  and  South 
Africa. Any threats, whether internal or external, to these regions especially, but equally in 
other imperial territories, had to be met adequately to ensure the maintenance of British 
prestige. The Empire also provided Britain with a useful resource, on which it could draw 
to  enforce  its  hegemony  within  strategically  important  regions,  or  in  support  of  wider 
policy objectives. As Salisbury noted, India served as a ‘barrack in the Oriental seas’ and 
its troops were frequently used after 1857 from East Africa to China in support of British 
policies. Similar demands were placed upon the self-governing colonies, although unlike 
India they could not be compelled to act, but the mere existence of such a large pool of 
resources  acted  as  a  forceful  reminder  to  its  rivals  of  British  strength.  Another 
consideration underlay British reliance on its empire; the desire to defend its interests at 
minimal expense. Garrisons were often only large enough to provide an obvious symbol of 
British power, and were used only in the direst emergencies.
9 The costs of occupying India 
were imposed upon its taxpayers, while attempts to cajole the self-governing colonies into 
making greater contributions to imperial defence were frequent. Debate about the costs 
and benefits of the Empire has been especially contentious, with little agreement being 
reached between those who regard it as an expensive liability and others who see it as a 
valuable asset.
10 
 
 
                                                 
8 G. Kennedy, ‘Introduction: The Concept of Imperial Defence, 1856-1956’ in Kennedy, Imperial Defence, 
pp. 1-8. 
9 Burroughs, ‘Imperial Institutions’; D. French, ‘The British Army and the Empire, 1856-1956’ in Kennedy 
(ed.), Imperial Defence, pp. 91-105. 
10 See  for  example  L.E.  Davis  &  R.H,  Huttenback,  Mammon  and  the  Pursuit  of  Empire  (CUP, 
Cambridge, 1986), pp. 145ff; P.K. O’Brien, ‘The Costs and Benefits of British Imperialism’ P&P 120 
(1988), pp. 163-200 ; A. Offer, ‘The British Empire, 1870-1914: A Waste of Money?’ Econ HR 46 
(1993), pp. 215-238; Peden, ‘Treasury’, pp. 71-75.   10 
As  Burroughs  and  Beynon  have  argued,  ensuring  the  maintenance  of  security  in  their 
scattered possessions remained a priority for British governments, and thus they came to 
rely  on  their  local  representatives  to  implement  policies  designed  to  counter  external 
threats  or  internal  subversion.
11  The  ‘men  on  the  spot’  played  a  crucial  role  in 
communicating information on local conditions to their superiors in London, which proved 
vital in the policy-making process. Knowledge of the periphery was a valuable asset, often 
entitling proconsuls to a voice in decisions, as Minto and Kitchener demonstrated during 
the negotiation of the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907. Minto’s tenure in both Canada 
and  India  provides  evidence  to  support  the  idea  of  ‘pragmatic  imperialism.’  No  pre-
conceived  plan  for  what  a  governor  could  achieve  during  his  post  had  much  hope  of 
success in the fluid atmosphere of either a mature self-governing colony like Canada, or 
the frequently chaotic circumstances of India, where the unexpected outbreak of crises 
required the authorities  to make immediate response. Minto was able to accommodate 
himself  into  this  structure,  as  beyond  a  pragmatic  notion  that  the  Empire  must  be 
maintained and threats to its security must be countered, he had few fixed ideas on how it 
should be governed.  
  
 
Britain’s pragmatic approach to governing its Empire was partly motivated by the sheer 
size of the task this entailed. ‘Diverse’ is a barely appropriate word to convey the range of 
territories,  just  as  ‘complex’  does  little  justice  to  the  task  Britain’s  administrators 
undertook in  governing  the Empire.  From the developed urban  economies of the self-
governing  colonies,  to  the  turbulent  mountains  of  India’s  North  West  Frontier,  to  the 
expanses  of  the  veldt,  conditions  and  peoples  varied  enormously.  The  only  principles 
vaguely applicable to imperial administration were that colonies should be governed in a 
manner suitable to, and appropriate for, local conditions, and that they could not be ruled 
from  London,  which  ‘resulted,  obviously,  in  a  lack  of  uniformity  throughout  the 
Empire.’
12 Minto’s service in Ottawa and Calcutta allows him to be utilised as a means to 
consider  the  heterogeneity  of  the  Empire,  and  the  different  methods  employed  in  its 
administration. Historians have echoed the views expressed by contemporaries like Milner 
that the Empire could not be regarded as a coherent whole: 
 
 
                                                 
11 J. Beynon, ‘Overlords of Empire? British “Proconsular Imperialism” in Comparative Perspective’ JICH 19 
(1991), pp. 165-202; Burroughs, ‘Imperial Institutions.’  
12 R.F. Shinn Jr., Arthur Berridale Keith 1879-1944: The Chief Ornament of Scottish Learning (Aberdeen 
University Press, Aberdeen, 1990), p. 45.   11 
I  often  wish  that,  when  speaking  of  the  British  Empire…we  could  have  two 
generally  recognised  appellations  by  which  to  distinguish  the  two  widely 
different and indeed contrasted types of state of which the Empire is composed.
13 
 
 
Such  heterogeneity  has  rendered  the  task  of  writing  a  coherent  history  of  the  whole 
Empire, already rendered challenging by its geographical and chronological scope, that 
much  more  difficult.
14 The  division  of  responsibility  for  the  Empire  within  Whitehall, 
where India was treated as a separate entity, and the objections expressed by the self-
governing  colonies  about  being  grouped  together  with  the  crown  colonies  under  the 
Colonial Office umbrella, reflected such attitudes.
15  
 
 
It has been argued that Britain’s formal Empire could be divided into two distinct spheres 
according not only to race, where the civilising mission for supposedly backward races 
was allegedly paramount as the settler colonies could be left to their own devices, but also 
by method of  government. Although collaboration with influential local actors was an 
important  consideration  in  both,  these  separate  spheres  can  be  categorised  broadly  as 
empire  by  consensus  or  coercion,  and  Minto’s  career  provides  a  useful  point  of 
comparison between the two.
16 The former, specifically the self-governing colonies like 
Canada, had been granted a significant degree of autonomy during the Victorian era, and 
their representative institutions exercised control over most aspects of domestic policy. 
Dependence on British support for defence and the conduct of external relations made 
these the Governor’s main role, but it was becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish 
between  ‘imperial’  and  domestic  matters  or  persuade  restless  young  nations  to  accept 
policies they did not believe to be in their interests. The tendency before 1914 was for 
increasing control over the former to shift to the colonies where only local issues were 
concerned,  thus  diluting  further  the  Governor’s  already  limited  powers.  Britain  had  to 
work together with its self-governing colonies to achieve its aims; they could not be forced 
to adopt any policies, as Chamberlain discovered to his frustration. The absence of any 
major  potential  threat  to  the  security  of  British  interests  meant  that  only  a  symbolic 
imperial  military  presence  was  maintained,  and  responsibility  for  local  defence  was 
devolved to local authorities. Encouraging them to maintain their forces to an adequate 
                                                 
13 D.C.B. Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals (Pimlico, London, 2003), pp. 19ff. 
14 See the general histories by Hyam, Judd, Lloyd, Marshall or Porter. 
15 J.A. Cross, ‘The Colonial Office and the Dominions before 1914’ JCPS 4 (1966), pp. 138-148. 
16 J. Darwin, ‘A Third British Empire? The Dominion Idea in Imperial Politics’ in J.M. Brown (ed.) The 
Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. IV: The Twentieth Century (OUP, Oxford, 1999), pp. 64-87. 
   12 
standard or accept any wider role in imperial defence proved to be a particularly difficult 
role for Minto and provided a fertile source of friction with Laurier’s government.  
 
 
The ‘coercive’ Empire proved to be very different. Legislative bodies existed by 1914, but 
their powers were circumscribed, they were elected on a very narrow franchise, and very 
few contemporaries would have regarded them as presaging any move towards granting 
authority to India. Real power was vested in the Viceroy and his small Executive Council, 
backed  by  the  presence  of  225,000  British  and  Indian  troops.  The  extent  of  Britain’s 
possessions necessitated devolution of many powers to the provincial level and working 
with local collaborators, but unlike Canada, the Viceroy retained real authority; in Calcutta 
the monarch’s representative ruled as well as reigned. Even here, however, the governor’s 
powers were being eroded, albeit from the opposite direction, as the Secretary of State 
came to dominate the governing partnership. As long as the Viceroy was willing to accept 
this subordination the relationship would proceed amicably, but an independently-minded 
governor, an overly autocratic Indian secretary, or incumbents from opposite ends of the 
political  spectrum  often  created  tension,  that  at  the  worst  extreme  could  render  the 
government  of  India  impossible.    Little  account  was  taken  of  local  opinion,  beyond 
consideration of the risk imposed by deliberately ignoring native susceptibilities, when 
implementing  policies,  and  the  vast  military  establishment  retained  responsibility  for 
defending India against internal rebellion as well as external threats. The danger posed in 
both these areas, and the vast responsibilities entailed by ruling 300 million people, meant 
that except in the most serious emergencies, India was regarded as an entity distinct from 
the rest of the Empire, and the focus of its authorities had to be within its borders, rather 
than on any wider role.  
 
 
Minto also held office at a time of emerging challenges to the Empire. He was appointed 
when popular belief in the strength of Britain’s Empire was at its zenith, but this had 
begun to waver slightly in the early stages of his Canadian career, and was on the verge of 
shattering  by  the  time  of  his  departure  from  Calcutta.  The  celebrations  of  Victoria’s 
Jubilee in 1897 were soon replaced by abject gloom; as Hyam argued ‘pessimism became 
the  all-pervasive  and  quintessential  characteristic  of  Edwardian  thinking  about  the 
Empire.’
17 Pessimism reached its nadir during the Boer War, and the apparent displays of 
                                                 
17 R. Hyam, ‘The British Empire in the Edwardian Era’ in Brown (ed.) OHBE IV, p. 50.   13 
vibrant popular imperialism that greeted even recoveries rather than real successes, such as 
Mafeking, were indications of relief rather than jubilation. Military setbacks exposed the 
alarming inadequacies of Britain’s international position and led to campaigns to improve 
the ‘efficiency’ of the nation.
18 Reform and readjustment followed as Britain attempted to 
stabilise its position, a process in which Minto was involved at several points. The breadth 
of the challenges Britain faced produced a diverse range of responses as the future of the 
Empire  became  a  subject  of  intense  public  debate.  ‘New  Imperialists,’  most  vividly 
represented by Chamberlain, viewed the Empire as the defining aspect of Britain’s global 
position  and  felt  that  its  development  would  serve  to  strengthen  it.  Efforts  to  achieve 
imperial federation were accelerated, but their hopes were frustrated by the failure to agree 
a  coherent  plan  or  attract  Cabinet  and  imperial  support  for  their  objectives.  Despite 
widespread popular appeal, little was achieved in defence terms beyond agreements on 
standardisation,  while  Chamberlain’s  fiscal  policies  succeeded  only  in  hastening  the 
collapse of Balfour’s government and did little to improve his standing with the party 
grandees, who already disliked his middle class traits. The Liberals tried to move away 
from  their  predecessors’  confrontational  approach,  believing  this  would  do  little  to 
strengthen the Empire. Instead they moved towards conciliation, granting the Dominions 
greater control over their own affairs, and extending the principles of self-government to 
other colonies, notably India
19  
 
 
To meet the increasing challenges Britain faced, its military forces, both the army and 
navy,  were  reorganised  and  redistributed  to  make  them  more  capable  of  meeting  new 
threats from the continent, although the exact purpose of Haldane’s Expeditionary Force or 
Fisher’s plans remain a matter of some debate.
20 Foreign policy objectives were also re-
                                                 
18 C. Bartlett, Defence and Diplomacy (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1993), pp. 89ff; K. Jeffery, 
‘The Impact of the South African War on Imperial Defence’ in D. Lowry (ed.), The South African War 
Reappraised (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2000), pp. 194-96; D. Judd & K. Surridge, The Boer 
War (John Murray, London, 2002); B. Nasson, The South African War (Arnold, London, 1999); G. Searle, 
‘“National Efficiency” and the “Lessons” of the War’ in D. Omissi & A. Thompson (eds.), The Impact of the 
South African War (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2002), pp. 194-211; K. Wilson (ed.), The 
International Impact of the Boer War (Acumen, Chesham, 2001), pp. 158-167. 
19 For a brief critique of the ‘New Imperialists’ see R. Hyam, Britain’s Imperial Century 1815-1914, 
(Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2002), pp. 235-45 or B. Porter, The Lion’s Share: A Short History of 
British Imperialism, 1850-1996 (Longman, London, 1996), pp. 130-41, 196-99. For defence, see D.C. 
Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defence, 1870-1914 (Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore, 1965) or Z. Steiner & K. Neilson, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2003), pp. 441ff. 
20 For the debate on the army see E. Spiers, ‘Between the South African War and the First World War, 1902-
1914’ in H.F.A. Strachan (ed.), Big Wars and Small Wars (Routledge, London, 2006), pp. 21-36 or H.F.A. 
Strachan, ‘The British Army, its General Staff and the Continental Commitment, 1904-1914’ in D. French & 
B.H. Reid (eds.), The British General Staff: Reform and Innovation c. 1890-1939 (Frank Cass, London,   14 
prioritised  as  Britain  recognised  the  impossibility  of  defending  its  overextended 
commitments.  In  the  context  of  Minto’s  career,  diplomatic  shifts  in  two  areas  proved 
significant, as he fought against the tide of changing British policy and tried to reconcile 
local interests with these dramatic shifts. Realignment in the Western Hemisphere pre-
dated the Boer War, as the Venezuelan crisis of 1895 had prompted a reconsideration of 
relations with America. Britain proved willing to concede regional hegemony to the US, 
realising  that  victory  in  any  war  would  be  virtually  impossible,  and  that  a  process  of 
rapprochement was the best way to economically defend its interests. Anxiety about the 
vulnerability  of  India’s  frontiers  and  the  extent  of  resources  that  would  have  to  be 
committed to their defence, convinced British planners that diplomacy was the only viable 
solution to the apparently intractable problems of Indian defence, thus prompting a lengthy 
effort to reach agreement with Russia, although this did little to ease the local difficulties 
caused by the warlike Pathans. 
21 
 
 
How does Lord Minto fit into this changing historiographical context? In many ways he 
provides an interesting insight into the governance of Britain’s Empire after its period of 
breathtaking expansion and at a time of mounting challenges to its existence, both from 
within  and  without.  Previous  historians’  considerations  of  Minto’s  career  illustrate 
Hopkins’s arguments about the increasing specialisation of imperial history,
22 where the 
focus is on a specific area with minimal effort devoted to linking local developments to a 
wider imperial whole. Most historians who have studied his career have done so in a local 
context, considering only the impact of his policies on the national development of Canada 
and India, rather than how far they were the result of wider imperial policy, neglecting the 
fact that no proconsul could govern his territory without reference to overarching imperial 
concerns.  Minto’s  appointment  to  both  posts  represented  a  shift  away  from  the  brief 
flirtation with overzealous ‘new imperialist’ proconsuls towards those who approached 
their posts from a more pragmatic angle and tended to regard their duty as administering 
Britain’s possessions rather than ruling them as personal fiefdoms. One result of this more 
                                                                                                                                                    
2002), pp. 75-94. For the navy see, N. Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution (University of South 
Carolina Press, Columbia, 1999). 
21 For Anglo-American relations see A.P. Dobson, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century 
(Routledge, London, 1995); C. Lowe & M. Dockrill, The Mirage of Power (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
London, 1972), pp. 96-106; A. Orde, The Eclipse of Great Britain (Macmillan, London, 1996), Ch. 1; B. 
Perkins, The Great Rapprochement (Gollancz, London, 1969), passim. For Anglo-Russian relations and their 
impact on defence see K. Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995), J. Gooch, The 
Plans of War (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1974), or J. Siegel, Endgame: Britain, Russia and the Final 
Struggle for Central Asia (IB Tauris, London, 2002). 
22 A.G. Hopkins, ‘Back to the Future: From National History to Imperial History’ P&P 164 (1999) pp. 198ff.   15 
proactive approach towards imperial governance, as exercised by Curzon in India, was a 
determination in Britain to consolidate their control over events in the Empire, a trend that 
did  much  to  curtail  Minto’s  freedom  of  action.  In  some  respects  Minto  was  a  typical 
proconsul; he came from an aristocratic background, and his family had a long tradition of 
serving  the  Empire.    Like  many  of  his  contemporaries,  Minto  firmly  believed  in  the 
Empire, and that it was the primary source of British strength, but he did not exhibit the 
almost religious intensity displayed by the likes of Curzon or Milner. It can be argued that 
while  he  approached  his  Canadian  post  determined  to  work  towards  achieving 
Chamberlain’s aim of federation, experience soon disabused of him any notion that this 
could  be  achieved  without  the  support  of  self-governing  colonies.  Indeed,  Lloyd  has 
argued that the appointment of men like Minto was necessary after the upheaval caused by 
the  rule  of  the  overzealous  like  Curzon,  or  the  indolent  like  Aberdeen,  to  restore  the 
Empire  to  its  default  state  of  normality.
23 While  Salisbury  described  Curzon,  Milner, 
Kitchener and Cromer as the ‘satraps’ of Empire,
24 and undoubtedly these four are for 
many  historians  the  epitome  of  ‘proconsular’  imperialism,  they  do  not  represent  the 
totality of Britain’s imperial experience. In many respects they are the exceptions rather 
than the rule, whether in regards to the length of service, the proactive nature of their 
administration, or the challenges they created for themselves. Most governors aimed above 
all to maintain stability in their territories, and avoid causing trouble for their superiors. In 
this way it can be argued that those proconsuls, like Minto, Lansdowne, Grey, Elgin or 
Tennyson whose tenures did not embroil Britain in wars or end in bitter resignation or 
recrimination are the true representatives of imperial rule. 
 
 
Minto’s career can thus provide useful insight on the influence an imperial governor could 
exercise on the formation of British imperial defence and foreign policy during a period of 
great transition, and the evolution of this important role in two very different parts of the 
Empire before 1914. An examination of his relationships with his superiors and colleagues 
illuminates the pressures and challenges facing a governor in the Edwardian Empire, and 
how the idea of ‘pragmatic imperialism’  furthers understanding of the  policies Britain 
adopted in response. Minto’s career in both Canada and India is approached from three 
angles. ‘Repairing the Damage’ considers how predecessors were often the determining 
influence in shaping the parameters of any governor’s tenure, and Minto was particularly 
afflicted  in  this  regard,  as  the  mistakes  made  by  both  Aberdeen  and  Curzon  were  to 
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reverberate for the duration of his gubernatorial careers in Ottawa and Calcutta. The need 
to  find  a  candidate  suitably  different  from  the  current  incumbents  proved  to  be  the 
deciding factor in the decision to appoint Minto to both posts. The process behind his 
appointment  provides  an  opportunity  to  analyse  the  role  of  aristocracy  in  imperial 
governance, considering how they came to be regarded as particularly suited for the duties 
of  the  more  prestigious  appointments  in  India  and  the  self-governing  colonies  as  the 
Empire expanded.  For Canada, Chamberlain was motivated by a desire to find a man who 
not  only  possessed  a  suitable  reputation,  but  also  shared  his  goal  of  strengthening 
Canadian support for the various methods he had conceived of tightening imperial links. 
Thus Minto’s early months in Ottawa were dominated by the need to identify the areas 
where Aberdeen’s influence had encouraged Canada’s wish to ignore its wider imperial 
responsibilities,  specifically  plans  for  militia  reform.  Events  around  the  Empire  soon 
eradicated  Aberdeen’s  legacy,  but  unfortunately  in  India  the  problems  caused  by  his 
predecessor  were  to  dominate  his  entire  Viceroyalty.  Balfour’s  disintegrating 
government’s aim in appointing a replacement for their troublesome subordinate was to 
find someone capable of working in tandem with, rather than in opposition to, London to 
implement government policy, and restore the shattered harmony of India’s government. 
Minto proved capable of the latter, but the legacy left by Curzon’s attempts to rule India 
according  to  his  own  whims,  particularly  the  unrest  on  supposedly  pacified  frontiers, 
occupied  much  of  his  attention  and  created  much  antagonism  in  relations  with  his 
superiors.  
 
 
‘Containing Unreality’ focuses on Minto’s relationship with his constitutional superiors, 
and the difficulties entailed by the local implementation of Britain’s policies at the local 
level.  In  Canada,  this  proved  to  be  a  dual  role.  Minto  undoubtedly  supported 
Chamberlain’s aim of federating the Empire, but his constant contact with all shades of 
Canadian opinion convinced him that the methods the Colonial Secretary adopted would 
only succeed in alienating the Dominion. His views on what could be achieved with the 
self-governing  colonies  had  a  profound  influence  on  the  path  followed  by  ‘new 
imperialism’. An equally important role here was persuading Laurier and his colleagues 
that Canada must accept its imperial responsibilities, and to act as the middle-man in the 
Anglo-American rapprochement, ensuring that both Ottawa and London understood the 
other’s conceptions of the emergent relationship. In India, Minto’s efforts were dominated 
by debates with Morley on the necessity for securing Britain’s position on the frontiers, 
and it proved no less important for Minto to contain the unrealistic expectations of the   17 
Liberals  about  the  Empire.  Morley’s  efforts  were  focussed  on  reforming  Indian 
administration, but Minto believed that order and stability must be a prerequisite for any 
concessions. Rampant frontier lawlessness could not be tolerated and active precautions 
had  to  be  taken  to  prevent  its  escalation.  Concomitantly,  and  unsurprisingly  given  his 
background, throughout his career Minto remained reliant on military advice and deeply 
involved in military reforms. As is argued in ‘Exploiting Solidarity’ Minto, believing that 
Britain’s imperial position was dependent on military power supported the efforts of his 
generals  to  strengthen  local  military  forces.  This  stance  created  much  tension  with  a 
Canadian  government  reluctant  to  commit  any  resources  to  its  own  defence  let  alone 
undertake  any  wider  Imperial  responsibilities.  Ongoing  debates  about  military  reform 
contributed to Minto’s maturation as a governor; he increasingly came to accept Canada’s 
own  conception  of  its  defence  requirements  and  worked  to  help  implement  Laurier’s 
policy. Indian defence was a more pressing concern, and occupied much of the Viceroy’s 
energies. Despite their opposition to rapprochement with Russia, Minto and Kitchener’s 
input influenced many of the final terms of the agreement. Subsequently they focused on 
frustrating London’s plans to use the new diplomatic climate to justify the reduction of 
Indian  defence  expenditure  and  the  cancellation  of  Kitchener’s  reforms.  Much  was 
dependent on the issue, but throughout his  gubernatorial  career Minto worked hard to 
ensure his views were at least taken into account in the formulation of policy. 
   18 
 
Britain’s Aristocracy and the Empire 
 
 
Debate over the ‘imperial’ shift in American policy has led to frequent comparisons with 
Britain’s Empire, in an effort to use historical examples to understand modern events. In 
turn this has helped reinvigorate research into areas of British imperial history, particularly 
the  governance  of  the  Empire,  recently  engulfed  by  the  focus  on  cultural  aspects.
25 
Ferguson and Porter have produced the most publicised contributions to the debate about 
British and American imperialism, and both paint remarkably similar pictures, agreeing on 
the similar motivations behind expansionist policies but also about the differences created 
by  the  vastly  superior  financial  and  military  power  currently  available  to  the  US.  The 
emphasis placed on the absence of a ‘ruling class’ or an imperial ‘ethos’ in contemporary 
America is of particular importance in the context of Minto’s career. America’s failure to 
produce a generation of graduates willing to go to Iraq as proconsuls, or indeed to exhibit 
any  desire  to  promote  such  beliefs,  running  counter  as  it  does  to  an  ingrained  anti-
imperialist  philosophy,  will  prevent  its  ‘empire’  from  becoming  a  directly  governed 
territorial entity like that of Britain’s.
26 In contrast, as imperial historians like Hyam stress, 
Britain’s education system was geared specifically towards creating a ‘caste’ capable of 
ruling its extensive imperial territories. Britain’s social elite was believed to be particularly 
suited  for  this  task,  and  the  aristocracy  and  upper  classes,  reflecting  the  control  they 
exercised  domestically,  predominated  in  the  higher  echelons  of  imperial  government. 
Inculcated with a belief in the civilising mission of Britain’s Empire, many perceived it as 
a  duty  to  work  in  its  service  to  further  Britain’s  global  interests,  although  many  were 
motivated by more materialist concerns, particularly the lack of opportunity created by 
changes in metropolitan British society.
27  
 
 
Many  influential  historians  have  examined  the  role  Britain’s  aristocracy  played  in 
governing  the  Empire,  as  well  as  other  conservative  institutions  like  the  army  and 
diplomatic service to emphasise the continuing influence they exercised, or otherwise, in 
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Edwardian  Britain.
28 Not  all historians investigating  Britain’s imperial expansion agree 
with  interpretations  suggesting  aristocratic  dominance.  Cain  and  Hopkins,  challenging 
Robinson  and  Gallagher’s  ‘official  mind’  thesis,  argue  instead  for  the  existence  of  a 
‘gentlemanly capitalist’ class created by the integration of the traditional landed ruling 
class and the burgeoning financial sector, as the power of the former declined. They claim 
that the common ethos of this group enabled it to dominate British imperial and economic 
policy to serve the interests of the City. Although influential, their ideas have provoked 
widespread  criticism.  Many  have  questioned  the  existence  of  a  unified  ‘gentlemanly 
capitalist’ class, which Cain and Hopkins failed to properly identify, and the extent of its 
influence  on  the  formation  of  British  policy  beyond  the  purely  economic  sphere  has 
become a contentious issue.
 29  
 
 
As  part  of  their  wider  investigations  into  the  position  held  by  the  ‘ruling  classes’  in 
Victorian  and  Edwardian  Britain,  Cannadine  and  Adonis,  although  agreeing  on  certain 
points, have put forward conflicting arguments about the aristocracy’s role in the Empire. 
Few peers volunteered to work in ‘dangerous and inhospitable conditions’ for unappealing 
salaries in the early 19
th century, but imperial administration became a more attractive 
career for peers as the Empire underwent an expansion that coincided with a narrowing of 
opportunities for advancement elsewhere.
30 Changing conditions in, and attitudes towards, 
the  Empire  created  a  belief  that  rather  than  middle  class  professionals  men  of  higher 
calibre  were  required  for  the  more  important  self-governing  colonies  and  India,  where 
major  policies  had  to  be  implemented  or  serious  local  crises  erupted.  But  Ottawa  or 
Calcutta needed men not only equal to the enormous workload, but also able to represent 
and  symbolise  the  glory  of  the  Empire.  Many  aristocrats  had  served  imperial 
apprenticeships  on  gubernatorial  staffs  where  they  acquired  experience  of  public  life. 
Aristocrats had also gained skills through tradition and experience of similar ceremonial 
roles at local government level which gave them both the training and temperament for 
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ornamental  positions.  They  had  the  ‘habit  of  command  and  handling  people.’
31 
Contemporaries and historians agreed that such roles were most appropriately filled by 
men of high status and illustrious lineage: 
 
 
Here, where the paramount concern was to avoid offending the easily offended 
sensibilities of both emerging nationalists and imperial federationists, the need 
was for a distinguished and diplomatic peer, rather than an autocratic military 
officer.
32 
 
 
Chamberlain put it more bluntly, ‘the colonies were not content unless a person of high 
rank and remarkable distinction were appointed.’
33  
 
 
Among those aristocrats who entered imperial service similar educational backgrounds at 
leading  public  schools  and  Oxbridge,  (although  very  few  were  renowned  scholars), 
military careers in elite regiments, connections to the unofficial power and policy-planning 
networks around London’s clubs, created a caste mentality that manifested itself as a sense 
of superiority encouraging a belief in their predestined role as leaders.
34 Although there 
were some zealous proconsuls like Milner and Curzon, very few peers arrived with a sense 
of purpose or clear goals. Most retained a suspicion of the more idealistic approaches to 
imperial policy. Their imperialism was ‘instinctive and unphilosophical’, as Stevens and 
Saywell argue for Minto: 
 
 
It represented stability and provided him with a sense of purpose and security. On 
the other hand he detested politics and politicians in the abstract at least, and was 
sceptical about the efficiency or soundness of the parliamentary democracy.
35 
 
 
Dislike of democracy was widespread among certain elements of British society in the 
Edwardian era, and many imperial governors resented House of Commons interference in 
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the running of the Empire, believing such important issues had to be placed above the petty 
squabbling of partisan rivalry. Cannadine argues that genuine belief in the Empire and 
imperialism  was  a  motivating  factor  for  many  aristocrats  in  their  decision  to  accept 
imperial appointments. Further developing this argument in ‘Ornamentalism,’ he claims 
that the aristocracy used the Empire to perpetuate an image of traditional rural British 
society that was in retreat before 1914 and preserve traditional values from the evils of 
increasing  industrialisation,  urbanisation  and  capitalism.  An  Empire  dominated  by 
aristocrats  and  patricians  became  more  hierarchical  than  the  ‘mother  country’,  as  this 
group  transported  their  own  attitudes  and  values  round  Britain’s  overseas  possessions. 
Such  attitudes  proved  particularly  useful  in  India  where  they  could  be  employed  as  a 
bulwark in support of the order established by the British by emphasising loyalty to the 
crown rather than the local government. Even Canada, which affected disdain for such 
aristocratic pretensions, placed the Governor General, as the monarch’s representative, at 
the  apex  of  a  hierarchical  society  modelled  on  Britain’s  and  which  developed  an 
exaggerated  regard  for  British  traditions  as  part  of  a  strategy  to  define  Canadian 
separateness vis-à-vis their more egalitarian southern neighbour.
36 
 
 
Disagreement centres on the functions carried out by aristocratic proconsuls. Cannadine 
echoes Bright’s oft-quoted view that the Empire existed merely as a gigantic system of 
outdoor relief for an impoverished aristocracy. With few opportunities available in Britain 
to those unconnected to ruling cliques, especially during the period of the ‘Hotel Cecil,’ the 
Empire offered new challenges to those who believed junior ministerial or even Cabinet 
careers had reached a dead end. Material considerations provided an incentive to accept 
highly paid imperial posts offering the chance to escape financial difficulties in Britain. 
Manifold other  advantages beyond the salary  accompanied high level imperial service. 
Governors often enjoyed a grander style of life than would have been possible when living 
in  Britain.  Huge  staffs,  palatial  mansions,  free  transport  and  lavish  entertainment 
allowances  were  some  of  the  additional  benefits  accompanying  prestigious  and  secure 
posts. Further lucrative employment opportunities were opened up on returning to Britain, 
from City directorships to chairmanships of royal commissions.
37 Cannadine argues that 
the  aristocracy  were  ideal  for  such  posts  as  they  ‘were  social  jobs  rather  than  power 
positions,’ and to illustrate his point he claims that ‘even in India, the Viceroyalty itself 
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was  a  relatively  undemanding  job…’  Appropriateness,  experience  and  expertise 
paradoxically often counted for little in making appointments, and could prove to be a 
positive disadvantage. Cannadine argues that most Viceroys knew little about India before 
their arrival, and although Kirk-Greene stresses that not all of the Governors General were 
‘rank outsiders with no previous knowledge of Canada,’ in Cannadine’s view the general 
tendency was to appoint grandees with little relevant experience or qualifications; few had 
been  proconsuls  before.  Equally  few  made  the  step-up  from  Canada  to  India,  as  the 
‘inflexible figure-head’ required for the former was of little use in the latter.
38 High rank 
became more important than any remarkable distinction. Most aristocratic governors were 
not men of great ability. Almost uniformly undistinguished, few made any reputation for 
themselves  beyond  their  temporary  imperial  homes.  For  Cannadine,  Stanley,  Governor 
General of Canada in the 1880s, was representative of aristocratic proconsuls: ‘He was fat, 
lethargic, honourable, not too bright, uxorious, without high seriousness, but absolutely 
straight.’
39 
 
 
Curzon developed a similarly dismissive view of his predecessor in India: 
 
 
If a man like Lord Elgin – who had returned to what he was eminently fitted to 
be, a County Councillor in his Scotch town – could govern India successfully, 
there couldn’t be much required to be a success.
40 
 
 
Such  appointments  were  not  universally  popular.  Embittered  Colonial  service 
professionals,  denied  the  opportunity  to  reach  the  apex  of  the  system,  bemoaned  that 
‘untried and juvenile noblemen’ received the prestige posts, appointed through a system of 
government  patronage  where  family  connections  apparently  counted  for  more  than 
personal  ability,  ‘selected  rather  for  their  coronets  they  have  inherited  than  for  any 
distinction they have gained.’
41 
 
 
Adonis adopts a different and more plausible viewpoint. He dismisses Cannadine’s focus 
on  the  ‘ornamental’  nature  of  proconsular  posts,  which  was  used  to  illustrate  an 
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unconvincing  argument  about  aristocratic  decline  and  betrays  a  failure  to  properly 
understand  the  nature  of  imperial  governance.  Britain’s  aristocracy  provided  a  pool  of 
talent and knowledge on a range of issues which made them well-equipped to meet the 
demand created by the evolution of the self-governing colonies for a new type of governor, 
able to combine the roles of ambassador and constitutional monarch:  
 
 
Of late  years, there has been a strong tendency on the part of self-governing 
colonies to prefer great English noblemen with distinguished names and great 
fortunes, who will make Government House brilliant and attractive.
42 
 
 
Fulfilling the dominions’ desire to bask in the reflected glory of the nobility, together with 
the established practice  of appointing peers to imperial ministerial offices, enabled the 
aristocracy to entrench itself in the higher reaches of the imperial service. Their role in 
governing the Empire made a ‘significant contribution to the…self-image of the peerage as 
a governing elite.’ Although many peers saw imperial service as a way to advance their 
own political careers, this rarely occurred, and senior imperial appointments provided an 
opportunity to maintain a position in the running of the Empire that may have otherwise 
been denied to them in the rapidly changing conditions of Britain.
43 Adonis’s argument 
that the Governor had much greater powers of interference than a constitutional monarch, 
his interjections in Canadian politics remained significant and occasionally controversial,
44 
is more convincing than Cannadine’s claims that the Governor could never act as instigator 
or initiator as such ill-judged behaviour was guaranteed to threaten what was otherwise a 
non-contentious post.
45 Mere title was not enough for appointment to such posts. Instead of 
being ‘plumage positions’ much work was involved in imperial administration and several 
important  functions  had  to  be  fulfilled;  any  appointee  had  to  conform  to  minimum 
standards. For Adonis, occupying a post considered to be equal to Cabinet rank enabled 
most Viceroys to have a ‘formative and often decisive influence’ on the policies of the Raj. 
Governors in the settlement colonies had to act as constitutional monarchs, but had to 
exercise great tact to allow them to safeguard British interests, assist in the development of 
party political government, and promote imperial attitudes.
46  
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Minto’s  career  provides  an  interesting  example  of  how  Britain’s  aristocratic  network 
operated, and the influence they retained. His position as a peer, attendance at prestigious 
educational institutions, commission in an elite regiment, military adventures across the 
Empire, and marriage to an aristocratic wife enabled him to establish contacts with various 
people in positions of power. Eventually these assisted him to gain some advancement, as 
men like Wolseley and Lansdowne, and connections within the royal court, supported his 
appointment  to  Ottawa.  The  experience  gained  there  proved  a  useful  qualification  for 
promotion  to  Viceroy,  but  this  appointment  was  also  assisted  by  a  close  personal 
acquaintance  with  the  then  Secretary  of  State  for  India,  Brodrick,  which  had  been 
strengthened by their work on Canadian military issues. The fact that almost all the other 
seriously considered candidates for both posts were hereditary peers, illustrates that, for the 
Unionists at least, background was an important quality. Governments obviously looked 
for peers with similar political views when considering appointments to such important 
posts, and their benches in the Lords provided a plentiful supply of suitable candidates. 
Governors also relied on their contacts in Britain for support in the implementation of 
policies,  even  in  India  where  they  were  surrounded  by  officials  with  similar  outlooks. 
Minto turned to Brodrick in Canada to assist in his efforts to prevent the alteration of local 
military organisation, while in India he utilised the efforts of men like Roberts, and Bigge, 
who as George V’s private secretary could mobilise some very influential voices against 
any Liberal policy perceived to pose a threat to the stability of the Raj. The Liberals began 
to  affect  slight  changes,  but  even  Hardinge,  appointed  to  succeed  Minto  and  who  had 
amassed a wealth of professional experience, had close connections to the court.  
 
 
Analysis  of  the  roles  played  by  Governors  General  and  Viceroys,  and  the  place  they 
occupied within the imperial government serves to illustrate Adonis’s argument about the 
functional purpose served by Britain’s aristocracy. The continued presence of the Governor 
General at the apex of Canada’s government after Confederation in 1867 has provoked in-
depth study of the exact role he fulfilled, as the ambiguity inherent in Dominion status 
made  it  difficult  to  precisely  define  his  sphere  of  action.
47  His  powers  decreased 
proportionately as the Dominion government expanded its areas of responsibility, but his 
entitlement to intervene on key issues meant that few incumbents passed their complete 
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terms  without  facing  some  controversy.
48  Nationalist  historical  criticism  of  the 
gubernatorial  office  and  its  occupants  reflects  Canada’s  belief  that  the  imposition  of 
aristocrats to ‘rule’ them implied some inferior position within the Empire, rather than that 
of ‘senior Dominion’, or that despite having been granted self-government, governors were 
part of an imperial conspiracy to eradicate their autonomy.
49 Little attention is paid to the 
contribution Governors made to Canada’s political development,
50 and most are dismissed 
as ‘nonentities, manifestly unsuitable or simply dull.’
51 Criticising those sent to Ottawa in 
such terms, or considering what more zealous pro-consuls like Milner or Curzon would 
have made of the post, ignores the fact that although a prestigious office, the contradictions 
of the Governor’s post and Canada’s remoteness from the centre of imperial power, made 
it an unattractive proposition for the more ambitious.
52 The absence of self-government in 
India removed any possible ambiguity about the Viceroy’s role; he had a clearly defined 
and  less  contentious  position  as  the  active  head  of  a  complex  system  of  Government, 
although  criticism  of  the  incumbents  and  their  policies,  rather  than  of  the  office,  is  a 
common thread in Indian historiography. Autocratic government provided wider scope for 
initiative and made the post more attractive for ambitious politicians. But the balance of 
power between the Viceroy and the Secretary of State was shifting by 1914. The British 
authorities  found  it  increasingly  difficult  to  find  suitable  candidates  for  all  imperial 
positions, but were equally quick to complain when their policies were not implemented. 
Britain was becoming increasingly reluctant to appoint overzealous proconsuls liable to 
independent initiative. London, especially after Curzon’s tenure in India, wanted men who 
would carry out policies with the minimum of fuss.  
 
 
Fulfilling the numerous social functions incumbent on the monarch’s representative was a 
duty common to both Governors and Viceroys. In India, the Viceroy was the centre of an 
energetic ‘society,’ and his annual tours were believed to be an advantageous way to let 
him see the Raj and vice versa, but they became an irritant for overworked proconsuls.
53 
For Canada, such ceremonies served to strengthen imperial feeling by demonstrating the 
Governor’s,  and  therefore  Britain’s,  association  with  national  life  in  the  Dominion. 
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Aristocrats  were  believed  to  be  particularly  well  suited  to  act  as  the  ‘nation’s  host,’ 
evoking the traditions and grandeur of the mother country.
54 This social leadership role 
compensated for limited political functions, and could be used to focus attention on and 
promote  neglected  causes.  Social  duties  emphasise  for  Cannadine  the  essence  of  the 
proconsular  office  –  dignity  and  detachment;  overall  ‘being  was  more  important  than 
doing.’
55 Yet Buchan, in a response to critics of the Governor’s apparent indolence that 
became one of the most famous definitions of the office, argued that ceremony masked 
many anxieties and served a useful political purpose: 
 
 
A Governor General lives an intricate and crowded life in the public eye. His 
mind may be absorbed in some grave discussions with his Ministers, or the Home 
Government, but he must present himself smiling at a dozen functions and let no 
one guess his preoccupation. He must perpetually entertain and be entertained. 
He must show interest in every form of public activity, from a charity bazaar to a 
university celebration; he must be accessible to all men that he may learn of them 
as they of him; he must visit every corner of his dominion, and become for the 
time being, not only one of its citizens, but by adoption a perfervid son of each 
town and province. These things are the imponderabilia of governorship not less 
important  than  a  cool  head  and  a  sound  judgement  in  the  greater  matters  of 
policy, and many a man who is well fitted for the former duties fails signally in 
the latter.
56  
 
 
Occupying  Government  House  in  either  country  was  not  solely  about  entertainment, 
lengthy tours to exotic princely states or frozen wilderness, or shooting local wildlife in 
large numbers. As Laurier put it, carefully balancing the contradictions by then inherent in 
the post: 
 
 
The Canadian Governor General….long ago ceased to determine policy, but he is 
by no means, or need not be, the mere figurehead the public imagine. He has the 
privilege of advising his advisers, if he is a man of sense and experience, his 
advice is often taken. Much of his time may be consumed in laying corner-stones 
and listening to boring addresses, but corner-stones must be laid, and people like 
a touch of colour and ceremony in life.
57 
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Colonial  Governors  had  an  important  political  function  to  fulfil,  and  while  this  was 
particularly and obviously true of India, it remained so in Canada, even if it seemed as 
though the powers associated with the post were disappearing before the incumbent’s eyes. 
Despite the unstoppable advance of Canadian political autonomy, the Governor General 
‘contrived to remain a political necessity’, though his role was narrowly circumscribed by 
ongoing Canadian constitutional evolution.
58 Lansdowne, serving in the 1880s, was the 
first of the new type of Governor, who, while perfectly able, was content not to interfere 
and use his influence in the background. This suited the Canadian government, but made 
things  increasingly  difficult  for  his  successors,  who  faced  constant  accusations  of 
interference.
59  
 
 
It was a delicate position, not clearly outlined in any one piece of legislation. The British 
North America Act defined the Governor General as the representative in Canada of the 
monarch and their Government, the Chief Executive Officer and  Administrator, vested 
with  the  powers,  authorities  and  functions  of  the  sovereign.  Buchan  emphasised  the 
similarities between the two roles, arguing that 
 
A Governor General in an autonomous Dominion walks inevitably on a razor’s 
edge. His powers are like those of a constitutional monarch, brittle if too heavily 
pressed,  a  shadow  if  tactlessly  advertised,  substantial  only  when  exercised 
discreetly in the background.
60  
 
 
But the right to ‘encourage, advise and warn’ traditionally assigned to a constitutional 
monarch remained ill-defined, and it was never clear how far these could be taken in a 
self-governing  colony,
61 much  depended  on  the  individual  and  the  issues  he  faced. 
Reigning but not governing, leading but not attempting to rule, this was the Governor’s 
fate.  Precedent  and  experience  played  an  increasingly  important  role  in  defining  the 
Governor’s  functions,  which  could  pose  problems  for  those,  like  Minto,  unfortunate 
enough to succeed someone with very different conceptions of the office. 
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Canadian sovereignty over its domestic affairs circumscribed the Governor’s influence in 
this sphere. Levels of interference depended on the personalities of the Governor and the 
Prime  Minister,  and  the  political  circumstances  facing  the  Government,  as  those  in 
difficulty  often  welcomed  intervention.  By  the  1890s  gubernatorial  advice  was  rarely 
sought  here  except  in  the  most  serious  crises,  making  politicians  unaccustomed  to 
interference  and  disconcerting  them  when  long  dormant  powers  erupted,  as  Aberdeen 
discovered to his cost. The Governor’s domestic role became more strategic than tactical, 
and he played an important part in the development of responsible government by tactfully 
ensuring that norms of constitutional practice were adhered to and attempting to restore 
stability by mediating in particularly bitter political disputes heightened by ethnic tension. 
Remaining  impartial  in  such  circumstances  became  vital,  and  although  many  faced 
criticism  for  partisanship  or  unwarranted  interventions,  most  forgot  personal  political 
prejudices  and  put  aside  their  distaste  at  having  advisers  lukewarm  or  opposed  to  the 
British  connection  more  successfully  than  the  Colonial  Office,  whose  inclination  to 
sympathise with the ‘loyal’ party was a fertile source of friction; Chamberlain in particular 
found it irksome to appear impartial with a Liberal government that looked askance at his 
imperialist schemes. Immersion in Dominion politics and society enabled the Governor to 
appreciate more the difficult circumstances faced by Canadian governments.
62 Miller and 
Stevens  emphasise  that  in  the  absence  of  official  guidance  the  Governor’s  personal 
qualities became immensely important. The Governor was entitled to take a close interest 
in political events and be informed of important decisions or discuss proposals; this was an 
effective  method  of  gaining  ministerial  confidence,  the  key  to  exercising  gubernatorial 
influence.  Knowledge  of  local  circumstances,  when  combined  with  judgement  and 
common sense could allow the Governor to become a powerful figure. Even Minto, whom 
both criticise severely, was able to express his opinions forcefully.
63 
 
 
The road to a successful governorship could be perilous and required careful negotiation. 
In Buchan’s view: 
 
 
There have been many failures among those sent abroad to represent the British 
Crown,  due  largely  to  the  narrowly  circumscribed  area  from  which  they  are 
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chosen; but that does not derogate from the tremendous importance of the office 
or belittle the success of the rare few who have succeeded.
64 
 
 
Although the Governor was increasingly sidelined, military, diplomatic or constitutional 
controversies could thrust the office into the limelight, while the resurgence of imperial 
fervour and unstable domestic politics invited gubernatorial involvement. As Aberdeen put 
it, the Governor may have been aloof from actual executive responsibility, but required a 
ceaseless, watchful readiness to take part.
65 The Governor had always to remember that 
Canada was exceptionally jealous of its hard-won autonomy, and increasingly resented 
even practical suggestions as unwarranted interference. Despite criticisms of the system, 
there  was  little  desire  for  change.  Laurier  argued  that  it  strengthened  the  ties  binding 
Britain and Canada, keeping them constantly before the public while placing at the head of 
the administration a man unconnected with party or political differences, thus easing the 
evolution of self-government. But the greatest argument against any change was the fear of 
the unknown; in Laurier’s view the system had ‘worked harmoniously and satisfactorily, 
and any change…would not, I am sure, be productive of good results.’
66 
 
 
How different the onerous responsibilities facing the Viceroy, a position distinct from and 
elevated above all others in the Empire, the head of its largest administration rather than a 
mere figurehead. Buchan emphasised the differences between the two posts: 
 
 
In  Canada  Minto  had  learned  the  duty  of  a  self-effacing  governor,  quick  to 
understand  the  nuances  of  constitutionalism  and  exercising  his  power  by 
suggestion and counsel. His new position was very different, for he was in a land 
remote from the forms and spirit of Western democracy, wielding through his 
Council an executive authority far greater than that of an ordinary monarch. His 
business was to govern as well as to reign…The position of a Viceroy is like that 
of a general.
67 
 
 
Dilks’s description provides some indication of the range of work facing the Viceroy: 
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Correspondence  with  the  home  government  about  Aden,  Persia,  Afghanistan, 
Central Asia, Tibet and Siam came before the Viceroy in his capacity as head of 
the  Foreign  Department,  which  dealt  also  with  the  tumultuous  affairs  of  the 
frontier and with the chiefs. As political head of the administration, he received 
hundreds  of  petitions  upon  every  conceivable  subject;  dealt  constantly  with 
military  questions,  many  of  which  had  a  bearing  [on]….the  politics  of  India; 
corresponded  regularly  with  the  Governors,  Lieutenants-Governors  and  Chief 
Commissioners,  with  the  Sovereign,  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  the  Under-
Secretary  at  the  India  Office.  The  Viceroy  carried  on  all  the  ceremonial  and 
social duties of a head of state, presided over the Council, saw his colleagues and 
the Secretary to each Department; in short, gave the administration its cohesion 
and direction.
68 
 
 
The Viceroy’s official life was unending, no  escape  could be found  from the ‘endless 
typhoon,’
69 of work. Files followed him on his tours around India and were often piled to 
the ceiling of his office, all requiring the closest attention and long hours of toil. Although 
firmly  entrenched  as  the  head  of  a  complex  Government,  an  image  that  was  forcibly 
portrayed  to  the  Raj,  the  Viceroy  received  support  from  various  sources.  A  Private 
Secretary, usually a man of great Indian experience, acted as the principal adviser. The 
Executive Council acted as a Cabinet, dealing with every conceivable aspect of policy 
affecting  India.  Its  members  were  responsible  for  their  own  departments,  and  as 
experienced Indian officials they could provide valuable advice for less knowledgeable 
Viceroys. Provincial governments exercised control over local affairs, provided these did 
not  affect  the  wider  interests  of  India,  and  therefore  controversial  subjects  were  best 
avoided. Legislative Councils existed at national and provincial levels, which had some 
elected members and could discuss certain issues, although these were strictly controlled 
by the Government of India. Undoubtedly the Government of India, however benevolent 
and  beneficent,  was  an  autocracy,  in  a  form  that  even  Curzon  was  surprised  that  the 
constitution permitted.
 70 
 
 
For all the scope and opportunity offered by the powers available to both Governors and 
Viceroys, they remained answerable to Parliament through their direct superiors in the 
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Cabinet. Responsible for managing the Empire were the India Office and Colonial Office, 
two departments unique in Whitehall: 
 
 
They had no special area of competence, but managed all the affairs – fiscal, 
economic,  political  and  strategic  –  of  great  empires.  Each  was  a  Treasury,  a 
Foreign Office, a War Office, a Home Office and a Board of Trade rolled into 
one.
71 
 
 
Canadian governments increasingly came to resent their inclusion under the remit of the 
Colonial Office and Secretary as an affront to their perceived status in the Empire. Many 
were annoyed that they were grouped together with non-white crown colonies, and that the 
Colonial  Secretary’s  huge  portfolio,  covering  all  aspects  of  policy,  from  economic 
development to local military defence, in areas as diverse as East Africa and Australasia, 
prevented him from focusing his attention on the affairs of any one imperial possession. 
Insult was added by the lowly position he invariably occupied in the Cabinet, which was 
believed to minimise any influence self-governing colonies could have over British policy. 
Chamberlain proved the exception rather than the rule, and despite his prominent position, 
he  was  not  universally  popular  in  Canada,  where  even  imperialists  feared  his  plans 
threatened the Dominion’s autonomy.  
 
 
The permanent officials of the Colonial Office were equally unloved, paradoxically facing 
criticism  for  lacking  knowledge  of,  or  interest  in  Canadian  affairs,  as  well  as  for 
overenthusiastic imperialism and interference inappropriate for responsible government. 
Self-conscious  dominion  nationalism  was  fuelled  by  the  undue  influence  assigned  to 
private  correspondence  with  the  Governor  General,  which  was  believed  to  enforce  the 
inferior  status  of  the  Canadian  Prime  Minister,  and  a  perceived  failure  to  appreciate 
Canadian  viewpoints.  Unsurprisingly  politicians  began  to  lobby  for  the  creation  of  a 
separate department responsible for Dominion affairs.
72 Governors often arrived imbued 
with  a  typical  metropolitan  attitude  of  superiority,  but  immersion  in  Canadian  society 
encouraged  identification  with  local  viewpoints,  and  led  to  frequent  complaints  about 
British insularity. The Governor was valued as a bridge between opposing opinions, and he 
could make important suggestions on imperial matters. But Britain increasingly came to 
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believe that the Governor was too close to the problems to see them in a proper imperial 
setting and could not be considered a good judge of imperial interests as a whole. Direct 
cultivation of leading colonial politicians, for example through Borden’s visit to the CID in 
1904, was believed to work better than indirect pressure through the Governor.
73 
 
 
Dominion autonomy and control over internal affairs lessened Colonial Office interference 
to an extent, but not so for India. Despite the power apparently vested in the Viceroy, and 
the claims made by Curzon that the Viceroy and Secretary of State for India were two 
constitutional allies, there was no doubt in Whitehall where the ultimate responsibility lay: 
 
 
[the Viceroy] is in many respects an independent sovereign; but the essential fact 
is that he is the representative of His Majesty’s Government in India, and the 
channel by means of which the views of the Government – and through them the 
House of Commons, who are our real masters – find their expression in India.
74 
 
 
Technological  change  had  steadily  eroded  Viceregal  independence.  Completion  of  the 
telegraph link between Britain and India meant that the Secretary of State ‘could thus less 
than  ever  be  confronted  with  accomplished  facts.’
75 Cases  in  which  the  final  decision 
rested  with  the  Viceroy  became  fewer  in  number,  and  all  important  decisions,  unless 
vitally urgent, had to be referred to London for approval. The India Office was a far more 
prestigious  ministerial  portfolio  than  that  at  the  Colonial  Office,  more  senior  and 
experienced politicians tended to be appointed, and it offered much wider scope for action, 
responsible as it was for the vast domain of India, without the tedious intermediation of 
local legislatures. Although the post-Mutiny settlement was based on the principle that ‘the 
government  of  India  must  be,  on  the  whole  carried  out  in  India  itself,’
76 minimising 
interference as much as possible, a large amount of business had to be transacted in Britain 
to  ensure  that  parliament  retained  responsibility  for  administration  of  India.  While  the 
Viceroy protested that the ‘man on the spot’ must have control over events in India, as 
Curzon  said  ‘you  cannot  treat  the  Government  of  three  hundred  million  of  people  as 
though  it  were  a  subordinate  department,’
77  interference  from  London  increased 
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exponentially during the 19
th Century.  Lack of parliamentary interest in India, a common 
Viceregal  complaint,  and  Cabinet  preoccupation  elsewhere  gave  the  Secretary  of  State 
more of a free hand, and consequently they ‘became more absolute.’
78 Disputes over where 
the real authority over India lay became more frequent, embittered by personality clashes, 
and by the time of Minto’s appointment, the India Office had done much to establish its 
superiority over Calcutta, desperate to prevent a repeat of the danger caused by Curzon’s 
attempts to run India as his own personal fiefdom. By this time the Viceroy had come to be 
regarded as the ‘agent of [their] own political aspirations’ by the British government.
79  
 
 
Imperial issues provided an arena for the Governor to take positive action and have some 
influence over the formation of policy, particularly if they believed defence was being 
neglected  or  foreign  relations  adversely  affected.  As  Miller  argues,  however,  the  line 
dividing  Canadian  and  imperial  interests  was  hazy  and  ill-defined,  and  it  took  much 
gubernatorial skill to defend the rights and interests of the imperial government, reconcile 
the conflicting interests and demands of two masters, and avoid accusations of interference 
with Dominion autonomy.
80 Strengthening latent imperial sentiment and advising on the 
best methods of utilising the previously untapped reservoir of imperial feeling, increasingly 
came  to  occupy  the  Governor’s  attention.  Playing  the  role  of  mediator,  the  Governor 
General  could  help  Canadians  appreciate  imperial  viewpoints  and  realise  that  their 
attitudes were known and understood in Britain.  
 
 
Defence  policy  was  a  key  source  of  tension  in  the  imperial  relationship,  and  here  the 
Governor fulfilled two key functions. Firstly he attempted to smooth relations between the 
British officers commanding Canada’s militia which were a source of endemic friction, 
which related to the Governor’s second duty. He could exercise his influence to encourage 
the Dominion Government to undertake greater responsibilities for Canadian and imperial 
defence and assign a higher priority to military preparedness, but he also had to advise his 
British  superiors  about  the  obstacles  to  achieving  imperial  goals  posed  by  Canadian 
attitudes.  Both  Minto  and  Grey  tried  to  inculcate  a  sense  of  commitment  to  imperial 
defence with limited success. Canada often only agreed to such policies to preserve their 
precious  national  autonomy,  and  both  Governors  faced  criticism  for  pressuring  the 
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Canadian Government to make greater contributions, something they remained reluctant to 
do until Borden’s election victory in 1911. Given Canadian proximity to the US, foreign 
policy was another important role for the Governor. Without diplomatic representation and 
unable to formulate its own foreign policy, the Dominion relied on the Governor to act as 
an  unofficial  ambassador  and  represent  their  viewpoints  to  London  and  Washington.  
External affairs often forced him to balance the demands of two masters as he was in a 
unique position to act as ‘an on-the spot apologist for imperial policy’ or to champion 
Canadian  interests  when  they  appeared  to  be  neglected.  But  this  was  an  anxious  and 
responsible duty, and Britain’s desire to resolve outstanding grievances with America often 
put the Governor in an awkward position. The Foreign Office had become jealous of its 
sphere of control and was reluctant to relinquish any aspect of responsibility to a non-
expert agency outside its jurisdiction beyond the unofficial level. Both Minto and Grey 
adopted conscious policies to achieve rapprochement, but the Governor increasingly had to 
assuage bitter complaints that Canadian interests were being sacrificed for the ‘false idol’ 
of Anglo-American friendship, something that occupied much of Minto’s time during the 
Alaska dispute.
 81  
 
 
Theoretically India retained absolute control over both its foreign and military policy. The 
Viceroy had almost exclusive responsibility for India’s Foreign Department, conducting 
correspondence with neighbouring states, keeping Britain informed of questions of wider 
policy connected with India and supervising the affairs of native states. But in practice this 
was increasingly eroded by the expansion of British interests and the belief in Whitehall 
that power be vested there. Only British officials were believed to be capable of seeing the 
Empire  as  an  interconnected  whole.  Jurisdictions  between  Calcutta  and  Whitehall 
conflicted  and  interests  overlapped,  fuelling  fears  that  the  parochial  outlook  of  India’s 
government (echoing concerns raised about Canada) would conflict with the wider aims of 
British imperial policy, by damaging relations with Russia through apparently expansionist 
intentions in India’s buffer states. As Dilks put it ‘a rash move in Persia or Afghanistan, it 
was believed, might mean war with Russia.’
82 Serious problems arose with the Foreign 
Office,  reaching  their  zenith  during  Curzon’s  attempts  to  secure  India’s  frontiers, 
provoking  Morley  to  issue  a  forceful  reminder  to  Minto  during  the  negotiation  of  the 
Anglo-Russian Convention that the Empire could not have two foreign policies. Military 
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authority rested on firmer foundations. The Viceroy was usually blessed with more reliable 
military advisers than the Governor General in Canada, and was ultimately responsible for 
the policy, strategy, and welfare of an enormous force. Commander in Chief of the Army 
in India was a prestigious appointment attracting the highest calibre of soldiers. Complete 
control over the Army in India was vested within the Government of India, although the 
subdivision  between  the  Military  Department  and  Headquarters  was  to  be  a  source  of 
friction,  especially  between  Kitchener  and  Curzon.  India’s  sheer  scale,  constituting  an 
Empire in its own right, and the number of potential threats it faced both within and on its 
borders necessitated granting control over defence policy to the local expert authorities.   36 
A Reassessment of Lord Minto 
 
Most of the proconsuls who served across Britain’s vast Empire have disappeared into 
relative obscurity. Only the few who went on to greater things, who served in important 
territories, or whose tenures were marked by memorable events, are remembered to the 
extent that historians believe they warrant investigation. Minto is on the fringes of this 
group, mostly recalled for the eponymous constitutional reforms introduced in partnership 
with  Morley  while  Viceroy  of  India,  which  even  merit  brief  mention  in  the  popular 
histories of the Empire: 
 
 
Curzon’s successor as Viceroy, Lord Minto, saw his role less as a proconsul than 
a civil servant, and together with Morley he attempted to extend legislative and 
administrative powers to Indians. Not much headway was made, partly because 
these  well-intentioned  Liberal  gradualists  met  opposition  from  both  Indian 
nationalists and from Tory British diehards.
83 
 
 
One complete biography was written, but its hagiographical tone raised the ire of many 
critics, and it was later dismissed by its distinguished author as a ‘perfunctory’ effort.
84 
Reflecting wider trends within the study of Britain’s Empire, the investigations of modern 
historians  became  increasingly  critical,  desperate  to  ascribe  the  initiative  for  any 
achievements to Minto’s colleagues. 
 
 
As he admitted himself Gilbert Elliot, 4
th Earl of Minto, was a rather unlikely candidate to 
hold two of the most prestigious posts in the British Empire. The family, descended from 
Border reivers, had a long tradition of service, most famously the 1
st Earl, who had been 
Viceroy  of  India  in  the  early  19
th  Century.  He  was  granted  his  title  as  a  reward  and 
remained an example for successive generations, although few came close to matching his 
achievements. Attending Eton, Gilbert discovered under the tutelage of his master Warre, 
who believed that a public school education should create well-rounded young gentlemen, 
that his talents were on the sports field rather than in the class room. An undistinguished 
academic record did not preclude graduation from Cambridge, where his focus had been on 
social events and further development of his athletic prowess, particularly in riding. This 
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lack of achievement mattered little, as Gilbert’s career had already been chosen. In 1867 a 
commission was purchased in the elite Scots  Guards regiment, but his  formal military 
career came to little. For a variety of reasons, including the boredom of military routine, 
the cost of a junior officer’s social life, and an unfortunate altercation with a superior over 
a woman, he resigned his commission.  
 
 
For many  years,  Lord  Melgund’s (as he was styled before inheriting  his father’s title) 
career lacked direction. For several years, much to his family’s consternation, he was a 
moderately successful ‘gentleman jockey’ determined to avoid any attempts to force him 
into a more suitable occupation. Melgund’s continued fascination with military affairs did 
provide some sense of purpose, and his efforts to promote interest in the mounted infantry 
combined with a series of military adventures across Europe to bring him to the notice of 
men  in  important  positions,  notably  Wolseley.  If  it  could  not  at  this  stage  procure 
permanent employment, an aristocratic background did provide useful connections. In the 
1870s it helped Melgund secure postings as a war correspondent in the Paris Commune, 
the Carlist Wars in Spain, and the Russo-Turkish war, before he was appointed as ADC to 
Roberts in Afghanistan, where his decision to reject the offer to join Cavagnari’s ill-fated 
mission to Kabul proved wise. In 1882 he served in a similar position with Wolseley in 
Egypt after Gladstone’s recognition of Transvaal independence following Majuba Hill had 
denied him the opportunity to serve in South Africa. These years shaped Melgund’s life 
and outlook in many ways. In practical terms it led to an offer from Lord Lansdowne to 
serve as his Military Secretary in Canada, which although relatively unimportant, was seen 
as a stepping-stone towards further advancement, and provided some stability after his 
recent marriage (which would eventually produce five children). These formative post-
University years had also done much to mould his political beliefs. He had been brought up 
in  an  atmosphere  where  family  ties  and  connections  were  thought  to  guarantee 
advancement.  But  society  had  changed,  and  Melgund  came  to  resent  those  who,  he 
believed, had blocked his ambitions, namely politicians. The exciting and manly world of 
the  military  proved  more  appealing  to  the  young  aristocrat,  but  continued  exposure  to 
soldiers’  ideas  did  much  to  buttress  his  own  prejudices.  First-hand  experience  of  the 
consequences  of  political  procrastination  confirmed  his  opinions  that  a  parliamentary 
democracy  could  not  be  trusted  to  run  Britain’s  Empire.  Only  those  who  experienced 
hardship and risk on its dangerous frontiers, without thought of material gain, as opposed 
to self-interested politicians, could truly be classed as patriots and servants of the state. 
Although his views matured during his service as an administrator, such ideas stayed with   38 
him throughout his imperial career; he retained a suspicion and dislike of politics and often 
turned  to  military  colleagues  for  advice,  invariably  supporting  them  in  struggles  with 
politicians.
85 
 
 
Like many other proconsuls, Melgund served an apprenticeship before advancing to more 
responsible positions. Time spent as an ADC or on gubernatorial staff was believed to 
provide valuable experience by exposing young aristocrats to the running of an Empire and 
enabling them to establish useful contacts. As Miller argues, Melgund’s time in Canada 
from 1883-85, with the duties he undertook, his interaction with local power brokers, and 
the challenges he confronted, proved to be of great value.
86 The increased powers granted 
to the dominion government after Confederation had reduced the responsibilities of the 
Military Secretary, as authority over the militia had been devolved from the Governor to 
the Minister. The duties had become focused on arranging the Governor’s ceremonial and 
social  routine,  and  were  thus  less  than  onerous.  But  Melgund  did  have  some  more 
important concerns. He was responsible for protecting Lansdowne’s safety, which due to 
his Irish experiences was believed to be under threat from Fenian terrorists. Both local 
Canadian and wider imperial defence issues occupied his attention. At Wolseley’s request, 
and  after  consultation  with  Macdonald,  Melgund  coordinated  the  recruitment  of  a 
contingent for service on the Nile. Success here led the Dominion government to appoint 
him to a committee investigating Canadian coastal defence. This increased his knowledge 
of the militia and Canadian politics, as well as the confidence of Macdonald’s government 
in his abilities, which subsequently requested his assistance in the production of defensive 
plans. Some tensions arose over later attempts to raise Canadian troops for imperial service 
that proved to be an interesting precursor of his future career. The most notable event of 
his time in Canada was his service in the North West Rebellion in 1885. Doubts about the 
capabilities  of  Middleton,  the  GOC,  led  the  government  to  insist  on  Melgund’s 
appointment  to  the  force  raised  to  quell  the  unrest.  He  provided  useful  assistance  and 
advice for the general, and saw action in several engagements before being despatched to 
Ottawa to report on the campaign. His decision to return to Britain a few months later 
caused friction with Lansdowne, but the government was sorry to see him go and he had 
learned much about Canada’s people and politics that would stand him in good stead for 
the future. 
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More time elapsed between the completion of this post and the fulfilment of his ambition 
to serve in a more influential post than Melgund desired. He dabbled in politics for a time, 
as Gladstone’s Irish policies, which Melgund, like many others, perceived to pose a threat 
to imperial integrity, completed his alienation from the Liberal views with which he had 
been inculcated as a youth and confirmed him as a Unionist. His one stand for election as 
an MP in 1886 ended in defeat, much to his relief, although he continued to work for party 
interests. Accession to his father’s title brought elevation to the Lords in 1892, but the 
chances for appointment had temporarily disappeared with the Liberals’ election victory. 
This enabled him to fulfil his traditional aristocratic duties, managing his newly inherited 
estate,  engaging  with  local  issues,  and  commanding  the  Volunteer  brigade.  This  latter 
concern provided the opportunity to maintain his military interests, and he retained some 
influence with the War Office, acting as an unofficial spokesman in the Lords. The return 
of a Unionist government in 1895 still provided no advancement despite his best efforts.
87  
 
 
Minto became focused on the possibility of obtaining the Canadian Governor Generalship, 
and  seized  his  opportunity  when  it  became  obvious  that  Aberdeen’s  retirement  was 
imminent. Although his previous experience provided a  good claim,  Minto needed the 
support of his influential friends, notably Lansdowne, Brodrick and Wolseley, as well as 
his wife’s royal connections (the court was anxious to restore social propriety to Ottawa 
after Lady Aberdeen’s antics),
88 to guarantee his appointment when he was not the first 
choice  of  those  ultimately  responsible.  At  54,  Minto’s  imperial  career  had  started 
somewhat later than he had hoped, and this perhaps explains his determination to make the 
most of his position. His predecessor’s time had been dominated by domestic issues, and 
many  believed  the  official  powers  of  the  Governor  to  be  waning  as  Canada  advanced 
towards nationhood. The dominance of imperial issues during Minto’s tenure provided the 
opportunity  to  use  the  Governor’s  powers  to  their  fullest  extent,  and  thus  his  career 
remains  a  source  of  controversy  for  Canadian  historians.    The  debate  about  Canadian 
participation in the Boer War came to be a defining event in this respect. It also raised 
questions about the role the self-governing colonies could fulfil in imperial defence. Minto 
played an indirect role in the government’s final decision, reminding Laurier of Canada’s 
responsibilities towards the Empire, and his government’s responsibilities towards their 
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electorate. He remained involved in the organisation of the contingents, and took a paternal 
interest in the welfare of the Canadian troops, making great efforts to ensure that their 
services received proper recognition. The Boer War came to symbolise the imperial and 
defence issues that became a common theme during the remainder his career.  
 
 
As the representative of the British government in Canada, Minto played an important role 
both in explaining their policies to Ottawa, as well as providing his views about Laurier’s 
attitudes and Canadian  opinion to his superiors. This proved particularly important for 
Chamberlain’s attempts during and after the Boer War to strengthen the bonds of Empire 
by creating centralised federal institutions and persuading the self-governing colonies to 
accept  greater  defensive  responsibilities.  Minto’s  extensive  investigations  of  Canadian 
views on this subject led him to encourage Chamberlain to focus on economic links as a 
more  productive  approach  to  achieving  his  aims.  Alleviating  civil-military  tensions  by 
eradicating corruption and political interference from the militia also occupied much of his 
attention. Minto was unable to prevent the removals of two GOCs, Hutton and Dundonald 
in 1900 and 1904 respectively, and the events surrounding their departures damaged his 
relations with Laurier’s government. He worked hard to properly define the relationship 
between  GOC  and  the  Minister  of  Militia,  and  to  retain  some  measure  of  imperial 
influence  over  Canadian  defence  policy.  Minto  could  not  prevent  the  alteration  of  the 
Militia Act in 1904 to allow the appointment of a Canadian GOC, but he recognised the 
trend towards increasing Dominion control in this respect, and used his influence with the 
War Office to secure the appointment of an officer favourable to the Canadians. 
 
 
Anglo-American relations were another important consideration for Minto during his time 
in Canada. The attempts to resolve potentially troublesome issues, particularly the Alaska 
Boundary dispute, ensured that these remained tense until his departure. Although he did 
not share the views fashionable at the time about the prospects for Anglo-Saxon harmony, 
and frequently expressed his annoyance at American behaviour and attitudes in private, he 
recognised the importance of improving relations and expounded much energy to fulfil his 
gubernatorial  duty  of  preventing  Canada  from  obstructing  attempts  to  reach 
rapprochement.  Much  energy  was  expended  explaining  British  policies  to  Laurier’s 
government and persuading them to accept various plans put forward to solve outstanding 
difficulties,  while  in  return  he  conscientiously  voiced  Canadian  objections  to  any 
unacceptable proposals, and supported them vociferously when they were treated unfairly.   41 
After the unfavourable decision of the tribunal in October 1903, Minto tried to assuage 
Canadian fury at the perceived sacrifice of their interests, and he was heartily glad that the 
issue gradually faded into the background during the latter stages of his tenure. 
 
 
Although these major difficulties arose frequently during his time in Canada, as Governor 
Minto was involved in various other issues. Much of his time was occupied by the social 
and ceremonial duties central to the post. Criticisms were voiced that Minto was the very 
image of a stiff and aloof aristocrat, but he exhibited an infectious enthusiasm for subjects 
that interested him, and many contemporaries were surprised to discover he was actually 
quite approachable.
89 His innate bravery did much to endear him to Canadians, particularly 
his daring rescue of a stranded fireman during the great Ottawa blaze. Minto travelled 
across  most  of  the  Dominion,  visiting  many  towns  en  route.  He  particularly  enjoyed 
touring places that brought back memories of his service in 1885 and the far north-west, 
where after listening to the grievances of locals he tried to persuade the government to 
improve  local  administration.  Protecting  the  cultures  of  Canada’s  first  nations  against 
government interference became a particular interest. He regularly gave speeches to, and 
attended the functions of, institutions and societies in Canada’s major cities. Engagement 
with emerging Canadian culture was another important duty; he attended art exhibitions 
and  concerts,  and  encouraged  the  preservation  of  Canada’s  heritage  by  advocating  the 
protection of historical sites like the Plains of Abraham and plans to establish a national 
archive. Charitable patronage was another significant role, and as well as his work during 
the Boer War, he and his wife helped to establish cottage hospitals for remote areas, and a 
foundation for respiratory diseases. Canada also provided many opportunities for Minto to 
indulge his passion for participating in, and watching, sport. Although he faced criticism 
for his imperialist policies, such views were in the minority; Minto departed from Canada 
in late 1904 a popular figure receiving widespread praise for his engagement with local 
customs and politics, and his efforts to restore Canadian links with the Empire. 
 
 
Like most proconsuls, Minto’s ambition was to become Viceroy; this was the apex of 
imperial government and the logical progression after Ottawa. Such hopes had faded after 
the extension of Curzon’s tenure, and were deflated further by the instability of Balfour’s 
government, which threatened to collapse at any time during 1905 and thus end his hopes 
                                                 
89 Stevens & Saywell (eds.), LMCP I, pp. xx-xxii.   42 
of preferment. Luck proved to be on Minto’s side. Curzon’s relations with London strained 
to  breaking  point  over  Tibetan  policy  and  his  dispute  with  Kitchener,  and  the 
temperamental  Viceroy  finally  resigned in  August 1905. With the preferred candidates 
either unwilling or unable to accept the post, Minto’s Canadian experience made him the 
best alternative, and in one of his final significant acts before resignation Balfour appointed 
him as the new Viceroy. Aged 60, he was twenty years older than his predecessor had been 
on appointment. Some concerns were raised about his capacity for the gruelling task ahead, 
but he remained very physically fit, and his athleticism had surprised many in Canada. In 
temperament, he was ideally suited. Amenable where Curzon had been abrasive, Minto 
was  capable  of  working  with  difficult  colleagues  to  get  policies  implemented  while 
avoiding  friction,  but  could  also  provide  firm  leadership  when  necessary.  Not  an 
intellectual  by  any  means,  especially  in  comparison  to  Curzon  or  Morley,  Minto  was 
capable of astute analysis of issues based on his own observation. He had learned from his 
Canadian experience that imperial government worked best as a consensual exercise, a 
useful lesson for the situation he encountered upon arrival. Indeed, one of the reasons for 
his  appointment  had  been  to  restore  tranquillity  to  a  disturbed  India.  Although  he 
established himself as head of the Government of India, Minto was far more approachable 
than his predecessor, and he proved willing to take advice from officials and meet with 
leaders of Indian opinion. Social events and tours were again a regular part of Viceregal 
routine, but the actual work of governing India was far more involved and during his five 
years in office Minto encountered a  wide range of  challenges, not least of which  was 
working  with  the  oversensitive  Morley  as  Secretary  of  State  for  India,  a  man  at  the 
opposite end of the political spectrum. 
 
 
Indian  opinion  had  been  outraged  by  Curzon’s  decision  to  partition  Bengal,  and  the 
measure had provoked widespread agitation and unrest that was to persist throughout his 
tenure. In a classic example of metropolitan-periphery tension, it produced much friction 
between Minto and Morley, who held conflicting views on the best way to approach the 
situation.  Morley  was  adamant  that  redressing  grievances  and  making  concessions  to 
Indian opinion, such as the introduction of a small measure of self-government, was the 
only way to maintain stability. Minto agreed with the ends but not the means, and he 
argued consistently that as ‘man on the spot’ he was the best judge of the situation. In his 
view, any concessions granted without the restoration of order would be taken as weakness 
and only encourage further unrest; agitation and violence had to be suppressed with a firm 
hand and rewards had to be earned by peace and loyalty.  Interference with the Indian   43 
Army, the foundation of British rule, and about whom any hint of disloyalty provoked 
paranoia amongst the Government, combined with a series of terrorist ‘outrages’ to justify 
their  worst  fears  about  the  spread  of  sedition.  As  a  result  an  uneasy  compromise  was 
adopted  to  solve  the  problem.  A  series  of  repressive  measures,  to  prevent  the  worst 
excesses of the seditious press, restrict access to firearms and explosives, and imposing 
harsh penalties such as deportation on agitators was introduced to curtail extremism. At the 
same time the famous reforms were implemented, increasing Indian representation on the 
legislative and executive councils, and introducing the spirit, if not the letter, of democracy 
to India.  
 
 
Internal unrest was not the only threat to concern India’s rulers. Changes in British foreign 
policy aimed to eliminate the major threat to the security of India’s frontiers by reaching 
rapprochement  with  Russia  on  their  respective  spheres  of  influence  in  Central  Asia  in 
August  1907.  Although  they  objected  in  principle  to  the  proposed  agreement,  Simla’s 
views on the terms needed to protect Indian security were taken into account during the 
negotiations. Minto had supported Kitchener’s plans to reform the Army in India, and he 
continued to back the c-in-c against Morley’s efforts to use the agreement to justify not 
only halting these schemes, but also to reduce the levels of troops in India. Curzon’s claims 
that  his  much-vaunted  reforms  had  supposedly  brought  unprecedented  peace  and 
tranquillity  to  the  chronically  unstable  region  proved  unfounded.  Like  most  Viceroys, 
Minto thus had to deal with the ever-present danger of frontier unrest. Minto’s attempts to 
stabilise relations with Afghanistan proved fruitful in some respects, but could do little to 
restrain the tribes. Minto therefore faced another prolonged struggle to persuade Morley 
that tribal lawlessness could not go unpunished, and that some military response to unrest 
was vital. These problems came to a head in February 1908, when it became necessary to 
despatch a military expedition to the frontier. Only swift action prevented these troubles 
from escalating a few months later, but it was never possible to pacify the whole province. 
Minto  also  successfully  persuaded  Morley,  though  not  without  difficulty,  that  some 
measures had to be taken to prevent the tribes obtaining the modern weaponry that was 
fuelling  their  criminality  and  providing  the  means  to  challenge  the  authorities,  and  a 
blockade was implemented in late 1909. Difficulties were also encountered on the other 
frontier, as China attempted to reassert its authority in Tibet and make claims in Burma, 
another legacy of Curzon’s aggressive policies. 
 
   44 
Minto suffered by comparison with his dynamic predecessor, but the India he bestowed to 
Hardinge was an oasis of calm compared with the powder keg he had inherited in 1905. He 
may not have been the  most illustrious of Viceroys, but Minto had been appointed to 
restore stability to  India, and achieved that difficult task as far  as was possible in the 
poisoned atmosphere created by Curzon’s policies. He was rightly praised for his efforts, 
and many were sorry to see him depart Simla. Advanced in years, suffering the strain of 
prolonged hard work in a punishing climate, and sitting on the opposition benches in the 
Lords, Minto did not have the opportunity to exercise great influence in British politics on 
his  return.  He  still  retained  an  interest  in  both  Canada  and  India  and  his  advice  was 
occasionally sought on matters relating to them. He returned to manage his Border estates, 
but his health soon deteriorated, and he died after a short illness in early 1914, mourned by 
many of his former subjects.  
 
 
Minto’s appointment to the two most important posts in the imperial government, when 
many criticised him as being unsuitable or unqualified, makes him an ideal vehicle for 
studying British attitudes towards its Empire, and the methods they adopted for running 
such an apparently unwieldy entity during a period of dramatic reorientation in foreign and 
defence policy. It is an opportunity which earlier scholars ignored, bound by the restrictive 
climate of imperial history. The few who investigated Minto’s career did so either only 
from  a  Canadian  or  Indian  perspective  resolutely  refusing  to  acknowledge  the  British 
contribution.  The  nationalist  or  anti-British  prejudices  incumbent  on  such  approaches, 
which made it necessary to criticise every move made by Britain’s representatives unless 
perceived to be motivated by a benevolent desire to devolve power to oppressed imperial 
peoples,  precluded  considering  his  career  in  a  wider  imperial  context  or  utilising  the 
chance provided to compare how Britain governed the diverse territories comprising its 
Empire. Further shifts in imperial historiography, away from the more perceptible topics of 
political  and  military  history,  towards  more  abstract  ideas  about  ‘culture,’  led  many 
historians, influenced by literary theory and social science methodology, to attack more 
traditional approaches as unfashionable and likely to shed little light on the Empire.  
 
Much  Canadian  writing  about  its  imperial  relationship  with  Britain  is  infused  with 
resentment of the humiliation implied by such subordination, believed to be unfitting for 
an emerging nation. Indeed, the development of Canadian nationhood is an obsession for   45 
Canadian historians, despite attempts to restore Britain to the centrality it warrants,
90 and it 
is  in  such  light  the  careers  of  its  Governors  have  been  examined.  As  Minto’s  career 
coincided  with  a  key  period  in  Canada’s  transition  away  from  colonial  status  and  the 
refashioning  of  Britain’s  relations  with  America,  it  has  been  the  subject  of  some 
consideration.
91  These  studies  illustrate  the  trend  towards  nationalist  dominance  in 
Canadian  historiography,  as  outlined  by  Owram,  where  Canadian  history  has  been 
interpreted as the study of relations with Britain, or imperialism can be defined as a form 
of  Canadian  nationalism,  particularly  in  emphasising  separateness  from  America.  As 
Owram argues, ‘the historiography of Empire in Canada, therefore, is really only partly 
about the Empire. It is instead the story of Canada and her main link to the wider world.’ 
92  
 
 
It is unsurprising that Canadian historians have little positive to say about Minto’s career, 
and the major studies of his tenure dismiss Buchan’s claims that Minto was able to impose 
his own influence and policy on Laurier’s government.
93 Instead they tend towards the 
views expressed by more nationalistic contemporaries, like the journalist John Dafoe, who 
criticised Minto for interfering with Canadian autonomy on the orders of Chamberlain, an 
indiscretion that made him unsuitable for the position of a constitutional governor.
94 Miller 
argued that Minto, due to a combination of the limitations imposed by his office and his 
propensity to fight for lost causes, ‘had little discernible effect on the formation of high 
policy.’ He was not without influence, but suffered because of his distance from the centre 
of  power  and  the  indifference  or  annoyance  demonstrated  by  the  British  government 
departments  responsible  for  Canada.
95 Stevens  and  Saywell  also  tried  to  offer  a  more 
balanced view, defending Minto against the more virulent contemporary  criticism. For 
them, Minto worked effectively in partnership with Laurier, who prevented the eruption of 
more serious crises during periods of tension, and the Governor was thus able to exercise 
his  influence  over  important  issues.  However,  Minto’s  career  marked  the  end  of  the 
relationship he thought should exist between the Governor and the Canadian government. 
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Minto’s concern for the Empire and its military position blinded him to the realities of 
British and Canadian policies, especially the redefinition of military policy in the Western 
Hemisphere. Refusal to admit that self-government granted Canada control over its armed 
forces  provoked  crises  over  the  position  of  the  GOC,  and  Canada’s  rejection  of 
Chamberlain’s efforts to strengthen imperial connections signified the failure of Minto’s 
efforts  to  encourage  imperial  sentiment  in  the  wake  of  Boer  War  cooperation.  Minto 
learned he could not force the adoption of unpopular policies and came to appreciate the 
complex nature of Canadian nationalist sentiment.
96 
 
 
Minto’s main appearances in Western contributions to Indian historiography are as the man 
who  tried  to  block  Morley’s  heroic  efforts  to  emancipate  India  from  British  imperial 
tyranny and set them on the road to eventual independence. Such arguments dominated the 
approach adopted in the two anti-imperialist studies of Morley’s tenure as Secretary of 
State for India written by American historians in the late 1960s. Historians like Wasti, who 
take a more balanced view of the reforms, recognise, however, that the respective role of 
the  two  men  in  their  gestation  was  virtually  equal.
97 Because  of  the  reforms  Minto’s 
relationship  with  Morley  is  the  most  frequently  and  carefully  considered  aspect  of  his 
career. Beyond brief mentions in general histories, however, these events have disappeared 
from the historiographical world-view in recent years. The last monograph was published 
in the late 1960s, since when historians have moved on from Buchan’s somewhat biased 
view that the Viceroy had dominated the relationship, ending his tenure with an impressive 
record of positive achievements on which to look back, particularly the reintroduction of 
harmony  to  fevered  and  disturbed  India.
98 Wasti  upheld  the  positive  view  of  Minto, 
arguing  that  he  coped  admirably  with  the  difficult  task  of  restoring  confidence  in  the 
Government of India and reconciling the aspirations of the growing number of educated 
Indians  to  British  rule,  while  coping  with  the  constant  interference  of  an  overweening 
superior in London.
99 Das’s work represented the beginning of a change; for him Minto 
was  merely  a  mediocre  Viceroy  who  achieved  the  remarkable  feat  of  keeping  a  great 
Liberal in line with his own conservative principles. Countering the traditional view of a 
harmonious  relationship  between  the  two  men,  Das  argued  that  they  actually  differed 
bitterly on fundamental issues. Despite the rhetoric of understanding, the relationship was a 
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clash of personalities between an obstinate mind and a shrewd vision.
100 Wolpert occupies 
the opposite end of the spectrum by establishing Morley as the hero of the tale. His legacy 
remained untarnished long after that of Minto had faded. It was Morley who was solely 
responsible for restoring tranquillity to India after Curzon and then moving it forward; 
elevating Minto to co-partnership was an ‘erroneous historical exaltation,’ the two men 
were only linked by ‘an accident of history.’ Minto failed to provide leadership for the 
Government of India and thus Morley’s confidence in his judgement diminished, resulting 
in an occasionally bitter struggle over whether the epicentre of power in British rule in 
India should be located in Simla or Whitehall.
101 
 
 
Changes  in  approach  to  the  study  of  Canada  or  India’s  relationship  with  the  Empire 
represent  the  wider  trends  of  imperial  history.  As  Howe  stresses,  for  the  Dominions, 
interpreting  the  past  has  become  a  national  exercise,  (‘trying  to  escape  the  history  of 
Empire’), where it has  become difficult to discern what role, if  any, Britain played in 
national  development.
102  Both  have  seen  the  shift  away  from  the  study  of  areas 
traditionally  associated  with  imperial  history,  notably  political  and  military  matters. 
Dominated  by  ‘dead  white  men,’  such  concerns  are  no  longer  considered  relevant  or 
fashionable,  and  are  believed  to  contribute  little  to  our  understanding  of  the  imperial 
experience in either Britain or its possessions. India has proved more susceptible to the 
influence of post-colonial discourse theories, particularly Said’s work. An interdisciplinary 
approach, rooted in the methodologies of literary criticism and social science, has become 
a dominating influence in the study of the dependent Empire. For India, the most important 
has been ‘subaltern studies,’ which aimed to analyse the discourses of domination and 
subordination to ‘promote the systematic and informed discussion of subaltern themes…to 
rectify the elitist bias,’ and focus on previously neglected groups to gain a more complete 
picture of Indian nationalism.
103 Such ideas are not without their critics, and many have 
attacked the post-colonialists for their dismissal of traditional archival methods and their 
propensity  to  regard  the  Empire  solely  as  a  ‘cultural  construct,’  thus  ignoring  the 
economic, political and strategic issues that are central to any understanding of Britain’s 
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relationship with its Empire. The blinkered ‘post-colonialist’ approach, removing the men 
responsible for running the Empire from the central place they must occupy in any study, 
does little to develop understanding.
104 
 
 
The reaction against these trends, combined with recent international events and the public 
consideration  of  ‘British  identity,’  has  prompted  a  more  detailed  discussion  of  the 
Empire’s place in British history. Leading historians like Bayly and Darwin have used 
imperial  history  to  argue  that  ‘globalisation’  is  not  merely  a  modern  issue.
105 The 
publication  of  the  monumental  Oxford  History  of  the  Empire  helped  to  reinvigorate 
academic  debate  about  the  subject,  provoking  heated  discussion  about  what  actually 
constitutes imperial history.
106 Many historians have challenged the once central idea that 
the imperial past had to be studied under a yoke of guilt: 
 
 
…Many younger British scholars appeared to be writing from a sense of shame – 
and collective shame is no better for analysis than assumptions of collective guilt 
or collective pride.
107 
 
 
Although attempts to portray the Empire in a  more balanced light, by stressing that it 
brought benefits as well as created problems, can still provoke vitriolic criticism,
108 British 
historians  have  rejected  the  anti-imperialist  tone  previously  inherent  in  studies  by 
Americans,  to  take  a  more  objective  view.  Attempts  to  utilise  the  imperial  past  to 
understand modern political developments have aided the efforts of those like Hopkins, 
who aim not only to restore the Empire to the epicentre of the study of British history, but 
also  to  end  the  process  of  ‘indigenisation’  within  imperial  history  by  returning  the 
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Dominions to their central place in the subject and considering the Empire as a ‘dynamic 
global network’ under British direction.
109  
 
 
Among  those  who  still  admit  continued  British  paramountcy  in  imperial  history  much 
attention has been paid to the more dynamic proconsuls, such as Curzon or Milner, whose 
intellectual prowess or fervent imperialism made them stand out amongst less ‘brilliant’ 
contemporaries. But a propensity to launch unwelcome policy initiatives of their own and 
create trouble for London, often made them less popular than steadier colleagues. Yet as 
the above narrative hopefully illustrates, a study of Lord Minto’s imperial career offers 
scope for wider investigation into the Empire during one of its most interesting periods. He 
was one of the many aristocrats who continued to wield power in the higher echelons of 
imperial government, a prime example of the ‘gentlemanly amateur’ who still dominated 
in  an  age  when  the  professional  administrator  was  only  beginning  to  emerge.  Similar 
educational backgrounds and career paths, combined with frequent contact in clubs and 
‘society,’ created a shared ethos amongst this ruling caste that influenced attitudes towards 
its Empire and permeated the ‘official mind.’ Foremost was a pragmatic realisation that the 
heterogeneous nature of Britain’s imperial territories rendered any attempt to impose an 
overarching theory of governance upon them at best hopeless and at worst dangerous. With 
its possessions divided into three separate groupings of self-governing colonies, India, and 
the crown colonies, it was difficult to find policies to suit the diverse regions within these 
let  alone  for  the  whole  Empire.  Policies  were  still  governed  by  certain  ‘unspoken 
assumptions’  that  permeated  the  outlook  of  all  involved  in  imperial  administration, 
foremost  of  which  was  ensuring  the  security  of  British  interests  as  defined  by  the 
government against external or internal threats. Regardless of what other historians have 
argued for the influence of financiers or missionaries, these claims were never allowed to 
interfere with this primary concern. 
 
 
Minto’s  career  as  Governor  General  in  Canada  and  Viceroy  in  India  provides  a  more 
accurate image of the workings of the British Empire in two of its most important and 
different,  possessions  during  an  important  period  of  transition.  Investigation  from  an 
imperial rather than a nationalist Canadian or Indian perspective provides a more balanced 
view  of  imperial  development  in  the  late  nineteenth  and  early  twentieth  centuries  by 
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restoring  Britain  and  its  policies  and  officials  to  the  central  position  that  they  must 
necessarily  occupy.  Minto  was  certainly  more  representative  of  the  way  that  Britain 
actually ran its Empire than any of his more famous contemporaries. He was not a ‘great’ 
proconsul, however that is to be defined, and this is a pivotal point. Instead, he was one of 
the  many  pragmatists  who  served  the  Empire  and  helped  to  steady  it  and  ‘reset  it  to 
default’ after periods of rule by the more zealous or lazy members of the imperial service. 
As one Canadian historian argues, it was one thing to sit in Britain and expound great 
theories on imperial government, but quite another for the ‘man on the spot’ to implement 
them in territories the size of Western Europe, and where the issues of imperial relations 
did not rank high in the list of local priorities.
110 But this was a key function for imperial 
governors, to act as a bridge between local opinion and the ‘official mind’, and therefore it 
was important for them to be representatives of the latter, but possessing an acute ability to 
understand the former. Men like Minto were the reality of the Empire, true examples of the 
‘official  mind’,  who  represented  the  larger  forces  behind  the  ‘ornamentalist’  image  of 
Britain and its Empire. Like many of his true contemporaries, Minto had a much better 
grasp of the requirements of imperial defence and the role that the Empire could play in 
maintaining Britain’s international position than the so-called imperialists. His responses 
to events were much more in line with reality – he learned from his early mistakes, and 
accepted that he was there to govern and implement the policies of his superiors (whether 
he agreed with them or not). He did not try to run any of the territories he governed like a 
personal fiefdom, or allow his personal political principles to interfere with the everyday 
running  of  the  Empire,  an  attitude  that  was  to  bring  him  into  conflict  with  his  more 
idealistic  superiors  on  several  occasions.  Although  describing  Cromer,  Owen’s  views 
could be applied to many of the Empire’s highest officials during the Edwardian period, 
including Minto: 
 
 
like  so  many  imperial  administrators  of  his  kind,  [he]  is  better  seen  as  an 
energizer, a coordinator, and implementer, a problem-solver, and an apologist, 
rather than as an original thinker in his own right.
111 
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2. Repairing the Damage: Minto and his Predecessors 
 
Aberdeen and Minto 
 
Not all share the opinion of Canadian liberal-nationalist historians that Aberdeen was a 
model governor; one more imperially minded interwar historian argued that ‘there can be 
no doubt that Aberdeen lowered his office.’
112 Aberdeen’s lasting impact on Canada was 
the further downgrading of the already declining powers of the Governor General. He was 
unfortunate  to  encounter  an  apparently  never-ending  series  of  domestic  political  crises 
worsened by an absence of talented or acceptable leaders among the ruling Conservatives. 
Concerns about the influence of his overbearing wife, who was treated as an equal partner 
in the task of government, and their barely concealed Liberal leanings, meant that their 
intervention during the Manitoba Schools Question, although driven by an altruistic desire 
to  end  the  ethnic  intolerance  that  so  shocked  them,  was  treated  with  suspicion  and 
provoked  complaints  about  unnecessary  interference.  Paradoxically  he  faced  equal 
criticism  for  his  prolonged  absence  from  Ottawa  at  the  nadir  of  the  crisis.  His  final 
intervention, during the prolonged collapse of Tupper’s government, was constitutionally 
correct but weakly defended and earned him the lasting contempt of the Conservative party 
and press.  
 
 
Minto was unfortunate in his predecessor; given carte blanche over the man he would 
succeed it is unlikely that Aberdeen would have been first choice. He followed a popular 
and  unassuming  non-entity,  who  held  a  very  different  conception  of  the  post  and  was 
entirely dominated by his wife. His career is only discussed in the context of Canadian 
events, and studying these makes it clear why Aberdeen, when compared with that of an 
active proconsul like Curzon or even Minto, has never warranted an independent study in 
his own right. The primacy of internal affairs during Aberdeen’s tenure, caused by bitter 
partisan and ethnic tension, combined with his indolence towards imperial responsibilities, 
created a belief that the Governor needed to be less obtrusive rather than be given greater 
freedom of expression as the Dominion grew in strength and confidence.
113 Thus Minto, 
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whose tenure was dominated by imperial and foreign policy issues, immediately faced 
difficulties caused by the widely circulated but misguided opinions about the Governor’s 
duties. 
 
 
The contrast Minto’s tenure offered with Aberdeen created a belief among contemporary 
Canadians  that  his  appointment  had  been  motivated  by  a  British  desire  to  strengthen 
imperial  ties.  His  denunciation  as  Chamberlain’s  ‘sinister  agent’  by  an  embittered 
Canadian journalist damaged his historical reputation almost beyond repair, and Buchan’s 
controversial biography did little to help: 
 
 
With  Mr  Chamberlain  at  the  Colonial  Office,  it  was  impossible  for  the  new 
Governor  General  to  be  a  merely  spectacular  figure,  opening  and  dissolving 
parliaments or giving automatic assent to ordinances. He was a representative of 
a new school of imperial thought which Canada could not ignore: and with this 
new spirit abroad his office took on a greater significance.
114 
 
 
Consensus  emerged  among  earlier  Canadian  historians  that  Minto’s  appointment  was 
engineered by Chamberlain as part of an elaborate plan to choose crusader proconsuls to 
educate  recalcitrant  colonials  in  accordance  with  his  ideals;  converting  them  to  closer 
imperial  union  and  actively  promoting  military  reform.  Chamberlain’s  alleged  plot  to 
summarily replace Aberdeen with a Governor more to his taste assumed a mythic status 
that some later Canadian historians attempted to debunk, although the argument is not 
without foundation. Some defended Minto for his restraint in not rushing into attempts to 
foster imperial enthusiasm merely to please the Colonial Secretary, citing Buchan’s views 
that while Minto supported Chamberlain’s aims, his willingness to criticise his superior’s 
policies and reluctance to trust him because of his association with the ‘ungentlemanly’ 
Rhodes,  proved he was no ‘blind hero-worshipper.’
115  
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Minto’s entry in the Dictionary of National Biography created an unfortunate and lasting 
image: 
 
 
one of those men who would probably never have risen to the high offices except 
in  a  country  where  some  deference  was  still  paid  to  the  claims  of  birth  and 
position.
116 
 
 
Little  in  his  early  career  had  suggested  the  makings  of  an  imperial  statesman.  The 
widespread  belief  that  aristocrats  were  well  suited  to  imperial  government  made  the 
‘claims of birth and position’ important considerations in Minto’s appointment. He was not 
the  first  choice  for  Canada,  and  was  only  approached  after  various  other  aristocratic 
candidates had rejected the offer.
117 Miller argues that Minto was not Chamberlain’s hand-
picked choice or the pliant instrument of a grander imperial design as if this had been the 
Colonial Secretary’s aim he would have chosen a more malleable, politically experienced 
and subtle man, who understood the relative impotence of the Governor’s post,
118 although 
imperial representative was a role into which Minto grew successfully. Minto claimed to 
‘have done nothing directly myself’ but he campaigned hard for the position, making no 
secret of his desire for preferment; it was a post he coveted and actively solicited, working 
assiduously through more influential friends to obtain it, especially when he learned of the 
impending vacancy. Wolseley, who had previously advised Minto to go for the Governor’s 
post, was used as an intermediary to approach Lansdowne, while his candidacy was raised 
with other senior Cabinet figures as well as influential Canadians like Mountstephen and 
Strathcona.
119 Brodrick offered assurance that he had given the issue a ‘little shove in the 
right direction’ and that his friends had been willing advocates.
120 Lady Minto’s contacts at 
court proved vital, as Buckingham Palace retained some control over prestigious imperial 
appointments and was known to have heartily disapproved of Lady Aberdeen.
121 These 
efforts evidently worked as Minto learned of his appointment on 19 July 1898, admitting 
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that he owed much to his friends, many of whom offered congratulations and expressed 
their belief that his appointment was the best thing for Canada.
122  
 
 
Minto was immensely  proud of his new position and believed that his  eclectic career, 
which he admitted was unlikely to lead to great appointments, made him more suited for it 
than those with experience only in politics, where minds were ‘formed in a groove’ and 
contact with  a ‘large  range of humanity’ was limited, making them unaware that men 
existed outside official circles as capable of administering the Empire as those in them.
123 
As  Minto’s  career  did  not  suggest  the  making  of  an  imperial  statesman,  he  owed  his 
appointment  to  various  other  factors.  Perhaps  his  early  days  as  a  ‘daringly  successful 
gentleman  jockey’
124 were  not  the  best  qualification,  but  family  traditions  of  imperial 
service, and connections with the Unionist elite who controlled such appointments proved 
helpful. Of more importance was his time as Lansdowne’s military secretary in the 1880s 
which  had  provided  valuable  first-hand  experience  of  Canada  and  its  defensive 
requirements, and was perceived to be a distinct advantage by his British superiors and 
new  Canadian  colleagues;  indeed  Laurier  claimed  that  news  of  Minto’s  elevation  was 
‘received  with  universal  satisfaction  by  those  who  remembered  his  services.’
125 Miller 
admits that Minto’s influence with the War Office, acting as an unofficial spokesman in 
the  Lords  and  publishing  articles  in  journals,  was  an  important  consideration  in  his 
appointment,
126  a  point  that  Penlington  also  emphasises  by  arguing  that  Minto’s 
‘considerable  military  reputation’  meant  that  ‘from  the  point  of  view  of  the  British 
authorities no man could better fill the post of Governor-General….since he possessed a 
wide knowledge of Canadian military conditions.’
127 Penlington supports the traditional 
argument,  dismissing  Saywell’s  claim  that  Aberdeen  decided  to  resign  for  financial 
reasons.
128 Considering Chamberlain’s decision to recall Aberdeen after he had apparently 
performed his task well and integrated into Canadian life, Penlington states that he had 
failed  to  represent  the  British  Government  as  well  as  he  had  done  for  the  crown.  An 
                                                 
122 LMCP I, Chamberlain to Minto, 19 July, 1898, Brodrick to Minto, 22 July 1898, Journal 26 July 1898, pp. 
4-7; NLS MS 12390, Lord Minto’s Miscellaneous Correspondence 1891 to August 1898; MS 12391, Lord 
Minto’s Miscellaneous Correspondence August to December 1898. 
123 LMCP I, Journal, 17 & 26 July 1898, pp.3-4, 6-7. 
124 Penlington, Canada and Imperialism, pp. 138-42. See also Buchan, Lord Minto, pp. 113-118; Kirk-
Greene, ‘Governors-General’; Miller, Canadian Career, p.1. 
125 LMCP, Lansdowne to Minto, 23 July 1898,  Laurier to Minto, 28 July 1898, pp. 6-7; Penlington, Canada 
and Imperialism, p. 138. 
126 Miller, Canadian Career, pp. 45-46. 
127 Penlington, Canada and Imperialism, p.139; N. Penlington, ‘General Hutton and the Problem of Military 
Imperialism in Canada, 1898-1900’ CHR 24 (1943), p. 158. 
128 Kirk-Greene, ‘Governors-General’, p. 44; Penlington, Canada and Imperialism, p. 139; Saywell, Journal 
of Lady Aberdeen, p. xxxii.   55 
‘indiscriminate indolence’ pervaded Aberdeen’s actions when matters did not interest him, 
in sharp contrast with the energy and subtlety of which he was capable when subjects 
aroused  his  enthusiasm.  Failure  to  offer  advice  about  important  issues  like  the  GOC’s 
planned  resignation  provoked  Colonial  Office  complaints  and  aroused  concerns  that 
Aberdeen’s  willingness  to  allow  the  Governor’s  powers  to  atrophy  was  lowering  the 
dignity of the office. Penlington argues that these anxieties, particularly Aberdeen’s lack of 
interest in one increasingly important area of imperial policy, influenced the decision to 
appoint Minto as his successor: 
 
 
Under  existing  conditions  little  further  military  progress  was  immediately 
possible  in  Canada,  more  forceful  men  than  General  Gascoigne  and  Lord 
Aberdeen as GOC and Governor General were essential. Two such men arrived 
in August and November 1898…No matter how able the men, however, their 
success  depended  on  public  acceptance  of  their  leadership,  and  this  in  turn 
depended largely on the continuance of anti-American resentments. These not 
only continued but intensified. 
129 
 
 
Canadian  critics  raised  concerns  about  Minto’s  military  background  and  lack  of 
administrative experience. Remarks in the British press that Minto had been appointed to 
rule  the  Dominion  ‘vigorously’  heightened  their  anxieties.  Penlington  challenges 
assumptions  that  Minto  ‘was  a  constitutional  ignoramus’  by  arguing  that  the  valuable 
experience he had gained working with Lansdowne and his study of key texts on the self-
governing  colonies  made  him  more  than  a  ‘combination  country  squire  and  heavy 
dragoon.’  Re-examination  of  his  policies  and  accomplishments,  particularly  his  role  in 
furthering  British  understanding  of  Canada’s  evolving  relationship  with  the  Empire, 
highlights the unconvincing nature of such views.
130  
 
 
Because of their opposing political backgrounds Minto’s conception of the gubernatorial 
role, particularly his desire to be a strong and conscientious leader and more than a mere 
figurehead, was very different from Aberdeen’s. As such it has generated criticism from 
Canadian historians who resent the inferiority implied by the imposition of unqualified 
aristocrats to rule the ‘senior Dominion.’ Miller, and Stevens and Saywell, argue that little 
scope existed for an ambitious Governor and that the Canadian government and imperial 
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authorities were the best defenders of the imperial interests that Minto aimed to protect; 
Governors  were  rarely  issued  with  specific  instructions  about  their  roles  as  imperial 
officers.
131  Such  an  argument  is  disingenuous,  as  the  Governor  was  the  imperial 
government’s representative in Ottawa, and retained a responsibility to inform the Colonial 
Office if he felt British interests were being neglected or damaged. Minto wanted to retain 
every vestige of his prerogatives as an imperial officer and it was the contrast with his 
predecessor that caused problems. 
 
 
While some of Minto’s correspondents admitted Aberdeen’s popularity, many echoed the 
excitement about the change expressed by one: 
 
 
Without wishing to criticise the late lamented occupant of the viceregal throne I 
am in a position to know that your appointment is generally considered a most 
popular one and a vast ‘improvement’ on your immediate predecessor.
132 
 
 
Unionists and Canadian Conservatives were glad to be rid of the openly Liberal governor, 
especially  one  so  admiring  of  Gladstone,  while  Canada’s  military  welcomed  the 
appointment of soldier to replace a man they derided as an ‘ex-duffer.’
133 Minto himself 
hinted that it would be easy to succeed Aberdeen,
134 remarking privately to his brother that 
on his departure the ‘whole country seems to have given an intense sigh of relief.’ The 
tendency to criticise his predecessor had created some awkward moments for Minto, who 
was  reluctant  to  publicly  disparage  a  fellow  peer,  especially  after  Aberdeen’s  friendly 
reception and assistance in providing information about the issues Minto would confront as 
Governor. Minto, however, marvelled at his predecessor’s methods, admitting that he had 
‘hardly imagined such a regime [was] possible,’ and that ‘respectful contempt’ was the 
best  description  of  their  lasting  impression.  People  regarded  Aberdeen  as  a  thorough 
gentleman, industrious and with excellent intentions, but who was unable to concentrate on 
subjects and had the added problem of a domineering wife,  who had  ‘earned the acid 
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sobriquet  of  Governess  General.’
135 Minto  hoped  in  particular  to  restore  the  dignity 
appropriate for the gubernatorial establishment and reassert the prestige of the monarch 
and Empire. Thus Aberdeen’s innovations in inviting tradesmen and servants to official 
dinners, which had made the latter ‘odious,’ were swiftly ended, and plans for a tram line 
running  outside  Rideau  Hall  were  shelved.  ‘Notwithstanding  all  their  nonsense’  the 
Aberdeens’ energy and kindness had helped them engage with Canadian society. Minto, 
offering one of the few hints that he intended to emphasise the imperial aspects of the role, 
stated to his brother that he had different ideas about what was expected of the Governor 
and believed he would have to take a new approach if the appointment was to carry the 
respect it ought, although he recognised that this may provoke criticism.
136  
 
 
Minto was undoubtedly glad that, unlike his predecessor, imperial issues dominated during 
his tenure, although that he was able to make efforts to encourage imperial sentiment was 
due in part to the legacy bestowed by Aberdeen, which offered opportunities to exploit 
Canadian imperialism. Minto’s fears that not all of Canadian opinion would approve of the 
new gubernatorial style, particularly his strong support of imperial military policies, were 
proved correct. But this was predictable – all new Governors faced criticism in comparison 
to their predecessors, and while they faced hostility from one section of public opinion, 
another would be equally quick to defend them. In July 1900, by this stage well established 
in  his  post,  the  ‘Toronto  Telegram’  claimed  that  the  Aberdeens  would  not  suffer  by 
comparison to Minto, unlike him they had never shown any inclination to interfere, nor had 
they ever insulted Canada. In a country where the press was notoriously partisan such 
barbed comments were to be expected, and many other papers were quick to accuse them 
of ‘Mintophobia.’
137 
 
 
Gundy has argued that ‘the almost simultaneous appointment of two well-known military 
men appeared to augur a shake up in the Canadian militia.’
138 Many Canadians feared that 
Chamberlain’s  objective  in  making  these  appointments  was  to  effect  an  unwelcome 
reorganisation of Canada’s forces to make them available for imperial defence purposes. 
Such suspicions were reinforced by Hutton and Minto’s connections with Wolseley, who 
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was working with Chamberlain to promote closer cooperation and reform of Canada’s 
defence system. The Governor and GOC both admitted owing a lot to the Commander-in-
Chief’s  patronage  and  support,  which  had  influenced  the  decisions  to  appoint  them.
139 
Hutton  regarded  himself  as  an  ‘imperial  agent,’  and  was  an  aggressive  and  energetic 
reformer ‘cast in the proconsular mould.’
140 His close friendship with Minto had developed 
through their mutual association with the Mounted Infantry movement, and its distorting 
influence on Minto’s perception of issues created many problems in the early stages of the 
Governor’s  career.  Hutton  also  became  the  source  of  many  misinterpretations  about 
Minto’s career, as early historians were guilty of taking his views at face value. Hutton 
believed the force of character and leadership abilities Minto had developed during his 
military career made him the perfect choice for Canadian Governor: 
 
 
To ensure the success of the imperial reforms thus to be initiated and  yet to 
modify too hasty or premature action, while being ready with sage counsel and 
well-balanced advice, a statesman of the highest qualities was obviously required 
as Governor General. An ideal personality was selected in the Earl of Minto. The 
principles and opinions of the new Governor General were in all essential points 
identical with those of the Wolseley school….earnest of purpose, lofty in aim, 
who possessed the strength of will and moral courage, without which no great 
undertaking can be carried to a successful conclusion.
141 
 
 
According to Hutton ‘few contemporaries displayed to greater advantage such qualities of 
statesmanship.’
142 It was hoped that this similarity of outlook would create an effective 
partnership  for  encouraging  Canadian  defensive  reform,  although  Minto  realised  more 
quickly the need for a pragmatic approach when dealing with Canadian politicians. 
 
 
Like  Minto,  Hutton’s  previous  experience  of  reorganising  military  forces  in  a  self-
governing colony and distinguished military career were believed to make him an ideal 
candidate for his post and one correspondent commented that ‘No one has ever before 
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gone  to  Canada  with  your  experience.’
143 Hutton  held  innovative  views  on  imperial 
defence, believing that each part of the Empire should provide for its own passive defence 
and help in the active defence of the Empire as a whole.
144 He was urged by senior soldiers 
like  Ardagh,  the  Director  of  Military  Intelligence,  to  introduce  in  Canada,  as  he  had 
successfully done in Australia, a cooperative defence system that would facilitate closer 
imperial integration.
145 Hutton ignored warnings from Seymour and Kitson, Commandant 
of the Royal Military College, about the difficulties involved in working with the Canadian 
government. Few remained long in the post as influencing government decisions was a 
laborious process, the GOC was expected to act merely as the minister’s mouthpiece, and 
would face a long series of insults and annoyances: ‘it is a Herculean task to actually do 
any good…except to a man who glories in a gloriously uphill task with little reward, I 
can’t recommend the position.’
146 He would not be put off and welcomed the challenges 
offered by the Canadian command. Canadian historians have stressed, however, that these 
problems were not solely the result of ministerial refusal to accept sound military advice or 
fulfil duties towards the Empire, but were often caused by the notoriously tactless generals 
sent by Britain.
147 Indeed the Colonial Office, aware of his troubles in Australia, was wary 
about appointing a general lacking tact and commonsense; as Buchan remarked, the last 
thing Canada wanted was a military enthusiast.
148  
 
 
The War Office urged caution but insisted on Hutton’s appointment, resisting pressure to 
appoint Lake, as they feared his relatively junior rank and popularity in Canada would 
allow Laurier’s government to dictate policy. Tact was not the sole quality required in the 
new  GOC,  although  Hutton  was  warned  that  its  absence  had  created  problems  for  his 
predecessors.  Ministers  and  senior  military  officers,  like  Buller,  advised  him  that  self-
governing colonies could not be coerced into accepting policies they found objectionable 
and attempts to do so would only provoke opposition; firm leadership and flattery were 
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necessary to assist Hutton to achieve his aims.
149 One was to overcome ingrained Canadian 
indifference to national defence and reluctance to contribute to the Empire, which was 
frequently concealed behind its wish to focus on its internal development. Not afforded a 
high  priority  by  successive  governments,  the  militia  had  been  left  to  decay,  becoming 
permeated  by  inefficiency  and  disorganisation.  British  pressure  for  improvement  was 
resolutely  resisted  until  the  inadequacy  of  Canadian  defence  preparations  was  exposed 
during  the  Venezuela  crisis,  although  the  peaceful  denouement  merely  reinforced  the 
Conservatives’ hesitancy in implementing changes. Few expectations existed that the new 
Liberal  government  would  continue  even  these  minimal  efforts,  but  Laurier  wished  to 
pander to the more virulent Canadian imperialism and anti-American hostility provoked by 
Venezuela. He thus supported Borden’s efforts to attack the more glaring deficiencies and 
welcomed the appointment of a committee to report on Canadian defence, although further 
progress was hindered by the presence of a lethargic GOC lacking any influence in Britain 
and  an  avowedly  Gladstonian  governor.  Laurier  had  publicly  expressed  Canada’s 
enthusiasm for the Empire at the 1897 conference, and, despite his rejection of proposals 
for defence centralisation, had alluded to its responsibilities to assist the Empire. Britain 
believed  that  the  appointment  of  a  more  prestigious  officer  would  help  to  further 
imperialist sentiment and secure formal imperial defence arrangements.
 150   
 
 
Minto seemed somewhat disappointed by his final meeting with the Colonial Secretary, 
leaving no record of the conversation beyond a note in his journal that Chamberlain had 
nothing of importance to say, offering no specific instructions or guidance on any imperial 
‘blueprint.’
151 Hutton, however, departed convinced that he had been sent to Canada on a 
mission to implement his own particular view of imperial defence policy. He was keen to 
secure Minto’s support for his plans to reform the Canadian militia, and hoped to utilise the 
Governor’s prestige to assist him rather than work with his actual constitutional superior. 
Hutton  stressed  to  Minto  before  he  arrived  in  Ottawa  that  both  Lansdowne  and 
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Chamberlain were anxious for Canada’s military house to be set in order, and had claimed 
that for this task Minto’s  ‘well-known soldierly qualities’  would be very valuable.
152 
Wolseley,  Lansdowne  and  Chamberlain  had  outlined  to  Hutton  the  difficulties  he  was 
likely to encounter, although he did not believe the likely problems would prevent him 
repeating  his  Australian  successes.  Some  consensus  was  reached  on  what  could  be 
achieved, as all agreed that it would be necessary to minimise political interference and 
patronage to improve discipline and professional standards. They also believed that Hutton 
could utilise the Canadian government’s anxiety to improve the militia to create a force 
capable of rapid mobilisation and checking an enemy advance until reinforcements arrived, 
thus assisting Britain to fulfil its obligations to defend Canada by placing the country’s 
defence on a satisfactory footing.
 153   
 
 
Hutton had drawn up with Ardagh before departing a schedule for his reforms and a list of 
principles to govern Canadian defence policy. He welcomed the Defence Commission’s 
work, believing it had strengthened his hand by demonstrating Britain’s determination to 
press for the necessary reforms in the militia, although Leach later castigated the GOC, 
blaming him for Laurier’s refusal to implement his recommendations.
 154 His main aim was 
to educate public opinion as he had done in Australia to support his plans to create a 
satisfactory  military  organisation,  and  the  anticipation  of  his  appointment  in  military 
quarters seemed to augur well: ‘There is little doubt but that Major-General Hutton will 
evolve a scheme to bring order out of chaos.’
155  
 
 
According  to  Hutton’s  recollections,  coloured  by  bitter  memories  of  the  circumstances 
surrounding  his  departure,  the  excitement  about  his  reforms  did  not  extend  to  the 
Government, which afforded him a somewhat frosty reception. Hutton attributed this to 
Laurier and Borden’s opposition to his plans, and he criticised them for lacking knowledge 
of military organisation and administration or Canadian defence and imperial strategy. In 
his opinion their only interest in military affairs related to patronage, and their dearth of 
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moral courage, political conviction or a definite defence policy was illustrated by their 
willingness to wait until his recommendations had been accepted with enthusiastic acclaim 
by the public and militia before agreeing to implement the necessary reforms.
156 Canadian 
historians  have,  predictably,  rejected  these  accusations.  Miller  disputes  traditional 
arguments that  Minto and Hutton induced the government to adopt a policy they had 
formerly repudiated by mobilising public opinion, arguing instead that as Borden’s fifteen-
year service as Minister of Militia and dedication to improving the force gave it a new 
public significance he deserves the credit for introducing reforms.
157 Penlington argues that 
Hutton’s intention to force reforms on the government created a contrast with his indolent 
predecessor  that  alarmed  his  superiors.  Although  he  was  undoubtedly  aware  of  them, 
Hutton chose to wilfully disregard the four key issues it was necessary for the GOC to 
approach carefully to avoid trouble. Canadian public apathy with regard to military matters 
and  colonial  sensitivity  created  by  nascent  nationalism  were  likely  to  collide  with  an 
enthusiastic GOC bent on reforming Canadian forces to enable them to contribute to wider 
imperial defence. Apparently glorying in creating tension, he rarely aspired to the great tact 
that was necessary to fill the post without friction Hutton’s determination to work with 
Minto  instead  of  Borden  and  his  willingness  to  criticise  Laurier’s  government 
demonstrated the difficulties likely to result from the ill-defined legal position of the GOC, 
his inferiority to the Canadian government, and the loose constitutional conventions that 
left military affairs to be managed on an everyday basis.
158 
 
 
Hutton believed that the ‘colonials’ needed an imperial officer to show them how an army 
should be run, although Canadian historians have criticised him for treating the militia not 
as Canada’s national military organisation, but as a district of the British military command 
system.
159 Such criticism is unfair, as most imperial officers regarded the forces in the self-
governing  colonies  as  integral  parts  of  a  wider  imperial  defence  system  that  would 
hopefully unify the Empire, rather than serving a purely local function, and they had to be 
reformed to fulfil this larger role. Hutton aimed to create a national force of which Canada 
could be proud, but which would also be capable of assisting to defend the Empire. His 
arrival in Ottawa provided an impetus that had previously been lacking in previous reform 
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efforts,  and  he  enjoyed  an  initial  ‘honeymoon  period,’  working  well  with  Borden  and 
gaining the support of the militia. Hutton hoped that adopting a twin-track approach of 
highlighting  the  wretched  condition  of  Canadian  forces  while  simultaneously  elevating 
military service to make it more prestigious in public eyes by eliminating party political 
interference  would  awaken  dormant  Canadian  enthusiasm  for  the  militia  and  stimulate 
imperial patriotism. This, he believed, would simplify his task of reorganising the force to 
enable it to fulfil its duties of defending Canada and the Empire.
 160 
 
 
Concerned  by  his  unfavourable  reception  from  Canada’s  troops  Hutton  very  quickly 
recognised  that  to  implement  any  reforms,  it  was  necessary  to  establish  a  mutual 
confidence with the troops by treating command as a personal matter. He used a series of 
personal  inspections  and  meetings  with  officers  in  October  and  November  1898  to 
establish a previously  absent connection with his men and identify both their essential 
requirements  and  the  militia’s  main  faults.  Hutton  believed  that  this  approach  made  it 
easier for him to find solutions to local difficulties than issuing anonymous instructions 
from Ottawa, and thus contributed much to ‘getting the whole of our Canadian army to 
work harmoniously.’
161 Hutton regarded the Canadian troops as ‘intelligent and soldierly 
material,’ whose enthusiasm had maintained the force during years of neglect, and felt that 
to extract maximum efficiency from them as a force training had to be intensified and 
improved.
162 Inherent enthusiasm had proved insufficient to counter the damage created by 
the pervasive Government indifference which had left the force in a ‘pitiable’ condition, 
especially at a higher level, and Hutton admitted he was not prepared for the chaos existing 
in the military department: 
 
 
It is not too much to say that the present condition of the administration as carried 
out…. by our existing HQ system is, from a military point of view, chaotic and 
pregnant with friction in peace and disastrous in war or national emergency.
163 
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To establish a balanced army able to take the field on its own it was necessary to create a 
proper staff, administrative departments and higher organisation.  
 
 
Hutton’s  first  annual  report,  which  he  believed  reflected  his  early  experiences  and 
continued the work of the Defence Commission, contained a harsh indictment of Canadian 
defence  policy.  His  aim  had  been  to  accurately  outline  the  unsatisfactory  condition  of 
military defence and the inadequate standard of the militia to enlighten the Government 
and public on the scale of the task improvement entailed. The militia had to be reorganised, 
as Hutton recommended, into a ‘National Army’ complete in all departments and trained to 
a higher standard. Hutton believed the force could attain appropriate levels of efficiency 
without difficulty or expense, enabling it to properly defend Canada by protecting key 
strategic centres and participating in wider imperial campaigns:  
 
 
The  creation  of  a  Militia  Army  upon  the  lines  indicated  will  transform  the 
existing militia units into a Military Force which shall in some degree at least be 
worthy of the Canadian nation and be equal to maintaining the rights and liberties 
of the Canadian people. It will be in its true sense, a National Army, and will, as 
such, be able not only to defend inviolate the integrity of Canadian soil, but it 
will be capable of contributing to the military defence of the British Empire in a 
manner and with a power which will place Canada in a position of unparalleled 
dignity and influence among all the possessions of the Crown. 
 
 
By emphasising that his new force increased not only Canadian capability to defend itself 
against attack, but also their ability to participate in imperial defence, Hutton made efforts 
to  appeal  to  nationalists  and  imperialists  in  Canada.
164 Hutton’s  ‘National  Army’  had 
provided  an  ‘emotive  slogan’
165 for  his  efforts,  and  his  plans,  offering  an  image  of 
Canadian independence within an imperial framework, did arouse public support. Hopes 
were raised that facilitating imperial recruiting in Canada, by repatriating the old 100
th 
Regiment, regarded by many as a potent symbol of Canada’s imperial connections, would 
provide a simple short-term route to utilising the imperial sentiment recently aroused while 
Hutton’s  plans  were  implemented  The  obstacles,  however,  proved  insurmountable, 
although the Colonial Office blamed the British authorities in Canada for not considering 
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the  issue  in  its  entirety,  particularly  the  advantages  likely  to  accrue  from  establishing 
depots in imperialist areas like Toronto.
166 Minto and Hutton had analysed the issue in 
detail  and  agreed  that  the  low  rates  of  pay  offered  for  imperial  service  would  deter 
volunteers, and were influenced by Seymour’s opinion that the Irish Catholic character of 
the regiment as currently constituted made it unsuitable to receive Canadian recruits, and 
that ‘someone is advising the War Office who has never been to Canada and is perfectly 
ignorant of the requirements of the case or of the military history of Canada.’
167 They 
concluded that creating a new regiment for service in North America would be the best 
solution, but emphasised throughout that recruits could be found easily in wartime,
168 as 
was proved during the Boer War when Laurier’s government
 raised a regiment to garrison 
Halifax thus freeing the British troops there for active service. 
 
 
Pleased with Hutton’s military achievements, Minto abandoned his initial approach of not 
becoming too closely associated for fear of avoiding suspicion, and now openly supported 
the GOC’s efforts to promote the militia and raise its public standing by inviting officers to 
official functions. Minto stressed to Chamberlain, Lansdowne and Wolseley that Hutton 
had made an ‘excellent start’ to his reforms. Attacking the major problems with a ‘great 
deal of tact,’ he had breathed new life into a previously moribund institution and gained the 
support of the militia, the public and the press, who anticipated a new level of efficiency 
for the force. Minto laid equal stress to his correspondents on what remained to be done, as 
the  ‘absolute  inefficiency’  of  the  militia  was  difficult  to  imagine;  lacking  essential 
departments, plagued by indiscipline and incapable of concentration into larger units, the 
force required a massive overhaul, although scope existed for improvement over the next 
few years.
169 Hutton was equally effusive about his achievements, expressing satisfaction 
with his results and believing that his efforts had been an extraordinary success. A great 
surprise  had  been  Borden’s  support.  In  contrast  to  his  later  opinions,  Hutton  initially 
believed that the Minister of Militia was ‘particularly pleasant to deal with’ and had a 
‘sound grasp of military requirements,’ although concerns remained about the strength of 
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his position in the Cabinet. A wave of military enthusiasm and patriotic ardour had been 
created, which would prove to be of great advantage, as it was ‘utopian’ to expect any 
colonial government to spend money unless the pressure of press and public opinion was 
brought to bear against them to drive reform forward. Chamberlain, perhaps pleased by the 
success of his appointees, promised to support the GOC as far as possible, believing that 
Minto would provide valuable assistance. But, in the Colonial Secretary’s view, everything 
was dependent on the attitude of the Canadian government.
170 
 
 
Minto  was  willing  to  remain  in  the  background  to  avoid  forcing  an  unenthusiastic 
government’s hand over the recommended changes, but Hutton’s abrasive personality and 
aggressive approach to addressing the problems he had identified, forgetting the advice 
offered about the need to work with the Canadians, caused tension to mount swiftly with 
Laurier’s ministers over the purpose of military reform. Minto and Hutton agreed with the 
assessment offered by the British authorities about the main problems which had to be 
addressed before reforms could be enacted:  
 
 
The  abominable  custom  of  political  patronage  which  has  so  shamefully 
influenced  the  Militia  Department  [and]  the  attempt  on  the  Civil  side  of  the 
Department to assume military control in questions with which the GOC should 
deal at any rate in the first place.
171 
 
 
The first issue arose periodically during Minto’s tenure, and often inflamed the friction 
created by the latter. An idea was prevalent among senior military officers and imperial 
officials, like Minto and Hutton, that democratic governments, especially in the colonies, 
could not be trusted with important matters like imperial defence. This, however, clashed 
with  the  established  principle  of  vesting  authority  over  the  military  in  the  elected 
representatives  of  the  people,  and  both  the  Governor  and  the  GOC  were  criticised  for 
confusing unwelcome party interference with the necessity for political control of military 
affairs.  Their  objections,  however,  were  frequently  focused  upon  the  extent  to  which 
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Laurier’s government pushed this principle, which threatened to either undermine military 
discipline or damage imperial interests. 
 
 
Upon commencing his post Hutton emphasised that a key element of his plan was to raise 
defence policy above ‘minor questions of local politics,’ and to make it independent of 
religious denomination, thus enabling the creation of a ‘National Army’ representative of 
Canada  as  a  whole  and  capable  of  defending  its  interests.
172 Improving  morale  was 
dependent on ending the ‘petty log-rolling’ that had previously ‘crushed the life’ out of 
Canadian troops.
173 Minto, who believed that improving Canada’s defence system was a 
central part of his gubernatorial duty to protect imperial interests, increasingly supported 
Hutton’s  crusade,  expressing  his  hope  to  Chamberlain  that  by  forcing  Laurier’s 
government to recognise the damage it had done to the militia they would end political 
patronage.
174 Both men were being overly optimistic, as Morton argues that while no one 
disagreed  in  principle,  in  practice  officers  continued  to  carry  their  grievances  through 
political channels.
175 Political control over military patronage had become so ingrained it 
was  believed  that  officers  gave  a  higher  priority  to  their  ‘political  pull’  than  their 
professional  development  when  attempting  to  gain  advancement,  making  it  virtually 
impossible  for  two  men,  however  energetic  or  committed,  to  overcome  it.  Despite  his 
technical and administrative successes, Hutton became increasingly discouraged about the 
chances of repairing the damage done to the efficiency and discipline of the militia by the 
political interference and party intrigue which controlled promotions and appointments, 
and  came  to  recognise  why  it  had  caused  such  problems  for  his  predecessors.
176 The 
trouble caused by attempts to remove the Liberal MP/militia officer Domville from his 
command amply demonstrated the difficulties Hutton and Minto faced.  
 
 
Chamberlain,  anxious  to  further  his  own  plans  for  imperial  federation,  believed  the 
circumstances  fully  justified  Hutton’s  frank  speaking  on  the  subject  and  promised  to 
support  the  GOC.
177 Others  closer  to  the  situation  believed  that  Hutton’s  aggressive 
approach, forgetting the notorious sensitivity of colonial governments about matters they 
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controlled, jeopardised the small advances they had made. Minto recognised that a more 
pragmatic  approach  was  necessary,  and  that  while  they  must  take  advantage  of  any 
opportunities presented, it was dangerous to coerce Laurier’s government. He intimated to 
Lansdowne his fears that the militia was a ‘powder magazine’ which could be ignited if 
Hutton said too much at a public occasion, undermining Canada’s political stability.
178 
Borden supported plans to improve the militia, but feared Hutton’s public speeches were 
damaging these efforts and that attempts to separate the militia from politics or stop civil 
encroachment into military responsibilities masked a desire to make the GOC the dominant 
power, which no colonial government could tolerate.
179 Outside the militia a belief became 
prevalent that as it highlighted discrimination against Conservatives, Hutton’s crusade was 
aimed against Laurier’s government and its dominant French element, which could not be 
trusted  to  reform  the  militia  or  support  imperialist  policies.  Hutton,  although  not 
particularly  enamoured  of  the  Liberals,  was  equally  critical  of  the  Conservatives,  and 
hoped that he could appeal to French martial traditions to end Quebec’s apathy towards the 
militia and use it as a force for national unity.
 180 
 
 
These  prompts  went  unheeded  and  Hutton  became  ‘increasingly  audacious  in  his 
speeches,’
181 until going too far in April 1899. Seymour urged the GOC not to ‘jeopardise 
the  immense  influence  you  are  gaining  every  day,’  by  adopting  the  risky  strategy  of 
appealing to the public to support his ‘mission’ to improve Canada’s military forces, as 
some of  Laurier’s government were ‘too democratic to stand too stiff a dose of Militarism 
administered by their own officer.’ Indeed, Borden had asked Seymour to stress to Hutton 
that ‘the ministry were afraid of your speeches in the country urging too much or more 
than they were prepared to support you on.’ While he stressed to the government that 
Hutton was an experienced officer devoted to improving the militia, Seymour urged the 
GOC to remember he had to work with the Dominion authorities and downplay references 
about his mission for Britain.
182 Little heed was paid to Seymour’s warnings. Minto did not 
feel  the  incident  warranted  mention  to  Chamberlain  or  Wolseley,  and  believed  that 
Hutton’s  popularity  with  press,  public  and  both  political  parties  had  strengthened  his 
                                                 
178 LMCP I, Minto to Lansdowne, 27 January 1899, p. 32. 
179 Morton, Canada and War, p.37; Morton, Ministers and Generals, pp.143-148. 
180 BL Add Mss 50087, Hutton to Harrison 27 July 1899; NLS MS 12582, ‘4
th Earl of Minto,’ pp. 245-247; 
Penlington, Canada and Imperialism, pp. 147-148. 
181 Penlington, Canada and Imperialism, pp. 144-148. 
182 LMCP I, Seymour to Minto, 14 April 1899, pp. 52-53; BL Add Mss 50088, Seymour to Hutton, 13 April 
1899.   69 
position to the extent that his views would do little harm if not pushed too forcefully.
183 
Hutton confirmed that he was committed to serving Canadian interests; it was up to the 
Government  and  electorate  to  decide  whether  to  accept  his  recommendations.  He  had 
merely tried to correct the erroneous impression of his views created by the ‘disgraceful’ 
reporting of his speeches, but he also argued that the only opportunity for success was to 
educate  public  opinion  in  Canada  as  he  had  done  in  Australia,  as  widespread  popular 
support would encourage an opportunist colonial government to act on his suggestions. 
Hutton recognised that the ‘difficulty is to go in advance just so far as to lead as to be 
followed, and not so far as to frighten or bewilder those who should follow!’ His views, 
however, illustrate a common British failing in seeing the self-governing colonies as a 
homogeneous,  monolithic  whole,  and  an  inability  to  appreciate  even  the  obvious 
differences between them, let alone the subtleties.
 184 
 
 
Nationalist historians praise Borden and  Laurier for ‘having the backbone to resist the 
pretensions of imperial officers who came to Canada filled with the notion that it was their 
function to govern the country.’
185 Yet other historians are more accurate in recognising 
that Hutton’s ‘apostolic zeal’ and ‘secularised evangelism’, proved both irresistible in the 
jingoistic  atmosphere  created  by  tensions  with  America,  and  highly  disturbing  to  a 
government  at  best  reluctant  to  strengthen  imperial  ties.
186   In  one  sense  Minto  was 
fortunate in having a proactive associate in the early stages of his Canadian career, able to 
take advantage of latent popular imperialism to focus attention on the defensive frailties 
which  Britain  aimed  to  alleviate.  Hutton’s  overzealous  public  espousal  of  potentially 
controversial views illuminated the first signs of strains in his relationship with both his 
Canadian employers, who disliked his militaristic tones, and some of his colleagues, who 
just disliked him. Sharp deterioration over the next few months would occur as issues 
central  to  the  civil-military  balance  and  relations  within  the  Empire  came  to  the  fore. 
Hutton had put himself on a collision course with the ministers, and as Wade puts it ‘these 
minor  difficulties  were  soon  to  create  major  ones,’
187 which  would  prove  a  valuable 
learning  experience  for  Minto,  who  came  to  appreciate  the  advantages  offered  by  a 
pragmatic approach. 
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Minto and Curzon’s Legacy 
 
A tendency to regard Curzon as not only the greatest Viceroy, but also Britain’s greatest 
proconsul, persists in popular accounts of the Empire.
188 More academic interpretations 
have recognised that he provoked vociferous criticism from many contemporaries,
189 and 
most would have agreed with Ferguson’s comment that Curzon ‘was a most insufferable 
man.’
190 Few, however, would have gone to the same extreme as Kitson, who gleefully 
recounted  to  Minto  that  ‘when  they  told  Ayub  Khan  the  other  day  of  Lord  Curzon’s 
accident he said “how sorry everyone must be that he wasn’t killed”, and then he spat 
loudly!!!’
191 
 
 
Curzon was distinctive amongst proconsuls, ‘not least because he was more than many of 
his contemporaries a consciously ideological imperialist rather than a pragmatist,’
192 who 
believed  passionately  in  the  civilising  mission  of  Britain’s  Empire.  He  was  strongly 
identified with the ‘new imperialism’ of the late Victorian era and provided the most vivid 
demonstrations of its philosophy.
193 Curzon arrived in  India determined to improve its 
administration, and he undoubtedly possessed the intelligence and capacity for hard work 
required to fulfil such an imposing task. He aimed not only to accelerate decision-making, 
but to treat Indians with justice, an essential part of efficient government in his view.
194 
Although his eventful tenure could boast many achievements, it can be argued that he 
failed conspicuously in as many areas. His relations with colleagues and subordinates in 
India, his superiors in Britain, and the Indians over whom he ruled were often troubled, 
and these difficulties ultimately terminated his Viceroyalty. Contempt for the abilities of 
British  officials  in  India  led  him  to  supervise  even  the  minutest  details  of  the 
administration, while refusing to delegate any responsibility. Supporters in Britain became 
concerned about the friction he created: 
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Hamilton did not blind himself to Curzon’s failings. ‘It is such a pity [Hamilton 
wrote]…[that] when he has such a rare power of work, ability and go that he 
should so rub up the people around him!’ 
 
 
Curzon’s ability increasingly became ‘warped by his growing sense of self-importance.’
195 
While some historians are willing to excuse these faults as the idiosyncrasies of genius, 
others  are  far  more  scathing  of  Curzon’s  relationship  with  his  Indian  colleagues.  Judd 
criticised Curzon as a sadistic tormentor who mercilessly bullied his subordinates: 
 
 
When he finally left for home in 1905, it was claimed that there was hardly any 
Indian official of any standing he had not personally insulted and confronted – 
from the iconic, brooding, world-famous Kitchener to relatively junior members 
of the ICS. 
 
 
His reforming zeal and energy ‘had been wasted in high profile and enervating disputes.’
196 
 
 
Curzon’s refusal to accept his constitutional subordination to Whitehall, and his tendency 
to treat them as inferiors, made for a turbulent relationship.  The departures of Salisbury 
and Hamilton removed two restraining influences on the impetuous Viceroy, and matters 
rapidly deteriorated during Brodrick’s tenure at the India Office until relations between 
London and Calcutta resembled those of rival states, rather than complementary centres of 
the  same  Empire.  Foreign  affairs  proved  to  be  especially  troublesome,  as  Curzon’s 
attempts to dictate policy according to Indian security requirements by extending control 
over the ‘buffer’ states threatened to provoke conflict with Russia. His disregard of direct 
instructions  about  Tibet  infuriated  the  Cabinet,  who  increasingly  believed  that  his 
continuation as Viceroy presented a danger to the safety of the Empire. Curzon became 
oversensitive to criticism and detached from reality, treating India as his personal fiefdom 
and reacting with ‘self-pitying disbelief’ to any frustration, which provoked a sharp rebuke 
from Balfour, ‘you seem to think you are injured whenever you do not get your own way!’ 
Curzon’s defenders are equally myopic, constantly blaming the other parties involved for 
petty disputes; they fail to recognise that the Viceroy represented the common factor. To 
criticise the Cabinet as ‘parochial,’ as Edwardes does, for failing to accept Curzon’s policy 
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is  unconvincing.  The  imperial  government  retained  an  overall  responsibility  for  the 
Empire, and had found it necessary to overrule a subordinate when his policy threatened to 
embroil them in war.
197 
 
 
Curzon’s  dismissive  attitude  towards  the  aspirations  of  Indians,  and  his  decision  to 
partition Bengal left a  further bitter legacy discontent for his successor. The reality of 
British India did not conform to the fantasy of a rural idyll that Curzon tried to preserve.
198 
Any  Indian presumptions that he perceived to conflict with this imperial mission were 
contemptuously swept aside, and for this reason he rejected Congress claims to represent 
all  Indian interests. Curzon expected to assist its peaceful demise, while rallying loyal 
elements to the  crown,  but his policy towards  Bengal merely  galvanised opposition to 
British rule. His determination to ignore the agitation partition had provoked strengthened 
Indian determination to resist a blatant attempt to ‘divide and conquer.’ Curzon departed 
from India unable to understand Indian enmity towards him and full of bitterness that his 
sacrifices had not been appreciated.
199 
 
 
Limited options complicated the task of finding a suitable successor for Curzon. Some 
candidates  were  easily  dismissed,  lacking  the  ability  required  for  the  post,
200 but  for 
various  reasons  the  preferred  alternatives  were  unavailable.  Selborne,  considered  to  be 
Curzon’s natural successor, had tired of waiting and opted to go to South Africa instead. 
Milner had been Brodrick’s first choice but the Secretary of State soon glumly reported to 
Balfour that Milner had ‘told me if the offer were made he could not possibly consider 
it…He is very clear against India,’
201 desiring above all a period of rest before undertaking 
another exhausting post in the Empire. Many, however, doubted his suitability for such a 
sensitive post given the problems he had caused in South Africa and the likelihood of the 
Liberals soon taking office. His appointment would have been anathema to them, and even 
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some  senior  Indian  officials  were  apprehensive  about  the  rumours,  as  Younghusband 
commented to Minto: 
 
 
still if he [Curzon] had to go I do not think we in India could possibly have done 
better than you in his place. I had always hoped that you would come to us but 
afraid they would send you to South Africa and still more afraid that they would 
send Lord Milner to India.
202 
 
 
As had been the case for Canada, Minto was by no means the first choice, but as the 
alternatives dwindled he became the best man available. During his time in Canada, many 
of his friends had suggested that Minto would be the perfect candidate for India,
203 but 
initial hopes had been dashed by the extension of both his and Curzon’s terms in 1903.  As 
he  had  been  prior  to  his  appointment  to  Ottawa  Minto  was  plagued  by  self-doubt, 
confiding to his journal his fears that with such a wide field of candidates he lacked the 
political influence to back him and that the government’s tenuous grip on power may end 
his chances.
204 Brodrick believed the choice had been narrowed to two remaining suitable 
candidates, after being pushed by Balfour to consider Minto’s qualifications: 
 
 
I think Jersey sounder than Minto. There was a little rift in the lute at Ottawa. But 
Minto is fresher. Jersey is not a certainty, Minto is – the latter has better health – 
Jersey would keep things quiet and I think he has the ability to deal with the mass 
of business which I feel pretty sure would puzzle Minto considerably. 
  As regards fiscal, Jersey’s views are more mine than Minto’s….But I can work 
well with either, or indeed with any of the men whose names are mentioned.
205 
 
 
Brodrick obviously did not reveal these doubts to Minto, instead expressing satisfaction 
that the place had fallen to an old friend.
206 Balfour also regretted that the new Viceroy was 
not more intelligent, but Minto had been chosen for his energy and tact, valuable qualities 
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in the circumstances, rather than his scholarly aptitude. Minto would probably agree with 
historical assessments, that while ‘not a remarkable man,’ he was perfect to maintain the 
status quo.
207 Historians arguing that Minto was not clever enough to be Viceroy, that he 
preferred horses to politics,
208 forget that despite their academic brilliance, both Curzon 
and Milner had turbulent relationships with their superiors. ‘Intelligent’ proconsuls were 
often more likely to create such difficulties; regarding themselves as superior to leaders in 
Britain,  they  became  frustrated  when  their  ideas  were  not  accepted  and  attempted  to 
implement  policies  on  their  own  initiative  with  little  thought  for  wider  consequences. 
Outstanding intellect was not a vital qualification for a colonial governor. 
 
 
‘Imagine sending to succeed me a gentleman who only jumps hedges’
209 was allegedly 
Curzon’s indignant reaction upon hearing that Minto would replace him as Viceroy. Others 
in  Britain  shared  this  incredulity,  although  criticism  was  aimed  more  at  Balfour’s 
government than Minto himself, as Churchill claimed that Curzon’s Viceroyalty had been 
the only thing to enhance their prestige: 
 
 
The appointment of Minto, poor dear thing, is another piece of Arthurism in 
excelsis. For cynical disdain of public interests and contempt of public opinion, it 
exactly matches Brodrick’s appointment to the India Office.
210 
 
 
Edward VII was equally unimpressed and felt that Curzon and Minto were as comparable 
as Pitt and Perceval.
211 Criticism from Canada was more personal, as Dafoe, a Canadian 
journalist who had frequently attacked Minto in Ottawa at the instigation of his political 
mentor,  claimed  that  his  appointment  as  Viceroy  following  his  time  as  Governor 
undermined ‘the theory  that in England  considerations of ability  alone  are regarded in 
filling  public  positions.’  Criticism  was  not  universal,  and  many  followed  the  Ottawa 
Journal’s example in defending Minto, arguing that his ‘present detractors must be forced 
to admit he is as big a man as either of the other two following the same course.’
212 Such 
favourable press comments and the many letters of congratulation Minto received reveal 
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why  his  appointment  was  welcomed.  The  experience  he  had  gained  of  imperial 
administration  in  Canada,  particularly  in  dealing  with  civil-military  troubles,  when 
combined with his military background and personal qualities, was believed to make him 
the  ideal  candidate  to  work  with  India’s  soldiers  who  felt  they  had  been  slighted  by 
Curzon. Others stressed the simple fact that he was not Curzon, who many identified as the 
source of India’s problems; although it would be difficult to replace him it was hoped that 
Minto could provide some respite and focus attention on military preparation after the 
‘excitement’ the departing Viceroy had created. As the Pioneer commented Minto was 
‘neither a prominent politician nor a great man,’ he was rather ‘a capable administrator 
with a good record,’ and this had influenced the Cabinet’s decision to appoint him. The 
difficulties Curzon had caused created a desire to replace this ambitious politician with an 
aristocratic amateur who would not only provide the prestige required, but would also take 
a less ideological approach towards ruling Britain’s most important imperial possession. 
Beyond upholding the totemic principle that Indian defence had to remain the Viceroy’s 
paramount priority, Minto was expected to continue the pragmatic methods he had adopted 
in Canada and restore the proper relationship between London and Simla by recognising 
that he served the imperial government as an administrator and was not an independent 
ruler.
213  
 
 
Selborne, although arguing that Curzon’s work had been brilliant and deserved to endure 
despite his disagreement with Kitchener, did admit that Minto’s arrival in India would be 
an awkward moment.
214 His prediction proved prescient as the handover of power created 
a  most  unfortunate  impression  on  Minto.  Balfour  and  Brodrick  became  increasingly 
anxious to remove Curzon as quickly as possible after his resignation; the latter stated to 
Minto that ‘I do not think Curzon’s continuance in India at all advisable.’
215 Concerns that 
unnecessary delay in the changeover was interfering with vital work relating to military 
reform and Bengali unrest were overruled by Edward VII’s insistence that the departing 
Viceroy receive the forthcoming royal visit as a fitting close to his official career. Minto, 
however, became apprehensive that failing to immediately introduce him as Viceroy on 
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arriving in India carried the risk of him being belittled.
216 Brodrick shared this viewpoint, 
writing to Balfour that: 
 
 
I think the King in his desire to exalt Curzon loses sight of the effect on Minto’s 
position…The fact, which I put strongly before him [Edward VII], that Indian 
business owing to Curzon’s remaining so long after his resignation is getting into 
hopeless  arrears  does  not  weigh  with  him,  compared  to  the  ‘show’ 
business…[the] position of Minto will be a very undesirable one.
217 
 
 
To Brodrick’s annoyance royal intervention ensured the arrangement of a compromise, 
allowing the tour to proceed and for Minto to arrive with minimal damage to the Viceregal 
office.  Minto  commented  that  ‘the  whole  situation  has  been  most  troublesome  to 
everyone,’
218 but unfortunately for him it would soon get far worse. Expecting the proper 
ceremonial  handover  of  power,  he  was  astonished  to  be  greeted  informally  by  an 
inappropriately attired Curzon in a brief civic ceremony. Some historians have attributed 
the difficulties to ‘a genuine misunderstanding,’ and those writing soon after the event 
were  unwilling  to  blame  Curzon.
219 Others  were  less  forgiving.  Indian  opinion  was 
indignant at the apparent slight, and even some usually staunch defenders believe Curzon 
had  taken  great  satisfaction  from  the  public  humiliation  of  the  government’s  new 
representative.
220 His  petulance  cost  him  valuable  support,  as  Edward  VII  shared  the 
outrage many had voiced: ‘what can you expect from a man who is not a gentleman. Have 
you ever known him to do the right thing?’
221 
 
 
The departing Viceroy had unwisely taken his anger at Balfour’s government out on an 
essentially innocent bystander, failing to realise that Minto, modest about his own talents 
and  apprehensive  about  the  immense  task  he  faced,  was  particularly  sensitive  to  any 
suggestion that he was being disparaged.
222 Minto was never able to forgive Curzon for 
this public insult, and the ‘truly regrettable’ affair, compounded by Curzon’s failure to 
offer  any  apology,  coloured  his  subsequent  interpretation  of  his  predecessor’s  legacy, 
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illustrated by his comments to Brodrick that ‘I have very sadly come to the conclusion that 
what occurred has been due to Curzon’s intense vanity.’
223 Gilmour criticises Minto for 
developing a dangerous obsession with his predecessor, due to petty jealousy of Curzon’s 
achievements. In his view Minto’s weak government, not Curzon was to blame for India’s 
unrest,
224 but he ignores the contemporary argument that Minto was forced to reap the 
whirlwind sown by Curzon’s policies. Curzon’s continued attempts to interfere in Indian 
politics and influence press opinion infuriated Minto, and made his task of repairing the 
damage caused by his illustrious predecessor that more difficult. Minto’s letters to his wife 
are  full  of  comments  about  Curzon’s  machinations,  ‘I  honestly  believe  he  has  worked 
through the press and in other ways to discredit me.’ He remained determined, however, to 
ignore such provocations, concluding that ‘one can only run straight and leave him to run 
as he likes.’ The insensitivity towards Indian opinion and the difficulties he had created for 
former colleagues indicated by suggestions like that to create a memorial for Clive led 
Minto to privately question his predecessor’s mental stability: ‘there is only one excuse for 
such action viz. that he is mad.’
225 
 
 
While contemporary writers like Buchan and Lady Minto avoided being overcritical of 
Curzon, they hint at the many problems Minto encountered on arrival as a result of his 
policies. Curzon’s drive for efficiency had produced only dissatisfaction. Too much work 
had been concentrated in viceregal hands, leaving him to deal with a ‘mass of inessential 
detail’ instead of providing the strategic direction expected of him. A refusal to delegate 
had stripped senior officials of power and responsibility. Minto recognised that he could 
not match Curzon’s power of work; his Canadian experience encouraged the adoption of a 
different style of leadership, where government was an exercise in cooperation rather than 
a dictatorship. Accordingly, responsibility and initiative were restored to the Executive 
Council, allowing the Viceroy to focus on larger questions of policy.
226 By  appointing 
Minto the government aimed to restore the shattered prestige of India’s government and 
recover  the  internal  harmony  lost  during  the  bitter  divisions  caused  by  the  Curzon-
Kitchener feud and the humiliating spectacle caused by public washing of official linen. 
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Minto was unfortunate to have succeeded one of the most disliked men in modern Indian 
history  whose  qualities  as  a  ‘Herculean  administrator’  did  little  to  compensate  for  his 
failings. Curzon was arrogant, overbearing and indifferent to human circumstances.
227 As 
Minto put it ‘how intensely Curzon’s egotism (I can call it nothing else) and ambitions 
have shed their influence over public life in India…’
228Many contemporaries were glad to 
be  rid  of  the  hated  viceroy,  whose  failure  to  appreciate  the  difficulties  caused  by  his 
policies had left a heritage of discontent to be faced by his successor.
 229 
 
 
Unfortunately  for  Minto  Curzon  had  destroyed  the  traditional  Indian  relationship  with 
Britain.  The  ideal  of  the  Government  of  India  as  a  great  quasi-independent  power 
negotiating on equal terms was now wholly impracticable, and this was to prove a spectre 
that would haunt Minto’s relationship with Morley.
230 Minto complained about Curzon’s 
attacks on his government, annoyed that things would be very different if people knew the 
truth: 
 
 
Much as one may wish to do so one can hardly treat Curzon’s actions as mere 
trivialities, for it is impossible to disguise from oneself that he means to lose no 
chance of throwing mud at my administration. I have committed the crime of 
succeeding him, and he cannot forget it…If a true history of Curzon’s rule is ever 
written, it will make the world wonder. Few people at home know the legacy of 
bitter discontent he left for his successor…He has never ceased to blow his own 
trumpet, though a knowledge of his life as seen from behind the scenes here 
would make people’s hair stand on end…
231 
 
 
Reopening  communication  between  rulers  and  ruled  after  the  resentment  provoked  by 
Curzon’s  lack  of  sympathy  with  Indian  opinion,  demonstrated  most  obviously  by  the 
partition of Bengal, was another problem it became vital for Minto to address. He adopted 
a  more  sympathetic  and  modest  approach  in  comparison  to  the  disdain  which  had 
characterised  Curzon’s  attitude,  and  showed  a  willingness  to  listen  to  the  previously 
ignored complaints of India’s educated classes. Minto believed that this could only be 
taken so far, given the unrealistic ambitions inspired in part by the growth of western 
                                                 
227 H. Tinker, ‘Power and Influence in Britain and India’ MAS 2 (1968), p. 75. 
228 NLS MS 12735, Minto to Morley 20 December 1905. 
229 Gilbert, Servant of India, Cornelia Sorabji to Lady Antrim, 28 May 1910, pp. 231-233.  
230 NLS MS 12400, Minto to Chamberlain, 31 August 1905; Das, Minto and Morley, pp. 46-60; Gilbert, 
Servant of India, pp. 3-6, 23ff, 250-253.  
231 NLS MS 12737, Correspondence between the Viceroy and the Secretary of State, 1907, Minto to Morley 
12 Sept 1907 (quoted in Das, Minto and Morley, pp. 73-74).   79 
education  and  Japan’s  recent  victory.
232  While  he  hoped  to  provide  employment 
opportunities and recognised the importance of Congress, he resolutely refused to strike at 
the  heart  of  nationalist  grievance  by  overturning  partition.  Minto  feared  that  any  such 
decision at the very start of his tenure would be taken, not as the perfect illustration of the 
new-found sympathy guiding British policy, but as weakness in the face of unrest, thus 
creating a dangerous precedent. Instead, the restoration of order became the necessary quid 
pro quo for any reforms, but the spark of nationalist agitation had been lit, and much of 
Minto’s  time  in  India  was  spent  in  battling  its  more  violent  manifestations,  while 
challenging a perceived British willingness to ignore the advice of the ‘man on the spot,’ 
to the detriment of imperial security.
233 
 
 
Curzon’s defence and external policies provided an equally troublesome legacy, although 
one that is relatively neglected by historians. In Tibet, Curzon’s paranoid Russophobia 
produced  an  ill-judged  adventurist  policy  that  achieved  little  beyond  souring  his 
relationship with a Cabinet infuriated by his insubordination and encouraging China to 
reassert their authority over what they regarded as sovereign territory. Tibet remained a 
thorn in India’s side for much of Minto’s tenure, provoking a minor crisis on the eve of his 
departure that briefly threatened escalation requiring military intervention.
234 But this was 
tame compared to the problems Minto faced on the North West Frontier, where Curzon 
had  introduced  much-vaunted  reforms  to  reorganise  the  government’s  structure  and 
withdraw  the  majority  of  regular  troops.  Curzon  and  Kitchener’s  government,  in 
considering  tribal  policy  almost  solely  in  the  context  of  war  with  Russia,  proved  the 
exception rather than the rule of Indian approaches to the turbulent North West Frontier. 
Most of their predecessors had regarded the tribes as posing a threat to Indian security 
independent  of  the  machinations  of  rival  Great  Powers.  Finding  a  solution  to  the 
difficulties created by the presence of a large, well-armed, warlike and religiously fanatical 
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population  on  a  strategically  important  frontier  occupied  much  time  and  effort,  but 
ultimately the problem proved insoluble.  
 
 
Curzon’s attempt to claim all the credit for introducing the new policy provoked derision 
from Dunlop Smith: 
 
 
I was amused at Lord Curzon’s statement that he hoped the new frontier policy 
introduced in 1899 would be adhered to. As a matter of fact no new policy was 
then introduced. The lines of frontier policy were laid down by  Lord George 
Hamilton in 1898. As a consequence of that policy Lord Elgin started the idea of 
gradually withdrawing troops and substituting for them tribal levies to do the 
police  work  of  the  frontier.  This  idea  Lord  Curzon  took  up  and  made  it  his 
own.
235 
 
 
The  struggle  to  overcome  tribal  resistance  during  the  1897-98  uprising  provided  the 
impetus  for  a  much-needed  reconsideration  of  frontier  policy.  Respect  for  tribal 
independence  had  not  prevented  aggression,  while  punitive  expeditions  in  response  to 
raids merely left a legacy of hatred for the mullahs to exploit.
236 Military suggestions to 
ensure pacification of the region and extend British control by occupying tribal territory 
were  swiftly  rejected,
237  as  Elgin  refused  to  countenance  any  adoption  of  new 
responsibilities  or  territorial  annexations.  Instead  troops  would  be  concentrated  in 
fortifications at key strategic points, supported by tribal irregulars and moveable columns. 
Although he criticised his predecessor for being the puppet of soldiers and lacking ideas or 
initiative, Curzon’s policy was guided by these basic principles.
 238 
 
 
Concerned by the Punjab’s inefficient handling of a sensitive area, the British authorities 
were  anxious for Simla to assume control of  frontier policy and  charged Curzon with 
overseeing the handover.
239 Curzon’s underlying aim in reforming frontier policy, which 
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he viewed as deeply flawed, was ‘not to prevent war by preparing for it, [but] to produce 
peace by creating the requisite conditions,’ and he summarised his policy thus, 
 
 
In all cases the principle is the same and is one of general application along the 
frontier,  as  well  as  of  practical  wisdom.  We  remove  our  own  soldiers  from 
exacting and distasteful service, for which they are not in all cases suited. By 
relieving  the  Indian  Army  from  the  task  of  garrisoning  and  defending  these 
outlying positions, we render it possible, when war breaks out on or beyond the 
frontier, to concentrate  the great mass of our troops on the principal lines of 
advance. By enrolling the local garrisons as levies, or militia, or police, we avoid 
the publicity that attaches to any proceedings of the regular army on the frontier, 
while, in the event of any contretemps, we escape the commotion and reproach 
that are invariably excited by military disaster. Finally, we take into our pay, and 
thereby acquire a hold upon the allegiance of, the tribesmen, who, while their 
local patriotism is conciliated by employment as the guardians of their native 
hills and vales, develop at the same time, under the influence of quasi-military 
discipline, and ever-increasing loyalty to the British Raj.
 240   
 
 
Despite criticism, there was no desire for territorial aggrandisement. Proposals from his 
military  advisers,  whom  Curzon  regarded  as  ‘incurable  bunglers,’
241  for  expensive 
fortifications  capable  of  resisting  Russian  attack  at  key  points  along  the  frontier  were 
dismissed as it was feared these would only provoke tribal and Afghan aggression. Curzon 
believed  isolated  stations  actually  posed  a  danger  to  Britain’s  position,  rather  than 
enhancing security: 
 
 
We desire to avoid locking up regular garrisons in costly fortified positions at a 
distance  from  our  base,  where  the  troops  are  practically  lost  to  the  offensive 
strength of India, and in time of emergency, would probably require additional 
forces to be detached from the Indian Army for their protection.
242 
 
 
Around 11,000 regulars were withdrawn from the tribal region and concentrated at new 
bases inside the administrative frontier from where they could easily advance in event of 
trouble. To replace these troops, and interest the tribes in defending and preserving order 
within their territory, irregular forces under British officers were created. Tribal maliks 
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were granted allowances to maintain these forces, in the hope that secure employment with 
regular pay would reduce the need for raiding, thus revolutionising the atmosphere on the 
frontier.
243 
 
 
Both  the  military  authorities  and  frontier  officials  increasingly  came  to  support  his 
ideas.
244 Ending  the  inefficient  practice  of  scattering  regular  troops  across  the  frontier 
furthered Kitchener’s reforms:  
 
 
No one recognises more fully than myself the waste of good military material 
which is involved by locking up in detached and isolated posts on the frontier 
units of our regular army. It is a frittering away of our strength which I regard as 
deplorable.
 245 
 
 
The  Khyber  saw  the  most  successful  implementation  of  Curzon’s  policy.  Plans  for  a 
railway and an elaborate new fort were dropped to avoid providing potential hostages for 
the tribes in the event of risings. Instead the existing defensible serai was strengthened, to 
be held by the newly formed Khyber Rifles, recruited from among the Afridis, which 
proved  to  be  an  efficient  and  loyal  force.
246 Universal  application,  however,  proved 
impossible, as certain regions were regarded as unsuitable for immediate transfer to tribal 
responsibility.  Regulars  were  retained  in  the  large  fort  on  the  Samana  Ridge,  which 
Curzon could never persuade his military authorities to evacuate, convinced as they were 
that the handing over of a key military position on one of the main lines of advance into 
Afghanistan to a potentially unreliable tribal militia was an unnecessary risk unless their 
conditions for the stationing of a large regular force at nearby Miranzai and the completion 
of railway construction were met. Curzon reluctantly deferred to the views of his military 
advisers, and this proved to be one occasion where political principles were sacrificed to 
military expediency.
247 
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To  complement  military  changes  Curzon  aimed  to  make  frontier  administration  more 
efficient by creating new structures that would increase Simla’s direct control over the 
frontier.
248 Its  tactless  introduction,  particularly  Curzon’s  willingness  to  insult  local 
officials by stressing the need for more intelligent officers, and the resultant friction with 
the Punjab did little to aid its implementation. Curzon stressed that Simla had no sinister 
intentions  in  establishing  the  new  province,  but  it  was  necessary  for  the  Indian 
Government to enforce its authority directly and thus business had to be conducted more 
efficiently: 
 
It was because we thought that the peace and tranquillity and contentment of the 
Frontier were of such importance that they ought to be under the direct eye of the 
Government of India, and of its head, instead of somebody else.
249 
 
 
The Viceroy’s responsibility for India’s foreign policy made it necessary to increase his 
power over its implementation in a region where it could have consequences for wider 
international  relations  rather  than  relying  on  a  parochial  provincial  administration. 
Although worked by officials devoted to their duty, the system had long been condemned 
by authorities on frontier affairs, as its procrastination had often resulted in delays when 
rapid reaction was essential. This weakness, which had threatened to jeopardise frontier 
security, was now removed, enabling the implementation of a consistent frontier policy, 
and increasing Simla’s freedom of action.
 250 
 
 
Curzon believed he had successfully brought peace and tranquillity to the frontier where so 
many of his predecessors had failed, and he frequently boasted about what his policy had 
achieved.  He  was  not,  however,  afraid  to  warn  the  tribes  that  their  newly  granted 
responsibility  must  not  be  exploited  as  the  consequences  of  continued  lawlessness  or 
religious fanaticism would be severe: ‘if you dart out from behind the shelter of the door to 
harass and pillage and slay, then you must not be surprised if we return quickly and batter 
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the door in.’
251 On departing India, Curzon made it clear that he regarded the peace he had 
established on the frontier as one of his greatest successes: 
 
 
The creation of the new administration has been justified by its results: for by 
substituting  direct,  decisive  expeditious  methods  for  vacillation,  divided 
authority, and delay it has not only given unprecedented tranquillity to the North 
West  Frontier  territories  of  India,  but  has  immeasurably  strengthened  the 
Government in the presence of ultimate political contingencies. The decision may 
indeed be regarded with satisfaction as the effective solution of a problem which 
had baffled successive Governments for 25 years.
252 
 
 
More material economic benefits, highlighted by comparisons with Elgin’s tenure, had 
resulted from Curzon’s policy. From 1894-99, £4.5 million had been spent on frontier 
campaigns, but during the seven years of Curzon’s Viceroyalty, as only minor operations, 
such  as  the  Mahsud  blockade,  had  been  necessary,  this  figure  had  been  reduced  to 
£248,000.
253 But Curzon was reluctant to measure success in such vulgar terms, and for 
him  the  greatest  achievement  was  ‘the  spirit  of  increasing  harmony  and  contentment 
among the tribes and…the relations that are growing up along the entire border.’
254 
 
 
Unsurprisingly,  Curzon’s  biographers  accept  his  claims  at  face  value,  believing  his 
reforms had established peace and reduced tribal violence. Edwardes argues that Curzon’s 
policy  had  ‘inserted  the  keystone  into  the  frontier  arch,’  and  although  admitting  that 
Curzon never claimed that it would settle all the frontier’s problems, it did give India a 
longer period of freedom from border warfare than it had ever known before. Opponents 
of the scheme had been proved wrong, as it had not plunged India into a second Tirah.
255 It 
could alternatively be argued that the reduced British military presence in the region was 
not  the  result  of  some  ‘Curzonian’  miracle,  but  was  made  possible  by  favourable 
circumstances.  Large  numbers  of  troops  were  stationed  in  the  frontier  to  prevent  any 
resurgence of violence, but as the tribes were exhausted after their major uprising, this was 
an unlikely  occurrence.  Curzon merely took advantage of the  golden opportunity with 
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which he had been presented. Little doubt exists that in the event of an emergency, troops 
would have been sent back in massive numbers.  
 
 
Contemporary officials cast doubt on the veracity of Curzon’s vainglorious claims for the 
success  of  his  policy.  Many  echo  O’Dwyer’s  views  that  no  ‘spirit  of  harmony  and 
contentment’ materialised to replace the continued, everyday occurrences of murders and 
raids, and that life in the cantonments became no more secure. Indeed one concluded that 
‘the Curzon policy advanced our relations [with the tribes] not one whit.’
256 Minto was 
preoccupied in his first months as Viceroy with the debate over frontier policy as  yet 
another dangerous legacy bestowed by Curzon was discovered. Initially comments focused 
on  the  continued  progress  made  with  implementing  Curzon’s  policy,  particularly  the 
withdrawal of regular troops and their replacement by tribal militias. As yet no judgement 
was made of the value of the policy, although some of his erstwhile allies believed it 
merely needed time to prove its worth.
257 It became evident that Curzon’s reforms were 
not  as  efficient  as  had  been  claimed,  and  Minto  grew  increasingly  angry  that  frontier 
difficulties, actually the result of a policy for which he was not responsible, were being 
ascribed to mismanagement on his part. The militias were not all reliable and the dangers 
that some had predicted were being realised. Affection for the policy was not alone a 
viable justification for its continuation. It soon transpired that Curzon had discouraged 
officials  from  giving  unfavourable  reports  to  produce  a  more  impressive  image  of  his 
policy, and thus prove that the presence of troops beyond the administrative frontier was 
unnecessary.  The  prevalent  belief  amongst  the  military  authorities  that  to  ensure  the 
efficiency of the militias they should have been supported by regulars for much longer had 
been vindicated by reports that sepoys from the Kharlachi post had robbed and murdered 
traders.  Minto  felt  they  needed  to  be  prepared  with  other  measures  in  the  event  of  a 
breakdown in the system.
258  
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Godley, concerned by the serious state of affairs on the frontier indicated by the high 
incidence  of  raids  reported  during  1905,  requested  further  details  on  the  practice  of 
covering up incidents.
259 The report, a catalogue of murder and mayhem across the frontier 
during Curzon’s Viceroyalty, provided the true picture of his policy. Incidents ranging 
from the theft of rifles to large-scale attacks on Indian Army positions had been recorded, 
but the reality was even worse: 
 
 
This  list  is  far  from  complete,  as  in  some  cases,  raids  committed  in  the 
administered districts are not reported in the Political Divisions and consequently 
not recorded in the Intelligence Branch.
260 
 
 
Astonished by the report, Minto believed it 
 
 
Appeared to indicate, during the period in question, that a state of disturbance 
existed on the Northern part of the border which was rare even in the history of 
the North West Frontier. 
 
 
The practice of not recording even large-scale raids or blaming Afghans and claiming the 
delicate relationship with the Amir would be damaged by publicising them suggested the 
existence  of  a  deliberate  policy  to  present  a  more  favourable  impression  of  Curzon’s 
reforms.
261 Simla reassured Morley, suspicious that this evidence was being compiled to 
justify an aggressive policy, that they had no desire to extend their responsibilities, but 
they could no longer tolerate the current unsatisfactory condition of the frontier; it could 
not  be  left  undefended  and  vulnerable  to  raids,  when  Britain  was  obligated  to  protect 
disarmed villages. Increasing expenditure on the Border Military Police appeared to be the 
only solution.
262  
 
 
Deane, Chief Commissioner of the North West Frontier Province, although reprimanded 
for  failing  to  control  the  current  unrest,  blamed  Curzon’s  policy,  with  which  he  had 
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disagreed  from  the  start.  The  former  Viceroy,  in  his  determination  to  have  his  policy 
accepted as right, had criticised individuals if anything went wrong rather than recognising 
the faults with his reforms. He had been unfair to officials and his successors, burdening 
them  with  too  heavy  a  workload  by  combining  the  duties  of  civil  administration  and 
military protection. As a result of his failure to consult local experts, Curzon had been 
unable to appreciate the reality of the situation on the frontier. Deane was annoyed by 
Minto’s criticism, arguing that ‘if in these circumstances Lord Curzon has been pleased to 
describe the frontier as a haven of rest and peace, am I to blame?’ Deane responded that  
 
 
I have given facts which show how much nearer to trouble we have been in the 
course of this last year or two than a bald statement of frontier offences, without 
regard to the political situation, can give an idea of. It is necessary to understand 
that we must be prepared for trouble which may arise at any time through the 
position we hold.  
 
 
The instability of the region made it impossible to permanently prevent trouble, which 
could erupt unexpectedly. The depth of religious fundamentalism meant that the policy 
successfully implemented in Baluchistan was inappropriate for the frontier. He believed 
that occupation of tribal territory was the only way to avoid repeated expeditions, but ‘[the 
real] difficulty on the Frontier is to avoid having to use force,’ to enforce government 
policy. Unprovoked aggression, or even gestures such as railway construction that could 
be misinterpreted on Britain’s part would only provoke retaliation and his aim throughout 
was  settle  disputes  and  reduce  tension  peacefully,  a  vital  skill  for  frontier  personnel. 
Therefore he urged Minto to understand the difficulties facing frontier officials, and utilise 
the detailed knowledge possessed by ‘men on the spot’ in achieving these aims.
263 Minto 
was more inclined to listen to advice proffered by his subordinates and colleagues, and 
their views influenced many of his ideas about frontier policy. Beyond the necessity of 
maintaining order and preserving security the Viceroy had few concrete plans, recognising 
that success in the turbulent borderlands remained dependent on maintaining a flexible 
attitude that allowed India’s authorities to respond to threats as they arose.   
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Kitchener  did  not  share  Deane’s  views,  instead  advocating  the  adoption  of  a  more 
aggressive  policy  to  establish  greater  control  within  tribal  boundaries  and  counter  the 
potential military threat posed by the tribes. It would be unnecessary to launch a full-scale 
campaign to achieve this end, as British authority could be extended gradually by retaining 
troops in the region following punitive expeditions, which would enable Simla to fulfil its 
obligations to defend its subjects and improve India’s strategic position vis-à-vis Russia. 
The Amir’s willingness to curb border lawlessness created a tribal respect for his authority 
that  contrasted  unfavourably  with  their  contemptuous  attitude  towards  British  power. 
Kitchener argued that spineless oscillation between conciliation and punishment had to be 
replaced by a more settled policy.
264 Morley’s response illustrated the difficulties Minto 
and his colleagues would face in persuading his British superiors that tribal violence posed 
a threat to India’s security. Despite his determination that there should minimal continuity 
with the previous regime, Morley supported the claims Curzon made for his frontier policy 
and wished to avoid the increased expenditure it was feared a return to aggressive forward 
policies would entail. He doubted that repeating the ‘old story – hammer the tribes and 
bully the Amir’ would stop raids.
265 Minto was bemused by Morley’s apparent belief that 
Kitchener was advocating a plan ‘to conquer the tribes immediately,’ as Simla merely 
argued that allowing tribal territory to become a ‘no man’s land’ posed a danger to India’s 
subjects which could be neutralised if they deployed occupying forces following punitive 
expeditions. Throwing away what had been gained by military operations only to have to 
repeat  the  procedure  was  an  expensive  waste  of  resources  that  could  be  avoided  by 
‘absorbing’ territory to break the cycle of tribal violence and official retribution.
266 Such 
debates illustrate the tension created by the conflicting priorities of centre and periphery. 
Minto was guilty of minimising the difficulties the large-scale military operations required 
to  affect  such  a  policy  would  entail,  and  was  unable  to  alter  Morley’s  views  that 
conquering tribal territory was a mistake. While willing to let Simla respond to serious 
disorder,  Morley  would  never  allow  the  adoption  of  new  fresh  responsibilities  and 
expenditure,  as  he  believed  that  the  frontier  should  not  be  the  sole  focus  of  India’s 
attention; ‘raids on one side, and hammerings on the other, are not the only things we have 
to think of.’
267 But Morley was equally guilty of failing to appreciate the anxieties that the 
frontier aroused for Indian administrators.  
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By  1908,  Minto  argued  that  ‘the  state  of  affairs  on  our  frontier  is  becoming  simply 
disreputable.’
268 Confronting widespread lawlessness, India’s Government was reaping the 
harvest sown by Curzon’s policy. A long succession of raids had proved how ineffectual 
the system of frontier defence was. Reliance on irregular forces was no longer a viable 
option. Curzon’s reforms had achieved the laudable aim of interesting the tribes in the 
defence of their own territory, but had not achieved its primary objective of securing the 
frontier in the absence of regulars. Curzon had been well aware of these difficulties, and 
when a Foreign Department report of 1905 commented that, 
 
 
An unparalleled state of terror existed on the frontier between November 1904 
and  March  1905,  and  that  state  of  affairs  had  not  been  fully  reported  to  the 
Government of India, 
 
 
even the former Viceroy had been forced to admit that: ‘the present system is a scandal 
and strong measures are required to remedy it.’
269 Although conversant with the turbulent 
state of the frontier on the eve of his departure, Curzon still refused to publicly criticise his 
policy and boasted in his farewell speech that he had handed over a peaceful frontier to his 
successor. Such blatant lies outraged Minto, as ‘Curzon left the frontier in a very unsettled 
condition and only great forbearance has prevented an explosion before now.’ Attempts by 
the British press to extol Curzon’s policy merely annoyed him further: 
 
 
For everyone knows here that it has been anything but a success: it’s weaknesses 
during his time were minimised, whilst the forces it provided to cope with border 
lawlessness  have  lacked  cohesion  and  have  not  always  proved  themselves 
reliable. 
 
 
Government enquiries into frontier defence reported that failure to act against continued 
raids, especially against major towns like Peshawar, was taken by the tribes as evidence of 
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government weakness. For a regime whose power was based on prestige, such a situation 
was intolerable.
270 
 
 
Attempts  to  stabilise  South  Waziristan  and  control  the  Mahsuds,  ‘perhaps  the  most 
troublesome  of  all  the  tribesmen,’
271  illustrated  the  difficulties  of  implementing  a 
consistent frontier policy and the need to adopt a pragmatic approach. Curzon believed that 
this district had demonstrated the success of his policy. The tribe had supposedly been 
pacified by the imposition of a blockade on their territory from December 1900 to 1902, 
which, when complemented by more active retaliation, forced the Mahsuds to come to 
terms after previous refusal to pay fines. Minto doubted the expediency of the enterprise, 
believing that Curzon had been guilty of dissembling and remarking that although a large 
military force had been employed ‘to avoid appearance of a campaign operations were 
called  a  blockade.’
272 Efforts  to  establish  a  militia  force  in  South  Waziristan  were 
cautiously adopted to demonstrate that the policy of replacing troops with irregular units 
could be successfully applied across the frontier without risk. Despite some initial success, 
the failure to eradicate the influence of radical mullahs like the ‘pestilential’ Powindah 
meant that the ‘crash was not long in coming.’
273 The force had been infiltrated, and in 
what the Government described as ‘a fanatical outburst’ the commandant and the Wana 
Political agent were murdered on the Mullah Powindah’s orders as part of a plot to take 
control  of  the  forts  and  spark  a  wider  jihad.  Farrell  blames  Curzon  for  ignoring  the 
opinions  of  experienced  frontier  officials  and  soldiers  in  his  desperation  to  get  his 
experiment working. Enlistment of the local tribes had been pushed too fast, and it was 
unrealistic to expect the Mahsuds to develop loyalty to British officers after the recent 
blockade  and  years  of  friction.  Expectations  of  their  ability  to  respond  to  European 
concepts of discipline were unreasonably high.
274  
 
 
Official claims that ‘the agitation [had] gradually subsided and when Lord Curzon left 
India there was no reason to apprehend any disturbance in Waziristan,’ astonished frontier 
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officials and the new Vicerine,
275 but is barely considered in the historiography. It hardly 
represented the facts. Curzon’s policy had done nothing to destroy the influence of the 
‘pestilential’ Mullah, the problem at the heart of Mahsud unrest. Almost immediately on 
his arrival Minto had to deal with the murder of another British officer. Captain Donaldson 
was shot dead by a North Waziristan Militia deserter who was closely connected to Mullah 
Powindah and had two relatives in prison for complicity in one of the other murders. The 
situation had become intolerable; three British officers had been murdered in Waziristan in 
fifteen months, throwing the entire militia policy into doubt.
276 The father of one victim, 
who had been Canning’s private secretary and was therefore familiar with the problems 
facing Viceroys, had no doubt where the blame ultimately lay:  
 
 
[one] cannot help feeling that it was a dubious step by Lord Curzon to withdraw 
the regular troops from six out of the ten frontier stations, and to place confidence 
in levies from a race so notoriously untrustworthy as Pathans, whose bad name 
has become a proverb.
277 
 
 
Minto undoubtedly agreed and assured him that ‘the safety of the British officers with the 
frontier levies is a constant anxiety to me.’
278  
 
 
While  other  tribes  could  be  successfully  subdued  by  military  operations  and  would 
subsequently  remain  quiet,  Mahsud  lawlessness  continuously  undermined  frontier 
stability.  Constrained  by  the  dictates  of  their  British  superiors  about  undertaking  new 
responsibilities, Minto and the Indian authorities were forced into various expedients to 
contain  this  threat.  In  early  1906  believing  that  they  were  facing  a  concerted  plot  to 
conduct jihad against British rule rather than ‘isolated cases of fanaticism,’ Simla feared 
that unless strong measures, possibly including punitive military operations, were taken it 
would prove impossible to preserve effective frontier administration. Some disagreement 
existed within the Indian authorities. While Kitchener favoured strengthening the militia to 
‘advance the pressure of civilisation,’ Minto argued that a system dependent on, at best, 
unreliable forces like the tribal militia, could not ensure the safety of British officers, a 
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primary consideration in his view. The Viceroy claimed that only reinforcing frontier posts 
with reliable regular troops could extend government influence, and that accepting tribal 
overtures in this direction was preferable to announcing that ‘we will have nothing to do 
with you, but will lay waste to your country if you do not keep your people in order.’ 
Nevertheless, Minto was concerned that to guarantee security on the frontier, an expedition 
would have to be undertaken immediately,  an idea which Kitchener opposed. Frontier 
officials  denied  that  any  of  these  measures  would  improve  security,  and  argued  that 
redeploying regular troops would provoke attacks and negate the usefulness of the militia, 
removing a source of lucrative employment and forcing many to resort to raiding. To 
avoid the necessity for military operations, it was decided in February 1906 to enforce 
collective  responsibility  on  the  Mahsuds  for  the  ‘heinous  crimes’  of  its  members  by 
imposing fines and withholding allowances until suspects were surrendered for trial and 
the tribe had provided evidence of its good conduct. The tribe was warned that if it failed 
to comply with the terms, an expedition would be launched followed by disarmament and 
occupation.  Such  leniency  must  have  surprised  the  Mahsuds,  who  were  apparently 
preparing for immediate retribution.
279 
 
 
Morley had been deeply disturbed by events on the frontier, especially the indications that 
organised incitement to murder had replaced the usually random violence. Accepting the 
above  proposals  despite  concerns  that  halting  tribal  allowances  would  provoke  further 
violence, Morley ordered India to be prepared for all possible contingencies, and even 
agreed to approve absolutely necessary measures to ensure the safety of British officers 
and enforce the demands, ‘even if they involve the return of regular forces.’ Simla was 
warned, however, not to anticipate approval for any ‘serious departure from established 
policy,’ especially permanent occupation, although as Morley wrongly believed that Minto 
and Kitchener opposed punitive expeditions, he did not expect it to be suggested.
 280   
 
 
Although they still regarded the Waziristan situation as unsatisfactory, a hope pervaded 
Indian  Government  opinion  that  more  magnanimous  treatment,  as  opposed  to  mere 
retributive violence, would appeal to the Mahsuds and have an eventual quieting effect on 
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the tribe.
281 The authorities had provided some financial assistance to prevent any recourse 
to raiding by the Mahsuds, and initially the tribe appeared willing to fulfil the conditions 
for  restoration  of  their  allowances,  as  even  Mullah  Powindah  cooperated  in  efforts  to 
capture  the  suspects  and  enforce  good  behaviour.  The  policy  soon  collapsed  as  the 
Mahsuds, fearing that the Mullah was using his influence to incite further violence, refused 
to accept responsibility for their fellow tribesmen’s conduct. The subsequent outbreak of 
an internal power struggle did little to curtail their aggression. Confirmation of Powindah’s 
complicity in the murder of the British officers and that he was continuing his ‘campaign 
of fanaticism’ closed another possible avenue for settlement, as it completed his alienation 
from the authorities who had once viewed him as a useful intermediary in their previous 
efforts.
282  
 
 
Minto  became  increasingly  frustrated  that  the  constraints  Morley  had  imposed  were 
preventing the Indian authorities from taking appropriate action to halt the growing tide of 
Mahsud  lawlessness  during  1907.  The  responses  sanctioned  by  London,  of  imposing 
collective  tribal  responsibility  or  withholding  allowances,  had  done  little  to  prevent 
raiding. Now, Minto argued, the situation was intolerable, and ‘for the sake of the safety of 
the Frontier, I do not see how we can avoid an expedition, and having embarked on it, we 
must do our best to remain in the country.’ Inaction in response to contemptuous tribal 
defiance of Government warnings had merely damaged British prestige and increased the 
danger that if forced to launch an expedition, it would be against a large-scale uprising 
provoked  by  their  apparent  weakness.
283 Disagreement  between  Minto  and  Kitchener 
about the best methods of controlling tribal territory, focusing on whether holding strategic 
positions and constructing roads would be more effective than administering Waziristan, 
undermined their case, and proved their doubts about whether the ‘Secretary of State will 
allow an expedition on the case we can at present put before him,’ absolutely right.
284 
Simla  was  unable  to  persuade  Morley  that  while  retreat  following  military  operations 
would  only  leave  an  unfortunate  legacy  of  hatred,  occupying  territory  would  improve 
security in tribal areas without further expense or bloodshed. The Secretary of State was 
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unconvinced  that  this  was  possible  without  precipitating  an  uprising,  and  remained 
concerned that India’s hawks were intent on launching a major campaign to avenge the 
humiliation  of  the  Tirah  uprising.
285 The  Viceroy’s  Council  doubted  that  the  measures 
introduced would achieve much, but, denied recourse to military action, they could devise 
no alternative way out of the difficulties they encountered and could only hope to exploit 
the tension between the Mullah and the tribal elders. Witnessing the consequences of such 
procrastination convinced Minto and his advisers that a forward policy was ‘the eventual 
solution of a lot of difficulties on the Frontier,’ providing the best guarantee of peace and 
the only way to prevent inevitable raiding, or lessen their frustration that their British 
superiors were refusing to adopt the most economical policy. 
286 
 
 
The successful measures taken by the local Political Agent following the Mahsuds’ murder 
of his servants in March 1908 illustrated that swift punitive action could curtail tribal 
lawlessness.  Widespread  arrests,  property  seizures,  and  the  imposition  of  a  blockade, 
supported by the moveable column from Tank, were used as a bargaining tool at the tribal 
jirga to settle outstanding disputes. While warned to avoid ‘any military display likely to 
encourage  idea  that  military  expedition  is  intended,’  the  Government  supported  his 
actions.  Minto  praised  his  prompt  response  for  saving  them  from  the  necessity  of 
launching an expedition and even Morley supported attempts to reach a settlement with the 
tribe  that  avoided  provocative  action.  This  consensus  proved  fragile  as  disagreement 
between Simla and London about the terms to be imposed on the jirga soon destroyed the 
opportunity  to  permanently  pacify  the  Mahsuds.  Morley  refused  to  approve  complete 
forfeiture of tribal allowances, fearing this would deny the Mahsuds the opportunity to re-
establish friendly relations with the Government, thus cementing their anti-British hostility 
and leading to a wider escalation of the tribal unrest. Temporarily halting payments was 
considered  to  be  sufficiently  severe  punishment,  as  it  provided  the  opportunity  for 
restoration once minor cases were settled and the tribe had proved its good behaviour. 
Simla,  however,  remained  concerned  about  the  Mahsuds’  ability  to  restrain  its  ‘bad 
characters,’ and despaired that an impasse had been reached. Minto believed that as the 
limit  of  what  could  be  achieved  with  low-intensity  reprisals  or  negotiations  had  been 
reached, stronger action was required to prevent the spread of more serious lawlessness, 
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but  London  refused  to  sanction  any  measures  entailing  extended  responsibility,  which 
prevented India from consolidating any advantages it had gained.
 287 
 
 
Continued Mahsud violence, including attacks on military police posts that left 11 officers 
dead, and the Mullah’s ongoing efforts to incite ghaza by threatening to resist any British 
encroachment  and  launch  further  raids  unless  restrictions  against  the  tribe  were  lifted, 
proved for many in India the bankruptcy of the approach that limitations imposed from 
London had forced them to adopt. Economic sanctions appeared to have some success, as 
the Mahsuds proved willing, on being told that mere promises did not warrant restoration 
of allowances or re-enlistment in the militia, to make efforts to atone for previous offences 
and re-establish friendly relations with the authorities by paying fines and surrendering 
rifles to settle outstanding cases. In March 1909 the jirga was praised for its excellent 
behaviour,  and  Minto,  delighted  by  the  results  that  could  be  achieved  by  a  more 
magnanimous policy of humanisation rather than mere military action, believed that more 
could be achieved by extending the enlistment of Mahsuds: 
 
 
In a military sense, our hands are tied by the policy of His Majesty’s Government 
in dealing with the Mahsuds, and we are, under present conditions, condemned to 
suffer a succession of raids and a loss of valuable lives. Though we are forbidden 
to take efficient military action, we are, I think, called upon to do something and 
the scheme in question appears to hold out reasonable hopes of success and to be 
well worth trying. 
 
 
The  new  found  harmony  did  not  last,  and  the  Mahsuds’  attempts  to  murder  the 
Commandant of the North Waziristan militia and their attacks on irregular frontier forces, 
contributed much to the generally unsettled atmosphere in the region.
288 Morley warned 
India to avoid any measures that could tend towards punitive military action, but at the 
same time criticised them for failing to curb the Mullah’s influence or prevent raids.
289 
Such criticism infuriated Minto, who argued that as a result of the Secretary of State’s 
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refusal to sanction the only measures capable of finally solving the problem, they now 
faced  the  situation  where  the  Mahsuds  had  become  a  source  of  constant  irritation: 
‘Personally I think we may well be satisfied as to our treatment of raids under political 
conditions,  which  without  embarking  on  new  policy,  we  cannot  disregard.’  Measures 
adopted so far had achieved some success: frontier forces were cognisant of the Mullah’s 
movements, several lashkars had been dispersed without committing any offences, and 
raiding now carried serious risks for the Mahsuds. But the Viceroy recognised that the 
employment  of  regulars  in  the  large  numbers  required  to  completely  eliminate  crime 
would only provoke unrest and necessitate large-scale military operations. In a final dig at 
Morley, Minto argued that the situation was as favourable as could be expected under the 
existing policy.
290 
 
 
Minto had learned from his Canadian experience that as a predecessor’s legacy could set 
the  parameters  for  an  incoming  governor’s  tenure,  it  was  important  to  maintain  a 
pragmatic attitude that would enable him to respond flexibly to any difficulties that may 
arise.  Curzon’s  frontier  policy,  particularly  the  erroneous  belief  that  it  had  brought 
unprecedented  tranquillity  to  the  troubled  borderlands  without  the  need  for  expensive 
military operations, imposed very tight restrictions on Minto. Experienced officials knew 
that no single policy could be successfully applied across such a complex region, and that 
Curzon’s plans were especially unsuited to troublesome areas like Waziristan, but it was 
difficult  to  convince  superiors  in  London  who  saw  only  reduced  expenditure. 
Temperamentally indisposed to support any military action, Morley was reluctant to depart 
from  Curzon’s  scheme,  but  paradoxically  Curzon’s  actions  in  other  spheres,  notably 
foreign  policy,  had  made  the  Liberals  equally  reluctant  to  grant  the  new  Viceroy  the 
freedom of action necessary to implement policy successfully and allow the ‘man on the 
spot’ appropriate influence in policy formation. Perhaps the Liberals feared that Minto’s 
Unionist background inclined him towards actions that they could not support; although 
this  was  never  explicitly  stated,  Morley  made  vague  hints  when  refusing  to  sanction 
military responses to tribal lawlessness. Simla had pacified the Mahsuds as far as was 
possible within the restrictions imposed by London, but as late as August 1910 troops had 
to be sent into their territory in response to renewed raiding, and fears remained that the 
Mullah would enlist wider tribal and Afghan support if larger military operations had been 
launched. As Minto departed, he could look with satisfaction at the vast improvements 
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made in Waziristan when compared with the menacing situation he had confronted on 
arrival, but he must have lamented that the limitations imposed by his office and the policy 
of his superiors in Britain prevented him from implementing the policies that could have 
successfully established order in the turbulent districts.
291 
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3. Containing Unreality: Minto and his Superiors 
 
Already hindered by the troublesome legacies bestowed by his immediate predecessors, 
Minto’s  relationships  with  his  superiors  proved  an  equally  insurmountable  obstacle  to 
attempts  to  impose  his  own  stamp  on  the  prestigious  offices  to  which  he  had  been 
appointed. Although vociferously resented by more zealous governors who wished to run 
imperial  territories  like  personal  possessions,  proconsuls  had  to  accept  their  ultimate 
subordination  to  ministerial  masters  at  Whitehall,  and  through  them  to  Parliament. 
Sensitive  foreign  and  defence  policy  issues  could  be  further  complicated  by  tensions 
between the views of ‘men on the spot’ and their need to respond rapidly to events, and the 
pressures  faced  by  superiors  in  London  from  other  departments  jealous  of  their  own 
spheres of influence and more aware of the wider impact imperial problems could have on 
Britain’s position. 
 
 
Forceful personalities could always dominate the proconsul-minister relationship, and in 
this respect Minto was unfortunate, working with three of the most dominant political 
figures of the era. In Canada, he faced the difficult proposition of serving two masters, for 
in many respects the Governor General was an intermediary between separate institutions 
that rarely saw eye-to-eye on many important issues. His immediate superior for most of 
his Canadian career was Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies until 
October 1903, when he resigned to launch his tariff reform crusade and was replaced by 
the ineffectual Alfred Lyttelton. Although suspicious of Chamberlain and contemptuous of 
his connections with Rhodes, Minto enjoyed working with him, supporting his ultimate 
goal  of  consolidating  the  Empire  by  strengthening  ties  between  Britain  and  the  self-
governing  colonies.  This  similarity  of  outlook  produced  fewer  complaints  from  Minto 
about  his  working  relationship  with  Chamberlain  than  would  be  voiced  about  his 
partnership with Morley, but the former was not as claustrophobic as the Viceroy/Indian 
Secretary combination; both had the safety valve of working with a wider range of people 
that provided greater opportunities for venting the frustrations that inevitably built up from 
working in close proximity. Over the course of his time in Canada Minto came to doubt 
the  efficacy  of  the  methods  Chamberlain  had  adopted  to  achieve  his  objectives. 
Recognising the strength of emerging Canadian nationalism, he increasingly felt it would 
be best to rely on sentimental links rather than formalised arrangements.  
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Chamberlain’s  decision  to  accept  the  Colonial  Office  in  1895  when  more  prestigious 
offices were open to such a high profile politician surprised many. But this was part of his 
plan. He appeared to have only one aim and pursued it vigorously: ‘with fanatical single-
mindedness  [he]  tried  to  bind  the  Empire  into  a  military,  economic  and  political 
federation,’
292 As Kendle argued, for the first time a statesman of the highest rank had 
chosen  the  Colonial  Office  in  the  hope  of  furthering  closer  imperial  union.
293 
Consolidating the Empire would allow more effective use of its resources, enabling Britain 
to strengthen its position in the face of increasing international competition. Making the 
Colonial Secretary a central part of the administration and turning the Colonial Office into 
a central department of state
294 would highlight the Empire’s role as the foundation of 
Britain’s great power status. The presence of such a leading figure at what was previously 
a  backwater  would  show  the  self-governing  colonies  that  their  interests  were  being 
afforded  a  high  priority  and  also  excited  those  imperial  unionists  who  considered 
Chamberlain to be the only man capable of providing the leadership necessary to effect 
imperial reconsolidation.
295 A Colonial Secretary who seriously considered their claims 
and listened to their problems, rather than treating them with the contempt to which they 
had become accustomed, proved popular with colonial politicians who believed he had the 
power to do something about them.
296  
 
 
The appearance of great achievements by the newly high-profile Colonial Office proved 
deceptive,  and several factors combined to prevent Chamberlain  realising many  of his 
goals.    As  a  result  many  historians  have  been  critical  of  his  efforts,  with  some  even 
dismissing his ministerial record as second rate. His vision and ambition frequently outran 
his ability, and attempts to challenge the control exercised by Salisbury and his fellow 
grandees, particularly in foreign policy, were hindered by his inept performance. When 
combined  with  an  unenviable  ability  to  land  his  government  in  trouble,  such  as  the 
association with the Jameson Raid which had done incalculable damage to his reputation 
at an early stage of his ministerial career, this interference did little to improve his standing 
with  those  elements  of  the  Conservative  party  that  despised  his  vulgar  materialism. 
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Despite claims that he brought a new businesslike approach to imperial administration, 
doubts have been cast on his efficiency; as Judd argues, bustle and noise could not conceal 
barren results. Devoid of the resources necessary to assume more imperial burdens, the 
Colonial Office could not overcome Treasury opposition to Chamberlain’s innovations, 
and was unable to obtain the power and status within the policy-making apparatus required 
to implement his schemes. His prescribed solutions for tightening imperial links took little 
account  of  the  increased  autonomy  among  the  self-governing  colonies,  and  he  grossly 
underestimated the strength of colonial nationalism, always believing it was an obstacle 
that could be overcome.
 297  
 
 
Having a fervent imperialist as his superior in London complicated Minto’s relationship 
with the Canadian  government. His main partner in Ottawa, Wilfrid  Laurier, is highly 
regarded by Canadian historians, although Minto took a more critical view. Laurier’s hopes 
for  Canada  were  not  dissimilar  to  Chamberlain’s  wider  plans  for  the  Empire,  aiming 
primarily  to  use  his  talent  for  compromise  to  consolidate  the  shaky  edifice  of 
Confederation after the damage caused by the crises of the 1890s, and ‘bring our people 
long  estranged  from  each  other  gradually  to  become  a  nation.’
298 Hoping  to  build  a 
stronger, more united Canada by healing the conflicts that had divided and weakened the 
country, Laurier showed little enthusiasm for Chamberlain’s potentially divisive imperial 
projects, despite the difficulties this caused in English Canada and Minto’s tireless efforts 
to persuade him.  
 
                                                 
297 E.H.H. Green, The Crisis of Conservatism (Routledge, London, 1995), pp. 72ff; Jay, Political Study, pp. 
211ff; D. Judd, Radical Joe (Hamilton, London, 1977), p. 185, 201-2; Kubicek,  Administration of 
Imperialism, pp. ix-x, 4-5, 14ff; P.T. Marsh, Joseph Chamberlain: Entrepreneur in Politics (Yale University 
Press, New Haven, 1994), pp. 406-7, 417; Porter, Lion’s Share, pp. 130-41; R. Quinalt, ‘Joseph Chamberlain: 
A Reassessment’ in T.R. Gourvish & A. O’Day (eds.), Later Victorian Britain, 1867-1900 (Macmillan, 
London, 1988), pp. 89-91; R. Sarty, ‘Canada and the Great Rapprochement, 1902-1914’ in B.J.C. McKercher 
and L. Aronsen (eds.), The North Atlantic Triangle in a Changing World: Anglo-American-Canadian 
Relations, 1902-1956 (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1996), p. 17; G Searle, A New England? Peace 
and War 1886-1918 (OUP, Oxford, 2004), pp. 263-65, 294, 391; S.H. Zebel ‘Joseph Chamberlain and the 
Genesis of Tariff Reform’ JBS 7 (1967), pp. 133ff. 
298 J.T. Saywell ‘The 1890s’ in Careless & Brown (eds.), The Canadians 1867-1967 pp. 131ff. For further 
information on Laurier see P. Berton, Marching as to War: Canada’s Turbulent Years 1899-1953 
(Doubleday, Toronto, 2001), pp. 20ff; G. Bowering, Egotists and Autocrats: The Prime Ministers of Canada 
(Viking, Toronto, 1999), pp. 132ff; Brown (ed.), The Illustrated History of Canada, pp. 372-373, 402ff; 
Brown & Cook, Nation Transformed, pp. 7ff; Buchan, Lord Minto, p. 121; Cook et al, Canada, pp. 153, 
169ff; McNaught, Penguin History of Canada, pp. 188, 207-212; J. Monet, ‘Canada’ in J. Eddy & D. 
Schreuder (eds.), The Rise of Colonial Nationalism (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1988), pp. 160-161; B. 
Robertson, Sir Wilfrid Laurier: The Great Conciliator (Quarry Press, Kingston, 1991), passim; O.D. Skelton, 
The Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier Vol. II (The Century Co., New York, 1922) passim; Stevens & 
Saywell (eds.), LMCP I, passim; Wade, French Canadians, passim; J. Willison, Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the 
Liberal Party: A Political History (John Murray, London, 1903), passim.   101 
 
Minto  thoroughly  enjoyed  working  with  Laurier  and  a  strong  friendship  developed 
between them. However, Minto took Laurier’s willingness to compromise as weakness and 
refusal to lead. Often this was just a case of not doing what Britain desired, and resisting 
Minto  and  Chamberlain’s  forceful  pressure  required  strength.  Minto  correctly  analysed 
Laurier’s attitude towards the Empire, as Berton states ‘he believed there was no advantage 
to Canadians in close connection with Britain…He was indeed a Canadian nationalist.’
299 
Minto’s correspondence is littered with references to the problems he encountered trying to 
persuade Canada to adopt the policies thrust forward by Chamberlain:  
 
 
Sir  Wilfrid  is  a  delightful  personality,  broad-minded,  and  I  always  find  him 
charming to deal with – but he is not a strong man – is I think anxious to take life 
easily, and generally inclined to agree all round – this does not always simplify 
the  position….It  is  impossible  to  help  feeling  that  there  is  an  anti-imperial 
connection feeling in high quarters in Canada – Mulock and Borden were both I 
believe in all the early discussions as to sending contingents thoroughly British. I 
cannot disguise from myself that at heart Sir Wilfrid is not. He may be so as a 
matter of political opportunity – but he is not genuinely so…
300 
 
 
He  realised  sooner  than  his  British  superiors  that  Canada  aimed  at  greater  autonomy 
within, rather than tightened links with, the Empire, rapidly appreciating that Laurier was 
at best indifferent, and at worst hostile to any perceived threat to Canadian unity, although 
his desire to maintain the compromise nature of Canadian government often manifested 
itself as an apparent lack of enthusiasm about anything. Such reluctance was ascribed to 
Laurier’s ancestry; to many British politicians his French background precluded him from 
absorbing British sympathies, although Minto acerbically noted that Laurier was perfectly 
willing to support Chamberlain’s proposals when there were obvious advantages to the 
Dominion and his own government. Minto frequently complained that Laurier was too 
easily influenced, especially by French Canadian firebrands opposed to the Empire, and he 
correctly identified that Laurier’s ultimate aim was independence, all the while bemoaning 
that the Prime Minister did not do enough to educate or lead the country on imperial issues. 
This clash of interest and ideas often created tension in what was a mostly harmonious 
relationship. 
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Minto, Canada and the Empire 
 
Despite  the  divisive  nature  of  its  ideology  and  the  almost  total  failure  to  achieve  its 
objectives, under Chamberlain’s dynamic leadership, ‘imperialism’ had become a central 
factor  in  British  politics.  Apparently  offering  viable  solutions  to  the  myriad  problems 
Britain encountered in the late nineteenth century, many elements of the programme, from 
tariff reform to the creation of a unified imperial defence system, attracted widespread 
popular support.
301 In Canada, Minto experienced the tension created by the conflict of 
these  proposals  with  local  desires  for  increased  autonomy.  Imperialist  sentiment  had 
emerged as a potent force in Canadian politics during the bitter domestic upheavals of the 
1890s,  and  thus  Laurier  had  to  accommodate  such  ideas  to  avoid  any  exacerbation  of 
existing  ill-feeling.  Some  historians  regard  it  as  a  primitive  expression  of  nationalist 
sentiment;  association  with  the  Empire  became  a  defining  aspect  of  British-Canadian 
identity, representing separateness both from their Francophone compatriots and America. 
For many it was a stepping-stone on the path to nationhood that offered autonomy as well 
as  protection  without  expense  from  the  potential  threat  posed  by  the  US.  Canadian 
imperialists  aspired  to  the  development  of  a  greater  role  within  the  Empire,  but  the 
Dominion proved reluctant to assume the responsibilities commensurate with its imagined 
status, happy to utilise the benefits bestowed by British prestige and quick to complain if 
its interests were ignored or its autonomy threatened.
302 Any subordination to the ‘wider 
aims’ of British policy was resented. The parochial outlook of the self-governing colonies 
infuriated British officials, who grew to resent preposterous colonial aspirations that were 
believed to pose a threat to imperial interests. 
 
 
Laurier remained ambivalent to imperialism, willing to accommodate it if necessary to 
protect Confederation or his own political position, but otherwise wishing to focus his 
attention on Canada. His public ‘rhetorical excesses’
303 in 1897 had further heightened 
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Chamberlain’s hopes of making progress towards federation, but  Laurier dashed these in 
private  by  rejecting  proposals  to  assume  greater  responsibilities  for  imperial  defence, 
especially  those  involving  higher  expenditure.  Laurier  returned  to  Ottawa  in  triumph, 
having assuaged the doubts of those who questioned his imperial loyalty while avoiding 
embroiling Canada in expensive commitments to the Empire that many had been anxious 
to avoid.
 304 Working with a more avowedly imperialist Governor during a series of crises 
for the Empire tested Laurier’s new-found enthusiasm and publicly expressed willingness 
for Canada to respond when ‘the fires were lit on the hills.’ Minto described the crisis over 
the  participation  of  Canadian  troops  in  South  Africa  as  the  defining  event  of  his 
gubernatorial career.
305 Providing a test case for Chamberlain’s aims to promote imperial 
solidarity and encourage more active colonial contribution to colonial defence, throughout 
the increasingly bitter debate Minto believed it his duty to protect and further imperial 
interests, regardless of the strain this placed on his working relationship with the Canadian 
government.
306 
 
 
Discussion between Minto and Seymour about possible Canadian assistance in the event of 
war with France in late 1898 raised larger questions about imperial defence cooperation.
307 
Recalling  the  difficulties  that  had  arisen  over  this  issue  during  his  service  as  Military 
Secretary, Minto doubted that Canada had overcome its previous reluctance to sacrifice 
men or money needed for its own development, an attitude ingrained in the Militia Act. As 
it considered only direct attacks on the Dominion, raising forces to serve elsewhere against 
a European country would be a ‘new departure,’ not covered by provisions for deploying 
the militia outside Canada in certain circumstances. Although Minto felt troops could be 
easily raised in an emergency, he steadfastly believed it was unwise to prepare contingency 
plans dependent on the availability of 
 Canadian troops for a wider conflict.
308 For Minto it 
was important for imperial purposes to distinguish between Britain’s right to officially call 
out the militia for service in the Empire, and an enthusiastically made ‘sentimental offer,’ 
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demonstrating Canadian support for Chamberlain’s policies.
309 Minto’s delight at Laurier’s 
imperialist  interpretation  of  the  act,  admitting  Britain’s  right  to  utilise  the  force  for 
overseas service, was qualified by the knowledge that Ottawa rested safe in the fact that no 
militia regiment was fit for overseas service and a belief that Britain could not rely on the 
universal application of Laurier’s literal translation; much would depend on the political 
considerations surrounding any decision.
310 
 
 
Consideration of the Section 79 issue simultaneous to the deterioration of relations with 
Transvaal  raised  Canadian  suspicions  about  Britain’s  plans  to  force  them  into  closer 
defence cooperation. Hutton’s boasts that he and Minto had forced 
 
 
The  weak-kneed  and  vacillating  Laurier  Government  with  their  ill-disguised 
French and Pro-Boer proclivities to take a part – nay a leading part – in the great 
movement which has drawn the strings of our Anglo-Saxon British Empire so 
close,
311 
 
 
did little to allay such fears. Later historians dismissed claims of an imperial conspiracy to 
denude Canada of its autonomy, arguing that Laurier’s government was driven to act by 
the strength of Canadian public opinion in favour of participation.
312  Minto, however, had 
a significant role in Canada’s involvement in South Africa.  
 
 
Chamberlain initially hoped that military contributions from the self-governing colonies to 
operations in South Africa would demonstrate imperial solidarity; 
 
 
If a really spontaneous request were made from any Canadian force to serve with 
HM’s troops on such an expedition, it would be welcomed by the authorities and 
all necessary arrangements would have to be made to accept and carry it out. 
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Such a proof of the unity of the British Empire would have a great moral effect 
and might go far to secure a pacific settlement.
313 
 
 
Minto fully supported Chamberlain’s idea, and pre-empting Laurier’s predicted refusal in a 
constitutionally improper move, instructed Hutton to secretly prepare a plan for a small 
Canadian  force  that  could  be  organised  and  despatched  with  minimum  disruption  or 
expense.
314 Simultaneously efforts were made to persuade Laurier to accept the proposal 
and make a spontaneous offer, rather than merely bending to British pressure, to prove the 
Empire’s strength and willingness to stand together to protect its interests.
315 Aware that 
any decision had to be made by Canada and that they could not be coerced to act, Minto 
urged Chamberlain to be cautious: ‘I would carefully avoid the appearance of bringing 
pressure to bear.’
316  
 
 
Minto  became  increasingly  frustrated  in  his  efforts  to  persuade  Laurier  to  support 
participation, complaining bitterly that his lack of British enthusiasm and susceptibility to 
French Canadian pressure would prevent any offer of military assistance.
317 Attempts to 
alleviate fears that Canada would be forced to assume burdensome military expenditure or 
dismiss ideas that Britain was demanding military contributions by playing on Laurier’s 
nationalism (‘if Canada makes a spontaneous request she will act as a nation’
318) came to 
little.  It  proved  difficult  to  shift  Laurier  from  the  traditional  standpoint  that  Canada’s 
development  was  more  important  than  military  adventures  or  ease  his  fears  about  the 
potential impact of participation on Confederation, although his  arguments that Britain 
should not expect Canada to take part demonstrated a misunderstanding of Chamberlain’s 
objectives.
 319 Caught between Francophone opposition and Anglophone pressure, Laurier 
sought to find a compromise solution through the passage of a parliamentary resolution 
supporting  British  policy  in  South  Africa  or  by  accepting  individual  offers.  Minto 
strenuously opposed the latter, believing it would defeat the whole purpose of raising a 
Canadian  force.  He  doubted  the  prospect  of  any  troops  being  sent,  but  increasingly 
sympathised with Laurier’s predicament and hoped that ‘there may be a decent way out of 
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it,’ when they faced an irresponsible press campaign urging them to commit Canada to the 
expenditure of lives and money for a quarrel not threatening imperial safety.
320 
 
 
Minto’s continued urgings to consider the issue from an imperial perspective could be 
resisted as unwarranted interference with local autonomy. Laurier could not withstand the 
popular enthusiasm that had been heightened in early October by Chamberlain’s attempt to 
pressure them into action by releasing a telegram thanking Canada for its ‘signal exhibition 
of  patriotic  spirit….shown  by  offers  to  serve  in  South  Africa’
321 and  the  simultaneous 
publication  of  Hutton’s  plans,  both  of  which  provided  imperial  endorsement  for  those 
favouring participation. Laurier’s policy of relying on private offers had been stripped of 
its credibility by Britain’s direct request for aid, but the ‘air of sinister design’ surrounding 
the episode, momentarily strengthened his obstinacy.
322 Refusing to believe that not only 
the public but elements of his own Cabinet supported a policy he resented, Laurier blamed 
Minto and Hutton for offering troops behind his back, referring bitterly to ‘the clandestine 
attempts…made to force our hands.’
323 As Miller argues ‘the first casualty of the crisis was 
the government’s relations with the Governor General. Until this point Minto’s relations 
with his government had been cordial.’
324 Minto indignantly defended himself and Hutton 
against  charges  of  coercing  Canada,  arguing  that  they  were  opposed  to  ‘irresponsible 
offers’ and that the Government should organise an official force. 
325 
 
 
Facing a ‘fundamental and grim’ ethnic division within his Cabinet over whether to send 
troops
326 and an increasingly bitter press battle,  Laurier’s primary  aim was to preserve 
fragile Canadian unity, but he could no longer resist public opinion. As Minto stated at the 
departure of the first contingent on 31 October, ‘it goes out because you insisted on its 
going and I am very glad you did so.’
327 Although severely criticised in some quarters for 
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this remark, others, such as the Montreal Star, the leader of the pro-participation campaign, 
praised him: ‘if Canada is unfortunate at this juncture in having a Government which is a 
little short on imperial spirit, it is fortunate in having a brave, gallant and loyal soldier for 
Governor General.’
328 Minto was reluctant to claim sole credit for the despatch of troops, 
but his final attempts to persuade Laurier proved successful in finally tipping the ever-
reluctant premier towards participation. Minto stressed that Canada’s lack of cordiality 
when asked for assistance, at a time they were reliant on imperial support over Alaska, was 
creating  an  unfortunate  impression.  When  combined  with  hints  about  the  praise  being 
lavished on the Australasian colonies for their contributions and that Canadian assistance 
would be welcomed as a demonstration of imperial unanimity, it provided the final push 
Laurier needed to make a decision.
329 Exercising his influence subtly, by explaining to 
Laurier  that  a  spontaneous  offer  would  be  appreciated  while  hinting  at  the  potentially 
severe consequences for Canada’s interests if they remained uncooperative, Minto proved 
that the Governor’s opinions could have a significant influence on colonial policy.   
 
 
The decision to send 1000 Canadian infantry was ‘an uneasy compromise between all the 
pressures playing upon’ Laurier,
330 as vividly suggested by the official announcement of 
14 October: 
 
 
The Prime Minister, in view of the well known desire of a great many Canadians 
who are ready to take service under such conditions, is of the opinion that the 
moderate  expenditure  which  would  thus  be  involved  for  the  equipment  and 
transportation of such volunteers may be readily undertaken by the Government 
of  Canada  without  summoning  Parliament,  especially  as  such  an  expenditure 
under such circumstances cannot be regarded as a departure from the well-known 
principles of constitutional government and colonial practice, nor construed as a 
precedent for future action.
331 
 
 
 
                                                 
328 NLS MS 12583, Montreal Star, 1 November 1899. 
329 LMCP I, Minto to  Laurier, 13 October 1899,  Chamberlain to Minto, 13 October 1899, Minto to 
Chamberlain, 14 & 20 October 1899, pp. 148-64; Gordon, Dominion Partnership, p. 140; Marsh, 
Entrepreneur in Politics, pp. 472-75; Miller, Map Red, pp. 47-48; Miller, Canadian Career, p. 95; Page, 
Boer War and Canadian Imperialism, p. 12; Penlington, Canada and Imperialism, p. 257; Willison, Wilfrid 
Laurier, pp. 313ff. 
330 M. Beloff, Britain’s Liberal Empire, 1897-1921 (Methuen, London, 1969), p. 67; Skelton, Life & Letters 
II, p. 98 
331 LMCP I, Report of Privy Council Committee, 14 October 1899, pp. 154-55.   108 
Minto, struggling to contain his ‘downright contempt for what has taken place,’ criticised 
the  decision  for  attempting  to  minimise  the  official  appearance  of  Canada’s  offer.
332 
Recognising the trauma involved in reaching this stage, Minto felt it was important to 
maintain the Canadian character of the force, ensuring that it represented an appropriate 
national contribution, rather than just an offer of troops as Laurier wished, for which he 
was praised by Canadian historians: ‘Here, as on some other occasions, one is impressed 
with Minto’s rugged common sense and with the fact that he was a rather remarkably 
“good  Canadian.”’
333  Minto  pursued  the  original  objective  of  despatching  a  force 
‘consistent with the dignity of the Dominion,’
334 believing that this would satisfy  both 
Chamberlain and Canadian imperialist opinion. Although able to persuade the War Office 
to  preserve  the  Canadian  force  as  a  distinct  unit  symbolising  the  policy  of  the  self-
governing colonies cooperating with Britain in enforcing imperial rule, Minto could not 
overcome Laurier’s opposition to sending a contingent of all arms, ‘more in consonance 
with the importance of Canada.’
 335 
 
 
Minto  remained  heavily  involved  in  all  aspects  of  Canadian  policy  relating  to  South 
Africa, as it constituted a central aspect of his gubernatorial duty, although he was insistent 
that all offers of troops ‘should emanate entirely from the Government of Canada.’
336 His 
efforts to promote imperial enthusiasm, such as over the second contingent, did little to 
ease the friction with his government until it became evident from the problems Britain 
was  encountering  that  colonial  assistance  was  necessary  as  well  as  welcome.  Minto’s 
military experience and contacts in Britain were utilised to ensure the rapid mobilisation of 
subsequent  contingents,  and  he  was  adamant  that  all  the  forces  should  be  suitably 
representative of the Dominion and a source of pride. Thus he tried to ensure that the best 
troops, especially the under-used and eminently suitable material from the North West 
Mounted Police (despite the problems this created with Hutton), were being raised for each 
contingent, and for this reason came to doubt the quality of some of the later contingents. 
As part of his on-going campaign against political interference, Minto insisted that all 
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officers be appointed according to merit, and was pleasantly surprised  when it proved 
unnecessary to veto any appointments.
 Minto corresponded with both Canadian and British 
officers in South Africa throughout the conflict, and was able to ensure that conditions for 
the troops were comfortable or that their efforts were being properly recognised through 
the award of medals or honours.
337 
  
 
While undoubtedly pleased that Canada had belatedly, and occasionally reluctantly, done 
its part for the Empire, Minto was perturbed by the negative consequences of the policy in 
which he had invested so much effort. The poisonous atmosphere of the 1900 election 
afforded  Minto  a  greater  insight  into  the  difficulties  Laurier  braved  in  stabilising 
Confederation, as an avalanche of ethnic and religious taunts buried Laurier’s hopes that 
the  admirable  spectacle  of  French  and  British  Canadians  fighting  together  for  a  noble 
cause would promote national harmony. The Montreal student riots of March 1900 raised 
Minto’s fears about the dangers posed by ethnic hostility, commenting that ‘it would take a 
very small spark to make a racial blaze here.’
338 Making his own efforts to reduce tension 
he stressed to his British correspondents that French Canadians were not disloyal, merely 
not  British,  and  thus  unlikely  to  be  sympathetic  to  imperial  action.  Laurier’s  election 
victory was the best thing for Canadian stability, ensuring that he could not eloquently 
rally  opposition  to  imperialist  policies  in  Parliament.
339  The  emergence  of  nascent 
Canadian  nationalism,  expressed  through  boasts  about  their  military  prowess  in 
comparison to Britain, not helped by the ill-informed praise lavished on Canadian troops, 
was equally concerning. As Minto stressed to Pauncefote, such ideas were ‘a mistake full 
of mischief for the future here.’
340 These early nationalist manifestations did not augur 
well for the success of Chamberlain’s policies; as Morton argued, the contingents ‘had 
embarked  as  soldiers  of  the  Queen;  they  returned,  for  the  most  part  as  self-conscious 
Canadians.’
341 
 
 
Chamberlain  was  anxious  to  utilise  the  ‘surge’  of  imperialist  sentiment  created  in  the 
colonies by the South African war, believing it had provided a favourable atmosphere for 
introducing  practical  measures  to  strengthen  the  connecting  bonds  of  Empire.  Over-
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optimistically  basing  his  plans  on  the  assumption  that  the  tide  of  war  was  turning  in 
Britain’s favour,
342 Chamberlain explained to Minto that it was:  
 
 
most  important  to  take  advantage  [of  the  situation  he  expected  to  exist 
immediately after the war] in order to confirm and render permanent the unity of 
the British Empire which has been so magnificently demonstrated by the support 
given by the colonies to the Mother Country during the contest.
 343 
 
 
He  suggested  two  ‘constitutional  innovations;’
344 for  the  colonies  to  be  consulted  in 
connection with the post-war settlement, and the creation of an imperial council to consider 
defence  policy  and  act  as  permanent  advisers  to  the  Colonial  Secretary,  although 
comparing  this  with  the  Council  of  India  was  a  most  unfortunate  analogy,  implying 
colonial  subordination  and  continued  obligations  to  provide  assistance  without  any 
increase in power.
345 For Chamberlain, as during the contingent crisis, it was important for 
the colonies to initiate any moves in this direction, or at the very least, for Britain to be 
assured that its advances would be ‘cordially reciprocated.’ Admitting the vagueness of his 
ideas,  Chamberlain  nevertheless  instructed  Minto  to  investigate  colonial  opinion  by 
consulting  not  only  Laurier  but  other  ‘influential  persons,’  thus  ascertaining  levels  of 
public  and  official  support  before  proceeding  any  further  with  the  project.
346 
Chamberlain’s prioritisation of the former is interesting, indicating that he remembered the 
public outcry in response to Laurier’s inaction during the contingent crisis, and that he 
relied  upon  another  significant  outburst  of  popular  imperialism  to  force  the  reluctant 
Laurier to follow Britain’s lead.  
 
 
Initial signs for success appeared hopeful. A resolution proposing similar ideas had been 
introduced  in  the  Canadian  Senate  and  the  Colonial  Office  believed  that  ‘a  more 
favourable opportunity cannot occur, and we should strike while the iron is hot.’
347 Hopes 
were raised further by Laurier’s speech in the House, which, like those in 1897, he would 
later regret: 
 
                                                 
342 Brown & Cook, Nation Transformed, p. 43; R.H. Wilde, ‘Joseph Chamberlain’s Proposal of an Imperial 
Council in March 1900’ CHR 37 (1956), pp. 225-27. 
343 LMCP I, Chamberlain to Minto, 2 March 1900, pp. 306-8. 
344 Marsh, Entrepreneur in Politics, pp. 488-92. 
345 Preston, Imperial Defense, p. 279. 
346 LMCP I, Chamberlain to Minto, 2 March 1900, pp. 306-8. 
347 LMCP I, Minto to Chamberlain, 14 March 1900, Memo, 16 March 1900, pp. 315-18.   111 
 
If you want us to take part in wars let us share not only the burdens but the 
responsibilities and duties as well…if you want us to help you, call us to your 
councils.
348 
 
 
Ever-optimistic,  Chamberlain  chose  to  ignore  the  ambivalence  and  interpret  this  as  a 
‘green light’ for his proposals. Through his enquiries, Minto discovered that, as Kendle 
argued,  ‘nothing  of  course,  was  further  from  the  truth.’
349 Despite  Minto’s  efforts  to 
persuade Laurier that tightening links with Britain would enhance imperial security, by 
arguing that ‘we have few friends, and the component parts of the Empire cannot stand 
alone,’ or urging even a non-committal indication that the proposals were acceptable to 
Canadians, Laurier remained unenthusiastic. Minto correctly identified that Laurier was 
apprehensive about French Canadian reactions to any discussion of imperial federation, 
fearing it would reignite ethnic hostilities. Laurier again reiterated that Canadian attention 
must be focused on internal development. As it was already expending considerable sums 
maintaining the militia for national defence, he did ‘not think it would be a sound policy, at 
the present time, to ask Canada to apply a larger portion of revenue to a definite plan of 
Imperial military organisation.’ Canada had given a solid indication that it could be relied 
upon to provide assistance; in the future this was more likely to be given voluntarily than 
under any detailed plan imposing fixed financial obligations. Canadians had little interest 
in a body established to organise plans for imperial defence, and continued to view existing 
relations  as  satisfactory.  Any  changes  would  evolve  as  the  Empire  adapted  to  new 
conditions, and in Laurier’s view, any movement to hasten change would retard rather than 
advance imperial unity.
350 
 
 
Previous close contact with Laurier meant Minto was unsurprised by his response, but 
consultation with other ‘influential persons’ was actively discouraging. Few favoured the 
establishment of any advisory body, and while they did not wholly support Laurier, they 
agreed French sensitivity about taxation would prevent more definite action and, as Minto 
had argued, that ‘sentimental connections’ would prove more beneficial to the Empire than 
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any defined responsibilities.
351 In outlining these unfavourable reactions to Chamberlain, 
Minto demonstrated a more detailed understanding of both public and official opinion in 
Ottawa than his superior ever managed. After his consultations, Minto concluded that ‘as 
regards the furtherance of imperial relations there must be great caution.’ Despite a great 
love  for  the  ‘mother  country’  and  an  eagerness  to  share  in  the  Empire’s  glories,  few 
equated Canadian prosperity with imperial strength, nor exhibited any interest in assuming 
tangible  responsibilities.  Fear  that  increasing  Canada’s  obligations  would  entail  greater 
military expenditure, which Minto criticised as indicating a selfish refusal to accept their 
liability  to  contribute  to  the  defence  of  the  Empire  that  protected  them,  had  created 
widespread  objections  to  suggestions  like  those  made  by  Chamberlain.  The  vaguest 
inclinations towards ‘closer relations’ were detectable, and Minto felt that only by working 
with Laurier, for example by invitations to post-war conferences, could French Canadian 
indifference, a major obstacle to imperial reform, be overcome. Even here success was 
doubtful, as he suspected that Laurier dreamed of future Canadian independence. Canada 
considered  imperial  issues  from  a  utilitarian  viewpoint,  focusing  on  what  economic  or 
political gains could be made, and this had to be used to Britain’s advantage. Thus the 
tariff question was a more productive path towards imperial unity than defence. Although 
Minto believed that the whole issue required ‘tender handling,’ he felt that progress could 
be made by initially strengthening sentimental connections.
352 
 
 
Infuriated by this unsatisfactory reply, Chamberlain unfairly blamed Minto for frightening 
Laurier by implying that his Advisory Council would produce immediate tax increases. He 
was equally annoyed that Laurier had responded negatively after his apparent invitation to 
advance towards union. Chamberlain was, however, forced to concede that if the colonies 
wanted no change in imperial relations, it was unwise to press them.
353 Historians have 
suggested that he tried to emphasise the gradual nature of any progress towards federation, 
following the colonial lead and protecting their autonomy. But this is not apparent in his 
correspondence with Minto, where more stress was laid on the colonies assuming their fair 
share  of  responsibility  before  any  undefined    ‘voice’  in  imperial  affairs  was  granted. 
Continued military stalemate led many colonial leaders to question the efficacy of closer 
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defence connections, thus destroying the slim hopes of success.
354 As Messamore argues, 
Minto  recognised  the  fundamental  difficulty;  British Canada  was  drawn  to the idea of 
Empire, but loath to place Canada’s control over its policies in the hands of an outside 
body, an idea central to Chamberlain’s plans, even if they played a leading role therein. 
Most commentators agreed it would be a serious mistake to bind Canada to any formal 
obligation to provide money or men to imperial wars. Although Laurier saw the need to 
reconsider  imperial  relations  if  the  consequence  of  sending  the  contingents  was  that 
Canada should take part in all British wars and contribute to imperial expenditure, many 
shared his views that much more could be got, as had been proved, by leaving the question 
to sentiment.
355 
 
 
Minto  remained  determined  to  harness  the  outburst  of  imperial  enthusiasm  created  by 
perceived Canadian successes in South Africa, and continued to urge Laurier to seriously 
consider imperial issues up to the 1902 conference. Minto stressed to Parkin that ‘a great 
deal of imperial benefit turns on the utilisation of imperial sympathy stirred up by this 
war,’  if  properly  directed  it  could  help  to  unite  the  Empire  ‘in  one  common  cause,’ 
although action on this front was urgently necessary as opportunities to encourage this 
feeling had already  been lost.
356 Preliminary, informal, steps towards this end, such as 
opening  imperial  careers  to  South  African  veterans,  would  demonstrate  British 
appreciation of Canada’s support and help to increase sentimental connections.
357 Laurier 
could not be persuaded to alter his views, as Minto reported, ‘he told me distinctly, the 
point  he  should  wish  to  avoid  was  imperial  defence…which  could  be  taken  to  mean 
taxation  for  military  purposes…’
358 Laurier  recognised  that  Canada  relied  on  British 
assistance but refused to support any measure entailing expenditure or obligation without 
any obvious benefit, or commit to a central council whose decisions may conflict with the 
policy of the Dominion government. Minto informed Chamberlain that Laurier believed 
‘that  the  time  for  closer  relations  in  the  direction  of  Imperial  Federation  has  not  yet 
arrived,’ but he had come to recognise that this time would probably never arrive.
 359 
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Minto continued to believe that stipulating  conditions of obligatory military service or 
expenditure was a mistake, and that instead Canada should focus on enhancing its ability to 
safeguard  its  own  portion  of  the  Empire.
360  A  pragmatic  acceptance  of  Canadian 
viewpoints did not lessen Minto’s irritation at their attitude towards imperial issues, and he 
believed Laurier’s refusal to even consider imperial defence at the forthcoming conference 
was ‘the worst thing done in an imperial sense since I have been here…’
361 Aware that 
pressure  from  Britain  would  achieve  little,  Minto  encouraged  Parkin’s  campaign  to 
pressure Laurier into actively discussing defence at the conference, but still complained 
that ‘in an imperial sense the position is unsatisfactory and uncertain.’
362 
 
 
Minto’s pessimism was well-founded.  Chamberlain’s hopes that the war would ‘tend more 
than anything else to draw the Empire closer together,’ were disappointed. As Judd argues, 
support  from  the  self-governing  colonies  did  not  presage  imperial  federation.  Imperial 
cooperation could not be taken for granted as ‘the bonds of Empire were only as strong as 
the colonies chose to make them.’
363 Colonial unwillingness to make larger contributions 
towards defence or accept greater centralisation in any form meant that little was achieved 
at the 1902 Conference beyond an  agreement to hold further meetings.
364 Chamberlain 
found it difficult to understand how Canada and Australia failed to see strength and safety 
lay in union or how they could with self-respect decline to bear their fair share of imperial 
burdens. He held Canada in particular contempt, damning them for ‘doing less than any 
other part of the Empire for its own defence and for the general maintenance of imperial 
interests.’ Laurier’s attitude exasperated Chamberlain, having ‘never appreciated how little 
[he] did compared with how much he eloquently said.’ Lady Minto tried to defend Laurier 
as a gentleman, but this did little to assuage Chamberlain, who commented that he ‘would 
rather do business with a cad who knew his own mind.’ Laurier was equally surprised that 
Chamberlain could not appreciate the view of the self-governing colonies that the Empire’s 
strength  lay  in  local  autonomy,  diversity  and  freedom.  Opposing  commitments  and 
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insisting  on  greater  colonial  responsibility  rather  than  imperial  centralisation,  Laurier 
argued that sentimental connections rather than pre-arranged official participation would 
encourage  Canada  to  respond  in  an  emergency.  Such  attitudes  forced  Chamberlain  to 
abandon the military and political routes to imperial unity and turn to a more detailed 
consideration of economic approaches; an idea which Minto had suggested held greater 
hopes of success.
365  
 
 
Minto  remained  frustrated  by  Laurier’s  indifference  to  imperial  issues  when  the 
opportunity  had  been  offered  to  achieve  so  much,  and  he  agreed  that  the  Australians 
appeared ‘sounder.’ But he could not accept that the whole blame for the meagre results 
could be attributed solely to Laurier. Britain was equally responsible for failing to grasp 
the importance of colonial possibilities, and he doubted Chamberlain was in touch with 
colonial sentiment. While undoubtedly strong, Chamberlain was unsympathetic and unable 
to endear himself to other statesmen, a vital attribute when dealing with sensitive colonial 
politicians, and he was ‘therefore not without risk in his colonial admin.’
366 
 
 
Minto’s insistence on his right to protect imperial interests ensured that the issue remained 
controversial and capable of creating friction. Speeches, like that to the Montreal Board of 
Trade in September 1902, arguing that as Britain was obligated to defend the Empire, the 
Dominion had a responsibility to maintain efficient forces on which Britain could rely in 
imperial wars, thus making it important for the Empire to work together against external 
threats,  provoked  considerable  criticism,  despite  his  admission  that  any  future 
contributions  would  be  dependent  on  colonial  public  opinion.
367 Nationalist  historians 
overplay the resulting  furore,
368 focusing on the  attacks by vocal  critics like Bourassa, 
which were fuelled by press misinterpretation of Minto’s views; as many people supported 
the Governor’s opinions, and he was publicly defended by Laurier. Minto believed that the 
uproar that had resulted had ‘been beneficial as a whole, as indicating how utterly opposed 
the extreme French section is to any imperial responsibility.’
369 
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Chamberlain increasingly valued Minto’s opinions and insights into Canadian attitudes, 
extending the Governor’s term to assist in the implementation of his policies. Minto had 
continued to consider the difficulties involved in strengthening imperial ties with Canada. 
His  enthusiasm  for  Canada  to  make  greater  contributions  to,  or  accept  greater 
responsibilities for, imperial defence never waned, but he recognised that it ‘appears to be 
a subject to be which [Laurier’s government] would wish to avoid,’ and that ‘nothing will 
din it into them.’
 370 Chamberlain berated the Canadian government for their inaction: 
 
 
Canada alone of the great colonies repudiates its obligation to do anything more 
than  to  provide  in  its  own  way  without  any  control,  and  even  without  much 
consultation in common for its own defence. 
 
 
But these efforts, along with those to flatter Canadian vanity by highlighting its failure to 
occupy a position commensurate with its imagined importance, achieved nothing.
371 Minto 
was frustrated that opportunities to foster the enthusiasm ignited by the Boer War and 
utilise it to strengthen Britain’s imperial military position had been wasted, but he was 
convinced that attempts to impose formal obligations were merely counter-productive and 
he never wavered from a belief that reliance on sentimental connections offered more hope 
of success.
372 New ideas had emerged about Canadian defence, influenced by nationalist 
sentiment.  Minto  agreed  with  Clarke’s  assessment  that  the  colonies  expected  British 
support  to  protect  their  interests,  but  did  ‘not  recognise  their  corresponding 
responsibilities,’
373 but as even Chamberlain accepted, it was ‘impossible…to force our 
views with regard to Imperial defence upon the colonies.’
374 Minto believed it was wisest 
to  allow  the  Dominion  to  develop  its  own  forces,  and  rely  on  them  providing  hearty 
cooperation in defending the Empire rather than trying to make them part of any general 
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defence system, supporting his brother’s view that ‘we ought to expect each colony to 
think of itself first, and of the Empire only in the second degree.’
 375 
 
 
As Minto tried to promote trade as an alternative method of strengthening imperial links 
his continued analysis of Canadian reluctance to accept Chamberlain’s policies identified 
several factors. Perceived British indifference to the colonies had done little to promote 
their aims: 
 
 
The  ultra-imperialists  at  home  who  talk  of  recognised  contributions  from  the 
colonies of men and money simply don’t know the feeling of the colonies…[such 
proposals] show in my opinion a want of appreciation of the growing strength of 
the growing aspirations of the young nationalities we call colonies.
376 
 
 
He feared that apparent British apathy would only alienate Canadian opinion. Britain had 
to  recognise  the  growth  of  nationalism  in  the  colonies,  but  simultaneously  provide 
leadership and direction,
377 something only possible if its leaders gained greater experience 
of their Empire. Minto also believed that local factors hindered imperial integration. He 
recognised  that  Quebec  was  not  overtly  disloyal  but  could  not  be  expected  to  share 
Ontario’s  enthusiasm  or  view  of  Canadian  national  interests.  While  sympathising  with 
Laurier’s  difficulties  in  maintaining  national  solidarity,  his  apparent  indifference  to 
imperial issues perplexed and annoyed Minto: ‘Sir Wilfrid is very unsatisfactory in a big 
imperial  sense.  I  can’t  make  him  out  on  that  point.’
378 Laurier  was  too  much  of  an 
opportunist, willing to bend to imperial enthusiasm when unavoidable or advantageous, as 
during the contingents crisis, but it was never a settled policy, and Minto blamed him for 
the failure to utilise the opportunities presented to strengthen the Empire: ‘a Prime Minister 
of more pronounced British sympathies might have strengthened public opinion here.’
379 A 
parochial failure to recognise that Canadian security rested on imperial strength existed 
throughout the Dominion, and as Minto lamented, was compounded by the absence of 
strong leadership: ‘no Canadian statesman of either side is honestly anxious to direct’ the 
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latent imperial enthusiasm. Interestingly, Minto recognised that attempting to strengthen 
the Governor’s role in this respect would have been self-defeating; there was little point in 
Britain’s representative acting as a public leader of imperialist sentiment when the aim was 
for this to evolve naturally, moreover, any attempt to do so would have been furiously 
resented  by  Canadians.  To  Minto  this  was  a  manifestation  of  growing  nationalist 
sentiment, together with a resentment of, and sensitivity towards, any perceived imperial 
interference. He concluded that ‘the strongest feeling…is that of Canadian nationality,’ 
however, like many contemporaries, he did not believe this incompatible with imperialism. 
Nevertheless,  the  two  required  careful  management  to  avoid  the  risk  of  Britain’s 
unsympathetic  attitude,  demonstrated  during  the  Alaska  dispute,  driving  Canadians  to 
believe their choice was between independence and annexation.
 380 
 
 
During  the  last  two  years  of  his  tenure,  Minto  watched,  often  with  barely  suppressed 
resentment, the dissipation of the imperial feeling in Canada that had appeared to be the 
precursor of great imperial achievements. During the South African war Canada seemed to 
have indicated a willingness to accept some responsibility for imperial defence. But, not 
for want of effort on Minto’s part, opportunities to utilise the undoubted imperial sentiment 
were wasted. Familiarity with local attitudes enabled him to understand that British and 
Dominion perceptions of ‘imperial responsibility’ bore little resemblance to each other, but 
it was only with difficulty that he persuaded his superiors to accept that attempting to force 
a reluctant Canada to accept new obligations would accomplish nothing. Instead, reliance 
on English-Canada’s sentimental connection to the ‘mother country,’ and its preference for 
schemes  providing  definite  material  advantage,  offered  a  more  viable  route  towards 
tightening imperial links. Despite his warnings little could be done to counter widespread 
beliefs that Britain was indifferent to its self-governing colonies, and when this became 
accepted policy under the Liberals, Canada made another step towards nationhood.  
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Minto, Canada and the Emerging ‘Special Relationship’ 
   
As Canadian autonomy did not extend to its external affairs, much of this responsibility 
was devolved to the Governor-General. Lorne, himself an ex-Governor, explained to Minto 
that it was ‘a position which is certainly as important as that of the Indian Viceroyalty, 
because [although] it covers a smaller country than India, it has relation to the US of A.’
381 
The Governor had to explain British policy to Canada, but was also uniquely positioned to 
analyse the Dominion’s viewpoint and protect their interests. He could use his influence 
with the British, Canadian and American governments to smooth the path towards greater 
understanding,  although  this  did  not  always  prove  successful.
382  Governors  with 
aristocratic  backgrounds  were  believed  to  be  more  suited  to  these  diplomatic  duties. 
Minto’s  tenure  in  Ottawa  coincided  with  an  intense  period  of  Anglo-American 
rapprochement and much of his time was occupied by attempts to reconcile Canada to this 
process. His dislike of America has been criticised by nationalist Canadian historians who 
argue that, in contrast to what the more positive Grey achieved, it reinforced Laurier’s 
prejudices  and  prevented  a  satisfactory  resolution  of  outstanding  difficulties.
383 Such 
attacks are unfair, forgetting that Minto was burdened with more complex issues than those 
encountered  by  Grey,  and  attributing  too  much  influence  to  local  actors  over  policies 
rigidly  controlled  by  the  Foreign  Office,  which  remained  reluctant  to  delegate  any 
responsibility to men it believed incapable of seeing the Empire’s interests in overview. 
Minto’s attitude was more complex than suggested. While appreciative of the importance 
of Anglo-American understanding and doing his best to further it, his imperialist outlook 
meant much stress was laid on the need to accommodate Canadian susceptibilities.
384 
 
 
Minto sincerely doubted America’s value as potential allies, believing they were unreliable 
and that their commitment to friendship was untrustworthy: ‘No one for an instant expects 
fair play from the States in either business or sport.’
385 Cultivating links with the self-
governing colonies was a more satisfactory way of strengthening Britain’s position without 
sacrificing any vital interests. Minto feared the likely impact of Britain’s desire to chase 
American  friendship  on  Canada.  Being  lukewarm  to  their  interests  for  the  sake  of 
transatlantic harmony or displaying ignorance of Canadian affairs while lavishing attention 
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on America threatened to damage intra-imperial relations. Minto frequently voiced these 
concerns to his correspondents, urging Britain to remember Canada’s concerns about its 
powerful southern neighbour: 
 
 
In fact there is a general dislike of the Yankees here – & I don’t wonder at it at 
all. It’s all very well for people in England to romance about the sentimental love 
of the Anglo-Saxon races on either side of the Atlantic but mercifully England 
has the ocean between her and her love – here there is nothing of the sort;
386 
 
 
and warning that ‘too demonstrative a declaration of affection for the States may be taken 
as indicating a want of sympathy for Canada.’
387 Canada’s fear of US intentions created a 
heightened  anti-Americanism  that  encouraged  the  pursuit  of  more  avowedly  imperial 
policies as they turned to Britain for support. This imperialist outlook did not quash the 
simultaneous  fears  that  manifestations  of  loyalty  would  not  prevent  the  sacrifice  of 
Canada’s national interests to rapprochement with America, a prospect they viewed with 
some ambivalence.
388 
 
 
Although the vogue for ‘Anglo-Saxonism’ provided a catalyst, rapprochement after the 
Venezuela  crisis  was  driven  by  Britain’s  desire  to  protect  its  interests  in  the  face  of 
increasingly  precarious  isolation.  Realising  that  war  with  the  US  would  have  proved 
disastrous,  Britain  courted  American  friendship  to  secure  its  position  by  offering 
concessions  to  resolve  outstanding  difficulties  and  abandoning  its  pretensions  to 
supremacy  in  the  Western  Hemisphere.  Differing  Canadian  conceptions  of  what 
constituted  vital  imperial  interests  in  the  region,  and  their  stubborn  resistance  to  any 
perceived  attempts  to  sacrifice  these,  made  Ottawa  the  main  obstacle  to  such  efforts, 
indeed diplomatic difficulties often arose because of Canada. Britain, however, refused to 
allow  these  minor  irritations  to  derail  negotiations,  and  relied  on  its  representative  to 
explain to Canada that it would be the main beneficiary of improved Anglo-American 
relations.
389 The  Alaska  Boundary  dispute  dominated  Anglo-American  relations  during 
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Minto’s tenure. Settlement became pressing after the discovery of gold in 1895, but the 
founding  of  the  existing  arrangements  on  the  vague  1825  Anglo-Russian  treaty,  ‘an 
inadequate  instrument  for  determining  the  boundary,’
390 complicated  attempts  to  reach 
agreement. The treaty’s failure to properly identify the geographical features key to any 
definition of the boundary, such as the Portland Channel, created conflicting Canadian and 
American claims. If the treaty had been interpreted in strictly judicial terms, Canada’s case 
was potentially strong. But their position was fatally undermined by a failure to challenge 
American possession of an important part of the disputed territory, notably the towns of 
Skagway and Dyea, or to protest against the production of maps which contradicted their 
contention.  The  coincidence  of  Canadian  claims  with  the  gold  discoveries  made  them 
appear as a trumped-up afterthought to gain economic advantage, merely strengthening 
America’s determination not to yield. 
391 
 
 
Minto could have little influence on initial efforts to settle these outstanding difficulties, as 
he arrived in Ottawa during the negotiations of the Joint High Commission that had been 
appointed to eliminate potential sources of tension, although he voiced his hopes for some 
minor  successes  upon  which  they  could  build.
392 Canadian  refusal  to  accept  various 
proposals  to  arrive  at  a  reasonable  compromise,  notably  that  made  by  the  American 
delegates to grant them commercial privileges around Pyramid Harbour, led to the collapse 
of  the  Commission  in  February  1899.  It  became  evident  that  Canada’s  inflexibility, 
founded on a naïve belief that Britain would support their every move and Laurier’s desire 
to portray his government as the defenders of Canadian interests, would prove the principal 
obstacle to agreement over Alaska. Minto lamented the failure of the commission for the 
damage it had done to Canadian-American relations. Subsequently he was able to establish 
an important role as an intermediary between Canada and Britain in the negotiations to 
reach  an  understanding  over  Alaska.
393 However,  as  Laurier  favoured  submitting  the 
dispute to arbitration on Canadian terms, which insisted on including all territory, it proved 
difficult to persuade him to accept the proposed solutions for grants of land and railway 
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construction  rights  around  the  Lynn  Canal,  despite  Colonial  Office  warnings  that 
‘prolongation of the existing state of things is in favour of the US.’
394 Minto’s warnings 
about the potential impact on hopes for imperial unity of any apparent lack of sympathy 
with Canadian aspirations influenced Britain’s decision not to attempt to impose a solution 
on  Ottawa  when  they  were  trying  to  obtain  military  support  for  South  Africa.  Laurier 
accepted the ‘modus vivendi’ agreement of October 1899, but his determination to extract 
maximum domestic political advantage from his defence of Canadian interests made him 
oblivious of the wider diplomatic and strategic difficulties facing Britain. 
395 
 
 
Prior  to  the  South  African  war  British  refusal  to  modify  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty 
governing construction of an isthmian canal, without reciprocal concessions on Alaska, 
had  hindered  negotiations.  America  exploited  Britain’s  imperial  difficulties  to  its  own 
advantage, although Britain, conscious of its isolation, was determined not to alienate its 
only friend. The Foreign Office swiftly dropped its previous insistence on keeping the 
issues  interdependent,
396  leaving  the  Colonial  Office  to  stress  to  Ottawa    Britain’s 
reluctance to abandon its support of Canadian wishes given its valuable support in South 
Africa,  but  that  it  had  to  discuss  the  issue  to  prevent  the  unilateral  passage  of  the 
unfavourable Hepburn Bill. Minto was enlisted to persuade Laurier that Canada and the 
Empire would benefit from the convention Pauncefote was negotiating to protect Britain’s 
position. Flattering the Premier’s vanity to encourage his acceptance of the agreement, by 
arguing  that  ‘you  will  recognise  the  immense  importance  at  the  present  time  of  our 
relations with the US and I know how much HMG rely on your personal endeavours in this 
matter,’ produced some positive result as Laurier admitted he could not hesitate to accede 
to Britain’s request.
397 Yet Canada, annoyed that its ‘only diplomatic weapon of any force 
on the Alaska boundary’ had been abandoned, continued to complain about the loss of 
considerable  advantages.  However,  their  rejection  of  Hay’s  efforts  to  solve  the  Alaska 
difficulty  before  ratification  of  the  convention  made  them  equally  to  blame,  and  the 
emergence of the dynamic and aggressive Roosevelt, eager to  control  his own foreign 
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policy and jealous of American sovereignty, meant that for Canada ‘bitter disappointment 
lay ahead.’
398 
 
 
Canada  remained  committed  to  referring  the  dispute  to  an  odd-numbered  arbitration 
tribunal if it could not be settled by compromise. Unable to coerce Ottawa to accept the 
proposals put forward by Hay for a tribunal of ‘six impartial jurists of repute’ to determine 
the  boundary,  Britain  relied  on  persuasion,  affording  considerable  influence  to  Minto. 
Contacts with the British military attaché in Washington heightened his concern about two 
developments, pushing him to make a decisive intervention to push Canada towards final 
settlement. Alarming rumours circulated about conspiracies among American miners to 
overthrow  the  Yukon  authorities
399  and  combined  with  disturbing  reports  about 
Roosevelt’s attitude to the issue, which hinted at grave consequences if the dispute was not 
settled in America’s favour,
 400 to strengthen Minto’s resolve to have the issue settled. He 
urged Laurier to use the opportunity provided by the forthcoming coronation to meet with 
Lansdowne and Choate to settle arrangements informally and avoid being outmanoeuvred 
by  the  ‘impetuous’  Roosevelt.
401 The  meetings  proved  to  be  decisively  important,  as 
Laurier, fearing the consequences of further gold discoveries and Roosevelt’s aggressive 
policies, made significant concessions that struck at the root of the deadlock, by agreeing 
to exempt Dyea and Skagway from any arbitration and accepting the creation of an even-
numbered tribunal, leading Anderson to complain that ‘after making all the trouble for the 
last three or four years [Laurier] has made an abject surrender of all the US ask for.’
402 
 
 
Minto remained sympathetic to Canada, stressing that they could not be expected to accept 
the ‘unqualified surrender’ of all their claims, and urging Britain not to attempt to compel 
Ottawa to accept unpopular measures.
403 After having expended much effort persuading 
Laurier to accept the agreement in principle and making assurances to British officials that 
                                                 
398 Brown & Cook, Nation Transformed, p. 45; Stacey, Age of Conflict, p. 92. 
399 LMCP II, Minto to Chamberlain, 23 November & 24 December 1901, pp. 91-92, 107-8; NLS MS 12581, 
Lord Minto’s Correspondence with his Canadian Ministers and Miscellaneous Canadian Papers, November 
1898 to November 1904, Meeting with Busby, 7 January 1902. 
400 LMCP II, Kitson to Minto, 28 March, 13 & 24 May 1902, pp. 139-40, 154-55, 161-62. 
401 LMCP II, Minto to Kitson, 17 May 1902, Minto to Laurier, 17 May 1902, Journal, 3 June 1902, Interview 
with Laurier, 3 June 1902, Minto to Lansdowne, 4 June 1902, Lansdowne to Minto, 15 June 1902 pp. 156-
57, 165-69. 
402 LMCP II, Conversation with Laurier and Lansdowne, 24 June 1902, pp. 170-71; Adams, Brothers Across 
the Ocean, pp. 100ff; Campbell, Anglo-American Understanding, pp. 256-58; Miller, Canadian Career, pp. 
164-65; Penlington, Alaska Boundary, pp. 63-64. 
403 LMCP II, Conversation with Laurier, 21 October 1902, Minto to Herbert, 21 October 1902, pp. 205-10.   124 
this was the case, renewed Canadian obstruction of the Hay-Herbert Treaty, characterised 
by  repeated  attempts  to  get  the  tribunal  modified,  infuriated  Minto,  who  believed  the 
Canadians  were  aware  such  requests  would  not  be  granted.  The  governor  was  able  to 
persuade Laurier that further resistance was futile; further delay in accepting what was 
potentially  the  best  offer  Canada  would  receive  might  anger  the  US  into  changing  its 
mind.
404 Minto reminded his superiors about Canadian fears that Britain would sacrifice its 
interests  ‘on  account  of  an  exaggerated  estimate  of  the  value  and  reliability  of  the 
friendship of the US.’
405 Such concerns were heightened by the furious debate that erupted 
about the composition of the tribunal. Canada had agreed to the appointment of a tribunal 
composed  of  ‘six  impartial  jurists  of  repute’  to  consider  the  1825  treaty  in  a  judicial 
manner  on  the  grounds  that  the  American  representatives  would  be  Supreme  Court 
justices. Instead, to ease the passage of the agreement through the notoriously Anglophobic 
Senate, Roosevelt appointed Root, Lodge and Turner, who were either members of the 
administration and technically disputants in the case or vocal public critics of Canadian 
contentions, and thus men unlikely to concede an inch of US territory.
 406 
 
 
Roosevelt’s nominations confirmed Minto’s worst opinions about America’s disrespect for 
fair play; he shared Canada’s outrage at the ‘flagrant violation of the terms of the treaty’ 
and  complained  bitterly  about  the  ‘the  disgraceful  behaviour  of  the  US.’
407 In  Minto’s 
view, America’s failure to adhere to a central tenet of the treaty had damaged the judicial 
nature  of  the  tribunal  by  undermining  its  supposed  impartiality,  while  the  publicly 
expressed opinions of their representatives had created an atmosphere of suspicion and 
bitterness.  Minto,  fulfilling  an  important  gubernatorial  duty  by  representing  Canadian 
concerns that their interests were being ignored, warned that accepting the proposed US 
nominations  would  provoke  a  ‘storm’  of  resentment  against  Britain.
408 Whitehall  was 
determined  that  Canadian  objections  would  not  disrupt  the  prospect  of  a  long-awaited 
settlement  and  refused  to  permit  any  criticism  of  the  American  appointments  or 
countenance any suggestions that negotiations be broken off. Instead, recognising Minto’s 
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influence over Laurier’s government, they and the Colonial Office suggested he urge his 
ministers to consider the situation carefully.
409 Although he lamented Britain’s failure to 
stand up to American bullying and feared that their acquiescence was setting a ‘dangerous 
precedent,’ Minto’s views influenced the selection of Britain’s representatives. He argued 
that  appointing  partisans  would  destroy  any  remaining  semblance  of  impartiality  a 
diplomatic tribunal ought to possess, and that therefore making legal appointments would 
vindicate British honour: 
 
 
In  that  case  we  ourselves  would  appear  in  the  eyes  of  the  world  as  dealing 
seriously with the question before us…whilst the inferior US appointments would 
lose weight in front of our big guns, and their Government would lose reputation 
in appointing them…
410 
 
 
These suggestions were accepted, but failure to consult Canada before final ratification of 
the  treaty  merely  heightened  Laurier’s  annoyance,  which  manifested  itself  in  unfair 
criticism  of  Minto  for  not  insisting  strongly  enough  that  conditions  should  have  been 
attached  to  British  acceptance  of  the  final  format  of  the  Tribunal.
411 Minto  had  tried 
throughout to ensure that Canadian interests were not neglected, but his warnings about the 
damage  caused  by  apparent  sacrifice  of  Canadian  interests  for  the  sake  of  American 
friendship were little heeded outside the Colonial Office, and he lacked the influence to 
overcome Foreign Office determination to reach an understanding. 
 
 
The Tribunal’s decision in October 1903, particularly Lord Alverstone’s support of the 
American contention to produce an agreement, ignited an explosion of nationalist fury in 
Canada.  Alverstone’s  action  leant  credence  to  the  complaint  voiced  by  the  Canadian 
delegates  that  rather  than  being  based  on  judicial  consideration  of  the  evidence,  the 
decision  constituted  a  diplomatic  compromise  yet  again  sacrificing  Canadian  national 
interests for the sake of friendship with the detested Yankees. Disgusted by this perceived 
injustice, the Canadian justices complained vociferously in the press and refused to sign 
the award, thus leaving behind ‘a generation of bitterness.’
412 
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An indignant belief grew in Canada that Britain could no longer be relied upon to protect 
its interests. Laurier described the decision as ‘one of those concessions which have made 
British diplomacy odious to Canadian people, and it will have a most lamentable effect,’ 
while  the  press  bemoaned  that  ‘the  hardest  blow  the  imperial  idea  has  ever  received’ 
marked the ‘parting of the ways.’
413 Minto now faced one of the most trying periods of his 
Canadian career, noting in his journal that ‘the Alaska decision very worrying as regards 
the  effect  it  has  produced  here  –  Canadian  newspapers  and  public  having  lost  all 
reason!’
414 He now faced the difficult task of attempting to assuage Canadian fury while 
explaining their grievances to his superiors in London to encourage them to make some 
official response to Ottawa’s accusations. Minto achieved some successes. To Laurier’s 
annoyance, he dismissed claims that the decision had damaged Canada’s strategic position 
in  the  North-west.
415 Worried  by  the  ‘open  talk  of  “separation,”’  he  was  also  able  to 
counter  Laurier’s arguments that Canada needed more extensive powers to sufficiently 
protect  its  interests.  Minto  stressed  to  Laurier  that  Britain  could  not  consent  to 
arrangements allowing Canada to enter into agreements with foreign powers about territory 
it could not defend, and made his best efforts to quash the idea before it could develop 
further by playing on Canadian reluctance to pay for its own defensive requirements: ‘if 
Canada wishes to possess complete treaty-making powers, she must be prepared to back 
her claims with her own forces.’
416 
 
 
Minto’s attempts to prevent Canadian anger from disturbing imperial harmony were not 
assisted by Colonial Office inaction, a situation exacerbated by Chamberlain’s resignation, 
or Laurier’s willingness to exploit the situation for political gain, which encouraged his 
rejection of the Governor’s suggestions that he take some action to ‘dispel the mischievous 
and entirely erroneous opinions that seem to be gaining ground.’
417 Minto, annoyed by 
Laurier’s failure to quiet the gathering storm, grew anxious that the Alaska decision had 
given focus to the usually aimless Canadian national sentiment, now manifesting itself in 
ingratitude for British assistance and anger at perceived interference. Unless checked, it 
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would fatally damage  chances  for imperial federation.  Increasingly  concerned after his 
discussions with the leading Canadian politicians involved in the decision, he urged on 
Lyttelton the necessity of counteracting ‘the harm that had been done by the unjustifiable 
utterances  of  the  Canadian  representatives,’  which  accused  Alverstone  of  making  little 
effort to reach a judicial finding and summarily dismissing Canadian contentions to secure 
a  diplomatic  settlement.  Minto  suggested  issuing  an  official  statement  countering  such 
claims, indicating that the case had been decided on its merits and offering reassurance that 
Britain still supported Canada and had not injured their interests for the sake of American 
friendship.
 418 The Colonial Office believed Minto had ‘done his best’ to assuage Canadian 
anger, but did not share his determination to defend Alverstone or refute the Canadian 
accusations, believing that ‘the whole matter is most unfortunate but it is distinctly a case 
in which the least said the soonest mended.’ Their decision to ‘let the matter severely 
alone,’
 419 to avoid upsetting new-found Anglo-American harmony and based on a belief 
that a British statement would not improve the situation, merely served to further indicate 
to  Minto  British  indifference  to  Dominion  attitudes,  against  which  colonial  governors 
perpetually had to struggle, although it also reflected that Chamberlain’s departure had 
reduced the Colonial Office’s ability to challenge the Foreign Office in any policy dispute.  
 
 
Still concerned that the affront to British honour had not been corrected, Minto offered his 
own apology to Alverstone for Canadian criticisms of his action and expressed his hope 
that Britain would take some action to challenge mistaken Canadian impressions, but his 
attempts to reconcile Laurier and the Chief Justice came to nothing. Minto recognised that 
further  public  discussion  of  the  Alaskan  issue  would  be  undignified  and  counter-
productive,  and  believed  that  the  ‘gross  unfairness’  of  Canada’s  accusation  would  be 
revealed in time.
420 He remained annoyed not only that advice relating to an issue with 
which  he  was  intimately  acquainted  had  been  ignored,  but  also  that  an  opportunity  to 
undermine  the  foundations  of  Canadian  anger  that  threatened  to  destabilise  imperial 
relations had been lost. Instead, he complained, they had provided nationalists with another 
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instance of Britain’s supposed lack of sympathy with Canadian interests, thus undermining 
hopes of implementing Chamberlain’s federation plans.
421 
 
 
Undoubtedly, ‘North Atlantic Triangle’ relations improved after Minto’s departure, but it 
is unconvincing to suggest, as some Canadian historians do,
422 that he was to blame for the 
troubles.  Continued  rapprochement  was  aided  by  the  resolution  of  the  most  dangerous 
outstanding difficulties, and as the remaining problems carried little threat of escalation, 
Britain even granted Canada increased control over its external affairs. Although the final 
settlement of involved, emotive and fractious difficulties like Alaska depended on people 
and circumstances beyond gubernatorial control, Minto had some influence in improving 
relations.  Exercising  his  ‘sound  common-sense’
423 Minto  never  allowed  his  dislike  of 
America to interfere with his approach to an important aspect of British foreign policy. He 
worked hard to fulfil his gubernatorial role to ensure that Britain and Canada appreciated 
the reasons behind their respective decisions. Frequent attempts were made to encourage 
Laurier  to  drop  his  unrealistic  demands  and  accept  British  proposals,  but  Minto  was 
equally diligent in his efforts to protect Canada against unfair treatment. His pragmatic 
approach was not entirely successful, as he was unable to persuade his British superiors to 
explain  the  Alaska  decision  or  challenge  Canadian  fears  about  their  interests  being 
sacrificed to secure American friendship, but it did assist in securing a settlement. Minto 
always  appreciated  the  importance  of  improving  Anglo-American  relations,  but  his 
foremost concern remained defending imperial interests, and his letters to Durand provide 
an  effective  illustration  of  the  difficulties  he  encountered  in  balancing  competing 
obligations: 
 
I need not say how thoroughly I agree with you, that whilst admiring the rising 
power and great qualities of the American nation…we must put the rights of our 
own people first.
424 
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Minto, Morley and the local defence of India, 1905-1910 
 
Historiographical interpretations of the Minto-Morley partnership have previously focused 
on the introduction of the famous reforms. Considerations of Indian defence are limited to 
the  response  to  the  emergence  of  nationalist  terrorism  with  brief  mentions  of  the 
disagreements over frontier and foreign policy. Morley’s biographers, especially Wolpert, 
created  an  image  of  a  Liberal  Titan  controlling  the  destiny  of  the  largest  and  most 
important part of the Empire, able to apply his own political principles to its administration 
and overcoming the prejudices of tyrannical bureaucrats in Simla to fulfil his mission of 
setting  India  on  the  path  to  self-government.  This  is  difficult  to  reconcile  with  the 
evidence. Many Indian nationalists and British radicals welcomed his appointment to the 
India  Office,  but  were  soon  disappointed  as  Morley  was  not  only  unable  to  stop  the 
repressive measures being implemented by Simla in a desperate effort to counter the waves 
of  unrest  sweeping  the  Raj,  but  often  acquiesced  in  their  introduction.  His  plans  for 
conciliation and reform did little to achieve their ends. As the local British representative, 
more aware of the difficulties that arose and to which it was necessary to respond, Minto 
was often able to set the policy agenda in India.
425 
 
 
Morley’s attitude to the Viceroy was summed up by his remark to Esher, who noted that he 
‘praised  Minto  as  a  gentleman.  Not  clever,  but  the  highest  type  of  the  old  governing 
class…’
426 Morley apparently held Minto’s qualities in high regard, lauding his devotion to 
duty  and  sense  of  responsibility,  his  shrewd  and  subtle  vision,  and  his  loyalty  and 
courage.
427 Differing conceptions of empire bred conflict, however, and his confidence in 
Minto decreased over his time in office, to the extent that he even sounded out Esher about 
succeeding to the Viceroyalty 1908,
428 and he was forced to reprimand Minto privately 
over certain issues, notably the release of the deportees in 1910. Morley found it difficult 
to compel the Indian Government to carry out his orders in the spirit in which they were 
issued,  and  became  depressed  by  their  propensity  to  resort  to  severe  measures.  The 
Secretary of State used his control over appointments to inject new blood into the overly 
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bureaucratic Indian Government, but these often only succeeded in provoking resentment, 
especially that of Fleetwood Wilson. 
429 
 
 
Wolpert is unrealistic in his praise of Morley, (‘few were his peers in their impact in Indian 
history’
430), guilty of arguing as if Morley was exempt or at least aloof from Britain’s 
imperial society because of his background, ignoring the fact that as Indian Secretary he 
was a central part of it.
431  His Cabinet colleagues, like Minto, admired his intellectual 
qualities, but found him difficult to work with: ‘he is quite the most impossible colleague 
that ever entered a Cabinet.’
432 They doubted his ability to administer a large department, 
let alone a populous Empire, and most were happy to have him isolated from the rest of the 
Government to prevent his unwelcome interference in their business.
433 Buchan argued that 
Minto regarded his superior as an exponent of principles and inspirer rather than a framer 
of policies.
434  
 
 
Minto undoubtedly appreciated the support offered by Morley, particularly the assistance 
in overcoming potential difficulties with the radical House of Commons: ‘he has backed 
me  up  really  well.’
435 Their  relationship  was  unexpectedly  close  despite  their  differing 
backgrounds  and political philosophies, but this masked an occasionally  bitter struggle 
behind the scenes over who should rule India, illustrating the tension that existed at the 
heart of Indian Government. Much of this arose from the differing priorities held by the 
Viceroy  and  Secretary  of  State,  and  it  intensified  whenever  issues  of  defence  were 
involved, as these were less to the liking of the latter. Inherent in this were the different 
tasks  they  faced;  Morley  had  to  take  the  ‘policy’  view  inspired  by  the  ideological 
background of the Liberal Government, Minto did not have this luxury, and although he 
did  frequently  consider  the  long-term  future  for  India,  more  often  his  concern  was  a 
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pragmatic one, having to confront the dangers that could immediately arise in India. In this 
regard, the disputes engendered by differing approaches to relations with Afghanistan and 
the frontier tribes, or internal defence policies, are key to understanding a relationship at 
the centre of British imperial government. 
 
 
Morley  was  criticised  for  his  lack  of  knowledge  about,  and  interest  in,  India.  On  his 
appointment, he was derided as ‘wholly ignorant of India and her difficult problems.’
436 
Minto prevented the Indian secretary from visiting the Raj during his tenure. In this way he 
could maintain his one advantage as the only one in the partnership with practical first-
hand experience of India. Frequent reminders that the ‘man on the spot’ was a better judge 
of the situation and that a distant politician was unable to appreciate the difficulties faced 
infuriated  Morley.
437 It  did  not  help  that  Morley  regarded  the  Raj  as  ‘unnatural  and 
artificial,’ and believed that Britain’s duty should be to assist it to a peaceful conclusion, 
rather than maintain it forever. 
438 
 
 
Many regarded Morley as temperamentally unsuited to the post, and his interference with 
the everyday administration of India became unbearable. He was ‘not unfairly described as 
the most autocratic Secretary of State that ever reigned in Whitehall.’
439 Morley tried to 
control every aspect of policy, from appointments to frontier military strategy, in an effort 
to fundamentally alter the Indian Government as a way to achieve his aim of changing 
Britain’s purpose in India. Wolpert argues that claims of his ‘despotic treatment of the 
misunderstood  and  long-suffering  Government  of  India’  are  a  distortion.
440 But  others 
support the Indian complaint that his interference fatally undermined British prestige and 
authority in India. Particular criticism was reserved for interference by the radical House of 
Commons, which made the government of  India even more difficult and led Minto to 
complain that they could not rule a turbulent country by ‘namby-pamby sentimentalism.’ 
As a Gladstonian radical, Morley found this especially difficult to stomach. Believing that 
Parliament  should  act  as  the  final  arbiter  for  Indian  government,  he  often  privately 
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supported  many  of  the  radicals’  criticisms.  Montagu’s  statement  that  the  Viceroy  was 
merely  the  Secretary  of  State’s  ‘agent’  in  India  provoked  a  storm  of  criticism,  but  it 
highlighted a belief that the Viceroy was a junior partner in the government of India.
441 
Minto always resented such a suggestion, and summarised his frustrations to Clarke, who, 
although appointed by Morley, was also finding his constant criticism and interference 
hard  to  bear.  The  Viceroy  argued  that  the  system  of  administration  from  London  was 
dangerous to India: 
 
 
India cannot be administered from home – great principles may be enunciated by 
a Secretary of State, but he cannot direct the daily administration of India; if he 
attempts to do so, he can only hamper its Government, and I have always felt 
that, notwithstanding the many personal difficulties with which I have had to 
deal, and which should never have been inflicted on me, my duty was to sail the 
ship as best I could, notwithstanding the needless interference with which I had 
to reckon. But putting oneself aside, what really impresses me is the danger of it 
all.
442 
 
 
Clarke agreed with the Viceroy’s argument that the Secretary of State could not rule India 
from Britain, but pointed out that because of parliamentary interference, he could make it 
very difficult for the men to fulfil their duties. Minto faced a difficult situation, and he 
faced severe criticism on his return home for allowing Britain to take over the governing of 
India and further damaging the prestige of the Viceroyalty. But his travails reflected a shift 
in  Britain’s  attitude  to  its  Empire  as  power  became  increasingly  centralised  in  the 
metropolis to avoid overzealous pro-consuls damaging British interests: 
 
 
Far-flung  imperial  possessions  made  centralised  control  impractical,  yet  no 
government could accept that questions of foreign policy…might be decided by 
the actions of low-ranking officers in distant lands.
443 
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Minto found Morley very difficult to deal with. He was hypersensitive and vain – ‘almost 
feminine’ in his vanity according to Minto – and this increased the burden of his already 
heavy workload, although with the bonus in the Viceroy’s  eyes of assisting in always 
gaining his point: 
 
 
I really marvel how I have got on with him. He is the vainest of the vain, and I 
have written every letter to humour him with the turn of a phrase – but always 
insisting  on  what  I  thought  right  and  I  shall  always  do  –  but  the  trouble  of 
framing every sentence in telegrams as well as letters so as not to wound his 
sensitivities and yet to get what one wants is untold.
444 
 
 
Undoubtedly a struggle occurred between Simla and Whitehall over how best to counter 
threats  to  India’s  safety,  but  arguing  over  which  side  ‘won’  and  whether  Minto  kept 
Morley in line with his conservative principles or Morley cajoled Minto into associating 
himself  with  moderate  reforms  is  missing  the  point.
445 Morley  tried  to  ensure  by  his 
appointments to replace Minto and Kitchener that his legacy would continue, but he never 
succeeded in eradicating unrest in India, nor the local authorities’ harsh responses to it. 
Minto accepted that they could not always respond with force or repression whenever a 
threat arose, but supported the introduction of reforms from the outset. Porter makes the 
plausible  argument  that  compromise  between  conciliation  and  repression  drove  them 
forward,  well  illustrated  by  their  frontier  policy,  as  both  sides  accepted,  however 
reluctantly, the limitations of their respective positions.
446 
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Afghanistan 
   
Sandwiched between two rival Empires, Afghanistan occupied a key position in British 
strategic thinking. Whether viewed as a buffer against, or the likely theatre of operations in 
a war with, Russia, or as posing a threat to India’s frontiers of its own accord, most Indian 
authorities  agreed  that  remaining  on  good  terms  with  the  Amir  was  vital  for  Indian 
defence. Having worked hard to restore cross-border friendship, Minto was dismayed that 
the Liberal Government’s foreign policy threatened to destroy his achievements. 
 
As with much else during his Indian career, Minto’s initial encounters with Habibullah 
were defined by the difficult legacy bestowed by Curzon.
447 Minto’s willingness to treat 
Afghanistan as an important ally, rather than a feudal vassal, enabled him to persuade the 
Amir to visit India, a task in which Curzon had signally failed. Most agreed with Roberts’s 
assessment  that  it  was  ‘impossible  to  overestimate  the  importance  of  the  approaching 
visit.’
448 It was decided, however, not to utilise the opportunity presented to discuss joint 
military  arrangements.  Instead  the  occasion  was  treated  as  an  opportunity  to  cement 
goodwill, believed to be of more tangible benefit to India than the precise definition of 
military obligations.
449 Minto remained convinced both about Habibullah’s intentions and 
the benefits of a successful visit: 
 
My belief is that he means studiously to avoid discussing affairs of state, no 
matter  how  trivial.  I  have  no  intention  of  introducing  them  unless  the  most 
palpable opportunity offers, and I believe that if he only departs with some real 
feelings of personal friendship towards me, we shall have made a step in advance 
which should be of the greatest use to us in respect of the various points affecting 
India and Afghanistan which we shall have to consider in the future.
450 
 
 
When Habibullah finally departed, Minto was optimistic about the results achieved, ‘I am 
firmly convinced of the immense future value of the personal acquaintance he has made 
with many people here,’
451 and he must have wondered in more troubled times about the 
difficulties he would have faced had Habibullah not regarded him as a personal friend. 
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Much to Minto’s chagrin, British negotiations with Russia threatened to undermine these 
achievements.  To  him  Afghanistan  posed  a  more  immediate  threat  to  India,  and  was 
therefore a ‘more necessary friend.’ Concerns about the potentially dangerous impact of 
this shift towards Russia on Indian security were frequently reiterated to Morley. Minto 
particularly emphasised the risks posed by failing to consult the Amir about agreements 
with Russia that affected Afghanistan: 
 
 
If he in any way considers that we have entered into a bargain behind his back 
with his arch-enemy, I much doubt if we can ever expect again to exercise the 
influence we now undoubtedly possess over him.
452 
 
 
Britain risked losing a friendship of incalculable value for the defence of India to gain a 
‘phantom friendship’ with a power still actively advancing its own interests. Others in 
India, like Dane, the Foreign Secretary, shared the Viceroy’s misgivings, arguing that: 
 
 
It  will  be  lamentable  if  once  again  His  Majesty’s  Government  destroy  our 
chances of making a satisfactory advance in the direction of settling the Afghan 
problem out of an undue regard for Russian susceptibilities.
453 
 
 
Different motivations prevented the establishment of any consensus. While India’s policy 
focused  on  maintaining  frontier  security,  Britain’s  focus  had  shifted  to  the  potential 
benefits to be gained in Europe from a Russian agreement.
454 Morley swiftly dismissed 
Simla’s objections, facing Cabinet pressure to overcome expected Indian opposition and 
further  the  policy  of  reducing  defence  expenditure.  Simla  endeavoured  to  assist  the 
negotiations, but could not easily discard entrenched suspicions. Minto continued to voice 
his concerns about the agreement, doubting it could achieve its stated aim of permanently 
guaranteeing tranquillity on the Indian frontier: 
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Our friendship with the Amir as far as present circumstances are concerned is of 
much  greater  consequence  to  us  than  any  agreement  with  Russia  (I  am  only 
speaking of the North West Frontier) can possibly be. 
 
 
India’s anxiety was further heightened by the danger of Russian intrigue posed by local 
Russo-Afghan communications or commercial relations. Minto believed that insisting on 
Afghan acquiescence would damage relations, and argued that the only way to appease 
Habibullah  sufficiently  to  persuade  him  to  accept  the  Convention  was  by  delaying  its 
publication  to  provide  an  opportunity  for  the  Viceroy  to  explain  its  advantages  to 
Afghanistan. Minto found it difficult to disguise his fears: ‘it will be a very serious matter 
if he does not view the Convention in a favourable light.’
455 Morley appreciated India’s 
concerns  that  the  agreement  would  arouse  the  Amir’s  suspicions,  but  as  the  issue  of 
respective  influence  in  Afghanistan  remained  a  potential  stumbling  block  he  was 
determined that this Oriental potentate would not derail the negotiations. Given its wider 
implications,  Indian  suggestions  to  drop  the  agreement  completely  could  not  be 
countenanced, and Simla was forcefully reminded of its duty to manage the Amir and 
prevent the proceedings collapsing ignominiously.  Russian agreement that the Convention 
would only come into force if Habibullah consented, and to minimise their presence on the 
border to facilitate the process, provided some relief for Morley.
 456 
 
 
Continued  complaints  about  the  potential  damage  to  relations  with  Afghanistan  or  the 
opportunities  provided  for  Russian  intrigue  achieved  nothing.
 457 Signed  on  31  August 
1907, the Anglo-Russian Convention laudably aimed to maintain ‘solid and lasting peace.’ 
For Britain, arguably the most difficult part was over,
458 for Minto and India’s authorities 
the difficulties were about to multiply as they confronted the task of persuading the Amir 
to accept the agreement. Russia had agreed that Afghanistan was outside its sphere of 
influence while Britain promised not to alter Afghanistan’s political status unless the Amir 
failed to fulfil his obligations, nor to use its influence in a hostile sense. Minto’s belief that 
‘the soundness of the bargain, especially as to Afghanistan, is beyond criticism,’ satisfied 
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the  Secretary  of  State,  who  remained  confident  that  the  matter  could  be  resolved 
favourably providing the Amir ‘did not kick up his heels.’
459  
 
 
Unfortunately this was exactly what he did. As both London and Simla recognised the 
importance of quickly obtaining the Amir’s assent debate between the two governments 
focused  on  the  best  methods  to  achieve  this,  as  the  various  strategies  adopted  failed 
miserably. Such centre-periphery disagreement illustrated their conflicting priorities, and 
the  different  perceptions  of  the  two  principal  actors.  Minto’s  aristocratic  background, 
Canadian  apprenticeship  and  Indian  experience  had  made  him  more  adept  at  handling 
people, and he was more aware than Morley that Habibullah could not be bullied into 
acceptance. However much he disagreed with the policy, Minto accepted that his Viceregal 
duty impelled him to assist in the implementation of  London’s initiatives, although he 
always took advantage of opportunities that arose to apply his local knowledge and make 
suggestions to Morley. Whitehall’s determination to secure finalisation of the Convention 
to suit the needs of a Eurocentric policy clashed with the stubborn insistence of their Indian 
subordinates that Afghan friendship, the keystone of local defence, was endangered by 
British policy. The prospect of any innovative approach to the problem was stifled by these 
disputes, which merely served to heighten frontier tension. 
 
 
In  his  initial  approaches  to  the  Amir,  Minto  followed  Morley’s  suggestions  to  offer 
reassurances that the Convention secured Afghan independence and prevented any British 
or Russian interference with their political integrity. Russia had been granted the right to 
non-political  communications  to  facilitate  the  agreement,  but  advice  from  Simla  was 
readily available to prevent any difficulties. Appealing to Habibullah’s vanity, Minto stated 
that his assent was necessary for this important international agreement, advantageous to 
their  joint  interests,  to  come  into  force.
460 Early  inquiries  met  with  resolute  silence, 
provoking further Anglo-Indian debate  about the best course to pursue. Suggestions to 
despatch a British mission disturbed Morley, who, although anxious for a reply, wished to 
avoid further inflaming the already volatile situation on the frontier
461 or strengthening the 
already powerful anti-British ‘fanatical’ party at Kabul, which Habibullah was unable to 
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bypass. Criticising proposals to apply pressure on Afghanistan as likely to provoke outright 
rejection, Minto believed his friendship with the Amir could assist in overcoming such 
obstacles and that regardless of the opposition, Habibullah would agree to the Convention: 
‘I am still sanguine as to ultimate assent.’
462 
 
 
Morley’s arguments became increasingly conflicted. While increasingly exasperated by the 
lack of progress: 
 
 
What’s  the  good  of  all  your  noble  feasting  of  him  –  what’s  the  good  of  his 
versatility and cleverness, if he is too lazy to use it effectually, and with good 
faith to his English friends, 
 
 
and alarmed by the prospect that the Russian military would ignore the Convention he had 
worked hard to create if it was not accepted by the Amir, he had no wish to provoke a 
‘row,’ and advised Minto to adopt a cautious policy.
463 Such concerns proved prescient, as 
rumblings circulated during the tribal uprisings of early 1908 that India was ‘face to face 
with possible hostilities with Afghanistan.’ Minto wished to avoid creating this impression 
to prevent exacerbating existing tensions, and he believed that maintaining good relations 
was  all-important,  but  he  did  approve  surreptitious  preparations  while  simultaneously 
appeasing  Morley  by  dispelling  the  idea  that  war  was  probable.  Morley  favoured  the 
continuation of friendly relations, and argued that ‘irresponsible talk and war fever’ did 
nothing to enhance the possibility of the Amir agreeing to the Convention, although he 
admitted that the issue had become a double-edged sword; the Amir would be called a 
coward if he complied, the British would be accused of being afraid if they failed to secure 
his assent. 
464 
 
 
Further  consideration  of  their  options  forced  British  officials  into  an  unimaginative 
recourse to correspondence with Habibullah. Sending a British emissary was unjustifiably 
dangerous.  Exaggerated  courtesy  risked  being  interpreted  as  weakness,  but  applying 
pressure would alienate the Amir and India could not rely on Afghan fear of its recently 
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demonstrated military strength to discourage the provocation of war when reports had been 
received that jihad was being openly preached. Minto appreciated the Afghan objections to 
an  agreement  which  apparently  undermined  their  sovereignty,  and  he  believed  the 
importance  of  maintaining  friendly  relations  with  Afghanistan  was  axiomatic  despite 
Habibullah’s  troublesome  behaviour,  and  they  could  ‘do  nothing  without  risking  his 
friendship, which I consider most necessary for the peace of India.’ As the only viable 
option  available  it  was  decided  to  send  another  despatch  to  Afghanistan  stressing  the 
advantages of Britain reaching a permanent settlement with Russia, but Minto began to 
hint at the unthinkable; Afghan refusal to agree and being forced to inform Russia that 
while India accepted the articles relating to Afghanistan they could not be forced on the 
Amir without provoking war.
465 This worst-case scenario was evidently something Morley 
did  not  wish  to  consider,  and  desperate  to  avoid  any  confrontation  over  the  issue,  he 
resolutely continued to advocate correspondence and gentle persuasion as the best way to 
persuade the Amir to adhere to the agreement.
 466 
 
 
Edward VII, kept informed of all Indian affairs by Minto and used as an unofficial conduit 
to pressure Morley, summarised growing British frustration: 
 
 
It is satisfactory to learn that the Amir has acted in a very friendly spirit towards 
you,  but  his  brother  Nasrulla  is  an  objectionable  and  dangerous 
individual….However it is much to be regretted that the Amir has not yet agreed 
to the Anglo-Russian Convention, I almost look upon it at any rate as a snub, if 
not an offence to us. I suppose he is afraid of his own people and the effect it 
would have in his own country if he gave his assent.
467 
 
 
Minto  continued  writing  to  the  Amir,  appealing  for  a  response  and  again  offering 
assurances about the benefits Afghanistan could gain from adherence to the Convention, 
but he was ‘not hopeful as to the result,’ and warned London to consider its next steps in 
the inevitable event of  a direct refusal.
468 The situation became increasingly critical as 
Simla received warnings about Afghan opposition to the Convention based on fears of the 
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threat  European  interference  posed  to  their  continued  independence,  and  rumours 
circulated about efforts by the ‘fanatical’ party to instigate uprisings among the tribes. 
Minto  had  no  wish  to  provoke  war,  but  he  feared  that  they  may  yet  be  forced  into 
hostilities, and he had little doubt where the blame for this lay or the problems it could 
entail: 
 
 
It is important that they should know at home what their diplomacy has brought 
about…Personally I am inclined to think the outlook on the frontier is worse than 
we have yet had it, and I should doubt…that we could limit matters to a tribal 
war without actual war in the face of Nasrulla’s machinations.
469 
 
 
References to ‘armed pressure’ bandied about in London and Simla did little to ease the 
tension. Morley admitted that continued Afghan frontier intrigues or refusal to accept the 
Convention raised the possibility of confrontation, but he reminded Minto of the need to 
rely on diplomatic methods, and of their duty to ‘persuade our Barbarian friends that the 
Convention is for their own good.’ With the Amir fully aware that he was no longer able to 
play Britain and Russia off against each other, this was easier said than done.
470 
 
 
Unable  to  pursue  his  preferred  course  of  avoiding  unnecessary  interference  with 
Afghanistan  and  thus  avoiding  the  associated  risks  of  undermining  a  friendly  regime, 
Minto  continued  his  patient  efforts  to  work  with  the  Amir,  ever  wary  of  the  need  to 
carefully handle ‘Asiatic perplexities.’ Attempts to reduce frontier tension accompanied 
repeated  assurances  that  Britain’s  aim  was  to  protect  Afghanistan.
471  A  reply  was 
eventually received in September 1908. Although it voiced Afghan criticisms, both of the 
Convention,  particularly  the  threat  it  posed  to  their  independence,  and  of  British 
willingness to discard Afghan friendship without compensating advantages, both Minto 
and Morley were not completely discouraged by Kabul’s response. Simla’s attempts to 
persuade London that the Amir would not consent to the Convention in its existing form 
had been met with swift and angry rebuttals emphasising that Whitehall would not even 
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attempt to alter the treaty. Minto understood objections to the clauses threatening Afghan 
safety or damaging their interests, but Morley attributed this to Habibullah’s removal from 
his old vantage point of being able to play the two great powers against each other, and 
argued  that  it  was  Minto’s  duty  to  emphasise  the  advantages  they  would  accrue  from 
adherence,  notably  the  extra  protection  it  offered  from  Russian  interference.
472 Never 
believing it was in India’s best interests to repeatedly press the point, Minto nevertheless 
accepted his Viceregal responsibility to continue his efforts to implement British policy. 
Peripheral crisis fatally undermined the chances for success, as domestic Afghan turmoil 
forced the Amir to turn to the ‘fanatical’ party in an effort to shore up his position, once 
again raising the spectre of frontier war among British officials, a conclusion with which 
Minto did not wholly agree: 
 
 
I am far from saying a frontier war and complications with Afghanistan may not 
be forced on us some day, but I largely discount the assumption of so many of 
our frontier officers that things are going from bad to worse and that a war on the 
frontier is unavoidable and imminent. 
473 
 
 
War never materialised, but Morley’s efforts to persuade Habibullah to assent before he 
departed Whitehall came to naught, although he remained confident their aim would be 
achieved: ‘I don’t despair of his one day assenting to the Russian Convention.’
474 It never 
happened, and by the time of the Amir’s assassination in 1919, the treaty had long been 
overtaken by events. 
 
 
The  Convention  heightened  tension  with  Afghanistan  over  other  issues,  making  them 
potentially  explosive  flashpoints.  Disagreements  over  the  handover  point  for  trade 
caravans  on  the  frontier  reopened  old  wounds  about  undefined  boundaries  and 
jurisdictions, and provoked further arguments between Minto and Morley over the best 
methods of dealing with such problems. The Viceroy’s insistence on remaining strong in 
the face of such provocation, fearing that any other course would be perceived as weakness 
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on  Britain’s  part,  disturbed  Morley,  who  constantly  urged  the  need  to  respond 
diplomatically.  While  closing  the  Khyber  Pass  frequently  assisted  in  defusing  such 
problems, no long-term solution could be found. Tribal feuding at the other end of the 
frontier  in  the  Kurram  Valley  proved  equally  problematic,  even  threatening  to  disturb 
Minto  and  Kitchener’s  usually  harmonious  relationship,  and  posing  the  danger  of 
provoking  a  wider  conflagration.
475 Local  tensions  over  the  Tor  Kham  and  Kurram 
boundaries indicated the worrying lack of control the Amir exercised over his own officials 
and population. Wider fears that the Convention endangered Afghan independence made 
them unnecessarily difficult to resolve. 
 
 
Forced to accept a policy it did not support, objections to which were brusquely silenced, 
India  suffered  the  opprobrium  for  failing  to  secure  the  Amir’s  assent,  becoming  an 
unwilling victim of its own success in repairing damaged relations with Afghanistan. The 
centre-periphery  tension  inherent  in  imperial  government  was  amply  illustrated,  and 
exacerbated by the conflicting outlooks of the two figures at its apex. Morley, infuriated by 
the parochial outlook of the Indian authorities, always stressed that improving relations 
with Russia would enhance India’s security. Obtaining Habibullah’s assent was vital to 
formalising that relationship. He was rarely convinced by Minto’s arguments that Afghan 
opinion paid little attention to the wider European considerations involved, and frequently 
annoyed by the heavy-handed Indian approach, which, in his view, was the root cause of 
war scares. Minto did his best to implement the wishes of superiors, but was as successful 
in obtaining Afghan adherence as he was in persuading London that their policy was the 
cause of cross-border tension or that British prestige was dependent on firmness. That war 
was averted owed much to his earlier success in cultivating the Amir’s friendship, but, 
paradoxically,  it  did  much  to  undermine  the  chances  of  successfully  concluding  the 
Convention.  
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The Frontier Tribes 
 
Curzon’s reorganisation of local government institutions and military deployment on the 
frontier had not achieved its stated aim of curtailing tribal lawlessness. It was recognised 
that although laudable, such hopes were utopian. By removing the intervening authority of 
the Punjab and making the Viceroy directly responsible for the most unpredictable and 
strategically vital aspect of Indian foreign policy, it should, theoretically, have made the 
authorities able to respond more rapidly to any outbreaks. In reality, it failed to consider 
the likely reaction of superiors in London anxious above all to preserve peace in any region 
that threatened to complicate relations with Russia. Frontier defence frequently embittered 
relations between London and Simla. India could not tolerate mayhem on its frontiers, and 
believed that any failure to react adequately would be perceived as weakness by the tribes, 
therefore provoking further outbreaks. Strength was vital, and ‘hammering’ the tribes as 
soon as trouble erupted was believed to be the best response; British dithering endangered 
the safety of the Raj. London could never agree, fearing that military intervention would 
merely  encourage  resistance  and  entail  ruinous  expenditure  for  little  benefit,  while 
bemoaning that India’s aggression posed a threat to wider imperial interests and distracted 
attention away from reforms. As a result frontier policy debates came to epitomise the 
struggle between an aristocratic periphery and the Liberal centre.  
 
 
Escalating  Zakka  Khel  lawlessness  after  January  1907  in  a  strategically  crucial  area 
provoked a lengthy debate about possible responses and endless bickering over the policy 
to be adopted in the aftermath of any expedition.
476 Indecision merely allowed the situation 
to deteriorate alarmingly when a swift operation could have prevented further problems. 
Continually  emphasising  to  Morley  the  dangers  posed  by  the  Zakkas’  conduct,  Minto 
hoped to persuade the Secretary of State not only to launch an expedition, but to allow the 
establishment of a permanent military presence. Backed by Kitchener, the Viceroy was 
confident he could succeed: 
 
 
I think it quite possible from the tone of Mr Morley’s last letter to me that he 
might agree to our going into the Zakka Khel country, and staying there, that is, 
occupying such posts permanently as we thought necessary. He does not mention 
this particular case, but there are indications of a new view of frontier policy. 
477 
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On  what  he  based  his  optimism  is  not  clear.  Morley  was  a  fervent  critic  of  anything 
resembling a ‘forward policy’ and only reluctantly sanctioned any military policy.  
 
 
Minto and Kitchener adopted a multi-pronged attack in their efforts to convince Morley; 
little worked. Attempts to persuade him that the ‘man on the spot’ was a better judge of the 
situation than advisers in Britain merely succeeded in arousing his ire, with its implied 
criticism that he neither understood nor appreciated the dangers faced in India.
478 Alarming 
reports of the extent of tribal lawlessness were repeatedly fired at Morley. Well-armed 
tribesmen were raiding villages and attacking government positions along the frontier, and 
apparent British unwillingness to react made them increasingly audacious.
479 Fearing that 
the trouble would spread to other tribes if left unchecked, Minto, Kitchener and Deane 
argued that an expedition had become inevitable to immediately vindicate Government 
authority,  especially  when  local  forces  were  appealing  for  assistance.
480  Although 
lamenting  the  failure  of  the  Zakka  Khels  to  behave  more  sensibly,  Morley  was 
unimpressed,  and  criticised  the  Indian  Government  for  their  inefficiency  in  allowing 
tribesmen to successfully attack a major city like Peshawar.
481 
 
 
India laid emphasis upon its eagerness to avoid an expedition fought along traditional lines 
of ‘raid and scuttle.’ Similar tactics in this instance would be a counter-productive waste of 
money.  Destruction  of  tribal  territory  and  inflicting  heavy  casualties  would  inflame 
resentment and breed a desire for revenge, while hasty withdrawal following operations, 
especially if under  fire, would not impress any lesson on the tribes but instead would 
merely  create  dangerous  perceptions  of  British  weakness  and  provoke  further  attacks. 
Permanent settlement and possession of military posts in the country following operations 
would save future expense.
482 It was hoped that promises of reduced expenditure would 
induce  Morley  to  accept  a  more  aggressive  frontier  policy,  but  this  optimism  was 
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misplaced. Morley greatly desired reductions in over-inflated military spending, but did 
not believe the claims the Indian authorities were making for their policy, particularly as 
they failed to provide any supporting evidence. Occupation of tribal territory only risked 
exacerbating  tribal  anger,  thus  increasing  the  danger  of  having  to  launch  larger-scale 
operations, possibly involving Afghanistan. Staying aloof from incurring expensive new 
responsibilities  or  any  ‘Curzonian’  trend  in  Indian  foreign  policy  unacceptable  to  a 
radically  inclined  House  was  more  important  than  reducing  expenditure.  Any  such 
proposals were regarded as a reversal of the 1898 policy and could not be adopted.
483 
 
 
When tribal lawlessness finally exhausted Simla’s patience, their demands for immediate 
action, regardless of any subsequent measures, could no longer be ignored. Morley’s initial 
suggestion, for a blockade of the tribal territory as had been used against the Mahsuds in 
1901-2, only succeeded in infuriating the Government of India, providing ample proof of 
Whitehall’s ignorance of both Indian geography and the difficulties Curzon’s blockade had 
caused.
484 Approval for an expedition under strict limits was finally granted in February 
1908, nearly a year after Simla had first voiced its concerns. As punishment of offenders 
was the object no annexation or occupation was permitted, nor would it be under any 
circumstances  by  the  Liberal  Government,  a  fact  that  India  had  to  accept  without 
complaint.  Morley  relied  on  Minto  to  ensure  that  the  military  and  political  authorities 
obeyed their instructions, and to prevent zeal overriding policy.
485 
 
 
Voicing  concerns  about  declining  local  confidence  in  Britain’s  ability  to  ‘afford  them 
proper protection’ Deane complained bitterly that failure to occupy territory would only 
encourage resistance and render the expedition ineffective.
486 Minto and Simla undoubtedly 
shared these views, and appreciated the difficulties London’s instructions had imposed, but 
aware of the futility of continued protests to Morley they reminded frontier officials that 
the policy had to be followed: 
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You will, I am sure, have suspected how much instructions have influenced the 
plan of campaign! And the quicker you can go in and come out again the better 
will His Majesty’s Government be pleased. Personally  I doubt the permanent 
efficacy of punitive expeditions unless we are permitted to reap the benefits of 
them by increased control. However we must do the best we can.
487 
 
 
India made great efforts to ensure the expedition’s success. As instructed, Minto wrote to 
the Amir offering reassurances that the operations aimed only at punishing criminal tribes 
rather than altering tribal administration,
488 while Deane made efforts to ensure that the 
Afridis, widely regarded as the most dangerous tribe, would not interfere.
489 In military 
terms it was decided that two brigades, with one in support, a strong enough force to 
overcome the  Zakkas’ 6000 fighting men  and prevent the spread of opposition, would 
blockade  the  valley  before  moving  in  to  destroy  the  offending  villages,  confiscate 
weapons, impose fines and capture prisoners.
490 Willcocks, commanding the force, was 
reminded that the expedition’s object was limited to punishment, and that while he and the 
Political  Agent  were  vested  with  responsibility  to  agree  terms  with  the  tribe,  ‘neither 
immediately nor ultimately, directly, or indirectly will there be occupation or annexation of 
tribal  territory.’
491 Accepting  these  restrictions  on  his  freedom  of  action,  Willcocks 
nevertheless promised to obey Minto’s command to ‘make [himself] as disagreeable as 
possible in the Bazar valley.’
492 
 
 
Despite Morley’s failure to accede with Minto’s request to keep the operations out of the 
public gaze, this had little effect on their progress. Indeed the expedition proved somewhat 
anti-climactic after the year of bickering that preceded it. Doubts prevalent amongst the 
political authorities about the potential success of the expedition on the lines it was being 
conducted were quickly dispelled by Willcocks’s efforts against the tribe. Flying columns 
destroyed fortified strong-points and inflicted heavy casualties, quickly disheartening the 
tribe and making them anxious for a settlement. Willcocks argued that this opportunity 
should not be wasted, as the Zakka Khels ‘would be willing to make almost any sacrifices 
to retain their independence….and they are in a mood to make a really binding agreement,’ 
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although it would be necessary to retain troops in the area temporarily to achieve this.
493 
The  continued  military  presence  served  its  purpose.  The  Afridi  jirga  quickly  agreed  a 
settlement  in  which  they  accepted  responsibility  for  the  future  good  behaviour  of  the 
Zakka Khels, secured by the handing over of rifles and Rs. 20,000, to be returned when the 
Government was satisfied that they had been punished.
494 
 
 
The rapid achievement of both the military and political goals outlined for the expedition 
delighted the Indian authorities, as Minto wrote: 
 
 
I am quite pleased with the result of the expedition – all the more so, as it has 
been worked with your Brigade and Divisional machinery. The final arrangement 
appears excellent, and if the Afridis can fulfil their pledged to keep the Zakka 
Khels in order, we have made a good bargain. Mr Morley ought certainly to be 
well pleased – nothing could have been better done.
495 
 
 
All involved echoed these sentiments, pleased that the efficiency of the troops proved a 
marked  contrast  with  that  demonstrated  in  1897.  Pleased  that  frontier  wars  under  his 
tutelage lasted two weeks and cost only £56,000, Morley’s efforts to claim credit for the 
success and gloating that the results merely vindicated the policy imposed by the imperial 
government, as opposed to that favoured by India, proved the only annoyance.
496  
 
 
Hopes for a prolonged ‘period of peace and rest from these troublesome raids’
497 were 
quickly dashed as the arrival of large Afghan and tribal forces in the region to support their 
co-religionists  confronted  the  Indian  authorities  with  another  frontier  crisis.  This 
demonstrated  the  importance  of  adopting  a  pragmatic  approach.  Dangerous  situations 
requiring immediate response could always arise, preventing any detailed discussions of 
the minutiae of prospective policies between Simla and London. The Mohmand expedition 
presented  Minto’s  government  with  a  different  set  of  challenges,  as  they  faced 
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simultaneous attacks on different parts of the frontier, which threatened to escalate into 
full-scale hostilities with Afghanistan.  Mohmand raids and the presence of the Afghan 
lashkar  had  prompted  the  Indian  authorities  to  strengthen  defences  on  the  frontier.  A 
standoff resulted as Willcocks’s forces adopted defensive positions to prevent any tribal 
attack, while the tribes launched raids to provoke a British response. Some concern was 
voiced about the danger of not responding to such hostility, but having been warned by 
Morley  to  adhere  to  London’s  frontier  policy,  Minto  and  Kitchener  were  content  to 
maintain  the  defensive  stand  to  avoid  bringing  a  ‘large  lashkar  about  our  ears’  thus 
entailing a ‘serious expedition.’
498  
 
 
To  stabilise  relations  with  Afghanistan  and  prevent  further  deterioration  of  the  border 
situation, Minto explained to Habibullah why military measures had been taken and asked 
the Amir to prevent any further violations of British territory.
499 At the end of April 1908 
Willcocks’s forces were able to drive the lashkars away from the border, but attempts to 
impose  a  settlement  at  this  stage  through  the  jirga  fell  flat  as  the  tribes  responded  in 
offensive terms to  government requests to submit. The subsequent lull enabled  India’s 
military authorities to undertake measures to defend the strategically vital Landi Kotal fort 
in the Khyber from attack by another Afghan lashkar. Despite concerns about the weakness 
of the force available and the impact of fighting on the Afridis, the attacks were poorly 
directed, and unable to muster local tribal support, the lashkars were easily driven off. 
Securing the Khyber Pass, and thus Peshawar, against further threat enabled the Indian 
authorities to turn their attention to punishing the Mohmands after Morley sanctioned the 
launching of a further punitive expedition. After offering reassurance about the purpose of 
the expedition, Minto, recognising the importance of ensuring Afghan friendship during 
negotiations about the Convention, was again able to obtain assistance from the Amir in 
protecting the border.  
 
 
Although  annoyed  at  having  again  to  undertake  a  further  expedition  under  Morley’s 
instructions,  which  were  widely  derided  among  Indian  authorities  as  self-defeating, 
Kitchener  and  Minto  nevertheless  urged  Willcocks  to  repeat  his  earlier  successes  in 
inflicting  suitable  punishment  on  the  worst  offenders.  The  operations  against
  the 
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Mohmands  followed  a  similar  pattern  to  those  against  the  Zakka  Khels.  Even  those 
sections  that  had  only  indirectly  assisted  the  lashkars,  by  providing  food  or  failing  to 
inform the government of their advance were punished by the destruction of towers and 
villages, although crops were left untouched. Willcocks had been granted power to arrange 
terms  with  each  section,  and  while  some  submitted  willingly,  others  proved  more 
recalcitrant. The fighting was heavier as frequent attacks on the camp were repulsed, while 
one larger-scale engagement was fought at Ambahar, where on 24 May 1908, Willcocks’s 
skilful  use  of  flanking  tactics  and  mountain  artillery  inflicted  heavy  losses  on  the 
tribesmen. Operations continued until all the sections, including the notorious Baezais, 
instigators of much of the recent trouble, had been appropriately punished and a settlement 
had  been  reached.  Although  this  left  the  government  optimistic  that  future  difficulties 
could  be  contained  within  the  tribe,  it  did  not  deter  them  from  taking  extra  security 
measures  in  the  region,  leaving  small  garrisons  at  strategic  points  on  that  part  of  the 
administrative frontier.
 500  
 
 
Pleased with the results of this latest expedition against recalcitrant tribes, Minto proudly 
informed Edward VII of the further success,
501 and expressed his thanks to the Amir for 
restraining  his  tribes.
502  ‘Willcocks’  Weekend  Wars’  had  successfully  stabilised  the 
frontier after six months of unrest, although the assistance of the loyal tribes in preventing 
a  dangerous  escalation  was  gratefully  acknowledged.  The  records  of  the  military 
operations, which involved intense fighting despite the small numbers of troops, contradict 
Siegel’s claims that the Indian authorities owed their success to the tribes’ departure to 
tend  their  crops.  This  misapprehension  arises  from  her  reliance  on  Foreign  Office 
correspondence, much of which was written to reassure Russia that the writ of British 
authority still ran in the region in an effort to counter any concerns about the working of 
the recently concluded Convention. Kitchener and Willcocks would have been thoroughly 
displeased by such assertions. Much emphasis was laid upon the demonstration that the 
Indian Army’s performance against the tribes had offered of the improvements in training 
and organisation for frontier warfare implemented since the disastrous performance in the 
                                                 
500 For correspondence relating to the Mohmand expedition and the defence of the Khyber, see NLS MS 
12651, the Minto-Morley telegraphic correspondence for May 1908 in MS 12743, Minto’s correspondence 
with his officials in India in MS 12768, and the summary of frontier policy in MS 12644. For accounts by 
two officers involved in the operations, see Lord Ismay, Memoirs (Heinemann, London, 1960), pp. 6-15 or 
W.R. Birdwood, Khaki & Gown: An Autobiography (Ward, Lock & Co., London, 1941), pp. 182-190. 
501 NLS MS 12728, Minto to Edward VII, 18 June 1908. 
502 NLS MS 12743, Minto to Morley, 3 June 1908, Minto to Morley, 8 June 1908 (2 telegrams); NLS MS 
12768, Minto to Amir, 2 June 1908, Amir to Minto, 21 June 1908.   150 
Tirah campaign. Rotating all the army’s units to expose them to conditions on the frontier 
as their most likely theatre of operations had proved very successful, while the effective 
use  of  mountain  artillery  had  obviated  fears  about  the  dangers  posed  by  the  increased 
numbers of modern rifles in tribal hands. British casualties were very low, while tribal 
losses had been on an unprecedented scale. While a high level of preparedness to deal with 
any potential frontier difficulties was maintained, concerns remained about the difficulties 
involved in overcoming a widespread rising.
503 
 
 
In political terms, both sides could claim a measure of vindication from recent events. 
Morley argued that the restraint he had imposed on the conduct of punitive expeditions had 
successfully inflicted punishment on wrong-doers while preventing any escalation into a 
general rising or Afghan war. Minto and Kitchener could have argued that it was only 
British dithering that had put them into this dangerous position in the  first place. The 
success of Willcocks’ operations against the Mohmands and Afghan lashkars, launched 
quickly in response to an immediate threat to Indian security had proved the validity of 
their strategy. Sufficient explanation to the neighbouring tribes of the reasons for launching 
such operations had ensured their continuing loyalty, and they must have wondered why 
the  imperial  government  remained  reluctant  to  authorise  further  expeditions.  But  India 
recognised the dangers attendant on such measures, providing an opportunity for radical 
mullahs to preach jihad by highlighting the apparent threat to tribal independence. Large-
scale warfare would have been a very difficult proposition.  
 
 
Attention in the latter stages of Minto’s Viceroyalty shifted  eastwards  to unrest in the 
North East as China attempted to assert its claims in Tibet and Burma. Tension on the 
frontier had been reduced by the success of the operations, but lawlessness could not be 
completely  eliminated,  as  the  problems  with  the  Mahsuds  demonstrated.  Minto  and 
Kitchener continued to advocate their solution of increasing British control in the frontier 
region, without which ‘there can be no permanent peace.’ Gradual extension of British 
authority would have removed any danger of an Afridi war and Minto believed that ‘we 
can quietly get the control by degrees if we were only allowed to.’
504 Minto had come to 
accept, however, that further attempts to persuade Morley to accept such a policy were 
futile. This did not preclude frequent reminders of the dangers that existed in the region 
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and the need to protect British subjects and officials. As taking over tribal territory or 
leaving the tribes to their own devices were not viable options, it was decided to encourage 
closer contact through the personal influence of the Political Officers while utilising the 
irregular  forces  to  enhance  tribal  responsibility  for  the  maintenance  of  order.  Raids 
continued, but these became an accepted part of frontier life for the British unless they 
were willing to accept the ruinous expenditure and responsibilities entailed with complete 
elimination of tribal crime. Despite this, little doubt existed that Minto left behind a more 
stable situation on the frontier than had been bequeathed to him by Curzon, assisted by 
measures like the decision to retain garrisons on the Mohmand frontier after the expedition 
where the mere presence of regular troops deterred raiders. Disregarding the potential of 
the frontier to explode unexpectedly was foolhardy in the extreme, but thanks to the policy 
adopted  during  Minto’s  tenure,  an  amalgamation  of  his  and  Morley’s  ideas,  Hardinge 
could afford to give it less attention than many of his predecessors, and remained one of 
the few Viceroys who was fortunate enough not to have to sanction an expedition into 
India’s wild borderlands.
505 
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The Arms Traffic 
 
While able to contain frontier lawlessness to the extent allowed by Liberal policy, Minto 
was concerned that the Gulf arms trade posed a major threat to India’s security. Constant 
urging  to  London  to  take  more  effective  measures  to  interrupt  the  traffic  produced 
significant results in this instance, but Minto was never able to completely convince his 
superiors, concerned with the international implications of any direct steps to interdict gun-
running, that military action rather than diplomacy was the only viable option. 
 
Minto illustrated his concerns by describing to Morley the scene he encountered while 
visiting the frontier in 1910: 
 
 
What impressed me most is the complete change in the personal armament of the 
tribesmen. In the old days it consisted of flintlocks, matchlocks, shields and long 
knives;  now  breech-loading  rifles  are  universal.  Notwithstanding  the  many 
reports I have seen on the subject I had no idea that the tribesmen had become so 
universally possessed of them. At a jirga which met me in the Kohat Pass in the 
tribal  territory,  there  must  have  been  several  hundred  rifles  among  the  men 
surrounding me, every rifle loaded and full-cock, and their owners heavily laden 
with ammunition. The whole atmosphere full of stories of raids, counter-raids, 
blood-feuds, and the gallantry of our frontier officers. One cannot shut one’s eyes 
to the seriousness of the position. The conditions we should have to face now in a 
big frontier war…would be entirely different to those of past years…
506 
 
 
First-hand  experience  of  this  alarming  situation  enabled  the  Viceroy  to  understand  the 
anxiety of local officials about the dangers posed by vastly improved tribal armament. 
Possession of better weaponry by a volatile and warlike population merely multiplied the 
problems facing the Indian Government. Rifles were particularly suited to guerrilla warfare 
in the frontier hills, allowing a change in tribal tactics as close-quarter attacks with swords 
were  replaced  by  long-range  sniping  into  camps  or  forts  from  impregnable  mountain 
sangars.  The  influx  of  rifles  had  serious  implications  for  India’s  defence,  enabling  the 
tribes to better resist military encroachment.  
 
Weapons in tribal hands could not be recovered, but improved security in cantonments and 
arms  factories  had  reduced  the  traffic  in  stolen  rifles  and  components.  Success  here, 
however,  was  soon  overwhelmed  by  the  scale  of  the  Gulf  trade,  which  dramatically 
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increased  the  number  of  rifles  available  to  the  tribes.  Given  impetus  by  the 
accomplishments of the 1890 Brussels Act in checking the African trade, the Gulf trade 
was  barely  affected  by  measures  introduced  by  the  Persian  and  Muscat  authorities  to 
prevent importation of  arms into their territory. British naval patrols,  granted  rights to 
search vessels and remove contraband, had been able to seize 13,000 rifles and 2 million 
rounds of ammunition between December 1897 and March 1898, but their efforts were 
completely undermined by the arrival of French merchants, whose dhows were exempt 
from restrictions. Arms trafficking expanded enormously; an estimated 70,000 rifles had 
been imported into Muscat by 1905, and the value had increased even further within two 
years of Minto’s appointment.
507 
 
 
Despite his concerns about the growing trade, and the inability of existing measures to 
prevent rifles reaching the tribes via Persia, Minto accepted assurances from London that 
negotiations to reach an international agreement would provide a more permanent solution 
for  controlling  the  traffic  than  strengthening  naval  patrols  or  occupying  areas  of  the 
coast.
508 Morley  and  Grey  trusted  the  forthcoming  Brussels  Arms  Conference  would 
provide this solution, and were unwilling to authorise any measures, such as the use of 
troops in Persian territory, liable to jeopardise negotiations with Russia or damage cordial 
relations with France, which proved to be a stumbling block throughout. Interception was 
to be left to the Persian authorities; India was limited to collecting information to support 
any recommendations arising from Brussels.
509 Minto, mindful of the difficulties caused by 
the  Anglo-Russian  Convention,  did  not  take  so  sanguine  a  view  of  the  efficacy  of 
diplomacy as a solution. Taking effective measures to arrest the traffic would persuade the 
Sultan and the other Great Powers, especially France, to agree to prohibition at Muscat. 
Instituting  international  control  would  assist,  but  Britain  had  to  maintain  paramount 
influence.
510  Minto’s  pessimism  about  the  prospects  for  a  satisfactory  diplomatic 
agreement proved well grounded. France paid little heed to the Entente in a sphere where 
they  could  gain  little.  Attempts  to  reach  agreement  eventually  collapsed  as  Lowe  and 
Dockrill argue: 
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The British were also angry with the French for refusing to terminate their right 
to  trade  arms  in  Muscat….unless  the  British  would  cede  the  Gambia,  a 
suggestion which the Cabinet rejected in 1909.
511 
 
 
Without a suitable quid pro quo France refused to shift their position, despite Bertie’s 
protests  that  it  should  have  been  unnecessary  to  provide  compensation  to  stop  them 
enabling wild tribes to kill France’s supposed allies.
512 
 
 
Indian intelligence-gathering activities and arms seizures merely served to emphasise the 
scale of the difficulties the authorities encountered and prompted apprehension about the 
dangers to India’s security while diplomatic negotiations dragged on. Information received 
that up to 94,000 Martini-Henrys were in tribal hands punctured the optimism expressed by 
local officials in the Gulf in early 1907 that ‘the Arms traffic is at a standstill.’
513 The 
capture of an Afghan arms caravan in the Kacha Gorge in October 1907 further strained 
relations  with  the  Amir,  whose  vociferous  complaints  were  dismissed  by  forceful 
reminders that India could not acquiesce in armed violations of its territory, and that the 
trade was illegal. As India provided facilities for Habibullah to import arms, it could not 
‘consent to the unrestricted illegal import of weapons by irresponsible persons,’ nor allow 
him to make a grievance out of a legitimate action carried out within British jurisdiction. 
Minto argued that dealing with the issue firmly illustrated the attitude of Indian authorities 
on what it believed to constitute a serious danger.
514 
 
 
Events in the Gulf lent weight to Simla’s arguments in favour of more direct action. British 
warships continued to intercept gun-runners, for example HMS Prosperine, which captured 
a  dhow  carrying  1500  rifles  in  April  1908,  but  these  measures  were  having  worrying 
consequences. Large groups of Afghans had collected in the Mekran to prevent the capture 
of arms caravans and launch attacks on British telegraph stations. Anxiety heightened after 
an exchange of fire between Prosperine and some Afghans resulted in the death of a sailor. 
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In response the telegraph stations were reinforced, but even Morley was concerned that 
such measures did not go far enough.
515 Simla argued that pressure needed to be exerted on 
Persia  to  make  adequate  arrangements  to  intercept  caravans  and  prevent  such  large 
quantities of weapons reaching the frontier. Minto connected the influx of weapons, stating 
that in May and June 1908 alone 12,500 rifles and 2 million rounds of ammunition had 
passed through Persia, with unrest on the frontier in an effort to persuade the ever reluctant 
Morley that action to interdict the traffic was imperative:
  
 
 
There can be no doubt that the large influx of rifles form the Gulf during the gun-
running season of 1908-9 into the Afghan districts of Khost and Ningrahar is in 
great measure responsible for the disordered condition obtaining in these districts 
generally, and in particular for the continuous raiding carried out from Khost, a 
district that has now become the chief rallying point for outlaws from our side of 
the border.
 516  
 
 
Anxieties  arose  among  British  officials  that  uncertainty  over  the  on-going  Brussels 
negotiations was encouraging greater exertions from gun-runners fearing the imposition of 
restrictions. Minto battled hard to overcome the unrealistic ideas about the scale of the 
problem facing India put forward by Morley and the officials he had foisted upon the 
beleaguered  Viceroy.  Under  pressure  from  local  officers  arguing  that  little  could  be 
achieved against the traffickers with the limited resources at their disposal, Minto, although 
aware of the financial and political objections to naval activity in the Gulf or use of troops 
in Persia, advocated to Morley their suggestions to establish an effective naval blockade 
and military cordon along the Mekran. Continued inaction would be taken as a sign of 
British  weakness  and  merely  encourage  the  trade,  but  enhanced  naval  activity  and 
reinforcing telegraph stations could increase the risks faced by the traffickers and disrupt 
their  efforts.
517 Minto  angrily  dismissed  Creagh’s  claims  that  the  tribes  had  ‘very  few 
modern  arms’  and  that  reports  about  ‘the  arming  of  the  tribes  are  exaggerated’  by 
reminding him that there was ‘ample evidence of the enormous increase’ in the number of 
rifles.
518 Morley’s insistence that Simla should stop getting ‘over-excited’ about the arms 
traffic
519 merely provided the outraged Viceroy with further evidence that London did not 
understand the complications it was already causing on the frontier. Well-armed tribes 
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were already launching ever more audacious attacks on British positions, and it was feared 
that the huge numbers of rifles reaching them would encourage large-scale insurrection. As 
no assistance could be expected from the Sultan or the Persian Government, immediate and 
effective action had to be taken by Britain.
520 
 
 
To Minto’s disappointment Morley only approved continuation of current naval operations 
and a temporary retention of troops at Robat.
521 Slade, the new naval commander in the 
Gulf, proved a valuable ally for Minto. Slade recommended to the Admiralty the adoption 
of a blockade for a year, supplemented by intelligence and military operations, to interdict 
the trade, arguing that unless they made ‘a determined effort to deal with it effectively, it 
may land us in great difficulties in the future.’ Cutting the supply of ammunition would 
force the tribes to revert to their old fighting methods, thus tipping the balance back in 
favour  of  British  forces.  Combined  military-naval  operations  were  essential  to  achieve 
success: 
 
 
To attempt to stop this trade by means of purely naval operations is like fighting 
with one hand behind one’s back. To exert our full strength and to make the 
utmost use of our seapower, we ought to follow up the operations afloat by action 
on shore, so as to ensure that any cargoes which escape our boats shall eventually 
fall into our hands. 
 
 
Using a military force sufficient to deal with the arms traders would avoid having to utilise 
ships’ crews for this purpose. With the advantage of mobility and secure communications a 
small  force  could  be  employed  anywhere  along  the  coast,  seizing  landed  cargoes  and 
meting out instant retribution to any village known to be storing arms without occupying 
any Persian territory.
522Admiralty support provided the impetus previously lacking to find 
a practical solution. Backing within the Cabinet overpowered Morley’s unwillingness to 
approve military measures proposed by Simla. Slade hoped that the simplicity of the action 
proposed,  cutting  the  enemy  line  of  communication,  would  help  commend  it  to 
politicians.
523 His  wishes  were  only  partly  granted  as  Morley  officially  approved  the 
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blockade but not initially the mobile force.
524 Even these concessions delighted Minto, who 
was sanguine about the prospects: ‘if we get all we want, we shall really be in a fair 
position to do a great deal of good.’
525 
 
 
The blockade quickly demonstrated its effectiveness. Slade noted that ‘the whole trade is 
stopped for the moment,’ but commented that it was ‘only the beginning of the struggle.’ 
He  and  Minto  faced  an  ongoing  battle  with  London  to  prevent  these  measures  being 
abandoned.
526 Two issues remained problematic. To avoid the blockade being rendered 
useless it was essential to ensure that captured weapons were destroyed, which could not 
be guaranteed by maintaining existing arrangements with Persia and Muscat. Minto argued 
to  Morley  that  Britain  must  press  Persia  to  grant  this  right  as  an  assertion  of  their 
dominance in the region. It was also necessary to provide a force to intercept caravans and 
seize caches, the importance of which had been emphasised by recent attacks by Afghan 
gun-runners on Slade’s patrols.
 527 
 
 
India’s protest proved effective as the full blockade, including permission to launch raids 
inland to seize caches, and destroy captured weapons, was sanctioned in 1910.
528 Morley, 
disgruntled at yet again having to approve military operations and unable to appreciate the 
threat  posed  by  the  arms  traffic,  remained  determined  to  find  an  alternative  solution 
involving less expenditure. Demonstrating his usual lack of vision when defence questions 
arose, he favoured reopening negotiations with France or imposing prohibitions at Muscat 
to restrict illegal imports.
529 Although he stated to Morley that any settlement relieving 
India of the expense of maintaining the blockade would be welcome, Minto, supported by 
Slade and other Gulf officials, argued that no one plan would provide a complete solution; 
all operations had to work in conjunction if the arms trade was to be successfully stopped. 
The Sultan had only become willing to cooperate when Britain had demonstrated its ability 
to paralyse the trade, and while he was an important partner in the enterprise, Minto argued 
that ‘it seems evident that the Sultan is not himself able to stop the import of arms, and that 
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we should have to do this for him.’
530 As for diplomacy, Minto and Slade argued that 
continuing  the  blockade  to  further  disrupt  the  traffic  would  facilitate  negotiations  with 
France. Stopping French imports into Muscat was an essential component in stopping the 
trade, but support from Persia was also required in preventing the weapons reaching the 
frontier.
 531 
 
 
In the absence of a diplomatic solution, Minto urged Morley to authorise the continuation 
of the blockade until December 1910, stressing that although successes had already been 
achieved,  they  could  only  reap  the  full  effect  by  increasing  their  efforts.
532 Morley 
reluctantly  agreed,  petulantly  adding  that  the  blockade  would  be  halted  as  soon  as 
agreement  with  France  was  reached.
533 As  with  the  1908  frontier  operations,  Minto’s 
arguments that forceful action could achieve effective results had been vindicated. Both the 
blockade and amphibious operations against the caravans in Persia achieved some success. 
Warships continued to intercept shipments, for example on 2 June 1910 HMS Perseus 
captured a dhow carrying 2260 rifles, 50 pistols and 270,000 rounds.
534 Such conspicuous 
seizures led the Army Department to boast in their report that ‘these arrangements attained 
a large measure of success,’ as a total of over 2 million rounds of ammunition and 12,000 
weapons had been seized, although large amounts of rifles and ammunition were still being 
landed in Persia.
 535 
 
 
It soon became apparent that the blockade’s success in preventing cargoes from reaching 
Persia had some unwelcome consequences. In September 1910 Minto reported increasing 
evidence of tribal unrest as the Mullahs asserted that interference with the arms trade had 
impoverished the tribes, and exploited this grievance to incite jihad: 
 
 
Owing to the serious losses sustained by the tribesmen engaged in the arms trade, 
owing to our suppression of the arms traffic in the Gulf, a feeling of exasperation 
exists on the Frontier; Mr Merk has reported that the jirgas of the clans most 
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severely  affected  admit  their  inability  to  control  the  malcontents,  whose 
intentions are openly and avowedly hostile.
536 
 
 
Interference with the arms supply had created a minor crisis on the frontier as tribes tried to 
compensate for their heavy financial losses by cross-frontier raiding. The naval blockade 
had  successfully  interdicted  the  arms  traffic  as  seizures  of  weapons  and  ammunition 
continued  up  to  1914.  Prices  subsequently  increased,  leading  to  a  return  to  domestic 
sources. However, British failure to confront the traffic effectively had allowed the tribes 
to amass a huge arsenal that shifted the military balance and created a potential crisis for 
frontier defence.  India’s military  authorities were forced to rearm the irregular frontier 
forces to enable them to hold their own against tribal raiders armed with better rifles, and 
to consider in their war plans the likely impact of improved tribal weaponry in any future 
war.
537 
 
 
Minto’s  response  to  the  arms  trade,  like  most  of  the  other  frontier  problems  he 
encountered, demonstrated the pragmatism at the heart of Britain’s approach to its Empire. 
While Morley was driven by a radical interpretation of Liberal policies aiming to reduce 
imperial military expenditure, stabilise relations with Russia, and adopt a more conciliatory 
approach to the Empire’s native peoples, Minto was required to respond immediately to 
any perceived threats to India’s safety. Minto’s personal experience of the frontier brought 
such dangers into sharp focus, while Morley’s relative ignorance made it difficult for him 
to appreciate how much the influx of sophisticated weaponry revolutionised the military 
situation in a vulnerable and potentially explosive region. He grasped at any solution that 
would avoid the deployment of military force, expenditure for military purposes or the 
embroilment of India beyond its borders, refusing to listen to Minto’s protests that attempts 
to reach agreements with France should be secondary to the actual business of physically 
stopping  the  gun-runners.  Morley  allowed  his  liberal  philosophy  to  interfere  with  the 
process of governing and defending the Empire, he was probably one of the few involved 
in efforts to stop the traffic who did not wonder how much more could have been achieved 
if they acted more forcefully, a criticism that could be applied to many of his interventions 
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in  Indian  defence  policy.  Equally  little  consideration  was  given  to  how  his  dictatorial 
control over India’s defence damaged the prestige of its Government. 
   161 
4. Exploiting Solidarity: Minto and the Generals 
 
Minto’s military exploits had provided invaluable experience of the Empire and enabled 
him to establish close contacts with many senior military officers and politicians. The high 
rank  he  had  obtained  through  his  command  of  the  local  Volunteer  force  added  to  his 
prestige, an important asset for an aristocratic governor. A common background created a 
similarity of outlook between Minto and his military colleagues; he valued their advice 
above other sources and often relied on their support. Military issues remained a source of 
interest throughout his imperial career, and his knowledge proved useful as formulation of 
defence  policy  was  a  central  responsibility  for  imperial  governors.  It  produced  much 
conflict with politicians, however, as the views of governors, familiar with conditions at 
the periphery and charged with protecting British interests and defending local populations, 
frequently  clashed  with  London’s  wish  to  avoid  policies  requiring  expenditure  or 
commitment of resources. The influence Minto could exercise over decisions varied. While 
his views on Canadian defence diverged from the changing trends of British policy, which 
aimed  at  consensus  with  Laurier’s  government,  he  and  Kitchener  retained  significant 
control  over  Indian  defence,  successfully  preventing  Morley’s  attempts  to  reduce 
expenditure. Minto’s military correspondents, like Roberts and Wolseley, shared his views 
about the primacy of Britain’s obligation to defend its Empire, but he had few contacts 
with  the  emerging  generation  of  soldiers  who  focused  on  Europe  and  whose  ideas 
increasingly shaped British policies.  
 
 
Minto’s appointment to Canada coincided with the highpoint of British imperial strength. 
Worrying indications in the 1890s of future challenges, such as Venezuela, had presaged 
the disaster that engulfed Britain in South Africa barely a year into his tenure. Widespread 
historical  consensus  exists  about  the  impact  of  the  Boer  War  on  British  military  and 
foreign policy, as Johnson states, it was ‘a conflict which had opened an alarming abyss at 
the feet of British political and military leaders.’
538 The many threats Britain faced had 
become apparent during its prolonged struggle to overcome the Boers, making the need for 
military reform and reprioritisation of foreign policy objectives obvious.  
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Alarming deficiencies in the Army’s performance and organisation were exposed by the 
shocks  of  Black  Week,  problems  which  Elgin’s  commission  confirmed  and  further 
publicised. Military reform focused on two areas. Attempts to restructure the army faltered 
during  Balfour’s  administration,  as  a  lack  of  consensus  and  direction,  coupled  with  a 
failure  to  reduce  inflated  expenditure,  torpedoed  both  Brodrick  and  Arnold-Forster’s 
schemes.
539 Haldane, ‘unencumbered with preconceived notions or dogma,’
540 recognised 
his predecessor’s failings and worked  with the Generals and his Cabinet colleagues to 
implement a scheme that met their respective  aims of securing military  efficiency and 
reducing  the  estimates.  Financial  constraints  and  troop  numbers,  rather  than  any 
preconceived continental strategy, determined the BEF’s size, as defending the Empire 
remained  its  primary  purpose.
541 Balfour’s  government,  aided  by  the  energetic  Esher, 
proved more successful in improving the machinery for coordination and planning. The 
War Office was reformed to improve its efficiency, most notably by creating a General 
Staff to undertake the analysis of intelligence and contingency planning sadly missing in 
South Africa. The CID was established to provide the formal coordination necessary to 
overcome  the  complex  defence  problems  facing  Britain,  although  whether  it  actually 
achieved this aim is a matter of debate.
542   
 
 
The revelation of dangerous vulnerability drove a ‘rapid and dramatic reorientation’
543 of 
British  foreign  policy  to  deal  with  the  most  obvious  weakness  of  ‘strategic 
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overextension.’
544 Its goal was to maintain the global balance of power, while reducing 
both expenditure and the number of threats it faced, thus enabling Britain to meet the 
increasing  number  of  challenges  thrown  by  an  unfriendly  world.  Rapprochement  with 
America  allowed  the  virtual  withdrawal  of  the  remaining  forces  from  the  Western 
Hemisphere,  while  alliance  with  Japan  strengthened  its  position  in  the  Far  East.  The 
creation of a semblance of stability in these important fringes provided the freedom to 
continue attempts to improve relations with France and Russia, the most immediate threats 
to  the  Empire.  However,  this  policy  only  served  to  further  embitter  relations  with 
Germany, thus leading to an equally dramatic reorientation of strategy, as the General Staff 
in particular shifted its attention towards countering the threats posed to the Entente.
545 
 
 
Canada and India, the most important and potentially most vulnerable parts of the Empire, 
were integral to the changes introduced to reorient British defence policy. Military reform 
and reorganisation here pre-dated British efforts, as both had to be made secure against the 
menacing  presence  of  great  powers  on  lengthy  and  practically  indefensible  frontiers. 
Diplomatic realignment, driven by a growing awareness that military plans for war against 
the US and Russian were divorced from strategic reality, meant that during Minto’s time in 
Canada  and  India  the  military  was  searching  for  a  new  role  and  trying  to  justify  the 
continuation  of  expensive  schemes  to  politicians  reluctant  to  sanction  expenditure 
involving  little  obvious  benefit.  Soldiers  in  both  looked  to  Minto  for  support  in  this 
struggle and his military experience was held to be invaluable for both posts. As Borden 
stressed: 
 
 
It is true that the conditions in India are in many respects the very opposite of 
those in Canada, especially from a military standpoint, with which you have had 
to deal, but I am sure the Canadian experience will prove none the less valuable 
in  that  account,  especially  in  view  of  your  long  military  training  and 
associations.
546 
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The  contrasting  military  positions  in  Canada  and  India  were  something  that  many  of 
Minto’s Canadian correspondents noted when congratulating him on his appointment to 
India: 
 
 
It will I am sure, afford you much satisfaction…to govern a country in which 
there  exists  something  like  an  army,  and  something  very  like  a  C-in-C  after 
leaving one possessing neither one nor the other.
547 
 
 
The differences between the two military organisations emphasise the different approaches 
Britain adopted towards governing its Empire. In Canada, facing negligible threat of either 
internal rebellion or war with America, there was felt to be little justification for a large 
military establishment. Indifference to military policy was widespread and expenditure per 
capita was one of the lowest levels in the world. The force was dominated by the amateur 
volunteer  militia,  which  had  a  maximum  effective  strength  of  65,000,  composed  of 
infantry, cavalry and artillery units raised in both urban and rural areas. Their efficiency 
varied markedly, much dependent on the enthusiasm and wealth of the local notables who 
served as officers. It proved difficult to concentrate any sizeable portion of the force even 
for the limited amount of annual training it was contracted for given its voluntary nature 
and the size of the country. Its main purpose was ‘aid to the civil power’ during strikes and 
riots.
548 A small nucleus of a professional ‘permanent’ force existed, numbering around 
3000, serving as instructors to the militia. Scattered across Canada, it proved difficult to 
attract candidates of a suitable calibre because of the poor pay and conditions. Britain 
retained  a  minimal  military  presence,  maintaining  small  garrisons  at  the  fortresses  of 
Halifax  and  Esquimalt,  the  former  an  important  coaling  station.  Consideration  of  the 
defence  of  these  two  outposts  occupied  some  of  the  CID’s  attention  when  it  was  not 
endlessly  debating  India,  but  the  complexities  and  expense  involved,  allied  with  the 
unlikelihood of any attack, encouraged Britain to initiate the process of final withdrawal 
while handing over responsibility to the Canadians. Confusion about its purpose led to 
serious consideration among the military and imperial officials in Canada about the role 
the Dominion could fulfil in the defence of the Empire, especially after its contribution to 
the South African war, but any wider responsibility was something Laurier’s government 
was  reluctant  to  discuss.  Successive  GOCs  made  valiant  efforts  to  create  out  of  the 
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ramshackle militia a national army capable of defending Canada or assisting Britain in the 
event of a serious emergency but frequently encountered insurmountable obstacles.
549 
 
 
India’s Commanders-in-Chief faced the equally difficult task of reorganising the second 
largest concentration of professional forces in the Empire into an efficient army capable of 
meeting the numerous obligations imposed by British rule in India, prioritisation of which 
set the pattern for military reform. The presence of 75,000 British and 150,000 Indian 
regular troops, constituting the Army in India, assisted by contingents from the Princely 
states and irregular forces on the North West Frontier, underlined the fact that Britain 
believed India could only be effectively ruled by the sword. These forces existed to defend 
the  Raj  from  external  threats  to  its  integrity  posed  by  the  Russian  presence  beyond 
Afghanistan  and  the  fanatical  tribal  population  of  the  frontier,  and  were  ultimately 
responsible for the maintenance of internal order, although the Indian Army itself was 
believed to present the greatest threat in this regard.
550 
 
 
The two commanders had contrasting levels of power and responsibility, but both faced 
similar  problems  that  damaged  civil-military  relations  and  threatened  the  hopes  of 
successfully  introducing  reforms.  In  Canada,  the  GOC  Militia  was  subordinate  to  the 
Minister of the Militia in the Cabinet, and was not technically the senior military adviser to 
the Governor, that honour going to the GOC Halifax. The latter commanded the small 
number  of  British  troops  and  was  usually  of  senior  rank  to  the  GOC  Militia,  whose 
authority was limited to Canadian forces. The failure to properly define responsibilities 
between civil and military officials, and the patronage opportunities created by the militia 
that encouraged constant political interference in its everyday operation, something that 
imperial officials worked hard to eradicate, damaged relations to the extent that few GOCs 
served their full term. In contrast the Army in India Commander-in-Chief had extensive 
power over all the forces in India, both British and Indian, and was responsible to the 
imperial government, through the Governor General in Council, for all military policy in 
India.  He  exercised  some  responsibility  for  civil  policy  by  virtue  of  his  seat  on  the 
Viceroy’s  Executive  Council,  and  was  second  only  to  the  Viceroy  in  the  order  of 
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precedence. Kitchener, who resented the presence of an alternative source of advice to the 
Viceroy on military issues, did much to concentrate even greater levels of control in the C-
in-C’s hands through the abolition of the Military Department. Although the system of dual 
control was finally destroyed, his actions had disastrous consequences for the efficiency of 
the Indian Army in war. His struggle with Curzon also brought the Government of India to 
a standstill, and Minto’s appointment was partially motivated by a desire to both restore 
some  semblance  of  normality  while  taking  advantage  of  his  military  experience  to 
implement the new system of army administration.  
   167 
Canada: the Limits of Gubernatorial Influence 
 
After  the  participation  debates  Minto’s  attention  focused  on  two  interlinked  issues. 
Attempts  to  eradicate  political  interference  from  the  militia  continued  as  a  necessary 
precursor  to  reforming  the  force,  but  this  remained  a  source  of  tension,  leading  the 
Canadian authorities to reorganise the command. Minto believed that improving Canada’s 
defensive capabilities was in the Empire’s interest and thus an important gubernatorial 
duty, but his personal attachment to issues and changes in British policy meant that his 
views were not always accepted.  
 
 
Debate  over  Canadian  participation  in  South  Africa  further  strained  the  already  tense 
relations  between  the  imperial  and  Dominion  authorities.  Hutton  had  brandished  his 
popularity  against  colleagues  and  superiors,  alienating  potential  supporters,  as  had 
happened during the dispute that erupted with Seymour over the respective responsibilities 
of  their  commands.  The  Halifax  commander,  inspired  by  the  example  of  a  proactive 
predecessor  who  had  taken  advantage  of  a  weak  GOC  Militia  to  offer  advice  to  the 
Canadian Government and Governor, mistakenly believed he had power over all forces in 
Canada. Seymour vociferously complained about being bypassed as chief military adviser 
and accusations of interference with the militia,
551  but proved unable to convince Minto 
that his views were correct. He resigned amid questions about his mental stability, seen by 
some historians as the root of the conflict, who argue accordingly that ‘his complaints 
cannot be taken too seriously.’
552 The War Office subsequently decided to downgrade the 
Halifax post to clarify the complex command structure, strengthening Canadian claims for 
increased autonomy. More importantly, relations between Hutton and Borden had become 
embittered over attempts to enforce orders limiting the tenure of command for long-serving 
officers. Hutton took attempts to remove Domville, also a Liberal MP, as a test case for his 
policy  of  preventing  political  interference  undermining  the  discipline  and  order  of  the 
militia, an aim Minto wholeheartedly supported.
553 The decision to remove Domville was 
publicly  lauded  as  a  triumph  for  efficiency,  strengthening  the  GOC’s  power  over 
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appointments, but Hutton had actually conceded Borden’s viewpoint under pressure from 
Minto, who was anxious to prevent an open breach.
 554 
 
 
Hutton’s public boasts that the despatch of the first contingent represented his successful 
assertion  of  military  authority  over  political  interference  merely  heightened  Canadian 
bitterness.
555 Minto was urged by Laurier to curtail the GOC’s public pronouncements, but 
although  the  governor  had  long  been  anxious  for  Hutton  to  avoid  public  speaking,  he 
supported the GOC’s aim of liberating Canadian military organisation from politics and 
tried to defend him, somewhat speciously, against criticisms that he had discussed political 
subjects.
556 Although aware of the need to avoid friction with the Dominion government, 
Minto felt it more important to defend imperial interests during a time of crisis. Minto 
recognised  that  despite  his  support,  Hutton’s  position  was  dangerously  tenuous.  As  he 
stressed  to  Chamberlain  in  January  1900,  the  willingness  of  Laurier’s  government  to 
tolerate what they regarded as insubordination had been exhausted and they were anxious 
to  remove  the  GOC.
557 Hutton’s  apparent  association  with  the  opposition  over  militia 
reform led Minto to expect serious trouble; he only hoped that it would come over an issue 
where the GOC was in the right.
558  
 
 
Horse purchases for the second contingent provoked the final collision. Hutton refused to 
work with the inspector Borden had insisted on appointing, criticising the move as an 
unjustifiable  interference  with  the  GOC’s  duties  and  incompatible  with  ‘any  known 
military  routine.’
559 For  Minto  it  perfectly  demonstrated  the  Government’s  distrust  of 
Hutton and lack of appreciation for the appropriate positions to be held by the general and 
the  minister.
560 These  accusations  were  vehemently  denied  by  Laurier’s  government, 
which countered by arguing that Hutton had disregarded their instructions by refusing to 
let a well-qualified official do his duty. They urged Hutton to consider the public interest 
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‘rather than how he could establish for himself a position in the public service wholly 
independent of all ministerial control.’
561  
 
 
Minto admitted Hutton’s tactlessness, but he blamed the Canadians for their over-sensitive 
reaction to any perceived threats to their autonomy. He was determined to fulfil his duty to 
defend  the  imperial  tie  against  the  threat  posed  by  Laurier’s  demands  for  Hutton’s 
resignation, although his suggestion that it would be easier to replace Borden was swiftly 
and angrily rejected. Minto hoped to utilise the opportunity provided to properly define the 
respective duties of the GOC and the minister, to ensure that while supreme authority 
remained with the latter, the former could exercise executive authority over military affairs 
without fear of interference.
562 He was therefore determined that Laurier’s Government 
accept responsibility for their actions in dismissing such a high official, and that any repeat 
of the previous ‘whitewashes’ should be avoided. He thus rejected British suggestions of 
sending  Hutton  to  South  Africa  as  an  easy  way  out.  Ignoring  Laurier’s  threats  of 
resignation, Minto insisted that a request for recall based on such trivial accusations at a 
time of danger for the Empire should be embodied in a Privy Council order rather than a 
despatch, also claiming that he was bound to state his own opinion if the government went 
through  with  its  actions.
563 Minto  agreed  that  Hutton’s  relations  with  the  government 
rendered his continued command useless, but he believed that the ministers’ action ‘was 
instigated  much  by  personal  feelings  against  the  general,’  rather  than  any  justifiable 
political reason.
564 Hutton had complained that it was ‘evident that my arrival was not 
welcomed by the government’ and that their discourtesy towards him had been inspired by 
their  opposition  to  ‘militarism’  and  imperialism.  This  paled  into  insignificance  when 
compared with Borden’s failure to support Hutton’s efforts to eliminate the party political 
interference that damaged militia efficiency and endangered both Canadian and imperial 
defence. The GOC despaired of the hopes for reform, complaining he was:  
 
 
Truly and deeply sick at heart over the Militia….[it was] impossible to evolve 
order out of chaos and make dirty water run clear when the political atmosphere 
pollutes everything.
565 
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Arguing that the GOC’s attitude towards, and relations with, the government had made his 
retention impossible, Laurier’s government decided to officially ask for Hutton’s recall to 
avoid  any  controversy  over  dismissal.
566 In  this  instance  Minto  allowed  his  desire  to 
support  his  friend  and  determination  to  protect  imperial  interests  outweigh  his  usually 
pragmatic approach to such issues. He reiterated his wish to avoid pressing upon Laurier 
the continued services of a disagreeable officer, but still carried out his threat to officially 
record  his  opinions  of  the  situation.  Defending  Hutton  against  the  government’s 
accusations and upholding his record, Minto again argued that the difficulties had been 
created by the  government’s mistaken views about the appropriate division of military 
responsibilities. Supreme constitutional authority evidently rested with the government but 
to  obviate  friction  the  minister  had  to  focus  on  departmental  administration  and 
expenditure, thus allowing the GOC to exercise control over military issues. Minto argued 
that the main problem was obvious, as it was ‘universally admitted that political influence 
has done much to impair the efficiency of the militia.’ Only an experienced British officer 
dissociated from these baneful political influences could effectively command the force, 
but  all  appointees  had  struggled  to  reconcile  the  performance  of  their  duties  with  the 
government’s wishes and Minto expressed his doubts that any ‘high-minded officer’ would 
accept the post in future unless such difficulties were removed. 
567 
 
 
Minto’s case was undermined by further revelations about Hutton’s insubordination: the 
GOC  had  erroneously  informed  two  officers  who  had  been  removed  from  a  list  of 
candidates for a staff college course that this had been done for political reasons, which 
emphasised for Laurier that such conditions in the Militia Department could not be allowed 
to  continue.  Little  support  was  forthcoming  from  Britain.  Appalled  by  Minto’s 
determination to create friction with Laurier’s government, the Colonial Office ignored 
appeals to retain Hutton and agreed to comply with requests for his recall. Convinced that 
his case was sound, but stretching his constitutional powers somewhat, Minto refused to 
inform  the  Canadian  government  in  an  effort  to  force  them  to  dismiss  the  GOC  and 
provoke a public outcry.
 568 
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Laurier’s government emphatically rejected Minto’s arguments. The GOC was a servant of 
the Canadian, rather than the imperial, authorities. He held no independent power and was 
entirely subordinate to the Minister. Failure by GOCs to understand the correct relationship 
had  created  tension,  not  political  interference  or  discourtesy.  Hutton  had  done  nothing 
towards the organisation of the contingent, and his attitude towards the Government and 
contempt for ministerial authority meant that retaining his services was not in the public 
interest; recall was now the most respectful option.
569 Minto recognised that his tactics, if 
not his strategy, had been mistaken. To prevent Laurier’s resignation, he now had little 
choice but to accept the Government’s assertion of its authority by dismissing Hutton, a 
decision which resulted from their belief that further action was necessary after Britain 
rejected earlier requests for recall. Surprised by Canada’s precipitate action, the Colonial 
Office was infuriated when it realised that Minto had not forwarded their instructions, and 
wishing to avoid a public controversy, efforts were made to obtain service for Hutton in 
South Africa.
570 
 
 
Limited reflection on the affair illustrated his wish to draw a line under a ‘disappointing 
transaction.’ Minto found it difficult to maintain a consistent position, informing Hutton 
that he had signed the Privy Council Order with regret, believing that his departure would 
have a lamentable effect on the militia, and arguing to both the GOC and Chamberlain that 
he merely wanted the government to accept responsibility and record reasons for their 
actions.
571 Simultaneously he agreed with the Colonial Secretary that it was a mistake to 
force an unwelcome general on his ministers and that pushing their advocacy of Hutton’s 
position  too  far  would  have  been  resented  as  unjustifiable  imperial  pressure.  His 
conclusions highlighted  his inability to understand the Government’s position, but also 
vaguely hinted at a belief that the Canadians were not solely responsible for the troubles. 
Minto  believed  that  bitter  feeling  over  the  first  contingent  had  intensified  Canadian 
determination to remove Hutton, the discourtesy demonstrated towards him was merely the 
tool adopted to achieve this aim. While reiterating that Borden had unjustifiably assumed 
control of details for personal and political reasons, Minto admitted that Hutton had been 
insufficiently careful in his attempts to reform all the abuses in the militia and encourage 
military enthusiasm throughout Canada. His faults, however, were those of a man keen to 
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succeed in his work: ‘whatever small mistakes he may have made here his great energy 
and ability under difficult circumstances deserve recognition.’
572 
 
 
Minto and Hutton, aware that they lacked public support, were forced to abandon their 
plans  to  request  a  Royal  Commission  into  militia  administration.  Miller  argues  that 
Hutton’s  departure  removed  a  troublesome  liability  for  Minto,  helping  to  improve  his 
relations  with  the  Canadian  government,  especially  Borden.
573 However  the  wounds 
caused  by  the  incident  did  not  heal  immediately  and  Minto  remained  annoyed  about 
Canadian administration of its military forces: 
 
 
I regret to say that since the departure of General Hutton, the conduct of Militia 
affairs has become daily more unsatisfactory…the minister aiming at a complete 
personal control over every military detail, the object of which is unfortunately 
evident.
574 
 
 
While he had wished to avoid sparking a crisis with Laurier’s government during the South 
African war Chamberlain shared his Governor’s vexation about the incident and the threat 
it  posed  to  his  long-term  goals:  ‘As  long  as  politics  play  so  large  a  part  in  military 
arrangements  in  Canada  these  difficulties  will  constantly  recur.’  His  despatch  on  the 
history  of  the  GOC’s  post  indicated  his  ‘sense  of  injury  to  imperial  interests  done  by 
political  interference.’  In  an  effort  to  encourage  the  Canadians  to  alter  their  attitude 
towards the senior imperial officers sent to work with them, Chamberlain expressed his 
regret  that  they  had  been  unable  to  allow  Hutton  to  complete  his  work  when  he  had 
achieved  much  and  reminded  them  that  Britain,  still  responsible  for  defending  all  its 
imperial possessions, retained an interest in the efficiency of the militia. 
575 
 
 
Laurier’s government refuted Chamberlain’s criticisms, blaming Hutton’s misconception 
of his position for the unsatisfactory condition of affairs in the militia. The government had 
been willing to concede the GOC greater control over military issues, but could not ‘yield 
to claims which practically would make the General the Controller of the policy of the 
                                                 
572 LMCP I, Minto to Chamberlain, 7 & 8 February 1900, pp. 289-92. 
573 Miller, Canadian Career, p. 119. 
574 LMCP I, Minto to Chamberlain, 5 April 1900, pp. 331-32. 
575 LMCP I, Chamberlain to Minto, 2 March & 17 April 1900, pp. 306-308, 342-43.   173 
Government  in  Militia  matters.’  Mistakenly  believing  himself  independent  from 
government  authority,  Hutton  had  been  guilty  of  consistent  insubordination,  making 
frequent speeches, passing information to journalists, announcing policy decisions without 
authorisation, and preventing officers and officials communicating with Borden without 
his permission. Further problems had been caused by Hutton’s offensive and discourteous 
manner,  making  proper  administration  of  the  department,  and  therefore  his  continued 
tenure, impossible. Suggestions that the ‘spirit of enthusiasm and devotion to duty, the 
fruits  of  which  were  manifested  in  the  splendid  service  rendered  by  the  Canadian 
contingents in South Africa’ were in any way attributable to Hutton merely angered them 
further,  ignoring  as  it  did  the  existing  strength  of  Canadian  imperial  zeal  and 
enthusiasm.
576 Such  contentions  infuriated  Minto,  who  believed  that  the  ‘spirit  which 
animates [them is] no doubt largely due to personal animosity against General Hutton.’
577 
Contrary to their claims, the administration of the militia appeared superficially efficient 
‘till one comes on something behind the scenes which makes one’s hair stand on end.’
578 
Minto still argued that the Canadian version of the relations that should prevail between the 
Minister  and  the  general  were  incompatible  with  the  position  of  authority  and  respect 
necessary  for  a  high  appointment  like  the  GOC  or  the  efficient  direction  of  military 
administration.  Canadian  assumptions  that  actual  military  command  rested  with  the 
minister, thus justifying interference in military detail, reduced the GOC to the status of a 
chief  clerk.  Ministers,  in  Minto’s  view,  were  incapable  of  understanding  that  the 
undoubted  constitutional  authority  of  the  government  over  the  military  did  not  render 
interference  with  the  executive  power  of  the  military  expert  appointed  to  command 
advisable.
579 Minto’s refusal to trust Laurier’s Government with military affairs created 
further difficulties over the distribution of 44 regular army commissions granted by the 
War  Office.  He  feared  that  his  ministers  viewed  these  simply  as  patronage,  and  the 
resultant tension only eased when a compromise was agreed granting the governor final 
responsibility for nominations in the absence of a GOC, providing he acted on the advice 
of his ministers.  
 
 
Miller  is  correct  to  argue  that  the  anomalous  position  of  the  GOC  had  become  an 
‘obsession’  for  Minto.  Arguably  the  most  important  imperial  issue,  it  provided  an 
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opportunity  for  the  Governor  to  enlarge  his  role  by  ensuring  that  Canada  fulfilled  its 
obligations.  Minto remained deeply interested in military affairs. He shared Hutton’s aim 
of fully utilising Canada’s excellent military material for imperial defence and he believed 
his links with the War Office and the British military establishment enabled him to initiate 
Canadian reform plans compatible with imperial strategy.
580 Unless the GOC’s position 
was properly defined however, any hope of achieving these aims would rapidly evaporate. 
Minto prodded the British authorities to persuade the Canadian government to accept the 
proper division of authority; the GOC had to be treated as an expert, whose professional 
advice  was  heeded,  and  who  could  operate  free  from  civilian  interference  in  military 
administration.
581 His  exhortations  produced  some  result,  as  Chamberlain  rebuked  the 
Canadians, advising them that, to prevent future conflict, it was necessary to allow the 
GOC a freer hand in matters essential to discipline than that granted to an ordinary civil 
servant.
 582  
 
 
Practical concerns reduced the chances of achieving such laudable aims. Minto, brought 
into  closer  contact  with  the  Militia  Department  in  the  absence  of  a  GOC  or  Military 
Secretary,  discovered  that  ‘military  matters  here  are  degenerating  into  a  disreputable 
chaos.’ Unless a good officer was appointed he feared that the situation would deteriorate 
further, and he appealed for the provision of an imperial officer even as a ‘stop-gap.’
 583 
The  pool  of  suitable  officers  was  drastically  reduced  by  British  commitment  in  South 
Africa and Wolseley’s concerns about the difficulties of coping with the atmosphere of 
political  interference.
584 Minto  dismissed  Laurier’s  suggestions  to  appoint  his  former 
Military Secretary, believing it was merely a ploy to appease him after the recent tension, 
and fearing it would expose him to accusations of interference. He argued that only the 
appointment of an officer ‘whose rank and military reputation command respect’ could 
advance the cause of military reform.
585 
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The  tenure  of  Haly,  appointed  as  a  temporary  replacement,  proved  an  oasis  of  calm 
compared to that of his predecessor, who bitterly criticised the new GOC for having more 
brains than courage, as ‘only men of that class…are available at home now, or would go to 
expose themselves to the indignities and petty annoyances of Laurier and co.’
586 Haly was 
aware of the difficulties involved in his new post and that ‘many capable General[s] have 
failed,’  but  he  still  hoped  to  ‘steer  clear  of  the  shoals  ahead.’
587 Avoiding  friction 
completely was impossible given the nature of the command, but his willingness to work 
within the limitations imposed by the Canadian conception of the post and amiably accept 
directions from the Minister, made him popular with the Canadian government, who came 
to regard him as an ideal GOC.
588 Such developments concerned Minto, although he was 
undoubtedly pleased with the  generally improved atmosphere of militia administration, 
particularly his relations with Borden, praising the Minister’s interest in his work. His 
outlook  brightened,  as  anxieties  that  no  imperial  officer  capable  of  rescuing  what  was 
regarded as an impossible position were replaced with optimism about what an energetic 
and  tactful  soldier,  working  with  the  Governor,  could  achieve.
589 However,  in  Minto’s 
opinion, Haly was ‘not the man for the place,’
590 and he complained privately that ‘the 
GOC  is  absolutely  useless.’
591 Minto  reported  that  Haly  had  abdicated  his  authority, 
arguing that his surrender of undivided military control to Borden was detrimental to the 
interests of the force and likely to frustrate Britain’s desire for Canada to contribute to 
imperial defence.
592 Canadian suggestions to permanently appoint Haly reinforced Minto’s 
contempt  for  their  administrative  methods,  about  which  he  complained  vociferously  to 
Brodrick and Roberts: 
 
 
The chief difficulty has always been the interference by the Minister of Militia in 
the executive command of the force. This interference has been frequently for 
corrupt political purposes in the case of promotions or otherwise, it has broken 
the heart of good officers and the resistance of the GOC has only been taken as 
an unjustifiable interference with the authority and patronage of the Minister.  
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Optimistically Minto believed that only the appointment of a distinguished officer would 
‘nullify corrupt opposition’ and ‘eradicate abuses.’
 593 
 
 
As the informed analysis of the militarily experienced ‘man on the spot’, Minto’s views 
evidently carried some weight with Britain’s military authorities. When combined with 
reports that Haly and Borden had recommended that vastly reducing the militia was the 
only way to improve its efficiency
594 they compounded heightened fears about Canada’s 
ability to fulfil imperial obligations or defend itself against American attack. Planning for 
this unpalatable contingency had been reinvigorated by fears about British vulnerability 
and isolation, tensions over Alaska, and inter-service rivalry over dominance in imperial 
defence. Military investigations confirmed that the Canadian government had done little to 
implement  previous  recommendations,  such  as  those  made  by  the  1898  Leach 
Commission,
595 to improve its defences, much to British frustration:  
 
 
What is the use of defence committee reports if no action is taken – do they 
imagine  at  Ottawa  that  they  would  be  allowed  time  to  discuss  these  various 
schemes for defence as to which was the best when the battering ram was at the 
gate. 
596 
 
 
Minto attributed this inaction to Canadian indifference towards defence rather than civil-
military friction,
597 but it strengthened Britain’s desire to take measures, such as following 
the Governor’s advice to appoint as GOC an officer more assertive than Haly, to pressure 
the Canadians to make the reforms that London demanded as a condition of providing 
military support against American attack.
598 
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Finding an officer capable of fulfilling these aims proved no easy task, requiring much 
consultation  between  Minto,  Kitson  and  the  War  Office.  Dundonald  was  eventually 
persuaded to accept the post, and as a Scottish aristocrat who had commanded Canadian 
troops in South Africa there were no questions about his experience, ability, or reputation. 
Some doubts were raised, however, about whether he was temperamentally suited to the 
post. Chamberlain expressed the contradiction facing them: ‘I think the Canadians will be 
very fortunate to get Dundonald. It is more than they deserve. Nevertheless, I have no 
doubt they will quarrel with him after a time.’
599 Chamberlain tried to ensure that the new 
GOC was fully briefed about the problems he was likely to encounter: 
 
 
The  post  is  a  difficult  one  and  the  remuneration  is  altogether  inadequate. 
Hitherto, those who have accepted the position have almost invariably come into 
conflict with the local authorities. It is not in my opinion a matter of blame to 
them but it arises from the differences of appreciation between British officers 
accustomed to our system and colonial politicians proceeding on other lines. 
600 
 
 
Minto echoed these points, offering his own interpretation of what was needed to establish 
a sound system of military administration: 
 
 
The main point is the position it is understood you should occupy here in relation 
to the Minister – viz. that of his military adviser and right hand man – and that 
your  jurisdiction  as  regards  purely  military  detail  should  not  be  perpetually 
interfered with.
601 
 
 
Despite  his  warnings  about  the  problems  caused  by  all-pervading  patronage,  Minto 
reassured  Dundonald  that  the  excellent  quality  of  the  force  provided  scope  to  achieve 
much.  Although  recognising  his  subordinate  position  with  the  Canadian  Government, 
Minto also urged upon the GOC the need to continue confidential correspondence with the 
Governor, arguing that this was the only way to ensure that Britain remained informed 
about an important aspect of imperial defence.
 602 
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Dundonald appeared to have arrived at a favourable time. A belief in the inherent military 
superiority of Canada’s militia compared to British regulars had been encouraged by their 
Boer War experiences, arousing a popular enthusiasm that replaced the usual indifference 
and  creating  a  desire  for  reform.  Most  Canadian  historians  agree  that  ‘no  Canadian 
institution benefited more from the war than the Canadian militia.’
603 Such enthusiasm was 
not universal, as doubts remained over the exact role of the force. Formal contributions to 
imperial defence had been forcefully rejected at the 1902 conference, and although vague 
agreements were reached to focus efforts on improving Canadian defences, it was not clear 
to what end. Laurier stressed to the new GOC that it was unnecessary to ‘take the militia 
seriously,’ as although it served a useful police function, American protection meant it was 
not required to defend Canada.
 604 
 
 
Dundonald, however, was determined to take the militia seriously and make it an efficient 
force.  Plans  were  formulated  to  create  a  ‘citizen  army’  capable  of  defending  Canada 
against American aggression, as it was hoped that emphasising this threat would encourage 
a more enthusiastic response.
605 A comprehensively trained skeleton army would form the 
front-line force, to be fleshed out in an emergency to two lines of 100,000 by all those who 
had undertaken basic cadet training. Dundonald argued in his annual reports that achieving 
this aim to satisfy British hopes would require much work, as the present system failed to 
provide an efficient and inexpensive organisation that could be easily expanded into a war 
establishment.
606 A comprehensive reform programme would decentralise administration 
by devolving certain powers to local commanders, enabling them to operate independently 
in wartime. Training would be modernised, while to create an army capable of undertaking 
campaigns,  deficiencies  in  stores  and  ammunition  had  to  be  made  good  and  essential 
auxiliary  units  such  as  intelligence  and  engineers  had  to  be  established.  Identifying 
deficiencies in the force proved simple;
607 encouraging the Canadian government to adopt 
his recommendations to remedy these defects, when these entailed significant expenditure 
(which  opponents  claimed  included  plans  to  spend  $12  million  fortifying  the  border), 
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proved difficult and created much friction with Laurier’s government. Borden recognised 
that any changes would have to be gradual to avoid provoking antagonism from those 
opposed  to  military  expenditure.  He  edited  Dundonald’s  reports  and  kept  the 
recommendations confidential to allow comparison with Leach’s 1898 plans that Canada 
claimed to have adopted with War Office approval.
608 The GOC ridiculed these arguments, 
stressing  that  Laurier’s  government  had  rejected  repeated  promptings  to  implement 
Leach’s  recommendations  and  had  failed  to  carry  out  even  the  most  important. 
Dundonald’s public announcement of his reform plans in an effort to push them forward 
provoked a rebuke from Laurier and Borden but enabled substantial progress to be made, 
including  the  establishment  of  the  Guides  and  Intelligence  departments.  Despite  these 
minor successes, the GOC, like his predecessors, came to realise ‘the obstacles that stand 
in the way of efficient Canadian defence are not merely the parsimony of the Government 
and  national  apathy.’  Government  and  popular  opposition  to  military  expenditure  and 
preparation was widespread, many valued the militia only as a tool to ‘keep the jingoes and 
ultra-loyalists  quiet.’  When  combined  with  a  ‘low  standard’  of  political  morality  and 
lukewarm  French  feeling  towards  imperial  connections,  it  made  ‘the  possibility  of 
effecting the serious improvement in the condition of Canadian defence a very difficult 
matter.’
 609 
 
 
Minto was thanked by Dundonald for his ‘invaluable’ support in their ongoing struggle for 
progress  in  militia  reform  and  he  publicly  stated  his  belief  that  the  new  plans  would 
improve  the  force.
610 The  Governor,  however,  sympathised  with  Borden’s  refusal  to 
publish the reports, believing many of Dundonald’s suggestions were impractical, and he 
became increasingly anxious about the GOC’s propensity to follow Hutton’s example in 
appealing to Canadian public opinion. Minto agreed with Dundonald’s assessment of the 
challenges they faced and his aim of creating an efficient force, but his experience with 
Hutton made it obvious that confronting the Canadian government would achieve nothing. 
He admitted to Brodrick that the problems with the militia were not entirely Canada’s fault 
and bemoaned that the tension created by overenthusiastic imperial officers prevented him 
exercising more influence 
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It  is  very  difficult  to  find  a  soldier  that  is  capable  of  looking  beyond  purely 
military needs, or of recognising political considerations, and the low standard of 
political morality in a new country, and yet with strength of mind enough to set 
his face against abuses and wear them down by ability and tact. I am sure you 
must know well the difficulty with the purely military mind.
611 
 
 
Minto’s belief that Dundonald was unlikely to remain in Canada for long proved prescient, 
as relations between the GOC and the government rapidly deteriorated. The battle over 
publication of the annual report was repeated in 1903, as Dundonald tried to spread his 
recommendations through the text but proved unable to escape Borden’s editing.
612 This 
was a struggle for influence rather than content as many of the proposals were accepted 
over time. Dundonald’s increasing frustration and impatience at the gradual pace of reform 
necessary in Canada embroiled Minto in another major dispute between an imperial officer 
and the government, remarkably similar to the last and confirming Bourne’s argument that 
‘the efforts of these British officers had been often noisy, sometimes downright offensive 
and always unsuccessful.’
613 Despite having apparently learned lessons from the Hutton 
affair,  his  role  was  still  criticised  by  some  Canadian  historians,
614 but  his  behaviour 
illustrated a resigned acceptance of his inability to make a radical overhaul of Canadian 
defence along the lines he favoured.  
 
 
Political  patronage  again  provided  the  flashpoint.  In  a  June  1904  address  to  Montreal 
militia officers, Dundonald took the opportunity presented to ‘arouse the nation to the 
danger of practices which rendered organisation useless and efficiency impossible,’ by 
attacking the government for a ‘flagrant instance of political interference.’
615 Allegations 
that Fisher, the acting Minister of Militia, had removed candidates from a list of officers 
approved by the GOC for a new regiment in his constituency, to prevent it becoming a 
partisan  organisation,  created  a  new  political  storm  over  the  appropriate  relationship 
between the GOC and the government.
 616 Minto immediately recognised that Dundonald’s 
actions had rendered his position untenable, and that friction in the Militia Department had 
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caused a breakdown in communications that not only prevented the rapid solution of a 
relatively minor problem but turned it into a major crisis. Although sympathising with the 
GOC’s complaints about political interference Minto did not regard Dundonald as a close 
friend,  as  he  had  Hutton,  allowing  him  to  be  more  detached  in  his  approach  to  this 
problem.  Indeed  Minto  blamed  Dundonald  for  much  of  the  trouble  that  had  occurred, 
dismissing him as a vain ‘crank’ and a ‘faddist’ who was more interested in grand schemes 
than dealing with the more immediate problems of the militia:
617 
 
 
I had always asserted that it was quite out of the question for the GOC to exercise 
influence contrary to the views of his Government or influence the public with a 
view to carrying on projects of his own.
618 
 
 
Despite these opinions Minto, who feared that Laurier’s government was bypassing him 
and using Strathcona to influence the imperial authorities to recall Dundonald, advised him 
to wait for the manifestation of public opinion and throw the onus for the decision upon the 
Government  so  they  would  have  to  accept  responsibility  for  their  actions,  rather  than 
immediately resign: ‘their political morality is publicly challenged and it is not for us to 
pull them out of the muddle.’
619 Minto, aware of the gubernatorial responsibility to ensure 
that colonial ministers adhered to certain standards of conduct, hoped that the government 
would thus finally be held to account for their ‘iniquitous’ military administration, and 
believed that the current difficulty represented a ‘test case.’ One Colonial Office official 
criticised this stance: 
 
 
I do not know how Lord Minto reconciles the advice he gave Lord Dundonald 
with that loyalty to his ministers which his constitutional position requires. It 
amounts to aiding and abetting a Government servant in insubordination. But 
Lord Minto’s despatches on these military questions clearly indicate an absence 
of sympathetic accord between his ministers and himself. 
 
 
Although Fiddian was correct in the last regard, Stevens and Saywell’s attempts to use 
such comments to prove that Minto was an incompetent imperialist dragoon using any 
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excuse to provoke a crisis with a government he loathed are countered by the views of 
senior officials like Ommanney, who argued that Minto was perfectly entitled to give this 
advice, and Minto’s own advice to Dundonald that he should avoid contact with opposition 
politicians and press, especially Hughes.
620 
 
 
Minto persisted in his attempts to influence his ministers to reform military administration, 
although ‘there was no other course open’ but to accept Dundonald’s dismissal.
 621 Any 
inclination he had to support the GOC evaporated after Dundonald launched a political 
campaign in conjunction with the opposition. Minto criticised him for damaging efforts to 
eradicate ‘abuses’ from the militia and the standing of imperial officers, denouncing the 
GOC’s  behaviour  as  incompatible  with  such  a  position.
622  Minto  had  argued  for 
Dundonald’s  temporary  retention  while  challenging  Laurier’s  government  by  attacking 
Fisher’s  actions  as  ‘entirely  subversive  of  the  idea  of  constitutional  government’  and 
urging his removal from the Cabinet to encourage his colleagues to recognise that such 
behaviour  could  not  be  tolerated,  but  this  achieved  little.  Laurier  was  understandably 
insistent  that  the  GOC  be  removed  for  his  insubordination,  and  fiercely  defended  his 
minister’s actions, claiming that Fisher was merely doing his ministerial duty by ensuring 
that the new regiment in his own district was being properly organised.
623 Minto felt he 
was justified in voicing his dissent to the government’s opinion, refusing to accept their 
conception of ministerial powers, and arguing that while the minister was entitled to reject 
advice from his military adviser he must be prepared to justify his actions.
624 Minto felt 
that the government should have publicly supported Borden in his wish for reform, but, 
more appreciative of his constitutional limitations, recognised that he could not insist on 
the  retention  of  an  insubordinate  servant  or  upon  Fisher’s  dismissal  without  damaging 
hopes for closer imperial links: ‘Fisher’s behaviour is a matter of Canadian politics which 
they can settle themselves.’
625 In a subsequent discussion with Fisher Minto made clear his 
views that political interference in military decisions was unacceptable, although he did not 
believe that Fisher had been motivated by corruption, reflecting his belief that Dundonald 
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had chosen the wrong occasion to tackle the government about the ongoing problem with 
political influence. 
626 
 
 
Minto believed he had handled the problem effectively, preventing any greater difficulty, 
and recognising that significant change could not be achieved solely by imperial officers. 
He had evolved as a constitutional Governor and developed a greater understanding of the 
role he could play in persuading the Canadian government to implement policies favoured 
by Britain by assisting in the creation of a consensus, rather than challenging any perceived 
infraction of imperial interests: 
 
 
No one has inveighed more than I have against political influences in the Militia 
and perhaps I may have written too strongly in that sense in my desp[atche]s for I 
should  be  v[ery]  sorry  to  convey  the  idea  that  the  Canadian  militia  is  past 
redemption. There have been grievous faults committed by our own officers – a 
complete want of capability to understand the conditions of a new country and 
the impossibility of tearing out root and branch which can only be dealt with very 
gradually  –  whilst  the  fatal  mistake  has  been  far  too  common  of  trying  to 
influence Canadian public opinion by speeches on military matters in a direction 
which the Government may not be prepared to accept, and moreover press views 
on the Government through the assistance of Opposition MPs. However mistaken 
a  Government  may  be  in  its  ideas  of  the  use  of  political  influence  in  its 
departments, it is justified in resenting such action. Borden has many faults – but 
on the whole I do not believe one could have found a better Minister of Militia 
under present conditions – I believe him to be really anxious for the improvement 
of the force, and I sincerely hope it may be possible to assist him now in the 
direction he proposes. 
627 
 
 
Laurier had commented during the ‘Dundonald incident’ on Britain’s selection of officers 
to command the militia: ‘If they had done it on purpose, they could not have created a 
more  prolific  source  of  friction  between  Canada  and  the  imperial  authorities.’
628 The 
continual problems caused by the fractious relations between the GOC and the Canadian 
Government eroded Minto’s desire to maintain a system that had proved less than useful in 
ensuring that Canada fulfilled its defence responsibilities,
629 especially when it combined 
with  the  increasing  national  consciousness  created  by  participation  in  South  Africa  to 
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accelerate the movement for increased Canadian defence autonomy. Borden’s plans to that 
end  were  made  finally  possible  by  the  changes  in  British  strategy  that  prevented  the 
Governor from interrupting any alterations. The issue occupied much of Minto’s attention 
after Hutton’s removal until his own departure, during which time his opinion on the best 
solution shifted. Strenuous efforts to persuade Britain that as ‘man on the spot’ he was best 
qualified to advise them worked to an extent until British political upheaval removed his 
two strongest allies from the relevant positions. 
 
 
It took some time for Minto to arrive at the magnanimous position noted above, as when 
Borden  originally  suggested  amending  the  Militia  Act  to  allow  a  Canadian  officer  to 
become GOC in the aftermath of Hutton’s departure,
 630 he denounced it as a dishonourable 
attempt to take advantage of British preoccupation in South Africa. He did not hesitate to 
voice his objections and mobilised his influential supporters in Britain against the change. 
Minto argued that ‘the result in a military sense would be disastrous,’
631 as no Canadian 
officer was capable of holding the command or reorganising the force, a point recognised 
by Borden, who only wanted to make a Canadian eligible. Anxious that the GOC’s post 
would become a political tool when, for imperial defence, it was necessary for Britain to 
ensure that Canadian forces were efficient, Minto persuaded Chamberlain and Lansdowne 
to  postpone  the  proposed  changes  pending  further  imperial  consideration.
632 Despite 
initially opposing any closer connection between the Halifax and militia commands, Minto 
increasingly believed that granting the former some inspecting power, an idea supported by 
Kitson, provided an opportunity for Britain to retain some power. He doubted, however, 
that Canada would agree to augment the powers of an officer not under their jurisdiction 
when their aim was to enhance Dominion autonomy. An alternative was to transfer both 
fortresses to Canadian control and appoint an imperial officer, answerable to Ottawa, as 
GOC,  while  creating  subordinate  opportunities  for  Canadian  officers.
633 Minto’s  plans 
continued  to  evolve  along  similar  lines  over  the  next  two  years,  as  he  battled  against 
British indifference to proposals that threatened hopes of centralising imperial defence, 
symbolised by their decision to downgrade the Halifax command. To satisfy both Ottawa 
and London he argued that such plans would enable Canada to adopt a greater share of 
responsibility, thus ‘bring[ing] home to the people of Canada the fact that we recognise 
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them as a bona fide factor in the defence of the Empire,’ while ensuring that Britain could 
still  direct  Canadian  military  organisation  ‘in  which  direction  we  have  been  steadily 
losing.’
634 
 
 
Borden’s formal introduction of plans to revise the Militia Act in April 1903, hoping to 
meet the public demands for increased autonomy created by Canadian successes in South 
Africa, produced renewed friction.
635 Consensus that no Canadian officer was yet qualified 
to hold the GOC’s post remained intact; Borden merely wanted to remove the perceived 
slight on their capabilities by revoking the clause limiting the militia command to regulars. 
Minto admitted that his recommendations to recognise their services after the Boer War 
had not materialised, but it would be  
 
 
Fatal  to  imperial  military  interests  to  throw  open  the  chief  command  to  a 
Canadian officer – not only that, but it would render impossible any  military 
reorganisation  here  which  you  may  consider  in  the  future…the  question  of 
imperial defence as affecting the forces of Canada, appears to me to be one in 
which we are fully justified in maintaining the slight influence we still possess.
636 
 
 
Dundonald’s  damning  reports  had  highlighted  the  ‘generally  unsatisfactory  position  of 
Canadian defence matters,’ creating fears that Canada ‘ran the risk of immediate extinction 
in the event of war with the US.’ When combined with Minto’s warnings, they heightened 
Colonial Office anxieties about the proposed changes. Aware that Canada was unwilling to 
pay for reform, Britain still needed reassurance that it was at least maintaining its own 
defences. If America attacked, assistance to Canada could only be provided if uniform 
imperial  defence  arrangements  existed,  something  only  possible  if  an  imperial  officer 
familiar with British training methods was appointed as GOC. Minto argued that even the 
existing  system,  where  the  GOC  was  responsible  to  Ottawa,  had  made  it  difficult  to 
ascertain  the  militia’s  progress  or  inform  the  Canadian  public  of  their  Government’s 
lacklustre efforts, complicating British attempts to respond to developments. Appointing a 
Canadian  would  reduce  opportunities  for  military  education  and  render  cooperation 
increasingly difficult.
 637 
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Agreement  existed  that  some  reform  was  vital,  if  at  least  to  alleviate  the  interminable 
friction generated by the existing system, which had endangered both the efficiency of the 
force  and  the  remnants  of  British  control.  Ommanney  dismissed  Anderson’s  prescient 
suggestion  to  let  Canada  follow  the  example  of  the  other  self-governing  colonies  by 
appointing  its  own  GOC  and  taking  over  the  fortresses  on  condition  of  annual 
inspections.
638 Minto  successfully  persuaded  Borden  and  Laurier  to  postpone  the  bill 
pending the interchange of opinions with Britain, allowing London to formulate its own 
plans after Chamberlain had referred the proposed changes to the CDC. He hoped that 
Borden’s invitation to the CID would result in the amendments being at least delayed, but 
also that his discussions would encourage Canadian participation in imperial defence by 
flattering their vanity.
639 The purpose served by the militia had to be considered in greater 
detail, and a decision reached on whether it existed to fulfil the British aim of imperial 
service or Canada’s hope of creating a national force. Minto now argued that it was too 
risky to transfer the bases to Canadian control; the policy could not be justified without 
strict conditions that Ottawa would reject and he believed that such an important part of 
imperial  defence  could  not  be  entrusted  to  corrupt  colonials  when  it  offered  tempting 
opportunities for patronage. Amalgamating the imperial and militia commands under a 
Lieutenant-General answerable to Britain for the fortresses but subordinate to Canada in 
respect to their forces offered the best solution for Minto, as it would replace the existing 
objectionable  dual  commands  and  open  subordinate  commands  to  Canadians,  although 
Dundonald did not even support offering such minor concessions. Minto doubted that any 
Canadian government would accept the reversion to their pre-Confederation military status 
implied by the GOC’s suggestion to reintroduce imperial troops; although he felt stationing 
a force in Canada for strategic purposes would strengthen imperial feeling.
 640  
 
 
As Miller argues, Minto’s delaying tactics backfired spectacularly. When Borden finally 
attended the CID in December 1903 Minto’s main Cabinet supporters, Chamberlain and 
Brodrick, had been replaced respectively by the ‘ineffectual and inexperienced’ Lyttelton, 
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and Arnold-Forster, who had very different plans for imperial defence.
641 Minto, wishing 
to avoid the appearance of gubernatorial interference with Dominion plans, had requested 
British assistance to block Borden’s proposals to open the command to a Canadian officer, 
warning that ‘it would be the end of all hopes for efficiency here.’ Retaining precedence of 
imperial rank over Canadian troops would enable Britain to maintain executive authority, 
but establishing a board of imperial and Canadian officers to investigate local defence 
issues would grant the Dominion an increased voice in policy formation. Minto’s warnings 
and suggestions were ignored. After reconsidering Britain’s obligations towards Canada, 
the military authorities and Colonial Office concluded that as attempts to create an efficient 
militia or obtain reliable information about defence conditions had only produced friction 
devolving responsibility to Canada was the best option.
 642 
 
 
To  Minto’s  distress  the  CID  accepted  Borden’s  proposals,  although  with  certain 
conditions, notably the right to appoint a General to command in wartime or for occasional 
inspections, and regulars to the Canadian staff. Canada agreed to take over the fortresses 
subject  to  maintaining  them  at  an  accepted  standard  of  strength  and  retaining  British 
technical  troops  until  local  units  were  properly  qualified.  The  relative  rank  of  militia 
officers was to be recognised and opportunities were provided for Canadians to attend the 
Staff College, increasing local control over the force while hopefully improving its quality. 
Proposals  were  also  made  for  Canada  to  raise  an  infantry  regiment  for  service  in  the 
Empire,  which  was  welcomed  as  a  contribution  to  imperial  defence.
643 Unwilling  to 
recognise  the  trend  towards  granting  increased  autonomy  to  the  troublesome  self-
governing colonies, Minto was absolutely infuriated. He believed the decisions would be 
lamented by Canadians concerned with the welfare of the militia, noting in his diary that 
‘HM’s Govt by sheer idiotcy [sic] are ruining the military position here.’
644 His omission 
from the process had also damaged the imperial position: ‘I never for an instant supposed 
that  any  such  important  step  would  be  taken  without  some  consultation  with  myself.’ 
Lansdowne offered some sympathy, stating that his previous experience had led him to 
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voice  a  protest,  ‘but  I  certainly  derived  from  what  was  said  the  impression  that  all 
concerned had come to the conclusion that the change could no longer be resisted.’
645  
 
 
Minto seized upon several points to prevent the proposed changes being implemented.  By 
continuing to voice his objections to proposals he regarded as ‘impracticable and full of 
risk’ Minto battled valiantly to secure the governor’s role in formulating defence policy, 
arguing that ‘before coming to decision there are alternatives which should in my opinion 
be  carefully  considered  by  HMG  after  full  advice  has  been  place  before  them.  Matter 
seriously affects Imperial interests.’
646 He feared that political motivations had influenced 
Borden’s recommendations, as with an election approaching Laurier’s government were 
appealing  both  to  nationalists  by  removing  the  last  vestiges  of  British  control,  and  to 
imperialists  by  accepting  increased  defence  responsibilities,  while  also  attempting  to 
increase party influence. This raised the danger of an inefficient officer being appointed, 
but was also opposed to public opinion, which talked ‘sorrowfully’ about the ‘removal of 
the last link[s]’ with Britain.
 647 Minto again argued that as the threat of war with America 
was ‘far removed from an impossibility,’ it was important to prevent the deterioration of 
Canadian  forces  and  provide  them  with  British  guidance.  As  no  Canadian  officer  was 
properly  educated  or  trained  to  command  a  large  force,  only  the  appointment  of  an 
imperial officer to command all troops, with subordinate positions in the militia and at the 
fortresses open to Canadians, could ensure efficiency.
 648   
 
 
Disagreement about the decisions reached at the CID emerged as Borden, driven by the 
displeasure prevalent among some of his colleagues about his mere attendance let alone the 
decisions themselves, fiercely disputed that any conditions had been attached. He asked for 
the  references  about  the  transfer  of  Halifax  and  Esquimalt  to  Canadian  control  to  be 
excised from the CID minutes: 
 
 
Because it is inexpedient at the very outset that the Canadian member of the 
Committee should appear over-zealous in assuming obligations. I think they 
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ought to know that some exception has been taken, here, in certain quarters, to 
my having taken a seat on the committee and that it is very important, at this 
stage, to disarm opposition….[however if Britain raised the question] I know a 
favourable answer  would be  given by Canada.  We are not only  willing but 
anxious to do our share and this seems the most obvious direction for out efforts 
to take.
649 
 
 
For  Minto,  this  highlighted  the  dangers  of  proceeding  with  the  transfer  of  important 
imperial assets to a government not unanimously in favour of the move, and he emphasised 
problems  raised  previously  in  an  effort  to  dissuade  Britain.  The  transfer,  when 
simultaneous with ‘the entire relinquishment of direct imperial military supervision and 
control’ would prevent Britain from ensuring the efficiency and safety of the fortresses as 
any  conditions  imposed  would  be  disregarded  and  defences  would  not  be  properly 
maintained.
650 Minto was annoyed that the CID had decided that the fortresses could not be 
defended against the US and would be of no value in war, as he believed that the two had 
to be seen as key points within any overall scheme of imperial defence, and suggested that 
encouraging  Canadian  involvement  by  appointing  officers  to  command  under  imperial 
supervision would assist in maintaining proper standards. But more than military and naval 
issues had to be considered, and Minto argued that while both remained important military 
stations, retaining imperial control could also cement imperial ties at a time when they 
were perceived to be weakening.
651  
 
 
Believing  it  his  duty  to  prevent  changes  detrimental  to  the  Empire’s  military  position, 
Minto continued his efforts to stall the proposed changes, by seizing on minor points. He 
expressed surprise that the bill Borden had introduced to parliament omitted the conditions 
of British approval, that given the imperial dimensions of any war in North America it 
would be necessary to appoint a British general to command, and to officially recognise 
the imperial rank of regular officers serving with the militia.
652 Laurier, however, claimed 
that the British authorities had accepted the changes without any conditions, and while the 
Colonial  Office  argued  that  maintaining  seniority  for  trained  professionals  was  an 
important  safeguard  for  efficiency,  the  issue  was  easily  disposed  of  by  inserting  new 
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clauses in the Act. Minto was annoyed that the Colonial Office did not take a stronger 
stand or adhere to military advice, but its officials complained that he did not appreciate 
the shifts in British policy, bemoaning that he ‘will not understand that a quasi-independent 
GOC is incompatible with complete Ministerial responsibility’ and that he was ‘trying to 
force  our  hand.’  Rejecting  his  complaints  and  suggestions,  Minto  was  thanked  for  his 
contributions,  but  informed  that  if  Borden,  in  his  capacity  as  a  member  of  the  CID, 
approved the minutes (the dispute over which had arisen because the War Office had made 
an  inaccurate  report  of  what  had  occurred,  recording  discussions  as  decisions,  and  the 
views put forward by Borden as binding on his Government), then he should consider that 
Britain finally adopted this version.
 653 
 
 
Imperial military authorities in North America offered their support for Minto’s views, as 
Parson, CO at Halifax, and Admiral Douglas, argued that the transfer ‘would be a fatal 
thing both for imperial interests and also for the safety of the places themselves.’ Both 
provided useful facilities for continuing the military education of a developing force.
654 
Minto  was  unable  to  influence  the  CID’s  decision  to  hand  over  the  fortresses,  as  the 
secretaries noted that he had not raised any points they had not already considered, but also 
that  his  reasoning  was  ‘eminently  defective.’
655 Fiddian,  Minto’s  severest  critic  in  the 
Colonial Office, was correct to argue that he was ‘evidently annoyed that his views have 
not been accepted and implies that HMG are acting in ignorance of the real situation,’
656 
but Minto was equally accurate about what had motivated the decisions, noting that Britain 
would have made the decisions regardless of any advice offered: 
 
 
I cannot help feeling that views apparently now in favour at home, are much 
actuated by the desire to reducing expenditure without considering the imperial, 
political and social effect such action may have.
657 
 
 
Minto  had  some  influence  on  the  final  form  of  the  military  organisation  adopted  by 
Canada, even if his dreams of retaining ultimate control in imperial hands were ultimately 
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shattered. Parsons had suggested that the adoption of a scheme similar to the War Office 
reorganisation  introduced  by  Esher  could  facilitate  cooperation  between  regulars  and 
militia in Canada, and he recommended the establishment of a defence council composed 
of  senior  officers  and  the  Minister  of  Militia  operating  under  the  Governor’s 
supervision.
658 Borden, much influenced by Esher’s proposals when in London, approved 
this idea, but it soon became apparent that the imperial authorities were working for very 
different ends from the Canadians: Minto and Parsons saw a way to maintain imperial 
control, Borden detected an opportunity to further Canadian autonomy and therefore his 
own power. Minto, certain that Borden was going to abolish the GOC Militia’s post, again 
suggested his ‘two master’ plan, arguing that the GOC Halifax could become Inspector-
General and senior officer on the council as a way to retain imperial control over important 
measures.  The  British  authorities,  by  now  desperate  to  rid  themselves  of  Canadian 
problems, rejected Minto’s suggestions and adopted the Canadian model where the Chief 
of the General Staff would be first Military Member, and whose duties were to restricted to 
advising  the  minister.  While  significantly  increasing  Government  control  over  defence 
policy, it also succeeded in harmonising civil-military relations.
659  
 
 
Minto admitted that ‘Borden’s proposed reorganisation is decidedly on the right lines’
660 
and urged that Otter be appointed as Inspector-General to start the system on efficient lines 
and prove that Canadian officers were capable. Minto had suggested that getting the duties 
of the Chief of Staff allotted to an imperial officer would enable Britain to retain some 
executive control over the militia. Asked by Borden if he could obtain Lake for this post, 
as an officer who had  gained a distinguished reputation during his previous service in 
Canada, Minto urged the British authorities that after previous problems this was the only 
way they could hope to proceed. He hoped that any objections could be overcome so the 
new system could be properly established, arguing that it was not a purely military matter, 
‘but….one  of  those  points  upon  which  a  proper  comprehension  of  which  imperial 
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connection  so  much  depends.’
661 Borden  thanked  Minto  for  his  efforts  in  overcoming 
opposition after Lake was appointed permanently.
662 
 
 
It proved some consolation for Minto that the Canadians appreciated his attempts to ease 
the transition over their new system, but he retained some influence and was invited to 
outline his views to the CID. These elicited some sympathy from British officials like 
Clarke, but did little to alter policy. Minto’s reiteration of his belief that Canada did not 
have the resources to take over the fortresses or the ability to organise their own command 
without political interference, and his, somewhat melodramatic, argument that any transfer 
would damage the possibilities of arranging imperial defence and even ‘tend towards the 
disintegration of the Empire,’ did not prevent the final handover of Halifax and Esquimalt 
in 1905. Some of his other ideas, such as occasional inspections by distinguished imperial 
officers and the appointment of regulars in Canada familiar with the region to formulate a 
defence scheme, were adopted, although whether this was a result of Minto’s promptings is 
matter  of  debate  as  argument  between  the  military  and  naval  authorities  about  the 
responsibility for Canada’s defence continued until 1908. 
663 
 
 
Minto  left  Canada  disappointed  that  his  efforts  to  encourage  the  utilisation  of  the 
opportunity  to  develop  an  imperial  defence  policy,  based  on  his  ideas,  had  come  to 
naught.
664 He lamented to Lyttelton about the failure to consult him on such important 
decisions  when  he  had  previously  been  in  constant  communication.  This  was  not  an 
appropriate position for the Governor to be placed in, who, as ‘man on the spot’, was 
expected to know what was going on an be given reasons for the adoption of policies, and 
it  proved  particularly  galling  when  he  realised  that  Britain  had  been  in  direct 
communication with Laurier and Borden. In complaining that ‘I cannot but feel that much 
which I have written home during the last five years has entirely failed to explain the 
position of Canada towards the Mother Country,’
665 Minto provided an accurate summary 
of  his  ‘achievements’  in  Canada.  Unable  to  overcome  the  obstacles  in  the  way  of 
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exercising influence, notably British indifference and Canadian nationalism, both of which 
had different conceptions of regional defence from that which he propounded, Minto found 
that  unless  his  views  were  consonant  with  those  of  his  superiors,  it  was  virtually 
impossible for the Governor to have any influence on defence policy in the self-governing 
colonies.  
   194 
India: Kitchener’s Other Army 
 
Before 1907 British defence planners became obsessed with the perceived Russian threat 
to India. The issue ‘monopolised the attention’ of the CID.
666 Entangling every aspect of 
imperial defence, Indian security became the ‘paramount consideration in British policy 
formation.’
667 Regarded as the weakest spot in the Empire, fears grew that Russia only 
needed  to  approach  India’s  borders  for  British  authority  to  collapse  after  its  easily 
exploitable  weakness  had  been  exposed.
668 The  gloomy  conclusions  reached  by  both 
British  and  Indian  studies  only  heightened  anxieties.  Russia  was  believed  to  be 
invulnerable to traditional British naval strategies and strong enough to strike a fatal blow 
to British prestige and power in India. As French naval power threatened the Admiralty’s 
ability  to  rapidly  provide  the  reinforcements  vital  for  Indian  defence,  large  permanent 
additions would have to be made to British troops in India. Simla believed the defensive 
strategy necessitated by financial and personnel constraints to be politically inadvisable, 
and urged the adoption of an aggressive plan to seize the Kabul-Kandahar line if Russia 
invaded Afghanistan to secure tribal and Afghan friendship.
 669 
 
 
Reorganising  the  Army  in  India  to  enable  it  to  hold  the  frontier  against  the  expected 
Russian assault until reinforcements arrived was regarded as an essential component of 
attempts to improve Britain’s imperial military position. Some minor reforms had followed 
the chaotic efforts against the tribes in 1897-98, but Curzon believed it required a more 
prestigious officer to implement the necessary changes, and thus, despite many warnings, 
welcomed  Kitchener  as  a  valuable  ally.  The  subsequent  clash  between  the  two  titanic 
figures overshadowed Kitchener’s ‘far-reaching reforms,’ which overturned the ‘outmoded 
legacy of the Mutiny’ that the army existed to hold India against the Indians. Moving away 
from  this  ‘obsolete  and  faulty’  idea,  Kitchener  tried  to  create  an  army  capable  of 
undertaking  sustained  campaigns  against  European  opponents  to  replace  the  existing 
glorified  police  force.  As  the  danger  of  external  aggression  had  superseded  threats  to 
internal order Simla focused on war with Russia, ‘the main condition to meet which all 
Indian plans must be directed,’ although efforts were made to ensure the maintenance of 
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internal security by providing sufficient troops to preserve order and protect key points. 
Forces previously scattered across India according to arcane theories were concentrated to 
enable the creation of a nine division field army, the peacetime organisation and training of 
which would correspond to wartime formations, thus easing its mobilisation against any 
Russian threat to the frontier.
 670 
 
 
Kitchener’s  schemes  were  officially  sanctioned  in  October  1904,  although  it  was 
recognised  that  their  implementation  would  entail  considerable  time  and  expense.  The 
implications of these reforms for strategic planning created a divergence between British 
and Indian authorities that combined with international events to encourage a re-evaluation 
of the best methods for countering the Russian threat. Debate revolved around the numbers 
of reinforcements needed to respond to a Russian invasion of Afghanistan. Britain aimed to 
organise its army to meet Roberts’s 1891 estimates that 30,000 troops would be required 
immediately with a further 70,000 necessary within a year of the outbreak of war. Curzon 
and Kitchener denied officially committing India to these figures, arguing that Russian 
railway  construction,  notably  the  Orenburg  to  Tashkent  line,  had  vastly  increased  the 
number of troops they could concentrate in Afghanistan and therefore the numbers needed 
to defend India. By 1904 the Indian authorities were arguing that up to 400,000 could be 
required by the second year of any conflict, prompting some historians to argue that in-
depth  consideration  of  the  threat  to  the  jewel  in  the  imperial  crown  had  produced 
‘unbalanced judgements and irrational conclusions.’
671  
 
 
British planners and politicians reacted against perceived Indian attempts to dictate policy 
and become the dominant partner in imperial defence. As ‘the figures entered the realm of 
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fantasy’
672 more  realistic  officials  like  Clarke  challenged  the  logistical  assumptions  of 
Indian plans by emphasising the difficulties involved in maintaining the large numbers of 
troops Kitchener envisaged in the barren terrain of Afghanistan, which in the absence of 
railways would require  several million camels.
673 The Cabinet therefore concluded that 
planning should be based on available Indian and British resources, rather than meeting 
India’s demands, especially when this threatened to denude Britain of forces to the extent 
that it could not respond to emergencies elsewhere. The reinforcements requested could 
not be supplied without conscription, an option that was not within the bounds of political 
possibility.  Realisation  that  the  military  problems  involved  were  insurmountable 
encouraged a belief that India could best be defended by diplomacy. The Moroccan crisis 
shifted British attention to the possibility of war in Europe, while Russia’s defeat by Japan 
reduced the urgency of the ever-present difficulty. Neilson dismisses arguments that the 
danger  of  Russian  attempts  to  regain  its  lost  prestige  by  utilising  the  efficiency  of  its 
railway  network,  recently  demonstrated  in  Manchuria,  heightened  the  threat  to  India, 
claiming  instead  that  a  chastened  Russia  was  now  more  amenable  to  British  advances 
towards the settlement of imperial issues.
674 
 
 
Arriving in India Minto encountered a very different strategic situation from that which he 
may have expected, and the approaching advent of a Liberal Government committed to 
retrenchment in defence expenditure to fund its social reforms threatened to herald further 
changes. Almost immediately on appointment to the India Office, Morley sought to take 
advantage  of  diplomatic  shifts  to  reduce  the  burdens  defence  preparations  imposed  on 
India. Suggested interventions in the disturbances in Persia and Aden provoked an explicit 
warning that the new government would not tolerate any ‘Curzonian’ expansionism.
675 Yet 
at every turn his efforts were met with fierce resistance from Minto and Kitchener. The 
Viceroy  undoubtedly  supported  the  c-in-c’s  arguments  that  although  Russia  had  been 
prostrated by its recent defeat it was far from crippled; it still posed a formidable threat to 
India  that  could  only  be  countered  by  completing  Kitchener’s  military  reforms  and 
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reaching  understandings  with  Afghanistan  to  facilitate  the  fulfilment  of  British 
obligations.
676 As he believed the opportunity presented to reconsider the amount of money 
spent by  a poor country must be exploited, Morley  emphatically disagreed, stating his 
‘strong feeling that the change in the military position of Russia ought to produce some 
change in our military policy in India,’
677 and ‘whether Kitchener’s schemes are necessary 
in  the  change  of  military  and  diplomatic  circumstances,  I  am  obstinately  dubious.’
678 
Imbued with an aristocratic, soldierly vision of empire, Minto argued that defending India 
must remain the primary concern for Simla and he endeavoured to persuade the British 
authorities to recognise  that expensive preparations to this end could not be carelessly 
discarded.  As  in  Canada,  his  pragmatic  outlook  encouraged  him  to  stand  against  the 
perceived  danger  to  imperial  security  posed  by  Liberal  determination  to  reduce 
expenditure.  Kitchener  proved  a  reliable  ally,  a  fellow  pragmatist  who  recognised  that 
when Britain’s imperial position faced a multitude of threats such a utopian stance could 
not be safely countenanced. Dismissing warnings to be wary of Kitchener’s machinations, 
Minto expressed relief that the c-in-c was a ‘sensible’ adviser and that they ‘generally 
agreed about most things.’
679  
 
 
War Office opinions that India offered some scope to reduce its over-inflated estimates 
prompted pressure upon Morley and Simla to consider whether the British garrison was 
excessive  and  what  reasonable  demands  could  be  made  on  Britain  for  reinforcements. 
Prompted by Esher, Morley assured Simla that the questions, 
 
 
Conceal no insidious or sinister intentions, but are a plain and honest attempt to 
look…at the political and strategic necessities of the Empire as a whole. 
 
 
Parochial, separate, isolated and divisive approaches to military organisation, directed by 
the  whim  of  autocratic  proconsuls,  were  no  longer  acceptable.  Praising  his  successes, 
Morley reassured Kitchener that changes already sanctioned would not be undone, and he 
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sought the c-in-c’s assistance to formulate plans for the new conditions imposed by tighter 
India Office control and a moratorium on increased expenditure.
680  
 
 
Esher had suggested to Morley that a deal could be reached on these terms, but also argued 
to  Kitchener  that  agreeing  to  a  temporary  diminution  of  British  drafts  for  India,  (as 
suggested by Haldane to reduce War Office expenditure despite Morley’s protests), would 
encourage the Secretary of State to look more favourably on what Kitchener regarded as 
most urgent.
681 Kitchener proved amenable to a certain extent: 
 
 
I am in entire accord with your desire to reduce the cost of the Indian Army to the 
fullest extent compatible with the safety of the country from internal disturbance 
and external aggression. 
 
 
If the number of units was maintained and could be rapidly brought up to fighting strength 
in  an  emergency,  up  to  200  men  per  battalion  could  be  reduced  to  meet  War  Office 
requirements, although he doubted that this was the most efficient method of retrenchment. 
Several caveats were added to ensure Morley did not mistakenly form the impression that 
Kitchener would accept wholesale abandonment of his reforms. Expenditure should be 
more evenly distributed throughout the Empire to reduce India’s burdens; India should 
only  meet  the  cost  of  local  security,  while  defence  against  Russian  invasion  was  an 
imperial responsibility. Kitchener explained that the initial expenditure had been necessary 
to ensure effective training and create an efficient organisation, and argued that his reform 
schemes had to be continued: 
 
 
Before  we  can  reduce  our  Military  expenditure  in  India  we  need  a  complete 
organisation for war and a full reserve of such stores as are necessary for the 
maintenance of an army in the field which cannot be hastily improvised, we must 
also redistribute our forces so as to get the best value out of them.
682 
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Kitchener’s arguments to Morley were echoed in the responses to other criticisms voiced 
in India and Britain. Duff informed the CID that the British garrison was adequate only 
because  the  absence  of  ‘native  solidarity’  prevented  organised  rebellion.  Temporary 
reductions  were  only  possible  in  peace,  but  permanent  measures  were  dangerous, 
destroying  confidence  in  the  stability  of  British  rule.
683  As  Minto  argued,  military 
expenditure was a ‘premium on the insurance of the country.’
684 
 
Confronted by various threats, it was difficult for the Indian authorities to abandon their 
traditional standpoint that continued British rule was dependent solely on military strength, 
any reduction of which merely encouraged unrest, something that Minto, with his military 
background, could appreciate. Convincing their British superiors of the legitimacy of such 
fears proved problematic, particularly when Whitehall was committed to economy. While 
Kitchener’s concessions did not go as far as Morley desired, he hoped that they might 
proved a valuable starting position for future reductions. The CID’s conclusions of August 
1906  that  reinforcements  could  not  be  guaranteed  in  war,
685 that  no  definite  pledge  to 
provide these had ever been given, and that the eight infantry divisions India expected did 
not exist, shattered this fragile accord. The Army Council had decided it was essential to 
immediately inform Simla, 
 
That the plans for the defence of India must be based on the actual resources of 
the Army in India alone, and that no more definite promise of assistance can be 
given than the general assurance that the Home Army would be bound to support 
India to the utmost extent of its power.
686 
 
 
As Morley gloated, ‘Kitchener will be pressed to cut your Indian coat according to your 
cloth.’
687  
 
 
He was sadly mistaken if he believed India would immediately accept reductions. Their 
reaction was unsurprisingly predictable. Kitchener’s plans had been founded on Balfour’s 
vague parliamentary statement in August 1905 and other assurances that assistance would 
                                                 
683 NLS MS 12735, Memo by Duff, 9 May 1906. 
684 NLS MS 12735, Minto to Morley, 18 April 1906. 
685 NLS MS 12736, Morley to Minto, 14 September 1906; Journals and Letters, Esher to Morley, 26 
September & 3 October 1906, Esher to Balfour, 3 October 1906. 
686 NLS MS 12755,  Correspondence between the Viceroy and Persons in India, July to December 1906, War 
Office to India Office 0164/2271 MO, 22 August 1906. 
687 NLS MS 12736, Morley to Minto, 14 September 1906.   200 
be forthcoming and he reiterated his argument that in war Britain had to demonstrate its 
power to fulfil its obligations by seizing advance positions: 
 
 
If the best use is to be made of the limited and inadequate forces at our disposal, 
it  is  essential  that  [the  redistribution  and  reorganisation  schemes]  should  be 
carried systematically to conclusion. 
 
 
Even  then  the  field  army  was  insufficient  to  defend  the  country,  let  alone  undertake 
essential military action unaided. A large addition to the British garrison would be required 
if  India’s  defence  was  to  be  dependent  on  the  forces  permanently  maintained  there. 
Kitchener’s alternative suggestion was to consult with other colonies on the provision of 
reinforcements, but it was essential above all to relieve the uncertainty surrounding Indian 
defence.
688 Minto  agreed  that  ‘it  is  a  nuisance  the  Secretary  of  State  fussing  about 
expenditure.’
689 Kitchener’s views did little to curtail Morley’s economising zeal, as his 
efforts  to  overhaul  the  military  reform  schemes  continued  apace.  A  committee  was 
appointed specifically for this purpose, while Morley parroted Esher’s views that Kitchener 
should have realised that in war all was dependent on circumstances and not based his 
plans on vague assumptions.
690 
 
 
Driven by fears of unrest and frontier lawlessness Minto continued to argue against the 
aimless tinkering with defence plans merely to save money and meet election pledges, and 
he stressed to Morley that it was important to remember the basis of British rule in India: 
 
 
Every  reduction  of  military  strength  or  any  idea  in  India  that  a  sacrifice  of 
military efficiency would be supported at home for political reasons would have 
dangerous  effects  as  a  weakening  of  both  our  internal  strength  and  our 
capabilities of dealing with Frontier difficulties…the efficiency of the army is the 
real guarantee for the safety of British administration, and any loss of power in 
that direction would not only mean the loss of actual military strength, but would 
be taken as an indication of weakness which would be answered at once by an 
increase of disaffection.  I cannot say how strongly  I  feel how dangerous any 
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appearance of a reduction of our military prestige in India would be at the present 
moment.
691 
 
 
Unfortunately this only succeeded in infuriating Morley: ‘only one thing is clear to me – 
the military expenditure will have to come down…’
692 Annoyed by suggestions that he did 
not  appreciate  the  responsibilities  of  imperial  rule,  he  disputed  claims  that  military 
efficiency  and  security  would  be  sacrificed  for  political  reasons.  He  sympathised  with 
India’s views about the danger of reduced military prestige, but he stressed that this could 
not be allowed to hinder progress; ‘I hope this does not mean that every request from the 
military people is to be held sacred and inexorable.’
693 Ensuring security did not require 
financial  extravagance,  accordingly,  the  expenditure  on  Kitchener’s  schemes  would  be 
spread over  a longer period of time than originally proposed and the  grant for special 
military expenditure would be reduced by £750,000 for 1907-8. The  Indian authorities 
accepted this minor defeat gracefully because of the dispute with the War Office over 
payments for training,
694 but the ominous prospect of military strength being determined 
by financial constraints loomed. 
 
 
Morley became increasingly aware that the major reductions desired could not be affected 
by simple reassessments. A simultaneous process of diplomatic readjustment, continuing 
the efforts started by the Unionists, aimed to remove the raison d’etre for Indian military 
preparation,  but  this  did  little  to  alleviate  the  tension  between  Simla  and  Whitehall. 
Diplomatic attempts to reduce India’s defensive burden had begun with the renewal of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1905, but it soon became apparent that this manoeuvre had 
raised more questions than it answered. As Nish argues, changes in Britain’s outlook had 
been guided by strategic and political considerations, and by 1905 ‘thinking had turned to 
the task of defending the Indian frontier without making large-scale increases in Britain’s 
standing army. The solution adopted…was that Japanese assistance should be sought to 
meet the deficiency.’
695 Japan’s forces had proved their effectiveness against Russia in 
Manchuria, and it was believed they could reach India much more quickly than British 
reinforcements. With some difficulty Japan had been persuaded to extend the terms of the 
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alliance to include the defence of British interests in India in return for a reciprocal British 
promise  to  protect  their  position  in  Korea.  Any  hope  that  Japanese  military  assistance 
could prove an effective deterrent to Russian aggression or the solution to British defensive 
difficulties soon foundered on obstacles of practicality. 
 
 
Arnold-Forster quickly concluded that Japanese forces could only be an adjunct to, rather 
than a substitute for, the Army in India. A renewed alliance could not be used as an excuse 
not to maintain India’s military establishment.
696 Fears that the Liberal Government would 
do exactly that were aroused when, in conjunction with the Tokyo conference on joint 
operations in 1906, Minto and Kitchener were asked to consider the expediency of ever 
asking Japan to send troops to India and what contribution of force India could make to 
concerted  operations  with  Japan  outside  India,  an  idea  to  which  Morley  had  grave 
objections.
697 Simla appeared to share these objections: 
 
 
In case of hostilities we do not at present consider that it would be advisable to 
employ Japanese troops in or through India. We are not, however, prepared to 
say this might never be advisable. 
698 
 
 
Echoing earlier General Staff concerns, it was believed that apparent reliance on non-white 
troops for India’s defence would convey a sense of weakness to the Indian population, a 
risk to be avoided at all costs, although use of Japanese troops to defend Seistan might be a 
different matter. Employment of Indian troops in Manchuria was declared impracticable, 
as none could be spared in war.
699 
 
 
There the matter rested until May 1907 when India’s views were again requested after 
Haldane had raised the matter prior to a further conference to discuss joint plans.
700 India 
argued that Russia’s strength allowed it to conduct simultaneous offensives in Manchuria 
and Central Asia while Britain could not spare troops from defending the frontier. Japanese 
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forces would only be available if Russia adopted a passive defence, and the transfer of 
troops to another theatre might provoke a Russian offensive. Doubts were cast on Japan’s 
willingness  to  spare  sufficient  troops,  and  it  was  concluded  that  the  best  means  for 
cooperation  was  for  them  to  launch  active  operations  elsewhere.  No  offer  could  be 
accepted  unless  the  proposed  force  was  large  enough  to  act  independently  away  from 
India. Using them to maintain order or as reinforcements in Afghanistan would damage 
British prestige. No arrangement could be suggested that would relieve India of the burden 
of preparation for unaided defence, and it was inadmissible to shift these responsibilities to 
their allies. If these preparations were completed, there would be no need for Japanese 
assistance unless Britain could not provide reinforcements, and in this scenario they would 
have to supply enough troops to defend the Kandahar line.
701 This was not something the 
British  wished  to  consider.  Recognising  that  Japan  had  little  intention  of  maintaining 
forces specifically for the purpose of assisting in the defence of India it was decided that 
separate British and Japanese operations in their respective theatres was the best method of 
assistance.
702 
 
 
Potential Japanese help only provided a temporary solution and it was evident that to effect 
significant reductions the threat to India had to be eliminated at source. Indian protestations 
about the continued threat Russia posed and the exorbitant cost of preparations required to 
meet it convinced the Liberal Government that diplomacy was the only viable solution. 
Success in this venture when their predecessors failed owed much to their willingness to 
trample  over  India’s  objections.
703 Morley  became  Grey’s  most  active  and  valuable 
supporter. Convinced that this new foreign policy departure was the best way to achieve 
his aim of reducing defence expenditure, he was relied on to quash Simla’s protests.
704 
Morley invited many of these by his consultations with the Indian Government, but he 
admitted to being unsurprised by the ‘incredulity, suspicion and dislike’ with which the 
proposal was greeted.
705  
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Morley had hinted about the possible new trends in foreign policy: ‘We may or may not in 
the fullness of time find it desirable to come to a general understanding with Russia.’
706 
Minto and Kitchener were specifically requested to provisionally address the question of 
the ‘terms essential to [any] bargain from the military, strategic and political point of view’ 
considering what India should demand that ‘Russia should agree to do or refrain from 
doing’ to meet the requirements of Indian safety.
707 Minto held the Russians in even lower 
regard than the Americans. While he welcomed understandings with both as strengthening 
the security of British interests, in this instance he found it difficult to disguise his distaste 
at making friends with the ‘mammon of unrighteousness.’
708 His outbursts should have 
given some indication of how Simla would greet the idea of entente with India’s mortal 
enemy, and they apparently regarded Morley’s suggestions as a blank cheque to criticise 
government policy. Expressing a belief that Russia would recover far more rapidly from its 
defeat  ‘than  is  sometimes  supposed  possible,’  Minto  and  Kitchener  immediately 
highlighted the dangers this posed to the existence of the ‘buffer states.’
709 Their initial 
ideas seemed to inform many of the instructions given to Nicolson: that Russia should 
accept  British  control  of  Afghanistan’s  external  relations  and  that  it  was  outside  their 
sphere  of  influence,  while  recognising  British  preponderance  in  Seistan.
710 Such  terms 
would enhance  Indian security, but throughout  they  stressed that Russian ‘good faith,’ 
especially that of its local officers, could at no staged be relied upon. Therefore India’s 
guard  could  never  be  dropped  by  troop  reductions:  ‘as  long  as  Russia  maintains  her 
enormous armaments we must be prepared for [all] eventualities.’
711  
 
 
During the negotiations India complained that its views were not receiving appropriate 
regard.  Slight  alterations  were  made  to  their  suggestions,  for  example,  Whitehall’s 
alteration of Simla’s proposals that Russia would not extend its railway system towards 
Afghanistan to include British construction provoked a furious response. The provision 
was derided as unjustifiable and dangerous. British railways were vital to the success of 
their frontier policy and the preservation of peace in the region, and were not solely aimed 
against possible Russian advance. Security could not be sacrificed for the sake of amicable 
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relations – any moratorium handed an immediate strategic advantage to Russia in the event 
of a breakdown of relations: 
 
 
What  is  however  less  appreciated….[is]  how  impotent  we  are  under  existing 
conditions, either adequately to defend the Amir against Russia, or even to coerce 
him ourselves, should this necessary railway construction be abandoned. 
 
 
Without railways they would have to reconsider their whole defensive preparation.
712 
 
Unfortunately  Simla  did  not  realise  that  they  were  merely  expected  to  ‘rubber-stamp’ 
government policy, and they over-stepped the poorly-defined boundaries between British 
and  Indian  responsibilities,  fatally  undermining  their  hopes  of  maintaining  some 
controlling influence over foreign policy decisions. Minto’s remarks that ‘if we are to enter 
upon an entente with Russia, let us bargain with her elsewhere than in Central Asia’ and 
that Simla should be fully consulted before the finalisation of any agreement because of the 
risks it posed to British security
713 only succeeded in provoking a furious rebuke from 
Morley: 
 
 
You argue, and so to a certain degree, I think does Lord Kitchener, as if the 
policy of entente with Russia is an open question. That is just what it is not. 
 
 
A bargain with Russia not including Central Asia was dismissed as a ‘sorry trophy of our 
diplomacy.’ Suggestions for ‘consultation’ with India produced derisory comparisons with 
Curzon’s  attempts  to  establish  it  as  an  independent  power,  the  Viceroy’s  Executive 
Council  could  make  no  effective  contribution:  ‘His  Majesty’s  Government  have 
determined their course on this issue, and it is for their agents and officers all over the 
world to accept it…the plain truth is…that this country cannot have two foreign policies.’ 
While forcefully stated, Minto’s views did not convince them to change the policy, and the 
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Indian authorities had to make the best of the situation.
714 Morley acknowledged that India 
remained unreconciled and that he would have to keep a ‘vigilant eye on his diocese.’
715 
 
 
The intervention of Godley, Permanent Under-Secretary at the India Office, enabled the 
two sides to retreat from these extremist positions and work together again on the issue. 
Minto was urged to be less ‘Curzonian’ in tone. His predecessor had suggested that the 
Indian  Government  was  an  equal  power  and  invited  much  unwelcome  trouble  for  his 
superiors in London, something the Liberals did not wish to repeat. Instead, Minto should 
express his opinions in a deferential and reasonable tone recognising the supremacy of 
Whitehall.
716 The Viceroy admitted that the safety of Empire was dependent on united 
action directed by London, but if Indian interests were affected, local views could prove 
valuable in the formation of policy. Morley also acquiesced, agreeing that ‘Asiatic policy 
is now the most momentous branch of foreign policy, and to leave out the opinions of 
Simla would be absurd.’
717 This did not presage harmony on the issue. India still objected 
to the principle of the policy and disagreement over the exact terms continued. On some 
issues India gained its point, for example the moratorium on railway construction was left 
out,
718 but others, such as Kitchener’s suggestions that general settlements with Russia 
about  Persia  were  inopportune,  did  little  to  ease  troubled  negotiations  and  were 
contemptuously dismissed. India had argued that maintaining influence in the Gulf and 
southern  Persia  was  a  better  way  to  retain  strategic  advantage  than  the  prospective 
friendship of a Great Power.
719 Concern for India’s security was paramount throughout the 
discussions, but agreement on how to ensure this could not be reached. India retained an 
essentially regional outlook, but their suggestions on Persia provoked reminders that this 
was a political question to be decided on the ‘broadest considerations of imperial policy,’ 
and the need to relieve the perpetual strain on British resources.
720 Morley, however, did 
recognise  that  in  this  respect,  Indian  strategic  concerns  had  to  inform  the  decision  on 
division of Persia into spheres as much as they did finalisation of terms on Afghanistan.  
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The  simultaneous  CID  assessment  of  Indian  defence  requirements  merely  served  to 
underline the importance for the Liberals of reaching agreement with Russia. The sub-
committee reported in favour of  
 
 
the  school  who  look  to  diplomacy  rather  than  to  arms  and  hold  that  the 
foundation of our rule in India would be more securely strengthened by peace 
with Russia than by success in war with Russia.
721 
 
 
Chaired by Morley, the sub-committee was formed at Esher’s suggestion. He argued that 
‘India is the key,’ its requirements governed the size of the army in peace and war on the 
North West Frontier was the most serious test Britain was likely to face; ‘to be prepared for 
that eventuality is to be prepared for all others.’ It was therefore necessary to have a clearly 
defined  policy.
722 A  certain  amount  of  working  at  cross-purposes  briefly  clouded  the 
conclusions reached. Those favouring continuing military preparations to meet the Russian 
threat, notably Kitchener, Roberts, Esher, and Minto, welcomed the endorsement of their 
proposals and views. It was accepted that Russia intended to seize Afghanistan by invasion 
or gradual absorption and thus it was vital to ultimate success in any war to complete 
Kitchener’s schemes for the reorganisation of the Army in India. In response to an attack 
Britain had to adopt the aggressive strategy of seizing the Kabul-Kandahar line to check 
any Russian advance  and secure their lines of  communication.  It was also essential to 
complete the construction of the frontier railways required to expedite the transport of the 
large numbers of the troops required. The committee ‘ominously’
723 concluded that it was 
a necessity to have a military organisation capable of sending 100,000 reinforcements to 
India in the first year of war, although it was admitted that they may have to send up to 
500,000  into  the  field  and  that  their  rapid  despatch  would  be  dependent  on  the  naval 
situation. The report believed that the question  about the demands war on the frontier 
placed on Britain’s resources had been answered.
724 
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Kitchener was pleased with the report: ‘It is a great thing for India to have at last converted 
the people at home to sensible views as regards the defence of the country. I am delighted.’ 
Minto  felt  it  highlighted  the  fact  that  the  danger  of  Russian  aggression  was  not 
diminishing.
725 Their pleasure was very much misplaced.  Although  glad  Kitchener had 
approved, Morley reached very different conclusions. He recognised that while the report 
justified Haldane’s demands for a large army, it also highlighted the tremendous load of 
military charge and responsibility India had to carry if they did not come to terms with 
Russia.
726 The  hypothetical  nature  of  the  conclusions  made  it  difficult  to  formulate  a 
complete scheme, but for the Secretary of State the vital point was: 
 
 
The conclusion that the despatch of 100,000 men to India in the first year of a 
war with Russia is a military necessity. That is one fundamental argument for the 
Convention, for we have not got the men to spare and that is the plain truth of 
it.
727 
 
 
Negotiations with Russia thus staggered to a conclusion. Minto expressed the remaining 
Indian  objections  about  the  inclusion  of  passages  to  prevent  either  Britain  or  Russia 
intervening in Afghanistan unilaterally: 
 
 
It is evident that circumstances might arise which, for the safety of India, would 
necessitate our protecting our paramount interests in Afghanistan, and this may 
involve interference in the internal affairs of the country.
728 
 
 
Fearing  a  surreptitious  attempt  to  gain  strategic  advantages,  they  recommended  the 
inclusion of a similar clause for Persia, but its omission raised doubts about the good faith 
of  Russian  diplomacy  and  their  ability  to  control  their  frontier  officers.  Whitehall 
recognised the force of this objection but stressed that Russia would not agree without its 
inclusion. Minto saw these clauses as a Russian effort to create friction or negate their 
submission  that  Afghanistan  was  outside  their  sphere  of  influence,  ‘which  is  our  only 
direct  gain  from the proposed Convention.’ Exasperated that  India’s views were being 
ignored, Minto suggested dropping the agreement, but his complaints were merely brushed 
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aside with comments that abandoning the policy would merely aggravate the ‘evils’ of 
military burdens on expenditure. 
729 
 
 
Minto was perhaps consoled to an extent by the influence India had on the final terms of 
the Convention but he found it difficult to overcome his anti-Russian prejudices. He had 
complained that the agreement made ‘no contribution to the cause of peace’ and would do 
nothing to end the Great Game, but this only succeeded in annoying Morley. The Viceroy 
was  forced  to  blatantly  lie  that  he  was  pleased  with  the  result;  ‘the  soundness  of  the 
bargain…is beyond criticism,’ but his sudden conversion suggests only a desire to appease 
his oversensitive Secretary of State to avoid friction. Even this most determined opponent 
had to surrender to Britain’s desire to finalise the agreement quickly, but he was unable to 
keep  up  the  pretence  of  a  favourable  attitude  and  quickly  reverted  to  his  traditional 
position, arguing that he had been too strong about the likely effects on peace and that 
Russia would continue its advance. Eventually he admitted, as in Canada, that he had to 
disregard his personal prejudices for the sake of international relations.
730 
 
 
Contemporaries, and most historians, agreed on the result of the Convention: ‘it is not too 
much to say that this agreement put an end, once and for all, to the ‘Russian menace to 
India’ which had ‘haunted the minds of British statesmen and diplomatists.’
731 Minto and 
Kitchener’s ideas on the problems that had to be eliminated to guarantee Indian security 
had great influence on its final form, which convinced many that the defence of the North 
West  Frontier  against  Russian  attack  no  longer  had  to  be  provided  against.
732 The 
motivations behind the agreement are a source of greater controversy. Some would agree 
with  Wilson,  who  quotes  Morley’s  statement  that  in  entering  into  the  Convention  the 
Government ‘were actuated not only by considerations affecting the Empire as a whole, 
but also very largely by considerations relating to India alone,’ to argue that it was ‘devised 
in the interests of [Britain’s] imperial position, not for the sake of the balance of power in 
Europe.’
733 Others, however, argue that it was solely designed to gain Russian support for 
checking  Germany  in  Europe,  and  it  was  necessary  to  perpetuate  the  myth  of  India’s 
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centrality to obtain Morley’s support to eliminate Simla’s expected opposition.
734 Even the 
traditional argument that ‘from the summer of 1907 India ceased to bulk large, indeed to 
bulk at all, in the cycles of strategic debate in [Britain],’
735 has now been challenged by 
those who claim that the demands of war with India remained the basis of British military 
thinking until at least 1911.
736 
 
 
Most would agree with Neilson’s conclusion: 
 
 
After 1907, Russia ceased to be discussed as a potential enemy in British war 
planning. This should not be read as meaning that the problems of defending 
India had been solved…By 1907, it was clear that India could not be defended 
within the limits imposed by the politics of finance and manpower. The Anglo-
Russian Convention, although not dictated by British military concerns, provided 
an answer, albeit a temporary one, to this seemingly insoluble problem. While 
never accepted by military men in India, the defence of India lay with the Foreign 
Office.
737 
 
 
If the defence of India vanished from the thoughts of British military planners, it should 
not be imagined that India’s strategists existed in limbo until 1914. For them only the 
largest  threat  to  security  had  been  eliminated  by  British  diplomacy,  although,  after 
encountering the continued regional tension with Russia, few would actually have agreed 
that this was the case. Defending India against Russian invasion remained their panacea: 
preparation  to  meet  this  guaranteed  their  ability  to  counter  the  numerous  other  threats 
confronting them across the sub-continent. It was this attitude that underlay the continued 
resistance, led by Minto and Kitchener, to Morley’s attempts to reduce expenditure. After 
the conclusion of the agreement, Morley approached his quest with renewed vigour. Barely 
was the ink dry when he started to impress on Minto that British public opinion would 
‘neither understand nor tolerate a continued persistency in military plans that were only 
justified by dangers of immediate Russian aggression.’ Although he tried to reassure his 
Indian subordinates that he would consider the issue in a reasonable fashion,
738 he later 
noted that Indian involvement in Persia ‘and all the other branches of Military policy, as 
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calling for readjustment since the famous Convention,’
739 had become a preoccupation. 
Throughout the debate Minto and Kitchener continued to argue that reducing forces was 
not possible, especially given the danger of frontier trouble or internal unrest. 
740 
 
 
Kitchener argued that various factors, not just Russian aggression, governed the nature and 
size of the force necessary to guarantee  India’s security. The Indian Army served five 
purposes. India had to be safeguarded from external attack. While recognising that the 
Convention stabilised relations and removed the immediate danger of a Russian advance, 
he expressed doubts about whether it ‘could be regarded as a complete guarantee of peace 
with Russia herself for many years.’ India’s strength had never been adjusted in response 
to  augmentations  of  territory  or  the  anxiety  caused  by  Russia’s  advance  towards 
Afghanistan.  The  Indian  Army  had  to  be  able  to  fulfil  Britain’s  obligations  and 
responsibilities towards Afghanistan, and may have to keep the peace between them and 
Russia.  Order  on  the  frontier  had  to  be  maintained,  and  war  against  the  tribes  in 
combination with Afghanistan would require the full nine division field army and increase 
the risks faced elsewhere. The impossibility of internal revolution had to be ensured. Only 
force  maintained  British  rule,  and  the  troops  available  were  tiny  in  proportion  to  the 
population. Three infantry battalions were stationed in Bengal, the centre of nationalist 
unrest, which was the size of France and home to 80 million people. Finally, a share had to 
be taken in operations outside India for the purposes of imperial defence. However, the 
available  forces  were  not  sufficient  to  face  simultaneous  complications,  and  therefore 
reduction  would  have  an  unfortunate  and  undesirable  political  effect.
741  Minto 
wholeheartedly supported the commander-in-chief’s views, arguing that India had to retain 
its  regional  influence  by  providing  military  assistance,  such  as  reinforcements  for 
consulates in Persia or to maintain Britain’s position in Aden. The surrounding regions 
were  ‘the  glacis  of  our  position  here,  where  hostile  intrigue,  if  unknown  to  us,  might 
threaten the safety of the fortress.’
742 
 
 
His analogy was ill-advised, and if it was designed to infuriate Morley into redoubling his 
efforts, it succeeded admirably. The Secretary of State had already complained bitterly 
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about Kitchener’s underhand contacts with journalists to publish his objections against the 
Convention: 
 
 
That is not very nice…He proceeds to argue that the Convention should not be 
allowed to make the slightest difference in military policy and preparations in 
India…[Kitchener also asked the journalist to mobilise public opinion against the 
government’s  policy]…can  you  conceive  anything  more  grossly  disloyal  than 
underhand machinations of this sort, first  against  you, whose approval of the 
Convention  he  must  undoubtedly  be  acquainted  with,  and  second  against  His 
Majesty’s Government of whom he is the servant.
743 
 
 
His  reaction  against  Minto’s  pretensions  was  no  less  fierce,  as  Morley  dismissed  the 
Viceroy’s claims as misleading, narrow and partial. They had provoked a barrage against 
the ‘mischievous absorption in military apprehensions and forecasts,’ which: 
 
 
Withdraws the best and most capable minds from the vast problems lying outside 
the master idea of the fortress. You are so much more than a fortress…In a poor 
country like India, economy is as much an element of defence as guns and forts, 
and to concentrate your vigour and vigilance upon [them] and upon a host of 
outlying matters…which only secondarily and indirectly concern you even as a 
garrison,  seems  to  me  a  highly  injurious  dispersion  from  the  other  more 
important work of an Indian Government. 
 
 
Simla was not the ‘man on the spot.’ It had no need to understand international policy or 
the  buffer  states.
744 Morley  provides  the  most  succinct  summary  of  divergent  opinions 
between the centre and periphery, reflecting his distaste for militarism, but also British 
desire to strengthen its control over aspects of foreign and defence policy. India could not 
be  trusted  to  fulfil  these  responsibilities  because  of  its  parochial  outlook,  challenging 
Minto’s traditional viewpoint that the ‘man on the spot’ was the only one qualified to 
report on and judge the situation. Instead, Morley implied, given the vast extent of the 
difficulties  it  encountered,  Simla’s  sole  concern  should  be  administration  of  the  sub-
continent, a further legacy of Curzon’s self-aggrandisement.  
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Widespread annoyance that the views of those best informed on local conditions, integral 
to the formation of any over-arching imperial defence policy, ensured that resentment of 
Morley’s cheeseparing became engrained. Kitchener bemoaned that he and Minto had been 
saddled with a ‘man who positively hates military efficiency’
745 as Secretary of State just 
as progress began to be made with the reform schemes. A review of these in October 1907 
reported that while much remained to be done, 50% of the work was in progress or had 
been completed. Massive deficiencies in artillery and small arms ammunition were being 
made good by increased expenditure on manufacturing, while the potential problems with 
transport were being addressed by continued railway construction.
746  
 
 
Morley was not to be deterred, and he urged Minto not to let Kitchener become diverted 
from the subject of expenditure before the axe was swung.
747 Writing to Minto in March 
1908 and beginning with his usual clumsy attempts at reassurance that must have filled the 
Viceroy and C-in-C with dread, Morley argued that his despatch would be: 
 
 
A  moderate  invitation  to  you  to  try  to  devise  serious  and  immediate 
retrenchments…It cannot really be argued that the Russian convention is to make 
no difference whatever in India’s military needs, unless you say that the Russians 
will  not  keep  their  word.  The  military  policy  has  been  framed,  and  the  size, 
distribution and organisation of Indian military force settled on the principle of 
resisting, or being ready to resist Russian aggression. If you insist that all must go 
on absolutely as before though danger from Russia has ceased, and that nothing 
less than the existing forces would be adequate for our needs independent of 
Russia, then you are landed in the curiously awkward position, that we must have 
been carrying on government all this time with forces that were inadequate, 
 
 
which in Morley’s view was ‘not a flattering conclusion.’ He suggested dispensing with 
units  to  be  added  to  the  permanent  establishment  and  any  accompanying  expenditure, 
discontinuing frontier railway construction, and abandoning the proposed rearrangement of 
divisional  areas.
748  He  agreed  with  India  that  the  Convention  did  not  justify  the 
abandonment of precautions necessary to ensure its observance, but the risks Kitchener had 
outlined could not be overstated. Not every hypothetical contingency could be prepared 
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for, and if  India was attacked, reliance on imperial military strength was preferable to 
burdening  India  with  the  enormous  cost  of  excessive  of  military  force.  Over-taxation 
alienated the population, which posed its own threat to security. 
749 
 
 
Simla’s  reaction  was  predictable.  Minto  commented  to  his  wife  about  receiving  an 
‘incomprehensible telegram about reduction of military expenses’, and that Kitchener was 
‘very much upset about it.’ Morley was threatening to stop important work: 
 
 
Which won’t save him a penny for this year, as this year’s work must go on, 
(though  I  suppose  he  thinks  it  will)  and  won’t  ever  save  anything  unless  he 
means to stop the whole of K’s reorganisation, in which state everything will be 
left incomplete and in a state of chaos, and buckets of money will have been 
spent for nothing – and very likely I should think K would chuck up the whole 
thing and go home. Of course Morley is no doubt tremendously pressed by this 
House of Commons to reduce expenditure and possibly when his dispatch arrives 
things may be better – but really this obstruction over military expenditure has 
been inexcusable.
750 
 
 
Similar arguments were made to Morley, admitting that the Convention encouraged the 
idea that reductions were possible, but that the immediate stoppage of the redistribution 
scheme was not the best method to achieve this aim, which could be more effectively 
implemented by extension of the period for its completion,
751 an argument that became the 
main line of resistance to Morley’s policy. Suggestions to reduce the numbers of British 
troops  and  create  ‘colonial  battalions’  at  Mediterranean  bases  and  in  South  Africa  to 
provide rapid reinforcement
752 were swiftly rejected by Minto and Kitchener, who argued 
that Morley’s ideas were based on the interpretation of a situation that had long since 
passed:  ‘Kitchener  is  very  much  opposed  to  any  reduction  of  British  troops,  and 
considering present conditions in India, I fully agree with him. We cannot afford to reduce 
our British strength here.’ It was logical that if military strength had been based on the 
possibility of war with Russia a reduction could be demanded after the Convention, but 
they had to remember the problems they faced. Sufficient force was needed to prevent 
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trouble in India rather than respond to it, they could not, therefore, rely on reinforcements 
that might take up to a month to arrive if they could be spared at all.
753 
 
 
It  was  stressed  to  Morley,  who  in  May  1908  had  decreed  that  all  military  building 
connected with Kitchener’s projects be suspended unless given India Office approval,
754 
that ‘as regards military expenditure…the cumulative effect of your various orders is to 
bring us to something like a standstill.’ Work in progress had been interrupted, and their 
control over decisions had been reduced. Simla hoped to reach an agreement on military 
policy  whereby  they  could  regain  a  free  hand  in  implementing  the  programme.
755 An 
official despatch reiterated that even Kitchener’s reforms did not create an army that could 
provide India with such a margin of safety that it could be reduced without undue risk as a 
consequence of the Convention. Creating an efficient army to enable  India to fulfil its 
obligations, namely providing for internal security after placing nine divisions in the field 
to meet the threat from Russia, Afghanistan or the frontier tribes (as the force maintained 
to ensure the observance of the Convention could deal with any other external danger), was 
an expensive and time-consuming process. Morley’s wishes could be met by completing 
the  reorganisation  ‘more  slowly  and  deliberately  than  hitherto  contemplated’  but  they 
asked for permission to complete measures already in progress or sanctioned. Adaptation 
to Morley’s policy that ‘in view of the limited economic resources of India, and of the 
growing demand for expenditure on the moral and material development of the population 
military charges had long felt to be a burden’ by allotting funds available according to 
volume of work, the urgency of schemes, competing demands or modifying the system of 
financing  special  expenditure.    Completion  of  the  1904-5  programme  remained  within 
India’s financial capacity: 
 
 
We should not, as we consider, be justified by any financial contingencies now in 
sight, in deliberately accepting, not the mere possibility, but the uncertainty of 
being unprepared in the event of a contest with Russia. This, in our opinion, will 
be the real result of a curtailment of our programme. 
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The military authorities argued that limited scope existed for reducing expenditure given 
the measures they had already undertaken to increase efficiency. 
756 
 
 
Reductions had been made inevitable by other events. Debate over the apportionment of 
charges had resulted in increased payments to the War Office. This had been identified by 
Haldane  soon  after  the  election  as  a  way  to  reduce  expenditure,  but  produced  an 
increasingly bitter dispute as their claims interfered with Morley’s economising plans, and 
thus India’s hopes for their reform schemes. The disagreement also provided an interesting 
illustration of the shift in power in imperial decision making; Simla was barely consulted 
on the issue. It had been referred to an inter-departmental committee, where the War Office 
argued that as the training of recruits was more expensive than when the level of payments 
was settled in 1892, and that as the army was organised to supply reinforcements to India 
in an emergency, Simla should contribute an extra £2 million p.a. to the cost. India Office 
objections that no other part of the Empire was asked to pay for the raising, equipping and 
transporting  of  drafts  or  that  Britain  was  incapable  of  supplying  reinforcements  were 
dismissed. India was willing to bear justifiable burdens, but anything more would be taken 
as a grievance by the educated nationalists. A compromise was reached between Morley 
and Haldane, who agreed that an extra payment of £300,000 was more advantageous than 
leaving the settlement to the Committee, despite the Indian Secretary’s earlier assurances 
that he would ‘make the strongest case that may be possible against [any] increase of the 
charge.’
757 Simla  protested  in  October  1908,  as  was  their  duty  on  behalf  of  India’s 
taxpayers, who could not support the imposition of a heavy additional burden during the 
financial year, especially when they had already incurred increased expenditure from the 
unforeseen cost of the frontier military operations without any prospect of a corresponding 
expansion in revenues. It was unsatisfactory that they had been given no opportunity to 
state their case or cite savings elsewhere to protest against extravagant and unjustified War 
Office claims. These objections were dismissed by Morley in March 1909, although the 
Indian military authorities believed his arguments were unconvincing, it admitted that the 
discussion was closed, and ‘that the Military budget in India is now burdened with an 
additional charge of £300,000 p.a. with nothing to show for it in return.’
758  
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As  Siegel  argues,  defence  requirements  remained  a  preoccupation  for  the  Indian 
authorities.
759 Despite Morley’s efforts to curtail their involvement outside India, Minto 
continued to claim that it was not possible to ‘separate the strategical position in Persia 
from  the  possibility  of  Indian  military  assistance,’  which  would  be  called  upon  in  an 
emergency.  Strong  opposition  to  the  development  of  Persian  railways  to  connect  with 
Indian lines was voiced unless guarantees could be given for India’s security. Similarly, 
they argued that potentially hostile powers had to be prevented from gaining control of the 
Baghdad line.
760 When reviewed by India’s General Staff in January 1909, it was found 
that progress continued with the reform schemes, albeit at a slower pace as consultation 
with the Secretary of State to obtain approval for new expenditure was a ‘laborious process 
fraught with complexities and difficulties’, but it was still regarded as the soundest basis 
for military organisation, and the best method for creating an efficient army. Deficiencies 
identified earlier were being eliminated, especially in transport and mobilisation stores.
761  
 
 
Morley realised that to effect significant alterations in military policy, changes in personnel 
were necessary. The first opportunity presented itself as the date for Kitchener’s departure 
approached in August 1909, by which time he had become increasingly indolent.
762 He 
departed India with a call for continuity in military policy, claiming this was the only way 
to maintain an army sufficiently efficient to fulfil India’s responsibilities, and stating that 
he had left India with a much better prepared force, one that was stronger and able to keep 
the Raj safe from attack.
763 Morley’s choice of successor reflected his desire to increase his 
control over Indian military policy, but the appointment, like that of Minto’s as Viceroy, 
indicated a wish for period of tranquillity after a whirlwind of reform – thus O’Moore 
Creagh  was  jokingly  referred  to  as  ‘no  more  K.’
764 Minto  had  some  influence  on  the 
selection, distinctly asking that Barrow was not appointed to avoid resuscitating the bad 
feeling of the dual control dispute. He argued that Creagh was not taken seriously as a 
candidate, and both the Viceroy and C-in-C feared that he could not be trusted with such a 
complex command in times of unrest. Minto’s views changed when, after soliciting further 
opinions on Creagh, he discovered that he was possessed of sound judgement and knew the 
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native army well, a key consideration when doubts persisted about its loyalty.
765 The India 
Office claimed that although a surprise, Creagh’s appointment had been well received.
766 
Minto  agreed  that  it  seemed  popular,  although  some  did  not  share  this  enthusiasm,  as 
Bigge commented many regarded the appointment as ‘preposterous.’
767 Minto admitted to 
remaining anxious, especially when ‘Scatter’ Wilson was appointed as Military Secretary, 
but he did not think that Creagh would attempt radical changes.
768 
 
 
Initially these did not have the effect Morley desired. Creagh vehemently denied having 
been sent to India for the sole purpose of proposing reductions in the army, and he worked 
with the Viceroy to recommend to the Secretary of State that the military budget be fixed 
as it was necessary to maintain a force capable of protecting India’s frontiers.
769 Haig’s 
appointment as Chief of Staff buttressed Creagh’s claims. He had been a firm supporter of 
Kitchener’s reforms, and argued that the aim of India’s military policy should remain the 
ability to place an army of nine divisions in the field, which was necessary even if Russia 
was excluded from considerations given the increasing numbers of external threats they 
faced,  while  providing  adequate  numbers  for  internal  security.    Withdrawal  of  British 
soldiers was not an option.
770 Haig took his plans further, and attempted to prepare the 
Indian Army for responsibilities in a potential European conflict, but only succeeded in 
enraging  Hardinge  and  Morley.
771 He  was  unable  to  overcome  the  desire  to  focus  on 
internal security that had become once again ingrained as the Indian Army’s raison d’etre 
during  the  previous  years  of  unrest.  His  departure  removed  the  final  obstacle  to 
retrenchment.  
 
 
Military  expenditure  faded  into  the  background  as  attention  focused  on  implementing 
constitutional reforms and countering the threats posed by nationalist terrorism. Only on 
the very eve of his departure did Minto admit that the military budget had to be relieved, 
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even then he still argued that urgent expenditure on military measures be sanctioned.
772 
Morley’s policy only succeeded when he was able to ensure the appointment of his own 
nominee  as  Viceroy  after  resisting  royal  pressure  to  have  Kitchener  succeed  Minto, 
something he feared would represent the establishment of the Indian Government on a 
military basis.
773 The new Indian authorities could be more easily coerced into financial 
retrenchment,  a  process  that  culminated  with  the  appointment  of  the  Army  in  India 
Committee in 1912. The contentious nature of the subjects discussed meant that unanimous 
conclusions were impossible, and a split emerged over whether the external or internal 
threats should be India’s primary focus. The Majority report’s recommendations in favour 
of the latter were accepted by the Viceroy and Secretary of State. Haig’s ideas that it was 
Simla’s  duty  to  maintain  forces  out  of  the  Indian  revenues  for  imperial  service  were 
rejected. As Afghanistan and the tribes, rather than Russia, were the most likely threat to 
be encountered, there was no justification for large-scale expenditure or for a field army of 
the size envisaged by Kitchener, a point bitterly disputed by the Minority. The limited time 
to  implement  the  ‘improvements’  suggested,  and  the  short-sightedness  and  narrow-
mindedness of the committee’s approach, which excluded the consideration that India may 
have to face several difficulties simultaneously, had disastrous consequences. As Creagh 
bemoaned, the Indian Army, ‘was not even properly prepared for an encounter with semi-
organised  Asiatic  enemies’  and  even  less  prepared,  thanks  to  the  parsimony  of  the 
politicians, to meet the more demanding challenges of war with a European opponent.
774 
 
 
In both gubernatorial posts Minto had confronted a contending vision of Empire, one based 
on Liberal ideals of eliminating unnecessary military expenditure wherever possible. The 
resulting collisions heightened his distrust of myopic politicians unable to realise British 
imperial power rested on military strength and reinforced his predilection to rely on advice 
from soldiers who shared his views. Throughout his career Minto worked with his military 
advisers to prevent the ideas put forward by men like Morley or Laurier undermining the 
pragmatic basis of the Empire; when policy was based on responding to often unexpected 
events it was vital to possess sufficient strength to enable Britain to protect its interests. 
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Success in maintaining this principle was not always possible as many factors influencing 
it  remained  beyond  Minto’s  control,  as  a  governor  he  could  only  advise  his  British 
superiors  on  how  their  decisions  would  impact  upon  the  periphery.  Often  he  could 
influence  details  of  policies  rather  than  the  underlying  principles.  Cabinet  reshuffles 
replaced those who supported his ideas on Canadian military organisation with men more 
inclined to devolve greater responsibility to the Dominion, something he came to accept 
reluctantly, although he endeavoured to retain some measure of British influence. He had 
little  control  over  the  changing  diplomatic  priorities  that  complemented  Liberal 
retrenchment initiatives, but together with Kitchener was able to influence the final form of 
the  agreements  affecting  India  by  ensuring  that  measures  essential  for  its  security 
represented a central theme, while his warnings about continued Russian aggrandisement 
were eventually proved correct. In partnership they continually thwarted Morley’s ill-fated 
efforts to derail the reform schemes by highlighting the dangers such moves entailed, and 
the fact that Morley succeeded in reducing expenditure only after removing both is fitting 
testament to the influence the pragmatic viewpoint could exercise.    221 
5. Conclusion 
 
Viceroys and Governors General were but fleeting presences in the countries they were 
sent to rule, often struggling against a tide of longer-term developments over which they 
had no control. The evolution of intra-imperial relationships, constitutional changes within 
colonies, and shifting British defence or foreign policies in the period before 1914 had 
significant results for the powers wielded by the ‘men on the spot.’ In the self-governing 
colonies, Governors had to forge often uneasy partnerships with governments that resented 
their very presence as an affront to emerging national consciousness. In India, the sheer 
volume of work could overwhelm even the most able and energetic Viceroys. In both, 
governors were beset by governments in London apparently indifferent to local concerns, 
required by necessity to always view these in relation to the increasingly complex web of 
Britain’s global interests. 
 
 
Pragmatism was a necessary virtue in such circumstances, and it was a vital requirement 
for  governing  a  heterogeneous  empire  like  Britain’s.  It  was  something  that  Britain’s 
aristocrats  were  thought  to  possess  in  abundance,  one  of  the  many  qualities  that  were 
believed to suit them for imperial government. Experience of ceremonial roles was thought 
to make them ideal to carry out the public functions that provided an additional burden for 
frequently overworked Governors but played a vital role in projecting British prestige and 
power to the Empire’s inhabitants. Many had held official positions either in Britain or the 
colonies,  often  in  the  military,  and  the  knowledge  this  provided  of  imperial  defence 
conditions was an important consideration for promoting them to more senior positions. 
Imperial administration, even the more prestigious posts, rarely attracted more ambitious 
politicians who disliked being detached from the centre of power. Often such men were not 
welcome, as governments realised that appointing as governors overzealous imperialists 
determined to follow their own policy agendas could create unexpected problems. They 
preferred to appoint reliable and restrained peers to important posts; men who shared their 
assumptions and would implement policies as instructed and provide information essential 
to decision-making. Defence had become a central element in imperial government, often 
acting as a guiding principle in policy formation, as it was believed that the Empire was 
vital to retaining Britain’s leading international position when it was facing an increasing 
number of challenges. Proconsuls with military experience or knowledge were especially 
valued  in  these  circumstances,  as  they  could  persuade  otherwise  reluctant  colonials  to   222 
make appropriate contributions to imperial defence, or ensure that defending India was 
afforded the priority it necessitated.  
 
 
Minto was the product of a society that valued the contribution of aristocratic amateurs, 
and  recognised  that  he  owed  his  advancement  to  a  cultural  milieu  that  favoured  the 
contributions of such men over a more professional approach. He maintained a pragmatic 
outlook throughout his imperial career and always regarded defence issues as his most 
important duty. His efforts are proof that despite the evolving nature of a governor’s duties, 
they remained more than mere ornaments, as even an apparent ‘mediocrity’ could have 
some  influence  on  policy  formation.  Minto’s  ideas  were  often  adopted  and  influenced 
many  decisions  on  defence  or  foreign  policy  relating  to  Canada  and  India,  frequently 
overruling the objections of officials in  Britain.  If his efforts were frustrated, this was 
mainly due to changing personnel or policy priorities in Britain. Despite being a junior 
partner in the imperial administrative structure, Minto was often able to set the agenda for 
policies  in  his  posts,  particularly  in  India,  and  his  analyses  of  information  on  local 
conditions  were  always  considered  in  decision-making.  The  Empire  remained  a 
heterogeneous and complex institution, but the experiences and characters of those who 
served in higher positions across its different regions provide some element of continuity. 
All proconsuls had to deal with limitations imposed by the actions and policies of their 
predecessors;  all  faced  equally  difficult  relationships  with  their  superiors  and  had  to 
challenge their unrealistic presumptions about what could be achieved; all relied on the 
support of their military advisers to ensure that defending British interests remained the 
priority for imperial government, but perhaps few confronted them to such extremes as 
Lord Minto. 
 
 
No amount of prior planning or briefing, if they were fortunate enough to be granted such a 
privilege officially, could fully prepare a Governor for the situation they confronted on 
arrival,  even  if  the  problems  their  predecessor  had  created  were  well  publicised.  No 
outgoing incumbent wished to publicise their own failings either and as such the incoming 
replacement would often be given a somewhat rose-tinted version of the situation they 
were inheriting. The actions and policies of a predecessor could remain a major influence 
throughout the tenure of the new man, in extreme cases setting the parameters for their 
entire tenure. Chamberlain may not have been directly influenced in his decision to appoint 
Minto by the need to replace Aberdeen with someone more in sympathy with his policies   223 
and less in thrall to Laurier’s government, but, together with Minto’s previous Canadian 
experience,  it  was  undoubtedly  a  consideration,  as  illustrated  by  Hutton’s  discussions 
before  his  departure.  Aberdeen  was  perhaps  glad  that  his  tenure  was  dominated  by 
domestic issues, rather than imperial problems, as these were more in line with his political 
ideas.  Ensuring  that  political  friction  did  not  degenerate  into  crises  endangering  the 
stability of the Dominion remained an important gubernatorial duty, but not his only one. 
Minto’s focus on Canada’s role in the Empire, often at Chamberlain’s prompting, proved 
to be an unwelcome contrast with a predecessor who had been little short of indolent in this 
respect. The early efforts of Minto and his somewhat overenthusiastic GOC to reignite the 
fading embers of Canadian military enthusiasm proved remarkably successful. Although 
Minto  recognised  that  he  had  to  proceed  warily  in  this  respect,  their  achievements  in 
encouraging respect for the military as a profession and creating awareness of the need for 
reform throughout the militia establishment, were applauded by his superiors.  
 
 
The  situation  confronting  Minto  on  arrival  in  India  was  very  different.  Here  he  was 
immediately faced with a series of crises, all caused by his predecessor’s policies. Finding 
someone capable of restoring stability in this turbulent atmosphere was the main aim of 
Balfour’s government in choosing a successor for Curzon, about whom historical debate 
rages. The departing Viceroy, although brilliant in many respects, had discovered to his 
cost that more than an outstanding intellect was required to make a success of the office. 
Respect for colleagues, subordinates and the native population all contributed, but Curzon 
denigrated  the  work  of  all  his  officials  by  refusing  to  delegate  even  the  most  minor 
responsibilities  and  his  contempt  for  Indian  aspirations  and  opinion  was  amply 
demonstrated by his decision to partition Bengal. A willingness to accept one’s proper 
place  in  the  constitutional  hierarchy  by  implementing  policies  as  ordered  rather  than 
pursuing  personal  objectives  in  accordance  with  purely  regional  interests,  without  any 
reference  to  wider  British  interests,  particularly  maintaining  amicable  relations  with 
Russia, was equally important. Curzon failed on all these counts, and as a result became 
increasingly  detached  from  his  Cabinet  superiors.  Believing  they  were  determined  to 
thwart, or were incapable of understanding, his aims to strengthen Britain’s position in 
India, he became more steadfast in his refusal to accept their advice, and their relationship 
deteriorated rapidly. His own hubristic desire to work in partnership with the most famous 
soldier in the Empire, Kitchener, proved his undoing, as during their initial ‘honeymoon’ 
period he had no conception that the government would not support him in the event of any 
dispute.    224 
 
 
Minto was not their first choice, but he proved more capable of fulfilling the short-term 
objectives set out by Balfour’s government than another zealous imperialist figure like 
Milner would have been. His recent Canadian experiences and links with the Unionist 
network undoubtedly influenced the decision to appoint him to Simla, but many saw him 
as a less authoritarian figure than Curzon who could lead rather than dictate in India. Any 
respect  Minto  retained  for  his  fellow  proconsul  quickly  evaporated  in  the  muddled 
circumstances of his arrival, and those unfortunate events did much to colour his attitude 
towards many of Curzon’s policies. The chaos he inherited across several fronts did little 
to  help.  Minto  worked  hard  to  restore  proper  levels  of  responsibility  to  previously 
emasculated  government  officials.  The  problems  created  by  Curzon  haunted  Minto 
throughout his Viceroyalty. The unrest started by the partition of Bengal rapidly spread 
throughout  India  and  required  harsh  measures  to  contain,  while  Curzon’s  aggressive 
adventures  in  Tibet  encouraged  Chinese  attempts  to  reassert  their  suzerainty.  More 
neglected by historians are the difficulties created by Curzon’s frontier reforms. While 
these  helped  improve  administration  it  was  far  from  the  panacea  envisaged  by  his 
biographers,  who  are  mistaken  to  take  the  claims  made  for  its  success  in  the  heated 
atmosphere of Curzon’s departure at face value, and in any case these were built on a 
foundation of lies and deceit. Deliberate failure to report crime or raids created a false 
impression that the frontier had become a haven of peace and tranquillity. It was nothing of 
the sort, but the perception Curzon had created, particularly about reduced expenditure, 
unduly complicated the task Minto confronted in restoring order. Lawlessness continued 
unabated, and Minto soon discovered that Curzon had forced through his changes against 
the better advice of his officials, implementing them in areas where they not only had little 
chance of success, but also endangered the lives of British officers. Troubles in Waziristan 
highlighted to Minto the importance of adopting a pragmatic approach to frontier unrest 
when it became obvious that military options would not be authorised. Various policies 
were  attempted  to  contain  the  troubles  in  this  particularly  turbulent  district,  which 
demonstrated  for  many  the  folly  of  the  idea  that  any  settled  policy  could  be  applied 
wholesale  across  such  a  heterogeneous  region.  For  senior  officials  like  Minto,  the 
overriding  concern  throughout  was  to  maintain  stability  in  an  area  of  key  strategic 
importance.  
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Minto’s  relationship  with  his  superiors  also  did  much  to  set  the  parameters  of  his 
gubernatorial career. In Canada, this proved to be a dual role, as he was forced to act as a 
bridge between the imperialists he served in London, and the nationalists over whom he 
nominally reigned in Ottawa. Advising both sides on both imperial and foreign policy was 
an important duty for governors in the self-governing areas of the Empire. In the early 
stages of his Canadian career Minto worked hard to strengthen the Dominion’s links with 
the Empire, investigating in detail the mechanics of Canadian military contributions. He 
supported Chamberlain’s efforts to obtain military support from around the Empire as war 
approached in South Africa. Minto emphasised to Laurier throughout the contingents crisis 
that a significant element of public and Cabinet opinion supported the despatch of troops. 
His most important contribution was reminding Laurier during their frequent discussions, 
that while Britain was  not officially  requesting military support from  Canada it would 
welcome any ‘spontaneous offer’ and that any contribution may prove valuable for more 
practical reasons, as Canada was reliant on Britain’s diplomatic support against America. 
Such interventions provided an example of how the Governor could discreetly influence 
the  policies  of  the  local  government.  Minto  also  showed  some  understanding  of  local 
sentiment when he made efforts to ensure that the contingents retained their Canadian 
character and remained as distinct units. To protect what he regarded as the governor’s 
proper sphere of influence and powers over imperial issues Minto remained involved in the 
organisation of subsequent contingents, working in close contact with both the imperial 
authorities in Britain, as well as with Borden and the militia in Canada.  
 
 
Events surrounding Canadian involvement in South Africa did much to influence Minto’s 
conceptions of the best way to advance Chamberlain’s plans to strengthen links between 
Britain and the self-governing colonies. His investigations into Canadian attitudes towards 
plans for any form of imperial council, as suggested by Chamberlain in March 1900, or the 
adoption  of  any  greater  defensive  responsibilities,  revealed  that  informal  methods  and 
reliance on the sentimental links with the ‘mother country’ were the best way to proceed. It 
proved difficult to strike a balance between persuading Chamberlain that Canada would 
not  welcome  any  attempts  to  enforce  closer  links  and  persuading  Laurier  to  accept 
Canada’s role in imperial defence. Eventually Chamberlain came to accept, especially after 
his failures at the 1902 Conference, that commercial links were the best way to proceed, as 
these held out the possibility of material advantages, rather than expensive obligations, for 
the Dominion. The information provided by Minto did much to influence his decisions in 
this  regard.  Minto  increasingly  came  to  accept  the  difficulties  under  which  Laurier   226 
laboured in maintaining the stability of the Confederation, the fragility of which had been 
alarmingly exposed during both his and Aberdeen’s tenure. He regretted that more had not 
been done to encourage Canada to accept its imperial responsibilities during his time, and 
that many opportunities to do so, particularly after the Boer War, had been lost, although 
he blamed British indifference for many of these problems. Minto developed a greater 
understanding  of  Canada’s  attitudes  towards  the  Empire  and  why,  under  Laurier,  they 
proved  reluctant  to  do  more,  although  he  never  stopped  pressing  the  issue,  and  his 
predictions that sentimental connections could be relied upon more than formal obligations 
was proved correct in 1914.  
 
 
Unrealistic expectations were also at the heart of the other issue that dominated his time in 
Canada, although in this instance it was the Dominion that was at fault. Minto could do 
little to solve the main issues at stake, particularly over Alaska, but he played an important 
role in pushing the Canadians towards accepting the agreement, by persuading them that 
their  aims  were  unlikely  to  be  achieved  and  that  it  was  therefore  prudent  to  accept 
favourable terms when offered. His contacts with the British foreign-policy establishment, 
notably Lansdowne and successive ambassadors to Washington, made him an important 
intermediary in the process of solving long-running disputes. It proved difficult for Minto 
to overcome his anti-American prejudices, and his constant contact with Canadian opinion 
strongly reinforced these attitudes. But this proved to be another area where a pragmatic 
approach  was  vital  to  finding  a  solution  for  an  apparently  intractable  problem.  Minto 
shared Laurier’s indignation at the shameful treatment of the Canadians by both the British 
and Americans, who both seemed to regard the apex of the North Atlantic Triangle as little 
more  than  a  hindrance  to  the  normalisation  of  relations.  He  also  recognised  that  the 
Canadians must accept the reality of American occupation in Alaska, and that neglect of 
their allegedly vital national interests until some obvious economic gain could be obtained 
had fatally undermined their arguments. Canada was responsible for its own predicament, 
but Minto believed it should at least be treated fairly. His intervention with Laurier to 
arrange the meetings with the American ambassador in London in 1902 during the imperial 
conference  was  the  first  step  towards  the  final  settlement.  During  the  negotiations  to 
establish the Tribunal Minto worked assiduously to ensure that Canada’s viewpoints were 
being taken into account, particularly their objections, which he wholeheartedly shared, to 
Roosevelt’s choice of representatives. He also understood Canadian indignation at the final 
decision, which illustrated that Britain’s pragmatic approach to policy extended to foreign 
affairs  –  sacrificing  distant,  and  to  Britain,  unimportant  interests,  was  the  best  way  to   227 
defend key assets. He was infuriated by the way this was expressed through attacks on 
British  integrity  and  honour,  but  also  by  apparent  British  indifference.  His  efforts  to 
assuage Canadian anger by encouraging Britain to provide some form of explanation came 
to naught, but he continued his attempts to prevent Laurier making rash decisions founded 
on anger, and to reconcile the Canadians to the decision. While not entirely successful, this 
was appreciated by the Colonial Office, and with time, the issue became less contentious. 
Minto’s  actions  throughout  the  protracted  solution  of  the  Alaska  boundary  dispute 
demonstrated the continued importance of the Governor at a time when the self-governing 
colonies lacked control over their external affairs. Influence in Britain could ensure that the 
Dominion’s concerns were at least given a fair hearing, although much was dependent on 
the  power  of  the  Colonial  Secretary  in  the  Cabinet,  as  demonstrated  when  Lyttelton 
replaced Chamberlain. To a certain extent, the Governor became a proto-ambassador for 
Britain, a role that Grey extended after 1904. 
 
 
Minto  was  unfortunate  in  both  Canada  and  India  that  despite  being  appointed  by  the 
Unionists, he had to work predominantly with Liberals. Although his relationship with 
Morley was remarkably harmonious, demonstrated by the way they worked in partnership 
to introduce the reforms, over certain issues it predictably began to break down. Their 
respective  viewpoints  on  acceptable  levels  of  interference  in  everyday  Indian 
administration or the appropriate weight to be given to the views expressed by the ‘man on 
the  spot’  did  little  to  ease  the  tension  that  inevitably  built  up  in  a  claustrophobic 
relationship.  Defence  of  India’s  North  West  Frontier  provides  a  prime  example  of  the 
problems Minto faced. Ensuring security within this key strategic region was, in Minto’s 
opinion, an overarching priority for the Government of India. For Morley, although he 
recognised its importance, defence could not be the ultimate concern, and could no longer 
monopolise the attention or resources of the Raj. Improving the lot of ordinary Indians 
would be equally successful in reducing the many threats that Simla faced.  
 
 
Such  ideals  were  admirable,  but  utopian,  bearing  little  resemblance  to  the  reality 
confronted by Minto’s government. The Viceroy found it particularly galling that his own 
successful efforts to stabilise Britain’s relations with its perennially unpredictable northern 
neighbour after the damage caused by Curzon, were being dangerously undermined by 
British foreign policy. The strong personal friendship Minto established with Habibullah 
proved invaluable after 1907, and probably did more than any other factor to prevent the   228 
deteriorating relations with Afghanistan descending into conflict. The fiercely independent 
Afghans  were  understandably  annoyed  at  being  marginalised  on  issues  that  directly 
affected their own sovereignty, and these were exploited by the powerful anti-British party 
to create a succession of incidents that threatened to endanger the peace of the frontier, 
whether by encouraging tribal raiding or interrupting cross-border trade. Minto’s efforts to 
persuade the Amir to accept the terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention were complicated 
by such difficulties, but throughout he also had to direct his energies towards explaining to 
Morley the difficulties that thoughtlessly implemented foreign policies could create for 
those responsible for everyday administration. Imperial governors were often criticised for 
their parochial outlook, but the British authorities were sometimes equally guilty of being 
unable to see how measures designed to protect the whole wood might damage individual 
tress.   
 
 
Dealing  with  frontier  unrest  in  the  widest  sense  was  another  issue  to  create  friction 
between Minto and Morley. The Indian Secretary never seemed to appreciate the problems 
this troublesome region could create for a Viceroy, and was apparently driven throughout 
his  tenure  by  a  desire  to  fulfil  Liberal  pledges  to  reduce  expenditure  and  avoid  new 
obligations. Most Viceroys would have accepted these aims, but not to the extent that 
security was being neglected; defending the subjects of the Raj was their primary duty. 
Minto’s  assertions  that  only  swift  military  action  could  curtail  tribal  lawlessness  were 
ultimately  proved  correct  by  the  successes  achieved  against  the  Zakka  Khels  and 
Mohmands in 1908, which had provided some measure of vindication for both Curzon and 
Kitchener’s policies, as these had made possible an efficiently organised response to the 
unrest.  Simla  proved  unable  to  convince  Morley  that  expeditions  by  themselves  were 
pointless, allowing the worst offenders to escape unpunished and leaving only a legacy of 
hatred  to  be  exploited  by  the  peculiarly  inflammable  brand  of  fundamentalist  Islam 
prevalent in the region. India had to tailor its responses accordingly, forced to stifle its 
annoyance that if left to its own devices the trouble caused by tribes like the Zakka Khels 
would not have been allowed to spiral out of control to the extent that they posed a serious 
threat to the safety of the frontier. Minto’s policy of recognising that the endemic unrest 
along the frontier did not necessarily indicate a failure of British rule and that in certain 
circumstances  lawlessness  could  only  be  curtailed  by  military  action  meant  that  he 
bestowed a far more favourable legacy to Hardinge in this area than had been left to him 
by Curzon. Although no Viceroy wished to deliberately provoke confrontation with the   229 
tribes, Minto left India wondering how much more could have been achieved if he had 
been given free rein to launch the policy he favoured.  
 
 
Despite the success of Willcocks’s operations, Minto recognised that the distribution of 
modern rifles throughout the frontier rendered any future military engagement with the 
tribes more dangerous to the British forces. He fought hard to introduce policies that could 
interdict the flow of rifles from Muscat, but yet again friction resulted with Morley, who 
insisted that the problems this would create with Britain’s friends, especially France, be 
paramount over the fact that these weapons were being used to kill British soldiers. The 
Secretary  of  State  could  only  see  increased  expenditure  and  responsibilities  in  any 
measures that Minto suggested to tackle this problem. He could not comprehend the long-
term impact the arms traffic would have on the military conditions of the frontier, and it 
was only when Minto had the backing of the Admiralty, who were more able to see the 
strategic issue at hand, to deal with the trade was he able to take any action. Minto’s 
measures, particularly the blockade, achieved some measure of success, but India was left 
again frustrated that more could have been done. Due partly to the problems created by 
Curzon,  and  partly  to  Morley’s  character,  the  trend  during  Minto’s  Viceroyalty  was 
towards centralising power in London. Minto fought against this wherever possible, and 
particularly over matters like frontier defence where a rapid response was vital, and his 
views, if not always accepted, were always taken into account. To this extent, the Viceroy 
retained some influence.  
 
 
Minto’s imperial career coincided with a period of dramatic change in British defence 
policies  which  by  their  very  nature  could  not  fail  to  have  significant  impact  upon  its 
Empire. His expertise on defensive matters was one of the reasons for his appointment to 
both posts, and it remained his primary interest. Minto endeavoured to involve himself in 
all the important decisions on defence in Canada and India, where he invariably supported 
the programmes of his military advisers. In Canada, this proved to be a complex problem, 
little  helped  by  the  characters  of  the  generals  appointed.  The  failure  to  resolve  the 
difficulties created by the poorly defined responsibilities of the main officials, and the 
clash  between  zealous  British  military  professionals  and  Canadian  politicians  with  no 
interest in defence beyond any material gain that could be obtained, meant that friction was 
inevitable. Minto saw in the crisis over Hutton an opportunity to establish Canada’s militia 
on a proper footing, or at least expose the corruption and interference damaging attempts at   230 
reform. But, blinded by his friendship with Hutton he handled the matter ineptly, as he 
eventually recognised, and endeavoured to move more cautiously in future, as seen in his 
relations with Dundonald. Minto had been desperate to remove  Haly  as interim GOC, 
believing that his easy-going attitude would only encourage Canadian indifference towards 
its defence. He undoubtedly supported the efforts of the new GOC to create a defensive 
system more suited to Canadian requirements, but was dismayed to find himself embroiled 
in yet another civil-military dispute. Having learned his lesson with Hutton, Minto saw he 
could not support Dundonald and merely tried again to solve the inherent dilemmas by 
trying to have the GOC’s duties properly defined. Minto began to recognise the limitations 
of his office during the debates over the revision of the Militia Act, when his own plans 
and his objections to the Canadian suggestions were rejected. On the eve of his departure 
he realised that it was unwise to force Canada to accept anything that had obvious wider 
imperial implications, and that therefore it was best to establish a system favourable to 
Canadian  opinion  and  conditions,  and  although  he  argued  for  the  retention  of  some 
measure of imperial influence, he worked with Borden to ensure the new system started on 
the best footing possible.  
 
 
Concerns  were  raised  on  his  appointment  to  India  that  Minto  would  be  dominated  by 
Kitchener, who could achieve his ambition of running the Raj as a military dictatorship. 
Such fears proved unfounded, and the Viceroy and C-in-C worked together in an effective 
partnership to frustrate some of Morley’s more drastic plans for the reduction of Indian 
defence expenditure, much to the Secretary of State’s annoyance. Minto fully supported 
Kitchener’s  reforms,  believing  they  had  brought  a  much  needed  improvement  to  the 
efficiency of the Army in India. As with frontier policy, Minto’s overriding concern was to 
protect  Indian  security,  this  could  only  be  achieved  by  maintaining  troops  at  suitable 
levels. As had been the case in Canada, Minto saw the Empire as Britain’s main source of 
strength, and he was fiercely opposed to undermining this by making agreements with 
potentially unreliable allies. His attitude towards the Anglo-Russian Convention infuriated 
Morley, who saw it as a way to advance the ‘cause of peace’ and more importantly, reduce 
Indian defence expenditure. Minto was never fully reconciled to this measure, but was 
willing  to  see  the  benefits  it  brought  to  Britain’s  security,  even  if  it  produced  local 
annoyances. Minto and Kitchener were at least able to influence the terms of the agreement 
to some extent, as the vital concerns of Indian security, particularly maintaining British 
influence  in  southern  Persia  and  preventing  Russian  interference  in  Afghanistan  were 
protected by the treaty. After the Convention, a long battle of attrition was fought with   231 
Morley over reducing India’s defence commitments. Together Minto and Kitchener were 
able to achieve some measure of success in this regard, ensuring that Kitchener’s reform 
plans were continued, albeit at a slower pace. Morley was not to be deterred, however, and 
his replacement of Kitchener with a more pliable officer, and Minto with a Viceroy with 
administrative, rather than gubernatorial experience, ensured that progress could be made 
towards achieving his aims of reducing expenditure and focussing Indian attention on its 
primary duty of administering the Raj. Unfortunately this removed men who were capable 
of  seeing  the  wider  picture  of  Indian  strategy,  and  the  determination  to  reduce  Indian 
defence expenditure in ignorance of its defence requirements, which Minto and Kitchener 
had always opposed, would only have disastrous consequences for the Indian Army. 
 
 
Minto’s appointments to the two most important posts in the Empire had been a surprise to 
some, yet his aristocratic background, imperialist outlook and military experience made 
him a typical governor. He governed during a period when the role was being redefined, 
either by returning power to London, or by accommodating the nationalistic aspirations of 
the  self-governing  colonies.  The  dramatic  changes  British  policy  was  undergoing, 
particularly those relating to diplomacy or defence, ensured that the Governor could retain 
some influence on the decision-making process, as this still had to be informed by local 
requirements, of which ‘men on the spot’ were often the best judges. Minto exemplified 
the pragmatic approach Britain adopted towards Empire, recognising that responding to 
events was the best method of continuing on a steady course. Such methods allowed him 
depart both Ottawa and Simla, very different parts of the Empire, having avoided any 
major crises and leaving them in better condition than when he arrived. In this sense, the 
most important consideration for those governing the Empire, pragmatic imperialism had 
triumphed.  
   232 
6. BIBLIOGRAPHY  
 
Primary Sources 
 
Manuscript Collections  
 
National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh 
Minto Papers  
4
th Earl of Minto official and private papers relating to service as Governor General of 
Canada and Viceroy of India, 1898-1910 
 
MS 12370-377 Family Correspondence 
 
MS 12378-411 General Correspondence 
 
MS 12412-452 Lady Minto’s Papers 
 
MS 12497-502 Lord Minto’s Diaries, 1895 to 1913 
 
MS 12531-541 Military Papers, 1874 to 1892 
 
MS 12549-555 Papers relating to the 4
th Earl’s service as Military Secretary to Lord 
Landsdowne, 1883 to1885 
 
MS 12556-587 Papers relating to the 4
th Earl’s Service as Governor General of Canada, 
1898 to 1904 
 
MS 12588-802 Papers relating to the 4
th Earl’s Service as Viceroy of India, 1905 to 1910 
 
Arthur Elliot Papers 
NLS MS 19475 – MS 19477, Correspondence between Lord Minto and Arthur Elliot, 1898 
to 1913 
 
R.B. Haldane Papers 
MS 5907 to 5909, R.B. Haldane Correspondence, 1906 to 1911 
 
MS 5919, Memo of Events between 1906 and 1915 
 
MS 6108A (I to IV), Cabinet Memoranda, 1906 to 1914 
 
MS 20063-64, R.B. Haldane’s Autobiography, Vols. I & II 
 
Haig Papers 
Acc 3155  
Box 2, Earl Haig’s pre-war diaries, 1904 to 1914, Nos. 16 – 26 
Box 89, Private Papers of 1
st Earl Haig, relating to service as Chief of the Indian General 
Staff, 1909-1911 
 
National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh 
Dundonald Papers 
NAS GD 233/132-133, 145-146, 153-155, 162-166, 169, 177 
12
th Earl of Dundonald, papers relating to service as General Officer Commanding 
Canadian Militia, 1902 to 1904,    233 
 
British Library, London 
Major-General ETH Hutton Papers 
Add Mss 50078, 50083-88, 500113 
Correspondence and Papers relating to Major-General Hutton’s service as General Officer 
Commanding Canadian Militia, 1898 to 1900,  
 
AJ Balfour Papers 
Add Mss 49721 
Correspondence with St. John Brodrick, August to September1905 
 
India Office Library Military and Political collections 
L/P&S/18/A159-A169 Papers relating to Afghanistan 
 
L/MIL/5/716 CID Minutes of Meetings 1-92, 1902-1906 
 
L/MIL/5/717 CID (General) Vol. I 
 
L/MIL/5/720 CID Secret Special Vol. III 
 
L/MIL/5/724 CID Defence of India, Papers 51-75 
 
L/MIL/5/725 CID Defence of India, Papers 76-100 
 
L/MIL/5/726 CID Defence of India, Minutes of Meetings 
 
L/MIL/7/17076 Treaties and Agreements with Foreign Powers – Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
Cooperation of Japan in the defence of India 
 
L/MIL/17/5/1617 Record of Lord Kitchener’s Administration of the Army in India, 1902-
1909 
 
L/MIL/17/5/1739 Report of a Committee Appointed to Consider the Military Defence of 
India, 24 December 1901 
 
L/MIL/17/5/1740 Second Report of a Committee Appointed to Consider the Military 
Defence of India, 30 December 1902 
 
L/MIL/17/5/1741 Scheme for the Redistribution of the Army in India, 1904 
 
L/MIL/17/5/1742 Scheme for the Redistribution of the Army in India and Preparation of 
the Army in India for War, 1904 
 
L/MIL/17/5/1745 Consideration of the Effect of the Anglo-Russian Convention on the 
Strength of the Army in India, 21 October 1907 
 
L/MIL/17/5/1741 Report by Sir O’Moore Creagh on the defence of India against a Russian 
attack, 12 February 1908 
 
L/MIL/17/5/1751/1-7 Army in India Committee Report 
 
L/MIL/17/5/1752 Proceedings of the Army in India Committee, Minutes 
   234 
L/MIL/17/5/1754 Army in India Committee, Introductions and Annexures 
 
L/MIL/17/5/1755 Recommendations of the Army in India Committee 
 
L/MIL/17/5/1756 Memo by Sir O’Moore Creagh on the Report of the Army in India 
Committee 1912 
 
L/MIL/17/5/1810 Report of a Conference of Staff Officers held at Agra, January 1909 
 
L/MIL/17/5/1811 Report of a Conference held under the Direction of the Chief of Staff, 
January 1910 
 
L/MIL/17/5/4286 History of the Military Department of the Government of India 
 
L/MIL/17/5/4287 The Indian Army History and Organisation (E Collen, 1905) 
 
L/MIL/17/5/5463 Report of the Army in India Committee related documents 
 
L/MIL/17/13/7 A Study of the Existing Strategical conditions on the North West Frontier 
of India (1909) 
 
L/MIL/17/13/9 Notes on the Indian Frontiers 
 
L/MIL/17/13/16 Frontier & Overseas Expeditions from India 
 
L/MIL/17/13/20 List of Raids and Outrages Committed on the North West Frontier and in 
Baluchistan from July 1899 to July 1906 
 
L/MIL/17/14/92 Military Report on Tibet, 1910 
 
L/MIL/17/15/26 Russian Military Designs in Persia: A Strategical Fragment (1909) 
 
The National Archives, London 
Cabinet Papers (Committee of Imperial Defence) 
CAB 5/1 Committee of Imperial Defence, Colonial Memoranda (Series C), Nos. 1-40, 
1902 to 1908 
 
CAB 6/1 Committee of Imperial Defence, Defence of India Papers 1-50, Vol. 1 
 
CAB 17/41 Committee of Imperial Defence Miscellaneous Correspondence and 
Memoranda, Canada: Defence of Halifax and Esquimalt, 1904 to 1905 
 
CAB 17/44 Committee of Imperial Defence Miscellaneous Correspondence and 
Memoranda, Canada (i) Militia (ii) Defence of, 1904 to 1910 
 
CAB 38/3 Committee of Imperial Defence Minutes and Memoranda 
 
CAB 38/5 Committee of Imperial Defence Minutes and Memoranda 
 
Colonial Office Papers 
CO 42/868-897 Canada, Original Correspondence, Secretary of State to Dominion of 
Canada, 1898 to 1904   235 
CO 537/476-492 Confidential General and Confidential Original Correspondence relating 
to Canada, 1898 to 1904 
 
Kitchener Papers 
PRO 30/57/22-34 Private Papers of Field Marshal Lord Kitchener relating to tenure as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army in India, 1902 to 1909 
 
War Office  
WO 32/6366 Report of Defence Committee of Canada on Defence Scheme, 1898 to 1899 
 
WO 106/40 Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence, Defence and Operational 
Plans for British Possessions in North America and West Indies, 1896 to 1910 
 
Edited Collections 
Bourne, K., & Watt, D.C., (eds.) British Documents on Foreign Affairs Part 1 Series C  
North America Vols. 10-15 (University Publications of America, 1987) 
Brett, M.V., (ed.) Journals and Letters of Reginald Viscount Esher Vol. II (Nicolson &  
Watson, London, 1934)  
Gooch, G.P., & Temperley, H., (eds.) British Documents on the Origins of the War, 
1898-1914 (HMSO, London, 1926) 
Morris, A.J.A., (ed.) The Letters of Lt Col Charles a Court Repington, CMG, Military  
Correspondent of the Times, 1903-1918 (Army Records Society, Vol. 15, 1999)   
Morrison, E.E., (ed.) The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (Harvard University  
Press, Cambridge, 1951-54)  
Stevens, P., & Saywell, J.T., (eds.) Lord Minto’s Canadian Papers Vol. I & II (The 
Champlain Society, Toronto, 1981)  
 
 
 
   236 
Secondary Sources:- 
 
I) Books:- 
 
Adams, I., Brothers Across the Ocean: British Foreign policy and the Origins of the  
Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’ 1900-1905 (IB Tauris, London, 2005) 
Adams, R.J.Q., & Poirier, P.P., The Conscription Controversy in Britain, 1900-1918  
(Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1987)                          
Bonar Law (John Murray, London, 1999)  
Balfour: The last Grandee (John Murray, London, 2007) 
Adonis, A., Making Aristocracy Work (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993)  
Allen, C., God’s Terrorists (Little Brown, London, 2006)  
Allen, H.C., Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations, 
1783-1952 (Odhams, London,1954)  
Allen, R., Ordeal by Fire: Canada, 1910-1945 (Doubleday, Toronto, 1961)  
Anglesey, Marquis of, A History of the British Cavalry Vol. IV 1899-1913 
(Leo Cooper, London,1986) 
Arnold-Forster, M., HO Arnold Forster: A Memoir (Arnold, London, 1910)  
Asquith, H.H., The Genesis of the War (Cassell, London, 1923)  
Avery, P., et al The Cambridge History of Iran Vol. VII (CUP, Cambridge, 1991)  
Balfour, M., Britain and Joseph Chamberlain (Allen & Unwin, London, 1985) 
Barrow, G., The Fire of Life (Hutchison, London, 1942)  
Barnett, C., Britain and Her Army, 1509-1970 (Allen Lane, London, 1970) 
Bartlett, C.J., Defence and Diplomacy (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1993) 
Bayly, C.A., The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914 (Blackwell, Oxford, 2004) 
Beale, H.K., Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power  
(Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1956) 
Bell, P.M.H., France and Britain, 1900-1940: Entente and Estrangement (Longman,  
London,1996)  
Beloff, M., Imperial Sunset Vol. I  Britain’s Liberal Empire, 1897-1921 
 (Methuen, London, 1969)  
The Great Powers (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1959)  
Bence-Jones, M., The Viceroys of India (Constable, London, 1982) 
Bentley, M., Politics Without Democracy, 1815-1914 (Fontana, London, 1984)  
Berger, C., The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 
1867-1914 (University of Toronto Press, Toronto,1970) 
Berton, P., Marching as to War: Canada’s Turbulent Years 1899-1953 (Doubleday,  
Toronto, 2001)  
Best, A., British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge in Asia, 1914-1941 
 (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2002) 
Birdwood, W.R., Khaki & Gown: An Autobiography (Ward, Lock & Co. Ltd,  
London, 1941)  
Bond, R., The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 1854-1914 (Methuen, London, 1972)  
Borden, R.L., Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs (Macmillan, London, 1938)  
Bothwell, R., (et al) Canada, 1900-1945 (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1985) 
  The Penguin History of Canada (Penguin, London, 2006)  
Bourne, K Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815-1908 
(Longman, London, 1967)  
Bowering, G., Egotists and Autocrats: The Prime Ministers of Canada (Viking, Toronto,  
2002) 
Brebner, J.B., North Atlantic Triangle (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1945)  
Brendon, P., The Decline and Fall of the British Empire (Jonathan Cape, London, 2007) 
Brodrick, S., Records and Reactions, 1856-1939 (John Murray, London, 1939)    237 
Brogan, H., The Penguin History of the United States of America (Penguin, London, 1990)  
Brooks, D., The Age of Upheaval: Edwardian Politics 1899-1914 (Manchester University  
Press, Manchester, 1995)  
Brown, J., Modern India: Origins of an Asian Democracy (OUP, Oxford, 1994)  
Brown, R.C., Canada’s National Policy, 1883-1900: A Study in Canadian- American  
Relations (Greenwood, Westport, 1964)  
Robert Laird Borden Vol. I (Macmillan, Toronto,1975) 
& Cook, R., Canada 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed (McClelland & Stewart, 
Toronto, 1974) 
Buchan, J., Lord Minto: A Memoir (Thomas Nelson & Sons, London, 1924)  
Burk, K., Old World, New World: The Story of Britain and America (Little Brown, 
London, 2007) 
Busch, B.C., Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914 (University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1967)  
Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914-1921 (University of California Press, Berkeley, 
1971)  
Cain, P & Hopkins A.G., British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion 1688 -1 914  
 (Longman, London, 1993)  
Campbell, A.E., Great Britain and the United States 1895-1903 (Longman, London, 1960) 
Campbell, C.S., Anglo-American Understanding 1898-1903 (Johns Hopkins University  
   Press, Baltimore, 1957)  
Cannadine, D., Ornamentalism (Allen Lane, London, 2001)  
The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy (Yale University Press, New 
Haven, 1996) 
Aspects of Aristocracy (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1994) 
Cavaliero, R., Strangers in the Land: The Rise and Decline of the British Indian Empire 
 (IB Tauris, London, 2002) 
Charmley, J., Splendid Isolation? British and the Balance of Power 1874-1914  
(Sceptre, London, 1999)  
Churchill, R.P., The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 (Books for Libraries Press,  
Freeport, 1972)  
Churchill, R.S., Winston S Churchill Vol. II (Heinemann, London, 1969) 
Churchill, W.S., Great Contemporaries (Macmillan, London, 1942) 
Clarke, G., My Working Life (John Murray, London, 1927) 
Cohen, S.P., The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation  
(University of California Press, Berkeley, 1971)  
Collier, B., The Lion and the Eagle: British and Anglo-American Strategy  
(Macdonald, London, 1972) 
Constantine, S., Lloyd George (Routledge, London, 1992)  
Cook, R., The Politics of John W Dafoe (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1963)  
et al, Canada: A Modern Study (Clarke, Irwin, Toronto, 1963)  
Corrigan, G., Sepoys in the Trenches (Spellmount, Stroud, 2006) 
Creagh, O., Autobiography of Sir O’Moore Creagh (Hutchison, London, 1923) 
Curzon, G., (ed. P King) A Viceroy’s India: Leaves from Lord Curzon’s Notebook  
(Sidgwick & Jackson, London, 1984)  
Dafoe, J., Clifford Sifton in Relation to His Times (Macmillan, Toronto, 1931)  
Darby, G., The Origins of the First World War (Longman, Harlow, 1994)  
Darwin, J., After Tamerlane: A Global History of Empire (Allen Lane, London, 2007) 
Das, M.N., India Under Morley and Minto (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1964)  
David, S., The Indian Mutiny 1857 (Viking, London, 2002)  
Victoria’s Wars (Viking, London, 2006) 
Davis, L., & Huttenback, R., Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: The Economics of  
British Imperialism (CUP, Cambridge, 1988)    238 
Davies, N., Europe: A History (OUP, Oxford, 1996)  
Dawson, R.M., Constitutional Issues in Canada, 1900-1931 (OUP, London, 1933) 
De Groot, G.J., Douglas Haig, 1861-1928 (Unwin Hyman, London, 1988)                         
The First World War (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1996)  
Dilks, D., Curzon in India Vols. I & II (Rupert Hart-Davis, London, 1969)  
Dobson, A.P., Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century (Routledge,  
London, 1995)  
D’Ombrain, N., War Machinery and High Policy: Defence Administration in Peacetime 
Britain 1902-1914 (OUP, Oxford, 1973)  
Dundonald, Earl of, My Army Life (Edward Arnold, London, 1926)  
Dunlop, J.K., The Development of the British Army, 1899-1914 (Methuen, London, 1938)  
Edwardes, M., High Noon of Empire: India Under Lord Curzon (Eyre & Spottiswood,  
London, 1965) 
Playing the Great Game (Hamilton, London, 1975)  
Egremont, M., Balfour (Collins, London, 1980) 
Ehrman, J., Cabinet Government and War, 1890-1940 (CUP, Cambridge, 1958)  
Eldridge, C.C., Victorian Imperialism (Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1978)  
Elliot, M.C., India, Minto and Morley, 1905-1910 (Macmillan, London, 1934)  
Farr, D.M.L., The Colonial Office and Canada (University of Toronto Press, Toronto,  
1955)  
Farwell, B., Armies of the Raj: From the Mutiny to Independence, 1858-1947 (WW  
Norton, New York, 1986)  
Feuchtwanger, E., Democracy and Empire: Britain 1865-1914 (Arnold, London, 1985) 
Ferguson, N., Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World (Allen Lane, London, 2003)  
The Pity of War (Penguin, London, 1998)  
Colossus (Penguin, London, 2004)  
Ferro, M., The Great War (Routledge, London, 1973) 
Field, L., The Forgotten War: Australia and the Boer War (Melbourne University Press,   
Melbourne, 1979)  
Fieldhouse, D., The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Study from the Eighteenth  
Century (Macmillan, London, 1982)  
Fraser, P., Joseph Chamberlain: Radicalism and Empire, 1868 - 1914 (Cassell, London,  
1966) 
Lord Esher (Hart-Davis McGibbon, London, 1973) 
Fredericks, D.G., The Sepoy and The Cossack (W.H. Allen, London, 1972)  
French, D., British Economic and Strategic Planning 1905-1915 (Allen & Unwin, London,  
1982) 
  The British Way in Warfare 1688-2000 (Unwin, London, 1990)  
Friedberg, A.L., The Weary Titan (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1988)  
Fry, M., The Scottish Empire (Birlinn, Edinburgh, 2001)  
Gallagher, J., The Decline, Revival, and Fall of the British Empire (CUP, Cambridge, 
1982)  
Garvin, J.L., The Life of Joseph Chamberlain (Macmillan, London, 1932)  
Gilbert, M., Servant of India (Longman, London, 1966)  
Gillard, D., The Struggle for Asia, 1828-1914 (Methuen, London, 1977)  
Gilmour, D., Curzon (John Murray, London, 1994)  
Girouard, M., The Return to Camelot: Chivalry and the English Gentleman (Yale  
University Press, London, 1981) 
Glazebrook, G.P.D., A History of Canadian External Relations (OUP, Toronto, 1950) 
Gollin, A.M., Proconsul in Politics: A Study of Lord Milner in Opposition and Power  
(Blond, London, 1964) 
Balfour’s Burden: Arthur Balfour and Imperial Preference (Anthony Blond,  
London, 1965)    239 
Gooch, J., The Plans of War (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1974)  
The Prospect of War (Frank Cass, London, 1981)  
Gopal, S., British Policy in India, 1858-1905 (CUP, Cambridge, 1965)  
Goradia, N., Lord Curzon (OUP, Delhi, 1993)  
Gordon, D.C., The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defence, 1870-1914        
 (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1965)  
Gould, L.L., The Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt (University Press of Kansas,  
Kansas, 1991)  
Graubard, S., The Presidents (Penguin, London, 2004)  
Greaves, R.L., Persia and the Defence of India, 1884-1892 (Athlone Press, London, 1959)  
Green, E.H.H., The Crisis of Conservatism: The Politics, Economics and Ideology of the 
British Conservative Party, 1880-1914 (Routledge, London, 1995)  
Grey, E., Twenty Five Years Vol. I (Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1925)  
Grey, J., The Australian Army (OUP, Melbourne, 2001)  
Grierson, E., The Imperial Dream (Collins, London, 1972)  
Hamer, D.A., John Morley (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1968)  
Hamer, W.S., The British Army: Civil-Military Relations, 1885-1905 (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1970)  
Hamilton, K., Bertie of Thame: Edwardian Ambassador (Boydell, Woodbridge, 1990)  
Hankey, M., The Supreme Command 1914-1918 (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 
1961) 
Hardinge, C., My Indian Years (John Murray, London, 1948)  
Hattersley, R., The Edwardians (Abacus, London, 2006) 
Hazlehurst, C., Politicians at War (Cape, London, 1971)  
Heathcote, T.P., The Indian Army (Hippocrene, New York, 1974)  
The Military in British India (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1995)  
Headrick, D.R., The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the  
Nineteenth Century (OUP, New York, 1981)  
Heller, J., British Policy Towards the Ottoman Empire 1908-1914 (Cass, London, 1983)  
Henig, R., The Origins of the First World War (Routledge, London, 1989)  
Herrmann, D., The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1996) 
Hobsbawm, E., The Age of Empire (Abacus, London, 1989) 
Hobson, J.A., Imperialism: A Study (Constable, London, 1905)  
Holland, R., The Pursuit of Greatness: Britain and the World Role, 1900-1970  
 (Fontana, London, 1991) 
Hopkins, A.G., The Future of the Imperial Past (CUP, Cambridge, 1997) 
Howard, C.H.D., Splendid Isolation (Macmillan, London, 1967)  
Howard, M., The Continental Commitment (Temple Smith, London, 1972)  
The Lessons of History (OUP, Oxford, 1991)  
Studies in War and Peace (Temple Smith, London, 1971) 
The First World War (OUP, Oxford, 2002) 
Hughes, M., Inside the Enigma: British Officials in Russia, 1900-1939 (Hambledon, 
London, 1997)  
Hyam, R., Britain’s Imperial Century, 1815-1914 (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 
1993) 
Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office 1905-1908 (Macmillan, London, 1968)  
Ismay, H., The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay (Heinemann, London, 1960)  
Jay, R., Joseph Chamberlain: A Political Study (OUP, Oxford, 1981)  
James, L., The Rise and Fall of the British Empire (Abacus, London, 1995) 
Raj: The Making of British India (Abacus, London, 1997) 
Jeffery, K., Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson (OUP, Oxford, 2006) 
Jenkins, R., Asquith (Collins, London, 1963)    240 
  Churchill (Pan, London, 2002) 
Johnson, A.F., Defence by Committee: The British CID 1885-1959 (OUP, London, 1960)  
Johnson, R., British Imperialism (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, London, 2003)  
Joll, J., The Origins of the First World War (Longman, London, 1992)  
The Unspoken Assumptions (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1972)  
Europe Since 1870 (Penguin, London, 1988)  
Judd, D., Balfour and the British Empire (Macmillan, London, 1968) 
Empire (Harper Collins, London, 1996)  
Radical Joe (Hamilton, London, 1977)  
The Boer War (John Murray, London, 2002)  
The Lion and the Tiger: The Rise and Fall of the British Raj (OUP, Oxford, 2004) 
Kaminsky, A.P., The India Office 1880-1910 (Mansell, London, 1986)  
Kazemzadeh, F., Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914 (Yale University Press,  
New Haven, 1968)  
Keenleyside,  H.L., The Growth of Canadian Policies in External Affairs (CUP,  
Cambridge, 1960) 
Kendle, J., The Colonial and Imperial Conferences, 1887-1911 (Longman, London, 1967)  
Kennedy, P., The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (Penguin, London, 1983)  
The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military  
Conflict from 1500-2000 (Fontana, London, 1988)  
The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (George Allen & Unwin 
Ltd., London, 1980)  
The Realities Behind Diplomacy (Fontana, London, 1981)  
Koss, S.E., Asquith (Allen Lane, London, 1976)  
Lord Haldane: Scapegoat for Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 
New York, 1969)  
John Morley at the India Office, 1905-1910 (Yale University Press, London, 1970)  
Kubicek, C.V., The Administration of Imperialism: Joseph Chamberlain at the Colonial 
Office (Duke University Press, Durham, 1978) 
Lambert, N.A., Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution (University of South Carolina  
           Press, Columbia, 1999)    
Langhorne, R.T.B., The Collapse of the Concert of Europe and International Politics 
1890-1914 (Macmillan, London, 1981)  
Lawrence, W.R., The India We Served (Cassell, London, 1928) 
Lee, C., This Sceptred Isle: Empire (BBC Books, London, 2005)  
Lieven, D., Russia and the Origins of the First World War (Macmillan, London, 1983)  
The Aristocracy in Europe 1815-1914 (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1992) 
Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals (John Murray, London, 2000) 
Lloyd, T.O., Empire (Hambledon, London, 2001) 
The British Empire 1558-1995 (OUP, Oxford, 1996) 
Lowe, C.J., The Reluctant Imperialists (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1967)  
& Dockrill, M., The Mirage of Power (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1972)  
Luvaas, J., The Education of an Army: British Military Thought, 1815-1940 (Cassell,  
London, 1965) 
Mackay, R.F., Balfour: Intellectual Statesman (OUP, Oxford, 1985)  
Macmunn, G., Behind the Scenes in Many Wars (John Murray, London, 1930) 
Magnus, P., King Edward VII (London, John Murray, 1964) 
Kitchener: Portrait of an Imperialist (London, John Murray, 1958)  
Maier, C., Among Empires: American Ascendancy and its Predecessors 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2006) 
Marlowe, J., Milner: Apostle of Empire (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1976) 
Marsh, P.T., Joseph Chamberlain (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1994)  
Marshall-Cornwall, J., Haig as Military Commander (Batsford, London, 1973)    241 
Mason, P., A Matter of Honour (Cape, London, 1974)  
Matthew, H.C., The Liberal Imperialists (OUP, London, 1973)  
Mayer, A., The Persistence of the Old Regime (Croom Helm, London, 1981)  
McKale, D.M., War by Revolution: Britain and Germany in the Middle East in the Era of  
World War I (Kent State University Press, Kent, 1998)  
McLean, D., Britain and her Buffer State: The Collapse of the Persian Empire 1890- 
1914 (Royal Historical Society, London, 1979)  
McNaught, K., The Penguin History of Canada (Penguin, London, 1988) 
McNeil, W.H., The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force and Society Since AD 
1000 (Blackwell, Oxford, 1983)  
Mehra, P., The McMahon Line and After (Macmillan, London, 1974)  
Mehrotra, S.R., India and the Commonwealth (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 
1965)  
Metcalf, T.R., Ideologies of the Raj (CUP, Cambridge, 1995) 
Miller, C., The Canadian Career of the Fourth Earl of Minto: The Education of a  
Viceroy (Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Waterloo, 1980)  
Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899-1902  
(Canadian War Museum Press, Ottawa, 1998) 
Moberley, F.J., Military Operations: The Campaign in Mesopotamia (HMSO, 
London, 1923)  
Mollo, B., The Indian Army (Blandford Press, Poole, 1981) 
Monger, G.W., The End of Isolation: British Foreign policy, 1900-1907 (Nelson,  
London, 1963) 
Moon, P The British Conquest and Dominion of India (Duckworth, London, 1989)  
Moore, R.J., Liberalism and Indian Politics, 1872-1922 (E Arnold, London, 1966)  
Moreman, T.R., The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849-                     
1947 (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1998)  
Morley, J., Recollections Vol. II (Macmillan, London, 1917)  
Morris, A.J.A., The Scaremongers: The Advocacy of War and Rearmament 1896-1914  
                        (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1984)  
Morton, D., Ministers and Generals: Politics and the Canadian Militia, 1868-1904 
(University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1970) 
A Peculiar Kind of Politics: Canada’s Overseas Ministry in the First World  
War (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1984) 
Canada at War: A Military and Political History (Butterworth, Toronto, 1981)  
Morton, W.L., The Canadian Identity (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1961)  
Mosley, L., Curzon (Longman, London, 1961)  
The Glorious Fault: The Life of Lord Curzon (Harcourt Brace, New York, 1960)  
Nanda, B.R., Gokhale: The Indian Moderates and the British Raj (OUP, Delhi, 1977) 
Nasson, B., The South African War, 1899-1902 (Arnold, London, 1999)  
Neale, R.G., Britain and American Imperialism, 1898-1900 (University of Queensland  
 Press, Brisbane, 1965)  
Neilson, K., Britain and the Last Tsar (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995)  
Neuendorff, G., Studies in the Evolution of Dominion Status (Allen & Unwin,  
London, 1942)  
Nish, I.H., Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations 1908-1923  
(Athlone Press, London, 1972) 
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires  
(Athlone Press, London, 1966) 
O’Brien, T., Milner (Constable, London, 1979)  
O’Dwyer, M., India as I Knew It, 1885-1925 (Constable, London, 1925) 
Offer, A., The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation (Clarendon Press, Oxford,  
1989)    242 
Omissi, D., The Sepoy and The Raj (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1999)  
Orchard, D., The Fight for Canada: Four Centuries of Resistance to US Expansionism  
 (Stoddart, Toronto, 1993)  
Orde, A., The Eclipse of Great Britain, The United States and British Imperial Decline  
(Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1996) 
Ovendale, R., Anglo-American Relations in the 20
th Century (Macmillan, 
Basingstoke, 1998)  
Owen, R., Lord Cromer (OUP, Oxford, 2004)  
Page, R.J.D., The Boer War and Canadian Imperialism (Canadian Historical Association,  
Ottawa, 1987)  
Pakenham, T., The Boer War (Weidnefeld & Nicolson, London, 1999)  
Penlington, N., Canada and Imperialism, 1896-1899 (University of Toronto Press,  
Toronto, 1965) 
The Alaska Boundary Dispute: A Critical Reappraisal (McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 
Toronto, 1972) 
Perkins, B., The Great Rapprochement, Britain and the United States, 1895-1914  
(Gollancz, London, 1969) 
Phillips, C.H., The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 1858-1947 (OUP, Oxford, 1962) 
Phillips, G.D., The Diehards: Aristocratic Society and Politics in Edwardian England 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1979) 
Pollock, J., Kitchener (Constable, London, 2001) 
Popplewell, R., Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the Defence 
Of the Indian Empire, 1904-1924 (Frank Cass, London,1995)  
Porter, A., European Imperialism (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1994)  
Porter, B., The Lion’s Share: A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850-1996  
 (Longman, London, 1996)  
Britain, Europe and the World, 1850-1982: Delusions of Grandeur (Allen &  
Unwin, London, 1983) 
The Absent-Minded Imperialists (OUP, Oxford, 2004)  
            Empire and Superempire (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2006) 
Preston, R.A., Canada and ‘Imperial Defense’: a Study in the Origins of the British 
Commonwealth’s Defense Organisation, 1867-1919 (Duke University Press, 
Durham, 1967) 
The Defence of an Undefended Border: Planning for War in North 
America (McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal & London, 1977)  
Pugh, M., The Making of Modern British Politics (Blackwell, Oxford, 1982)  
Reid, W., Architect of Victory: Douglas Haig (Birlinn, Edinburgh, 2006) 
Reynolds, D., Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 20
th Century 
 (Longman, London, 1991)  
Richards, D.S., The Savage Frontier: A History of the Anglo-Afghan Wars (Pan  
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2003) 
Robbins, K., The Eclipse of a Great Power (Longman, London, 1994)  
The First World War (OUP, Oxford, 1985)  
Robinson, R., & Gallagher, J., Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of  
Imperialism (Macmillan, London, 1981)  
Roberts, A., Salisbury: Victorian Titan (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1999)  
A History of the English-Speaking People Since 1900 (Weidenfeld &Nicolson, 
London, 2006) 
Roberts, J., Europe 1880-1945 (Longman, Harlow, 2001)  
Roberts, P.E., The History of British India (OUP, London, 1921) 
Roberston, B., Sir Wilfrid Laurier: The Great Conciliator (Quarry Press, Kingston, 1991)  
Ronaldshay, Earl of, The Life of Lord Curzon (Ernest Benn, London, 1928)  
Roskill, S., Hankey: Man of Secrets (Collins, London, 1970)    243 
Rowland, P., The Last Liberal Government Vols. I & II (Barrie & Rockliffe, London, 
1968 - 71)  
Royle, T., The Enigma of Lord Kitchener (Joseph, London, 1985) 
Said, E., Orientalism (Penguin, London, 1995) 
Sarkar, S., Modern India, 1885-1947 (Macmillan, London, 1989)  
Seal, A., The Emergence of Indian Nationalism (CUP, Cambridge, 1968)  
Searle, G.R., The Quest for National Efficiency (Blackwell, Oxford, 1971)  
A New England? Peace and War 1886-1918 (OUP, Oxford, 2004) 
Shannon, R., The Crisis of Imperialism 1865-1915 (Hart-Davis McGibbon, London, 1974) 
The Age of Salisbury, 1881-1902: Unionism & Empire (Longman, London, 1996) 
Sheffield, G., Forgotten Victory The First World War: Myths and Realities 
 (Review, London, 2002) 
Sheffy, Y., British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign 1914-1918 (Frank 
Cass, London, 1998)  
Shinn, R.F., Arthur Berridale Keith: The Chief Ornament of Scottish Learning 
(Aberdeen University Press, Aberdeen, 1990) 
Siegel, J., Endgame: Britain, Russia and the Final Struggle for Central Asia  
(IB Tauris, London, 2002) 
Skelton, O.D., The Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier Vol. II (The Century Co.,  
New York, 1922)  
Smith, I.R., The Origins of the South African War 1899-1902 (Longman, London, 1996)  
Spear, P., A History of India Vol. II (Penguin, London, 1990)  
Spiers, E.M., Haldane : An Army Reformer (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1980) 
The Late Victorian Army, 1868-1902 (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 
1992)  
The Army and Society, 1815-1914 (Longman, London, 1980)  
Stacey, C.P., Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Relations  
 Vol. I 1867-1923 (Macmillan, Toronto, 1977) 
Stanley, G.F.G., Canada’s  Soldiers (Macmillan, Toronto, 1960)  
Steele, D., Salisbury: A Political Biography (UCL Press, London, 1999)  
Steiner, Z., & Neilson, K., Britain and the Origins of the First World War (2
nd Ed.,  
Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2003)  
The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (CUP, Cambridge, 1969) 
Stevenson, D., Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe 1904-1914 (Clarendon Press,  
Oxford, 1996)  
The First World War and International Politics (OUP, Oxford, 1988)  
The Outbreak of the First World War (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1995)  
1914-1918: The History of the First World War (Penguin, London, 2004) 
Stone, N., Europe Transformed 1878-1919 (2
nd Ed., Blackwell, Oxford, 1999)  
Strachan, H., The First World War Vol. I: To Arms (OUP, Oxford, 2001)  
The Politics of the British Army (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997)  
Streets, H., Martial Races (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2004) 
Swinson, A., North West Frontier (Hutchison, London, 1967)  
Sumida, J.T., In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology and British Naval 
Policy 1899-1914 (Unwin Hyman, London, 1989)  
Taylor, A.J.P., The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918 (Clarendon Press, Oxford,  
1954) 
Terraine, J., Ordeal of Victory (Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1963) 
Thompson, A.S., Imperial Britain (Longman, Harlow, 2000)  
Thompson F.M.L., English Landed Society in the 19
th Century (Routledge & Kegan Paul,  
London, 1963) 
Thomson, D., Europe Since Napoleon (Penguin, London, 1957)  
Tilchin, W., Theodore Roosevelt and the British Empire: A Study in Presidential    244 
    Statecraft (St Martin’s Press, New York, 1997)  
Travers, T.H.E., The Killing Ground: Command and Technology on the Western Front, 
1900-1918 (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2003)  
Wade, M., The French-Canadians (Macmillan, London, 1955)  
Waite, P., Canada 1874-1896: Arduous Destiny (McLelland & Stewart, Toronto, 1974) 
Wasti, S.R., Lord Minto and the Indian Nationalist Movement 1905-1910 (Clarendon  
Press, Oxford, 1964) 
Watt, D.C., Personalities and Politics (Longman, London, 1965)  
Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain’s Place, 1900-1975 (CUP,  
Cambridge, 1984)  
Webster, A., The Debate on the Rise of the British Empire (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 2006) 
Westwood, J.N., Russia Against Japan, 1904-5 (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1986)  
Williams, R., Defending the Empire (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1991)  
Williamson, S.R., The Politics of Grand Strategy (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 1969)  
Willison, J., Reminiscences Political & Personal (McLelland & Stewart, Toronto, 1919)  
Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberal Party: A Political History (John Murray,  
London, 1903)  
Wilson, A.N., The Victorians (Hutchison, London, 2002)  
After the Victorians (Hutchison, London, 2005)  
Wilson, J., CB: A Life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman (Constable, London, 1973)  
Wilson, K., The Policy of The Entente (CUP, Cambridge, 1985)                   
Empire and Continent (Mansell, London, 1987)  
Wolpert, S., A New History of India (OUP, New York, 1997)  
Morley and India, 1906-1910 (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967)  
Woodruff, P., The Men Who Ruled India (Jonathan Cape, London, 1954)  
Young, J.W., Britain and the World in the Twentieth Century (Edward Arnold, London,  
1997)  
Young, K., Arthur James Balfour (Bell, London, 1963)  
Zebel, S.H., Balfour: A Political Biography (CUP, Cambridge, 1977)   245 
ii) Edited Books:- 
 
Archer, C., & Travers, T.H.E., (eds.) Men at War: Politics, Technology & Innovation in  
the 20
th Century (Precedent, Chicago, 1982)  
Beckett, I. & Gooch, J. (eds.) Politicians and Defence (Manchester University Press,  
  Manchester, 1981) 
Bourne, K., & Watt, D.C., (eds.) Studies in International History (Longman, London, 
  1967)  
Brock, M., & Brock, E., (eds.) HH Asquith, Letters to Venetia Stanley (OUP, Oxford, 
             1982)    
Brown, J., & Louis, W., (eds.) The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. IV 
The 20
th Century (OUP, Oxford, 1999)  
Brown, R.C., (ed.) The Illustrated History of Canada (Key Porter Books, Toronto, 2000) 
Buckner, P., (ed.) Canada and the British Empire (OUP, Oxford, 2008) 
Careless, J.M.S., & Brown, R.C. (eds.), The Canadians 1867-1967 (Macmillan, Toronto,  
1967)  
Chandler, D (ed.) The Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army (OUP, Oxford, 1994) 
Dawson, R.M., (ed.) The Development of Dominion Status: 1900-1936 (OUP, Oxford,  
1937)  
Dilks, D., (ed.) Retreat from Power (Macmillan, London, 1981)  
Dockrill, M., & French, D., (eds.) Strategy and Intelligence: British Policy and  
Intelligence During the First World War (Hambledon, London, 1996) 
Dodwell, H.H (ed.) The Cambridge History of the British Empire Vol. V The Indian 
Empire, 1858-1918 (CUP, Cambridge, 1932) 
Dummett, R., (ed.) Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Imperialism (Longman, 
London, 1999) 
Eddy, J., & Schreuder, D., (eds.) The Rise of Colonial Nationalism (Allen & Unwin,  
Sydney, 1988)  
Eldridge, C.C., (ed.) British Imperialism in the 19
th Century (Macmillan, London, 1984)  
Freedman, L., et al (eds.) War, Strategy and International Politics (Clarendon Press,  
Oxford, 1992)  
French, D., Reid, B.H., (eds.) The British General Staff: Reform and Innovation c.1890- 
1939 (Frank Cass, London, 2002) 
Gifford, P., & Louis, W.R., (eds.) Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and 
Colonial Rule (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967)  
France and Britain in Africa (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1971)  
Gilbert, M., (ed.) A Century of Conflict, 1850-1950 (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1966)  
Gourvish, T.R., & O’Day A., (eds.) Later Victorian Britain (Macmillan, Basingstoke,  
1988)  
Guha, R., (ed.) Subaltern Studies I: Writings on South Asian History and Society  
 (OUP, New Delhi, 1982)  
Guy, A.J., & Boyden, P.B., (eds.) Soldiers of the Raj (National Army Museum, London,  
1997) 
Hadley, M., et al (eds.) A Nation’s Navy (McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal,  
1996)  
Hearder, H., & Loyn, H.R., British Government and Administration (University of Wales
  Press, Cardiff, 1974) 
Hinsley, F.H., (ed.) British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey (CUP, 
Cambridge, 1977)  
Howard, M., (ed.) Soldiers and Governments: Nine Studies in Civil-Military Relations 
 (Indian University Press, Bloomington, 1959)  
Hyam, R., & Martin, G., (eds.) Reappraisals in British Imperial History (Macmillan,  
London, 1977)   246 
Kennedy, G., & Neilson, K., (eds.) Far-Flung Lines (Frank Cass, London, 1996)  
(ed.), Imperial Defence: The Old World Order, 1856-1956 (Routledge, London, 
2008)                                                      
Kennedy, P., (ed.) The War Plans of the Great Powers (George Allen, London, 1979) 
& Nicholls, A., (eds.) Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Britain and Germany 
before 1914 (Macmillan, London, 1981)  
Kennedy, W.P.M., (ed.) The Cambridge History of the British Empire Vol. VI Canada  
and Newfoundland (CUP, Cambridge, 1930) 
Krieger, L., & Stern, F., (eds.) The Responsibility of Power (Macmillan, London, 1967)  
Lloyd-Jones, H., et al (eds.) History and Imagination (Duckworth, London, 1984) 
Louis, W.R., (ed.) Imperialism: The Robinson-Gallagher Controversy (New Viewpoints,  
New York, 1976) 
Lowry, D., (ed.) The South African War Reappraised (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 2000)  
Mackintosh, J.P., British Prime Ministers in the Twentieth Century (Weidendfeld &  
Nicolson, London, 1977)  
Marshall, P (ed.) The Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire (CUP,  
Cambridge, 1996) 
Massey, H.J., (ed.) The Canadian Military: A Profile (Copp Clark, Toronto, 1972)  
May, E.R., (ed.) Knowing One’s Enemies (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984)  
McKercher, B.J.C., & Aronsen, L., (eds.) The North Atlantic Triangle in a Changing  
World (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1996) 
Morris, A.J.A., (ed.) Edwardian Radicalism, 1900-1914 (Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, London, 1974)  
Munro, J.A., (ed.) The Alaska Boundary Dispute Issue in Canadian History (Copp & 
Clark, Toronto, 1970) 
Murfett, M.H., (ed.) The First Sea Lords (Praeger, London, 1995)  
O’Brien, P.P., (ed.) The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Routledge, London, 2004) 
O’Day, A., (ed.) The Edwardian Age: Conflict and Stability, 1900-1914 (Macmillan,  
London, 1979) 
Omissi, D., & Thompson, A., (eds.) The Impact of the South African War (Palgrave  
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2002)  
Page, R., (ed.) Imperialism and Canada, 1895-1903 (Holt, Rinehart & Winston,  
Toronto, 1972) 
Paret, P., (ed.) Makers of Modern Strategy (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986)  
Porter, A., (ed.) The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. III The Nineteenth 
Century (OUP, Oxford, 1999)  
Read, D., (ed.) Edwardian England (Croom Helm, London, 1982)  
Saywell, J.T., (ed.) The Canadian Journal of Lady Aberdeen (The Champlain Society 
Toronto, 1960)  
Sampson, J., (ed.) The British Empire (OUP, Oxford, 2001)  
Smith, P., (ed.) Government and the Armed forces in Britain, 1856-1990 (Hambledon, 
London, 1996)  
Steinberg, J.W., et al (eds.) The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War  
Zero (Brill, Boston, 2005)  
Strachan, H., (ed.) Big Wars and Small Wars (Routledge, London, 2006) 
Waites, N., (ed.) Troubled Neighbours: Franco-British Relations in the 20
th Century  
(Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1971)  
Wallace, P., & Askew, C., (eds.) Power, Public Opinion and Diplomacy (Duke  
University Press, Durham, 1959)  
Wilson, K., (ed.) British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Policy from the Crimean War 
to the First World War (Croom Helm, London, 1987) 
Decisions for War, 1914 (UCL Press, London,1995)    247 
The International Impact of the Boer War (Acumen, Chesham, 2001)  
Winks, R.W., (ed.) The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. V: Historiography 
 (OUP, Oxford, 1999)  
The  Historiography  of  the  British  Empire-Commonwealth  (Duke  University 
Press, Durham, 1966)   248 
 
iii)  Articles:- 
 
Andrew, C., ‘France and the Making of the Entente Cordiale’ HJ 10 (1967), pp. 89-95 
Anon., ‘The Canadian Militia Before the Great War’ CHR 4 (1923), pp. 98-104    
Arenson, A., ‘Anglo-Saxonism in the Yukon’ PHR 76 (2007), pp. 373-404 
Auld, J.W., ‘The Liberal Pro-Boers’ JBS 13 (1973), pp. 78-99  
Bailey, T.A., ‘Theodore Roosevelt and the Alaska Boundary Settlement’ CHR 18 (1937),  
pp. 123-130 
Baker, W.M., ‘A Case Study of Anti-Americanism in English Speaking Canada: The 
Election Campaign of 1911’ CHR 51 (1970), pp. 426-449  
Bartlett, R., & Shimazu, N., ‘Rising Sun, Sinking Bear’ BBC History 5 (2) (2004), pp. 38- 
41 
Beynon, J., ‘Overlords of Empire’ JICH 19 (1991), pp. 165-202 
Boyle, T., ‘The Formation of the Campbell-Bannerman Government in December 1905’ 
BIHR 45 (1972), pp. 283-302 
Bray, M.R., ‘Fighting as an Ally: The English Patriotic Response to the Great War’ CHR  
  61 (1980), pp. 141-168 
Buckner, P., ‘Casting Daylight Upon Magic: Deconstructing the Royal Tour of 1901 to 
Canada’ JICH 31 (2003), pp. 158-189 
‘Whatever Happened to the British Empire?’ JCHA IV (1993), pp. 3-31 
Burrell, R.M., ‘Arms and Afghans in Makran: An Episode in Anglo-Persian Relations,  
1905-1912’ B SOAS 49 (1986), pp. 8-24 
Burton, D.H., ‘Theodore Roosevelt and his English Correspondents’ TAPS 63 (1973), pp.  
1-70 
Butterfield, H. ‘Sir Edward Grey in July 1914’ Historical Studies 5 (1965), pp. 1-25 
Cannadine, D., ‘Ornamentalism’ History Today 51 (2001), pp. 12-19 
Clippingdale, R., ‘J.S Willison and Canadian Nationalism 1886-1902’Canadian  
Historical Association Papers (1969), pp. 74-93  
Cohen, S.A., ‘The Genesis of the British Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914’ Middle 
Eastern Studies 12 (1976), pp. 119-132  
 ‘Mesopotamia in British Strategy, 1903-1914’ International Journal of  
              Middle Eastern Studies 9 (1978), pp. 171-181  
Cohen, S.H., ‘Issue, Role and Personality: The Kitchener-Curzon Dispute’ CSHS 10 
(1967-8), pp. 337-55 
Cole, D., ‘The Problem of “Nationalism” and “Imperialism” in Britain’s Settlement 
Colonies’ JBS 10 (1971), pp. 160-182 
Coogan, J.W., & Coogan, P.F., ‘The British Cabinet and the Anglo-French Staff Talks: 
Who Knew What and When Did He Know it?’ JBS 24 (1985), pp. 110-131                                           
Cook, T., ‘George R Parkin and the Concept of Britannic Idealism’ JCS 10 (Aug 1975),  
pp.15-31 
Cooper, F., ‘Empires Multiplied’ CSHS 46 (2004), pp. 247-272 
Cosgrove, R.A., ‘A Note on Lloyd George’s Speech at the Mansion House, 21 July 1911’  
HJ 12(1969), pp. 698-701 
Cross, J.A., ‘The Colonial Office and the Dominions before 1914’ JCPS 4 (July 1966), pp.  
138-148 
Darwin, J., ‘Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion’ EHR 
112 (1997), pp. 614-642  
De Groot, G., ‘Educated Soldier or Cavalry Officer? Contradictions in the pre-1914 
Career of Douglas Haig’ War & Society 4 (1986), pp. 51-69  
Edwards, D., ‘Mad Mullahs and Englishmen: Discourse in the Colonial Encounter’ 
CSHS 31 (1989), pp. 648-70 
Edwards, E.W., ‘The Far Eastern Agreements of 1907’ JModH 26 (1954), pp. 340-355   249 
 ‘The Japanese Alliance and the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904’  
History 42 (1957), pp. 19-27 
Edwardes, M., ‘The Viceroyalty of Lord Curzon’ History Today 12 (1962), pp. 833-844  
Eksteins, M., ‘Sir Edward Grey and Imperial Germany in 1914’ JCH 6 (1971), pp. 121- 
131 
‘Some Notes on Grey’s Policy in July 1914’ HJ 15(1972), pp. 321-324 
Fairbanks, C., ‘The Origins of the Dreadnought Revolution’ IHR 13 (1991), pp. 246-272 
Ferguson, N., ‘Germany and the Origins of the First World War: New Perspectives’  
             HJ 35 (1992), pp. 725-52   
Fieldhouse, D., ‘Can Humpty-Dumpty be put Together Again? Imperial History in the 
  1980s’ JICH 13 (1985), pp. 9-23 
Fraser, T.G., ‘Germany and Indian Revolution’ JCH 12 (1977), pp. 255-272 
‘India in Anglo-Japanese Relations During the First World War’ History  
 63 (1978), pp. 366-382  
 ‘Canada and the Sikh Problem, 1907-1922’ JICH 7(1978), pp.  35-55 
French, D., ‘The Edwardian Crisis and the Origins of the First World War’ IHR 4 (1982),  
pp. 207-221 
‘Spy Fever in Britain, 1900-1915’ HJ 21 (1978), pp. 355-370 
Galbraith, J.S., ‘The British South Africa Company and the Jameson Raid’ JBS 10 (1970),  
pp. 145-161 
  ‘British War Aims in World War I: A Commentary on Statesmanship’ 
JICH 13 (1984), pp. 25-45 
Gluek, A.C., ‘The Invisible Revision of the Rush-Bagot Agreement’ CHR 60 (1979), pp.  
466-484 
 ‘The Passamaquoddy Bay Treaty, 1910’ CHR 47 (1966), pp. 1-21 
Goddard, E., ‘The Indian Army: Company and Raj’ Asian Affairs 7 (1976), pp. 263-276 
Golant, W., ‘Imperialism and India’ History 66 (1981), pp. 61-68  
Goold, D., ‘Lord Hardinge and the Mesopotamia Expedition and Inquiry, 1914-1917’ HJ  
19 (1976), pp. 919-945 
Gordon, D.C., ‘The Admiralty and Dominion Navies, 1902-1914’ JModH 33 (1961),  
pp. 407-422 
 ‘The CDC and Imperial Collaboration: 1855-1904’ Political Science  
Quarterly 77 (1962), pp. 526-545 
Gordon, M., ‘Domestic Conflict and the Origins of the First World War: The British and  
German Cases’ JModH 46 (1974), pp. 191-226 
Gowen, R., ‘British Legerdemain at the 1911 Conference: The Dominions, Defense  
Planning and the Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance’ JModH 52 
(1980), pp. 385-413  
Grayson, R.S., ‘Imperialism in Conservative Defence and Foreign Policy: Leo Amery         
and the Chamberlains, 1903-1939’ JICH 34 (2006), pp. 505-527 
Greaves, R.L., ‘Some Aspects of the Anglo-Russian Convention and its Working in  
Persia, 1907-1914’ BSOAS 31 (1968), pp. 69-91 
 ‘Seistan in Indian Frontier Policy’ BSOAS 49 (1986), pp. 90-102 
 ‘Themes in British Policy Towards Persia in Relation to Indian Frontier  
Defence 1798-1914’ Asian Affairs 22, 1 (1991), pp. 35-45 
Green, E.H.H., ‘Radical Conservatism: The Electoral Genesis of Tariff Reform’ HJ  
28 (1985), pp. 667-692  
Greenhut, J., ‘The Imperial Reserve: The Indian Corps on the Western Front, 1914-15’ 
JICH 12 (1983), pp. 55-73 
 ‘Race, Sex and War’ Military Affairs 40 (1981), pp. 71-74 
 ‘Sahib and Sepoy’ Military Affairs 43 (1984), pp. 15-18 
Grenville, J.A.S., ‘Diplomacy and War Plans in the United States, 1890-1917’  
TRHS 11 (1961), pp. 1-21   250 
‘Britain and the Isthmian Canal, 1898-1901’ AHR 61 (1955), pp. 48-69   
Gundy, H.P., ‘Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Lord Minto’ Canadian Historical Association  
Annual Report (1952), pp. 28-38 
Harris, J.F., &  Hazlehurst, C., ‘Campbell-Bannerman as Prime Minister’ History 55 
 (1970), pp. 360-383 
Hatton, P.H.S., ‘Britain and Germany in 1914: The July Crisis and War Aims’ P&P 36    
 (1967), pp. 138-143 
Hayes, P., ‘British Foreign Policy and the Influence of Empire, 1870-1920’ JICH 12  
                 (1984), pp. 102-124 
Hazlehurst, C., ‘Asquith as Prime Minister, 1908-1916’ EHR 85 (1970), pp. 502-531 
Headrick, D.R., ‘The Tools of Imperialism’ JModHist 51 (1979), pp. 231-263 
Henige, D., ‘Omphaloskepsis and the Infantilising of History’ Journal of African History 
36 (1995), pp. 311-318 
Hendley, M., ‘“Help Us to Secure a Strong, Healthy, Prosperous and Peaceful Britain”:  
The Social Arguments of the Campaign for Compulsory Service in Britain, 
1899-1914’ CJH 30 (1995), pp. 261-288 
Hiley, N., ‘The Failure of British Espionage against Germany, 1907-1914’ HJ 26      
 (1983), pp. 867-889   
The Failure of British Counter-Espionage against Germany, 1907-1914’ 
HJ 28 (1985), pp. 835-862  
Hopkins, A.G., ‘Back to the Future: From National History to Imperial History’ P&P 164  
 (1999), pp.198-243 
 ‘Capitalism, Nationalism and the New American Empire’ JICH 35 (2007), pp. 95- 
117 
Howard, C., ‘Splendid Isolation’ History 47 (1962), pp. 32-41  
 ‘The Policy of Isolation’ HJ 10 (1967), pp. 77-88 
Howe, S., ‘The Slow Death and Strange Rebirths of Imperial History’ JICH 29 (2001), pp.  
  131-141    
Huttenback, R.A., ‘The British Empire as a “White Man’s Country” - Racial Attitudes  
And Immigration Legislation in the Colonies of White Settlement’ JBS 13 (1973), 
pp. 108-137  
‘The Siege of Chitral  and the “Breach of Faith” Controversy - The  Imperial Factor 
in Late Victorian Domestic Politics’ JBS 10 (1970), pp. 126-144 
Hyam, R., ‘The Primacy of Geo-Politics: The Dynamics of British Imperial Policy,                            
1763-1963’ JICH 27 (1999), pp. 27-52 
 ‘The Colonial Office Mind, 1900-1914’ JICH 8 (1979), pp. 30-55  
Imlay, T.C., ‘The Origins of the First World War’ HJ 49 (2006), pp. 1253-1271 
Ingram, E., ‘A Strategic Dilemma: The Defence of India, 1874-1914’ 
 Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen 14 (1974), pp. 215-224 
Jack, G., ‘The Indian army on the Western Front, 1914-15: A portrait of Collaboration’ 
War in History 13 (2006), pp. 329-362  
Jacobson, P.D., ‘Rosebery and Liberal Imperialism, 1899-1903’ JBS 13 (1973), pp. 83-107  
Jones, A., & Keogh, A.J., ‘The Dreadnought Revolution: Another Look’ Military Affairs 
49 (1985), pp. 124-131 
Judd, D., ‘The Impact of Imperialism’ BBC History 9 (1) (2008), pp. 24-29 
Keddie, N.R., ‘British Policy and the Iranian Opposition, 1901-1907’ JModH 39 (1967),  
pp. 266-282 
Kennedy, D., ‘On the American Empire from a British Imperial Perspective’ IHR 29  
 (2007), pp. 83-108 
 ‘Post-Colonial Theory and Imperial History’ JICH 24 (1996), pp. 345-363 
‘Review Article: The Boundaries of Oxford’s Empire’ IHR 22 (2001), pp. 604-622 
Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., ‘The Governors-General of Canada, 1867-1952: A Collective  
Profile’ JCS 12 (1977), pp. 35-57    251 
Klein, I., ‘The Anglo-Russian Convention and the Problem of Central Asia, 1907-1914’ 
JBS 11 (1971), pp. 126-147 
‘British Intervention in the Persian Revolution, 1905-1909’ HJ 15 (1972), pp. 731-
752  
Knaplund, P., ‘ Intra-Imperial Aspects of the British Defence Question’ CHR 3 (1922), pp.  
120-142 
Koch, H.W., ‘The Anglo-German Alliance Negotiations: Missed Opportunity or Myth?’ 
History 54 (1969), pp. 378-392 
Kohn, E., ‘“The Member from Michigan”: The Unofficial Diplomacy and Political  
Isolation of John Charlton, 1892-1903’ CHR 82 (2001), pp. 283-306  
Koss, S.E., ‘Morley and Kitchener: A Private War’ Quarterly review of Historical  
Studies 8 (1968/9), pp. 22-38 
Kramer, P.A., ‘Empires, Exceptions and Anglo-Saxons: Race and rule between the 
British and American Empires, 1880-1910’ Journal of American History  
88 (2002), pp. 1315-1353 
Lal, V., ‘Good Nazis and just scholars: Much ado about the British Empire’ Race and 
Class 38 (1997), pp. 89-101 
Lambert, N.A., ‘Admiral Sir J Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence 1904-1909’ 
JMilH 59 (1995), pp. 639-660 
‘British Naval Policy, 1913-1914: Financial Limitation and Strategic Revolution’ 
JModH 67 (1995), pp. 595-626 
Lammers, D., ‘Arno Mayer and the British Decision for War in 1914’ JBS 12 (1973), pp.  
137-165 
Loewenberg, P., ‘Arno Mayer’s “Internal Causes and Purposes of War in Europe, 1870- 
1956”: An Inadequate Model of Human Behaviour, National Conflict and 
Historical Change’ JModH 42 (1970), pp.  628-636 
Lowe, P.C., ‘The British Empire and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1911-1915’ History 54 
 (1969), pp. 212-225  
Mackintosh, J.P., ‘The Role of the CID before 1914’ EHR 77 (1962), pp. 490-503 
Maclean, G.R., ‘The Canadian Offer of Troops for Hong Kong, 1894’ CHR 38 (1957), pp.  
275-283 
Mahajan, S., ‘The Defence of India and the End of Isolation: A Study in the Foreign 
Policy of the Conservative Government 1900-1905’ JICH 10 (1982), pp. 168-193  
   ‘The Problems of the Defence of India and the Formulation of the  
Anglo-Russian Entente, 1900-1907’ Journal of Indian History 58 (1980), pp. 175-
192 
Marshall, P., ‘Imperial Britain’ JICH 23 (1995), pp. 379-394 
Martel, G., ‘The Meaning of Power: Rethinking the Decline and Fall of Great Britain’ 
IHR 13 (1991), pp. 662-694  
Martin, G., ‘The Influence of Racial Attitudes on British Policy Towards India During  
The First World War’ JICH 14 (1986), pp. 91-113 
Mawby, S., ‘A Crisis of Empire: The Anglo-Ottoman Dispute over the Aden Frontier,  
   1901-1905’ D&S 18 (2007), pp. 27-52 
Mayer, A., ‘Internal Causes and Purposes of War in Europe, 1870-1956: A Research  
Assignment’ JModH 41 (1969), pp. 292-303  
McDermott, W.J., ‘The Immediate Origins of the CID: A Reappraisal’ CJH 7 (1972)  
McKercher, B.J.C., ‘Diplomatic Equipoise’ CJH 24 (1989), pp. 299-339 
McLean, D., ‘English Radicals, Russia and the Fate of Persia 1907-1913’ EHR 93 (1978),  
pp. 338-352  
Mehrotra, S.R., ‘Imperial Federation and India, 1868-1917’ JCPS 1 (1961), pp. 29-40 
Messamore, B.J., ‘“On a Razor’s Edge”: The Canadian Governors-General, 1888-1911’  
BJCS 13 (1998), pp. 376-395  
Miller, C., ‘Loyalty, Patriotism and Resistance: Canada’s Response to the Anglo-Boer   252 
War, 1899-1902’ South African Historical Journal 41 (1999), pp. 312-323 
‘Sir Frederick Borden and Military Reform, 1896-1911’ CHR 50 (1969), pp. 265- 
284 
   ‘English-Canadian Opposition to the South African War’ CHR 55 (1974), pp. 422- 
438 
Monger, G.W., ‘The End of Isolation: Britain, Germany and Japan, 1900-1902’ 
TRHS 13 (1963), pp. 103-121  
Moore, R.J., ‘Curzon and Indian Reform’ MAS 27 (1993), pp. 719-740 
‘John Morley’s Acid Test: India, 1906-1910’ Pacific Affairs 40 (1967), pp. 333-
340  
 ‘Recent Historical Writing on the Modern British Empire and Commonwealth: 
Later Imperial India’ JICH 4 (1975), pp. 55-76 
Moreman, T.K., ‘The British and Indian Armies and Frontier Warfare 1849-1914’  
JICH 20 (1992), pp. 35-64 
‘The Arms Trade and the North-West Frontier Pathan Tribes, 1890- 1914’ JICH 
22 (1994), pp. 187-216 
Morris, A.J.A., ‘Haldane’s Army Reforms, 1906-1908: The Deception of the English  
Radicals’ History 56 (1971), pp. 17-34 
Morris, L.P., ‘British Secret Service Activity in Khorassan, 1887-1908’ HJ 27 (1984), pp.  
657-675 
Morton, D., ‘Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Use of Canadian Troops for Overseas Service’ 
Queens Quarterly 77 (1970), pp. 81-87 
‘“Junior but Sovereign Allies”: The Transformation of the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force, 1914-1918’ JICH 8 (1979), pp. 56-67 
 ‘Aid to the Civil Power: The Canadian Militia in Support of Social Order, 1867-
1914’ CHR 51 (1970), pp. 407-425   
‘Providing and Consuming Security in Canada’s Century’ CHR 81 (2000), pp. 1-28 
Mulligan, W., ‘From Case to Narrative: The Marquess of Lansdowne, Sir Edward Grey, 
and the Threat from Germany, 1900-1906’ IHR 30 (2008), pp. 273-302 
Naamani, I.T., ‘The “Anglo-Saxon” Idea and British Public Opinion’ CHR 32 (1951), pp.  
163-187 
 ‘The Abandonment of “Splendid Isolation” by Britain’ CHR 27 (1946), pp. 43-60 
Neary, P., ‘Grey, Bryce and the Settlement of Canadian-American Differences, 1905- 
1911’ CHR 49 (1968), pp. 357-380 
Neilson, K., ‘Watching the “Steamroller”: British Observers and the Russian Army  
before 1914’ JSS 8 (1985), pp. 199-217  
 ‘“That Dangerous and Difficult Enterprise”: British Military Thinking and  
Russo-Japanese War’ War & Society 9 (1991), pp. 17-37 
 ‘“A Dangerous Game of American Poker”: Britain and the Russo-Japanese  
War’ JSS 3 (1980), pp. 63-87  
 ‘“Greatly Exaggerated”: The Myth of the Decline of Britain before 1914’ 
IHR 13 (1991), pp. 695-725  
‘“My Beloved Russians”: Sir A Nicolson and Russia, 1906-1916’ IHR 9 (1987), 
pp. 521-554  
Nicholson, J.F., ‘A Provenance of Pro-Consuls: British Colonial Governors, 1900-1960’ 
            JICH 4 (1975), pp. 77-106 
O’Brien, P.K., ‘The Costs and Benefits of British Imperialism’ P&P 120 (1988), pp. 163- 
      200   
O’Brien, P.P., ‘The Titan Refreshed: Imperial Overstretch and the British Navy Before  
The First World War’ P&P 172 (2001), pp. 146-169 
Offer, A., ‘The British Empire, 1870-1914: A Waste of Money?’ Econ HR 46 (1993), pp.  
215-238    253 
‘Going to War in 1914: A Matter of Honour?’ Politics and Society 23 (1995), pp. 
213-241 
Omissi, D., ‘Europe through Indian Eyes: Indian Soldiers Encounter England and France, 
1914-1918’ EHR 122 (2007), pp. 371-396 
Otte, T.G., ‘“Almost a Law of Nature?” Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Office and the 
Balance of Power in Europe, 1905-1912’ D&S 14 (2003), pp. 77-118 
Overlack, P., ‘Australian Defence Awareness and German Naval Planning in the Pacific  
1900-1914’ War & Society 10 (1992), pp. 37-52 
 ‘German Interest in Australian defence, 1904-1914: New Insights into a  
Precarious Position on the Eve of War’ AJPH 40 (1994), pp. 36-51 
Page, R.J.D., ‘Canadian Imperialism and the Imperial Idea in the Boer War Years’  
JCS 5 (1970), pp. 33-48 
Penlington, N., ‘General Hutton and the Problem of Military Imperialism in Canada,  
1898-1900’ CHR 23 (1943), pp. 156-171 
Penny, B.R., ‘Australia’s Reactions to the Boer War - A Study in Colonial Imperialism’ 
JBS 7 (1967), pp. 97-130  
Perry, W., ‘Military Reforms of General Sir Edward Hutton in New South Wales, 1893- 
1896’ Australian Quarterly 38 (1956), pp. 65-75 
Popplewell, R., ‘British Intelligence in Mesopotamia 1914-1916’ INS V (1990), pp. 139- 
172 
Potter, S.J., ‘The Imperial Significance of the Canadian-American Reciprocity Proposals, 
1911’ HJ 47 (2004), pp. 81-100 
Preston, A., ‘Sir Charles Macgregor and the Defence of India, 1857-1887’ HJ 12 (1969),  
pp. 58-77 
 ‘Wolseley, the Khartoum Relief Expedition and the Defence of India, 1885- 
 1900’ JICH 6 (1978), pp. 254-280 
Prete, R.A., ‘French Strategic Planning and the Deployment of the BEF in France in  
1914’ CJH 24 (1989), pp. 42-62 
Price, R., ‘One Big Thing: Britain, Its Empire, and their Imperial Culture’ JBS 45 (2006),  
pp. 602-627 
Robbins, K., ‘Sir Edward Grey and the British Empire’ JICH 1 (1973), pp. 213-221 
Robinson, R & Gallagher, J., ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’ Economic History Review 6  
  (1953), pp. 1-15 
Ropp, T., ‘Conscription in Britain, 1900-1914: A Failure in Civil-Military  
Communications’ Military Affairs 20 (1956), pp. 71-76 
Rothwell, V.H., ‘The British Government and Japanese Military Assistance 1914-1918’ 
History 56 (1971), pp. 35-45 
 ‘Mesopotamia in British War Aims, 1914-1918’ HJ 13 (1970), pp. 273-294  
Roy, K., ‘Equipping Leviathan: Ordnance Factories of British India, 1859-1913’ 
War in History 10 (2003), pp. 398-423 
Ruger, J., ‘Nation, Empire and Navy: Identity Politics in UK 1887-1914’ P&P 185 (2004),  
pp. 159-187  
Sarty, R., ‘Canadian Maritime Defence, 1892-1914’ CHR 71 (1990), pp. 462-490  
Satre, L.J., ‘St John Brodrick and Army Reform, 1901-1903’ JBS 15 (1976), pp. 117-139 
Seal, A., ‘Imperialism and Nationalism in India’ MAS 7 (1973), pp. 321-347 
Seymour, W., ‘The Indian States Under the British Crown’ History Today 17 (1967), pp.  
819-827 
Shakow, Z., ‘ The Defence Committee’ CHR 36 (1955), pp. 36-44  
Shields, R.A., ‘Wilfrid Laurier and Canadian Defence Autonomy, 1902-1911’ Dalhousie  
Review 63 (1983), pp. 298-321  
 ‘The Canadian Tariff and the Franco-Canadian Treaty Negotiations of 1901- 
1909’ Dalhousie Review 57 (1977), pp. 300-321 
‘Imperial Policy and the Role of Foreign Proconsuls in Canada, 1870-1911’   254 
Dalhousie Review 59 (1979), pp. 717-747 
‘Imperial Policy and Canadian-American Commercial Relations, 1880-1911’ 
BIHR 59 (1986), pp. 108-121 
Skelton, O.D., ‘Review of Lord Minto: A Memoir, by John Buchan’ CHR 6 (1925), pp. 64- 
68  
Smith, V.C., ‘Moral Crusader: Henri Bourassa and the Empire, 1900-1916’ Queens 
Quarterly 76 (1969), pp. 635-647 
Spiers, E.M., ‘Rearming the Edwardian Artillery’ JSAHR 57 (1979), pp. 167-76  
‘The British Cavalry, 1902-1914’ JSAHR 57 (1979), pp. 71-79  
  ‘The Use of the Dum-Dum Bullet in Colonial Warfare’ JICH 4 (1975), pp. 3-14 
Stacey, C.P., ‘John Macdonald on Raising Troops in Canada for Imperial Service, 1885’ 
CHR 38 (1957), pp. 37-40  
 ‘British Withdrawal from North America 1864-1871’ CHR 36 (1955), pp. 185-198  
Steiner, Z., ‘Britain and the Creation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance’ JModH 31 (1959),  
pp. 27-36 
‘Grey, Hardinge and the Foreign Office, 1906-1910’ HJ 10 (1967), pp. 415-39  
‘British Power and Stability: The Historical Record’ D&S 14 (2003), pp. 23-44 
Stevenson, D., ‘War by Timetable? The Railway Race before 1914’ P&P 162  
 (1999), pp. 163-194  
Stokes, E., ‘Milnerism’ HJ 5 (1962), pp. 47-60 
Stone, N., ‘Army and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1900-1914’ P&P 33  
 (1966), pp. 95-111 
Strachan, H., ‘The British Way in Warfare Revisited’ HJ 26 (1983), pp. 447-461 
Stafford, D., ‘A Moral Tale?: Anglo-German Relations, 1860-1914’ IHR 4 (1982), pp.  
249-263 
Sumida, J.T., ‘British Naval Administration and Policy in the Age of Fisher’ JMilH 54  
 (1990), pp. 1-26     
‘Sir John Fisher and the Dreadnought: The Sources of Naval Mythology’ 
JMilH 59 (1995), pp. 619-637  
‘British Capital Ship Design and Fire Control in the Dreadnought Era’ 
JModH 51 (1979), pp. 206-230 
Summers, A., ‘Militarism in Britain Before the Great War’ History Workshop 2 (1976), pp.  
104-123 
Surridge, K., ‘“All you Soldiers are what we call Pro-Boer”: The Military Critique of the 
South African War, 1899-1902’ History 82 (1997), pp. 582-600 
Sykes, A., ‘The Radical Right and the Crisis of Conservatism Before the First World  
War’ HJ 26 (1983), pp. 661-676 
Tan, T.Y., ‘An Imperial Front: Punjab and the First World War’ JMilH 64 (2000), pp. 371- 
             410 
Thompson, A.S., ‘The Language of Imperialism and the Meanings of Empire: Imperial 
  Discourse in British Politics, 1895-1914’ JBS 36 (1997), pp. 147-177 
Tignor, R.L., ‘Lord Cromer: Practitioner and Philosopher of Imperialism’ JBS 2 (1963),  
  pp. 142-159  
Tinker, H., ‘Power and Influence in Britain and India’ MAS 2 (1968), pp. 71-78 
Towle, P., ‘The Russo-Japanese War and the Defence of India’ Military Affairs 44 (1980),  
pp. 111-117 
Travers, T.H.E., ‘The Offensive and the problem of Innovation in British Military  
Thought’ JCH 13 (1978), pp. 531-53 
 ‘Technology, Tactics and Morale: Jean de Bloch, the Boer War and  
British Military Theory, 1900-1914’ JModH 51 (1979), pp. 264-286 
‘The Hidden Army: Structural Problems in the British Officer Corps,  
  1900-1918’ JCH 17 (1982), pp. 523-544 
Tucker, A., ‘The Issue of Army Reform in the Unionist Government, 1903-1905’    255 
HJ 9 (1966), pp. 90-100 
‘Army and Society in England, 1870-1900’ JBS 2 (1963), pp. 110-141 
Tucker, G.N., ‘The Naval Policy of Sir Robert Borden, 1912-1914’ CHR 28 (1947), pp. 1- 
30 
Turner, L.C.F., ‘The Role of the General Staffs in July 1914’ Australian Journal of  
Politics and History 11 (1965), pp. 305-323 
Underhill, F.H., ‘Lord Minto on his Governor-Generalship’ CHR 40 (1959), pp. 121-131 
Valone, S.J., ‘“There Must be Some Misunderstanding”: Sir Edward Grey’s Diplomacy 
of August 1 1914’ JBS 27 (1988), pp. 405-424 
Vuoto, G., ‘The Anglo-American Global Imperial legacy: Is there a better way?’ CJH  
42 (2007), pp. 259-269 
Watt, D.C., ‘Imperial Defence Policy and Imperial Foreign Policy, 1911-1939 - A  
Neglected Paradox?’ JCPS 1 (1963), pp. 266-281 
Weinroth, H., ‘The British Radicals and the Balance of Power, 1902-1914’ HJ 13 (1970),  
pp. 635-682 
Wells, S.F., ‘British Strategic Withdrawal from the Western Hemisphere’ CHR 49 (1968),  
pp. 335-56  
White, J., ‘Henry Cabot Lodge and the Alaska Boundary Tribunal’ CHR 6 (1925), pp. 332- 
347 
Wilcox, C., ‘Relinquishing the Past’ Australian Journal of Politics and History 40  
           (1994), pp. 52-65 
Wilde, R.H., ‘Joseph Chamberlain’s Proposal of an Imperial Council in March 1900’  
CHR 37 (1956), pp. 225-246 
 ‘The Boxer Affair and Australian Responsibility for Imperial Defence’  
PHR 27 (1957), pp. 51-65 
Williams, B.J., ‘The Strategic Background to the Anglo-Russian Entente of August 1907’ 
HJ 9 (1966), pp. 360-373  
Wilson, K., ‘Imperial Interest in the Decision for War, 1914: The Defence of India in  
Asia’ Review of International Studies 10 (1984), pp. 189-197  
‘The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of August 1905 and the Defending of India: A  
Case of the Worst Scenario’ JICH 21 (1993), pp. 334-356 
 ‘The British Cabinet’s Decision for War, 2 August 1914’ British Journal of  
International Studies 1 (1975), pp. 148-159 
 ‘The Foreign Office and the “Education” of Public Opinion before the First 
World War’ HJ 26 (1983), pp. 403-411 
 ‘Anti-Germanism at the Foreign Office’ CJH 18 (1983), pp. 23-42 
Wilson, T., ‘Britain’s “Moral Commitment” to France in July 1914’ History 64 (1979), pp.  
380-390 
Wrong, G., ‘Canada and the Imperial War Cabinet’ CHR 1 (1920), pp. 3-25 
Yapp, M.A., ‘British Perceptions of the Russian Threat to India’ MAS 21 (1987), pp. 647- 
665  
Young, H., ‘The Misunderstanding of 1 August 1914’ JModH 48 (1976), pp. 644-665  
Zebel, J.H., ‘Joseph Chamberlain and the Genesis of Tariff reform’ JBS 7 (1967), pp. 131- 
157 
   
 
 